

Plurality versus Majority Runoff Rules for the Election of the President in Latin America: Insights from the 2006 Peruvian and Mexican Elections

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Do electoral rules affect the survival and quality of democracy, and concomitantly, democratic governance and public policy? Political scientists believe that, in general, the answer is yes.<sup>1</sup> Political scientists have rigorously examined the implications of parliamentary versus presidential provisions and plurality versus proportional representation systems for congressional elections. By contrast, another key electoral rule--election of the president by plurality or by majority runoff (or, "second round" or "ballotage")--has received relatively scant scholarly attention. However, it is this rule that a majority of Latin American nations has adopted in recent years.

Table 1 indicates the current rules for the seventeen nations commonly considered to comprise Latin America (save Cuba and Haiti), and the year when these rules were adopted. While prior to 1979 a runoff-among-voters rule was used only in Costa Rica and the plurality rule was preponderant, plurality is now in force only in Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela.<sup>2</sup> Along with Costa Rica, Argentina, Ecuador, and Nicaragua have adopted qualified majority-runoff rules; i.e., to win outright, the leading candidate must reach a threshold, but the threshold is lower than 50 percent of the vote. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Uruguay have adopted majority runoff with a 50 percent threshold. Most Latin American nations adopting a runoff rule did so around the time of their return to democracy in the 1970s or 1980s, but five have done so in the 1990s: Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. Bolivia is unique; it is the only Latin American nation where the runoff is among the country's legislators, not its citizens, and where any of the top three, rather than top two, candidates may be chosen.

The objective of this paper is to explore the implications of the majority runoff rule for Latin America's democracies. First, we consider scholarly arguments about plurality versus runoff. Then, we examine relationships between the rules and the effective number of political parties, Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties, and for World Bank scores for 1) political stability and absence of violence and 2) voice and accountability. Next, we turn to the 2006 Peruvian and Mexican electoral outcomes and consider their legislators' and political experts' views about these rules in the light of their 2006 electoral processes.



The argument of the paper will be that, in most countries in most elections, it makes little difference whether the electoral rule is plurality or runoff; however, occasionally circumstances arise when the rule does matter, and in those cases in Latin America, the runoff rule is advantageous.

Table 1  
Current Presidential Election Rules

Country	Electoral Rule	Year rules were established
<b>Argentina</b>	45%, but must win with 10% lead	1994
<b>Bolivia</b>	50% with second-round by Congress	1967
<b>Brazil</b>	50%	1988
<b>Chile</b>	50%	1925-1973: 2 <sup>nd</sup> round by Congress 1980: 50%
<b>Colombia</b>	50%	1991
<b>Costa Rica</b>	40%	1936
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	50%	1995
<b>Ecuador</b>	40% with 10% lead	1978:50% 1998: 40% wins with 10% lead
<b>El Salvador</b>	50%	1983
<b>Guatemala</b>	50%	1985
<b>Honduras</b>	Plurality	1957
<b>Mexico</b>	Plurality	1917
<b>Nicaragua</b>	40%, or 35% with 5% lead	1995:45% wins 2000: 40% wins, or 35% wins if leading by 5%
<b>Panama</b>	Plurality	1946
<b>Paraguay</b>	Plurality	1992
<b>Peru</b>	50%	1979*
<b>Uruguay</b>	50%	1996
<b>Venezuela</b>	Plurality	1947

\*Written into Peru's constitution in 1979, but it did not apply until the 1985 elections

Sources: Martínez, Rafael (ed.), *DV: La Elección Presidencial Mediante Doble Vuelta en Latinoamérica*. Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, (2004).

*Constituciones Hispanoamericanas* (<http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/portal/constituciones/>).

Negretto, Gabriel, "Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (May 2006), pp. 421-433.

## I. THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RULES IN LATIN AMERICA

To date, most scholarly assessments have been critical of majority runoff. The focus of most of these assessments has not been directly on the quality of democracy or the legitimacy of the president, but on the implications of majority runoff for party systems, and then indirectly on the implications of party systems for democracy.

Most scholars have argued that majority runoff exacerbates party system fragmentation.<sup>3</sup> Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Mark Jones, and Scott Mainwaring and Shugart have found that majority runoff is associated with a larger effective number of political parties in Latin America.<sup>4</sup> Summarizes Carey in a recent text: [majority runoff] "contributes to the proliferation of presidential candidates and the fragmentation of the first-round presidential vote."<sup>5</sup> Further, examining constitutional rule-makers' decisions to adopt the runoff, Gabriel Negretto argues that it has been small political parties rather than the dominant ones that believe they gain from majority runoff and advocate its introduction.<sup>6</sup>

These scholars believe that majority runoff favors the proliferation of small parties for various reasons.<sup>7</sup> It is argued that, needing only a second-place finish, a party is less likely to form alliances with other parties to maximize its potential first-round vote. Also, small parties may doubt their chances to win outright, but hope that they can get lucky enough to place second--or in the worst case scenario be able to bargain their support after the first round with the two candidates who do reach the runoff. At the same time, in the first round voters are more likely to vote with their heart (for the candidate in the entire field whom they prefer), and less likely to vote "with the head" or strategically (for the candidate with a chance to win whom they prefer). Put in slightly different words, they will be more inclined to "waste" their votes in the first round, and accordingly give seats to smaller parties.

Although these scholars' empirical attention is on the impact of electoral rules on party systems, they also suggest that the implications of majority runoff for the democratic regime overall are negative. They contend that, especially as legislators are often elected concurrently on the basis of votes in the first round, the president is less likely to enjoy majority support in the legislature and more likely to suffer the interruption of his or her term.<sup>8</sup> Further, given that majority runoff enables a relatively

unknown candidate to enjoy the benefits of media attention, rise in the polls, and squeak into the second round, the possibility of the election of an unknown "outsider" is feared.<sup>9</sup>

However, these scholarly arguments about electoral rules and the party system have not gone unquestioned. Michael Coppedge suggests that party fragmentation is a cause, not a result, of the runoff rule; countries adopt presidential runoffs because their party systems are already fragmented.<sup>10</sup> Coppedge also contends that majority runoff is associated with a larger number of parties only relative to plurality rules for countries in which presidential and legislative elections are concurrent. Criticizing Jones's methodology, Charles Kenney argues that the impact of the runoff rule can be measured only for those countries in which the rule was introduced at some point after the initial transition to competitive elections, so that it is possible to have data for before and after its introduction.

While Coppedge's and Kenney's criticisms are by and large methodological, other criticisms are substantive. In particular, while in the scholarly consensus the implications of party fragmentation for democracy are overwhelmingly negative, this may not be the case. Cynthia McClintock and James H. Lebovic find no relationship whatsoever in Latin America during the 1990s between the effective number of political parties and levels of democracy, as measured by Freedom House scores.<sup>11</sup> In Latin America, two-party systems have been vulnerable to the problem of what has been called "over-institutionalization" or "party ossification." This problem was first highlighted by Michael Coppedge for Venezuela, whose two parties were found to "monopolize the electoral process, dominate the legislative process, and penetrate politically relevant organizations to a degree that violates the spirit of democracy."<sup>12</sup> In Costa Rica, Fabrice Lehoucq worries that "The two major parties are losing their grip because they have failed to open up sufficiently."<sup>13</sup> While in the conventional wisdom the majority runoff is criticized as facilitating the emergence of "outsider" candidates, these candidates might also be up-and-coming politicians whose ascendance has been blocked by aging party oligarchs.<sup>14</sup>

While scholars have focused on the implications of majority runoff for party systems and in turn the implications of party systems for democracy, they have given scant attention to direct questions about relationships between electoral rules on the one hand and democratic quality and presidential legitimacy on the other. As various

scholars have assumed (and as will be confirmed below in this paper), Latin American political leaders adopted the runoff in the hope that a president endorsed by a popular majority enjoys greater legitimacy.<sup>15</sup> Also, by definition, a president endorsed by a majority is not at an extreme on the country's political spectrum, or disliked for some other reason by a majority of voters.<sup>16</sup> At the same time, however, scholars fear the logistical burden on voters of multiple trips to the polls and the financial burdens of multiple votes on the state.<sup>17</sup>

To date, however, empirical tests of these presumptions have been scant, and, given the changes in electoral rules in various Latin American nations during the 1990s, are now rather dated.<sup>18</sup> To my knowledge, there are only two relatively recent studies. In a 2002 paper, Anibal Pérez-Liñán vehemently criticizes the runoff rule. He contends that the runoff is rarely necessary, but when it is necessary and the second-place finisher wins (a "reversion" of the first-round result), the president will usually have less support in the legislature than the first-place finisher, and the president's support will be built on a weak coalition that, in countries with fragile party systems, may quickly erode, resulting in a crisis of governance.<sup>19</sup> However, in this study Pérez-Liñán includes a variety of problems within the dependent variable, "crisis of governance," and his "N" was small.

Whereas Pérez-Liñán employs sophisticated quantitative methodology across the Latin American countries, Rafael Martínez draws conclusions from thirteen cases of Latin American nations with runoff rules. Based on these thirteen experiences, Martínez argues that the runoff does not lead to a proliferation of political parties but rather respects the reality of these countries' multi-party systems, and that the runoff, fortunately, encourages party alliances between the first and second rounds; the durability of these alliances depends first and foremost on the president's political will and abilities.<sup>20</sup> Martínez concludes that the runoff "1) strengthens the president-elect 2) avoids the election of a president with limited popular support 3) facilitates the articulation of a bipolar multiparty system and 4) stimulates the creation of electoral alliances..." (my translation).<sup>21</sup>

This study hopes to elucidate these scholarly controversies. Relative to these previous researchers, I have the advantages of a larger number of elections (a larger "N") and a larger number of countries that have shifted from plurality to majority runoff after

the beginning of the "third democratic wave" (Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay).

## II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PLURALITY VERSUS RUNOFF RULES FOR DEMOCRATIC QUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA

In this section, we explore quantitatively relationships between electoral rules and democratic quality in Latin America. There are numerous ways by which the quality of democracy may be conceptualized and measured. Here, we consider the effective number of political parties, Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties, and World Bank scores for both political violence and accountability. These are quite different measures from those used by Pérez-Liñán, who focuses on confrontation between the executive and the legislature.

We have introduced several methodological changes in our analyses. First, we distinguish between countries where the threshold for victory in the first round is 50 percent--"majority runoff" in our analyses--and those countries where the threshold is lower--termed a "qualified majority." As indicated above, most Latin American nations use majority runoff, but Costa Rica after 1949, Argentina after 1994, Nicaragua after 1995, and Ecuador after 1998 use a qualified majority. In all our analyses, the case of Bolivia is omitted, in the belief that its runoff-in-the-congress among the top three candidates is too different from customary runoff rules.

Like other scholars, we find that countries with majority runoff rules tend to have larger numbers of effective political parties. At the moment, we have undertaken only calculations from data in other scholars' publications, and plan further analyses in the future that include the most recent elections. From the data in Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform by J. Mark Payne, Daniel Zovatto G., Fernando Carrillo Flórez, and Andrés Allamand Zavala, we calculated that, for elections between 1978 and 2000, the average number of effective political parties for countries with majority runoff was 4.1, for Costa Rica (the only country with a qualified majority during the entire period) 2.3, and with plurality 2.9.<sup>22</sup> From data compiled by Mark Jones for the two most recent elections in Latin American countries as of 2005, we calculated that the effective number of parties was 3.9 in those countries with majority runoff, 3.9 as well in those countries with qualified majority, and 3.1 in countries with plurality.<sup>23</sup>

These figures still do not solve the question posed by Michael Coppedge: Did the runoff rule cause the larger number of parties, or did a larger number of parties cause the runoff rule? On the basis of a preliminary assessment from the figures in these datasets, it appears that countries that have shifted to majority or qualified majority runoff from plurality during the 1990s (Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Uruguay) did not experience a major change in the number of political parties--with the likely exception of Colombia, where the number increased. As the case of Mexico below suggests, it may be that when a nation shifts from approximately two effective political parties to more than three, a runoff rule is advantageous.

Nor do the figures for effective numbers of parties necessarily tell us about the quality of democracy in these nations. Table 2 provides the annual Freedom House scores from 1985-2006 for political rights and civil liberties of Latin American countries with majority runoff, qualified majority runoff, and plurality rules. As is a customary scholarly practice, the Freedom House score for political rights and civil liberties were added, so that the best possible score was 2 and the worst possible score 14. The table shows that, through the 1990s, countries with majority runoff fared the worst for political rights and civil liberties, and those with qualified majority the best. As of 1999, however, the pattern reversed; the scores for countries with majority runoff and qualified majority runoff became similar, and surpassed the scores for countries with plurality. The changed pattern reflects in part the addition of Uruguay to the majority runoff group and the sharp decline in the scores for Venezuela, which by 1999 was one of only five countries in the plurality group.

Table 2  
Electoral Rules and Freedom House Scores

<b>Year</b>	<b>Majority</b>	<b>Qualified Majority</b>	<b>Plurality</b>
1985	5.6	2	4.9
1986	5.2	2	4.7
1987	5.2	2	4.7
1988	4.8	2	4.7
1989	5	2	5
1990	5.4	2	5.5
1991	5.9	2	5.3
1992	6.4	2	5.8
1993	6.5	3	6.4
1994	6.4	3	6.5
1995	6.8	4	6.3
1996	6.3	4.7	5.5
1997	6.1	4.7	5.8
1998	6	4.7	5.8
1999	6	4.8	6.2
2000	5.3	4.5	5.8
2001	5	5.3	5.8
2002	5	5.3	5.4
2003	5	4.75	5.2
2004	4.9	4.5	5.2
2005	4.9	4.5	5.2
2006	4.4	4.5	5.4

Sources: Scores from Freedom House “Freedom in the World” scores, available at [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org). Scores for Political Rights and Civil Liberties are added. Lower scores indicate superior evaluations.

Table 3 provides World Bank scores for 1) political stability and absence of political violence and 2) voice and accountability for Latin American countries with majority rules, qualified majority rules, and plurality rules. The World Bank initiated this data set in 1996, and reports scores every two years; accordingly, the figures are for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. The scores are percentile ranks; higher ranks are better scores. With respect to political stability and absence of violence, countries with qualified majority rules score the best; the scores of the countries with majority were below those of countries with plurality in 1996, but in 2002 and 2004 surpassed those of

countries with plurality. The patterns for percentile ranks for voice and accountability are similar. Again, these patterns reflect in particular the stellar scores of Costa Rica, the low scores of Colombia, the declining scores of Venezuela, and the shift of high-scoring Uruguay into the runoff group.

Table 3

## Electoral Rules and World Bank Political Stability Scores

<b>Year</b>	<b>Majority</b>	<b>Qualified Majority</b>	<b>Plurality</b>
1996	32.15	54.7	44.6
1998	40.83	53	38.54
2000	48.8	56.23	44.6
2002	47.03	46.63	37.66
2004	40.75	46.57	33

Source: Scores from World Bank Governance Indicators for “Political Stability and Absence of Violence” available at <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata>. Higher scores indicate superior assessments.

## Electoral Rules and World Bank Voice and Accountability Scores

<b>Year</b>	<b>Majority</b>	<b>Qualified Majority</b>	<b>Plurality</b>
1996	49.9	66.9	51.7
1998	50.3	65.1	52.1
2000	56.6	61.6	49.1
2002	55.5	62.1	48.1
2004	55.1	58.9	48.4

Source: Scores from World Bank Governance Indicators for “Voice and Accountability” available at <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata>. Higher scores indicate superior assessments.

Overall, the patterns in these data sets suggest that electoral rules do not have overwhelming effects on democratic quality in Latin America. However, the analysis in this section is based on average numerical scores over a considerable period of time. In many elections under runoff rules--indeed, almost half, 24 out of 52 to date (see Appendix 1), the threshold has been reached by one of the presidential candidates and a runoff has not even been necessary. It may be that singular events--outlying cases--are actually more significant and weigh more in the minds of constitution-makers. Such

outlying events would be plurality elections of presidents with less than forty percent of the vote, or runoff elections where the winner of the first round did not prevail in the runoff. In Appendix 1, the results of presidential elections in Latin America from 1980 to 2006 are provided, and from these results we can identify these outlying events. First, there were six cases of the election of a president with less than 40 percent of the vote: the Dominican Republic in 1990, Paraguay in 2003, Uruguay in 1989 and 1994, and Venezuela in 1993, and presumably now Mexico in 2006 as well. (Apparently in part as a result of concerns about the election of a president with a low percentage of the vote, both the Dominican Republic and Uruguay subsequently adopted the runoff rule.) Also, excluding Bolivia, out of 28 runoffs, there were 9 reversals of the first round result: Argentina in 2003, Colombia in 1998, the Dominican Republic in 1996, Ecuador in 1984 and 1996, Guatemala in 1990, Peru in 1990 and 2006, and Uruguay in 1999. In future work I will consider these outlying events in greater detail.

### III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUNOFF VERSUS PLURALITY RULES: INSIGHTS FROM THE 2006 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN PERU AND MEXICO

In Peru and Mexico in 2006, electoral rules made a major difference. In Peru, the runoff allowed a candidate closer to the political center to reverse the first-round victory of a candidate at the extremes; the new president appears to enjoy considerable legitimacy and, having built alliances between the first round and the runoff, appears likely to have majority approval for his initiatives. In Mexico, it appears likely that a candidate who won less than 40 percent of the vote will prevail, and that this president will face severe challenges to his legitimacy. At the same time, however, the implications of electoral rules for the number of political parties, party alliances, and outsiders appear less clear cut than some scholars have argued.

I would like to add a word about this paper's focus on Peru and Mexico. I decided to conduct research on electoral rules in these two countries without any knowledge of what the 2006 electoral results would be. Rather, these two countries are part of a larger study; I will subsequently be conducting field research in Chile and Venezuela. The two pairs of country cases were chosen because they had appeared to represent a range of success versus failure with the particular electoral rule. For scholars, Peru was a "most likely" case for the negative effects of majority runoff; in 1990, the "outsider" Alberto Fujimori finished a distant runner-up in the first round, but

was elected in the second, and proceeded to dismantle Peru's democracy. By contrast, Chile appeared a "least likely" case for the negative effects of majority runoff. In 1973, Chilean democracy was overthrown, in part because the country's leftist president had been inaugurated with only 36 percent of the vote; by contrast, since 1990 and the adoption of majority runoff, Chile's democratic trajectory has been very positive. Among the nations where presidential election is by plurality, Venezuela and Mexico also represented different levels of democracy. Liberal democratic principles have been threatened in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez; by contrast, between 2000 and 2005, Mexico had shifted toward a higher level of democracy.

Table 4  
Results of Peru's 2006 Elections

Political party and Presidential Candidate	First round, presidential race (% valid vote)	Runoff, presidential race (% valid Vote)	Congress # Seats (of 120 Seats)
Unión por el Perú (UPP) (Ollanta Humala)	30.6	47.4	45
APRA (Alan García)	24.3	52.6	36
Unidad Nacional (UN)* (Lourdes Flores)	23.8		17
Alianza por el Futuro** (Martha Chávez)	7.4		13
Frente de Centro*** (Valentín Paniagua)	5.7		2
Restauración Nacional (Humberto Lay)	4.4		2
Perú Posible (No presidential candidate)			2
Other (14 additional presidential candidates)	3.6		0
<b><u>Citizen Participation:</u></b>			
	<b><u>First round</u></b>	<b><u>Runoff</u></b>	
Blank votes (Of All Votes Cast):	11.9%	1.1%	
Null votes (Of All Votes Cast):	4.2%	7.4%	
Absenteeism:	11.2%	12.0%	

\*UN is a coalition that includes the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), a long-standing political party and two other parties. Lourdes Flores headed both the PPC and the UN.

\*\*Alianza por el Futuro is the pro-Fujimori party, successor to Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría.

\*\*\*Frente de Centro is a coalition that includes Acción Popular (AP), a long-standing political party, and two other parties. It was the party of former president Fernando Belaúnde (1963-68 and 1980-1985). Valentín Paniagua headed both the Frente de Centro and the AP.

Source: Peru's ONPE (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales, at [www.onpe.gob.pe](http://www.onpe.gob.pe)).

Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Table 5

Results of Mexico's 2006 Elections  
(the July 7 official count, percent of total vote)

Political party and Presidential candidate	Presidentia		
	1	Chamber	Senate
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) Felipe Calderón	35.89	33.41	33.63
Alianza por el Bien de Todos* Andrés Manuel López Obrador	35.31	28.99	29.70
Alianza por Mexico** Roberto Madrazo	22.26	28.18	27.99
Partido Alternativa Socialdemócrata y Campesina Patricia Mercado	2.70	2.05	1.91
Partido Nueva Alianza Roberto Campa	0.96	4.55	4.04
Write-in candidates, null votes	2.87		

\*Includes Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), the Partido del Trabajo (PT), and Convergencia.

\*\*Includes the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM).

As Tables 4 and 5 suggest, there were considerable similarities between the Peruvian and Mexican electoral contests. In both countries, there were three parties that, several months before the election, were given any chance to win. Also, in both countries, one of these three parties was conventionally placed to the right of the political center, and another to the left. (In the case of Peru, the classification of Ollanta Humala's Unión por el Perú as leftist is dubious because, although Humala's economic policies were critical of the free market and in favor of social justice and accordingly to the left, he was a former military officer whose foreign policy was ultra-nationalist and bellicose, which might be considered to the right; however, in any case, he was usually called a leftist.) Further, in both countries the party that was considered closest to the political center--the APRA in Peru and the PRI in Mexico--was also a party with a great deal of historical baggage that was widely perceived as corrupt. (The record of the PRI was, however, considerably more authoritarian than the record of APRA, and of course it

held power for many more years than APRA.) The tables also indicate that in both countries there were various small parties whose votes were sufficient to affect the electoral outcome--although the total vote for these parties was considerably greater in Peru.

#### Electoral Rules and the Number of Political Parties

Clearly, there is a larger number of political parties in Peru than in Mexico. However, the number of parties has been large in Peru since 1980, before the implementation of the runoff rule for the country's 1985 election. There were 15 presidential candidates in 1980; 9 in 1985; 9 in 1990; at least 14 in 1995; 10 in 2000; 8 in 2001, and 20 in 2006.<sup>24</sup> Clearly too, a field of twenty presidential candidacies is very fragmented, and the strengths and weaknesses of such a large number of candidates cannot be communicated by the media or judged by the voters. If such a large number were to gain representation in the congress, negotiations for the establishment of a congressional majority would likely be time-consuming and unwieldy.

In order to limit the number of political parties in the legislature, both Peru and Mexico have adopted threshold percentages of the vote that a party must win in order to gain any seats in the legislature. In Peru in 2006, the threshold was 4 percent, and in Mexico 2 percent. In general, the scholars whom I interviewed in both countries considered these threshold rules appropriate measures for the control of the number of political parties in the legislature. The threshold was considered important in Peru because of the large number of parties in the country and important in Mexico because of the generous financing that is made available to parties by the state.

Probably in part because of these legal thresholds, but in contrast to the arguments in much of the scholarly literature, in neither Peru nor Mexico during the 2006 elections was the number of political parties a particularly salient concern among voters or political analysts. Indeed, there was arguably more concern about effective representation by any of the three major presidential candidates than about an excessive number of candidates.

This was not surprising for Mexico, where the total number of presidential candidates was only five, but it was for Peru, where the total number of candidates was twenty. About six months prior to Peru's election, opinion poll results dominated the headlines, favoring candidates with strong party recognition and solid party backing who

were already campaigning; these results in turn affected media coverage. The pollsters and the media downplayed the fact that, less than a month before the election, a whopping forty percent of voters, presumably dissatisfied with the frontrunners, remained undecided; but they were not getting much information about other candidates and were being told that such votes would be "wasted."<sup>25</sup> In short, the polls and the media play an important role in shaping perceptions of the viability of candidacies.

### Party Alliances

In Peru and Mexico in 2006, alliance decisions were more complex than the scholarly literature has suggested. There are various factors in alliance decisions that appear important whether the electoral rule is runoff or plurality. Interestingly, a number of legislators and scholarly experts in the two countries contended that alliances were actually more likely under runoff rules, because there is a threshold that parties must obtain. (In Peru's regional elections recently, where parties can win with a plurality, they have won with as little as fifteen and twenty percent of the vote.)

Despite scholarly arguments that alliances are likely primarily for the electoral contest that decides the winner, in Peru various parties made alliances prior to the first round. Originally, Humala's party was the Partido Nacionalista Peruano, but this very new party failed to meet registration requirements and in December 2005 it allied with the Unión por el Perú (UPP), taking advantage of this party's registration. Founded by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar for the 1995 election, the UPP had gradually eroded and its remaining members' decision to ally with Humala was widely considered opportunistic. Valentín Paniagua, the head of the long-standing party Acción Popular (AP) and Peru's successful interim president after the implosion of the Fujimori government in 2000, had been a frontrunner in polls through mid-2005. Paniagua expected that his candidacy would fare better with party alliances, and he spent several months negotiating with various party leaders; ultimately AP joined two small parties on the center-right. These decisions appeared to hurt Paniagua, who fell to 10 percent in the opinion polls in January 2006. Lourdes Flores's political party, the socially conservative, free-market Partido Popular Cristiano, had allied for the 2001 election with the staunchly Roman Catholic Renovation party to form the Unidad Nacional (National Unity) coalition, subsequently joined as well by the National Solidarity party of Lima mayor Luis Castañeda Lossio. While critics of runoff rules have often argued that party alliances

made after the first round are likely to be "false" and ephemeral, these alliances before the first round were also false and ephemeral; all three of these coalitions were in serious disarray prior to the inauguration of the new administration. (add discussion here about Frente de Centro and Lourdes Flores non-alliance)

Also, despite scholarly arguments that parties will form the alliances necessary for the electoral contest that decides the winner, in Mexico there were parties that eschewed alliances. Both Patricia Mercado's party and Roberto Campa's made no formal alliances; the two parties were entering the elections for the first time, and by Mexican rules new parties must reach the two percent threshold on their own. However, Campa's Partido Nueva Alianza, which favored the PAN, was able to get out the message that its supporters should vote strategically for the PAN in the presidential race, whereas Mercado's party, inclined toward the PRD, did not get out this message (see Table 5).

Perhaps most interesting were the strategic decisions of the two long-standing, more or less centrist parties in the two countries, the APRA and the PRI respectively. For many months, both parties were distant thirds in the polls; as of late January 2006, APRA's Alan García stood at only 15 percent and in March and April 2006 the PRI's Roberto Madrazo was about 10 percentage points behind the frontrunners in Reforma and El Universal polls. Why did these more or less centrist parties not make an alliance with one of the major parties to their right or left? Scholars advocating plurality rules have implied that such a decision would be likely in Mexico; in fact, however, alliances may be inhibited for various reasons.

First, most political parties (and very definitely both the APRA and the PRI) have particular histories and leaders and different views on different kinds of issues; they are not just parties representing points on a right-left political spectrum. A sudden embrace between the APRA or the PRI and a long-standing rival would likely provoke many questions and also charges of opportunism. Alliances, which usually compromise a party's personality or ideology to at least some degree, are not invariably positively perceived. In an October 2005 University of Lima poll, 49 percent of respondents said that they were in agreement with the formation of party alliances for the 2006 presidential election and 48 percent said that each party should proceed on its own. It is interesting in this light that both apparent winners, the APRA and the PAN, stood alone.

Second, who should be the presidential candidate of the new alliance? Who should be the senior and who the junior partner? Advocates of plurality rules imply that such decisions could be made on the basis of the opinion polls. However, in Latin America, very large numbers of voters remain undecided about their vote until the final days of the campaign, and their decisions frequently shift. Most obviously, although Alan García stood at only fifteen percent in the polls in January, he went on to win. Felipe Calderón went from a mere twenty-two percent in a November 2005 poll to victory in the official count in July.<sup>26</sup>

Polls in Latin America are inaccurate for various reasons besides the large number of independent voters who decide at the last minute. In Peru, comparison of poll forecasts and election results for 2001 and 2006 suggest that there are biases in favor of establishment candidates. Presumably, pollsters are trying to get voters "on the bandwagon." In Mexico, by the final weeks of the campaign, as many as 35 percent of citizens approached by pollsters declined to participate; also, turnout is relatively low in Mexico, and pollsters must determine not only voters' preferences but also the likelihood that they will actually vote. Further, in some areas the PRI continues to wield heavy-handed tactics, and in these areas some citizens may have felt pressured to declare, incorrectly, a preference for the PRI. (Most polls overestimated the PRI's presidential vote.)

#### Electoral Participation for "Outsiders"

In the scholarly literature, in good part because of the 1990 Peruvian elections in which the outsider Alberto Fujimori came from nowhere to defeat the prestigious novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, runoff rules have been criticized as facilitating the election of outsider candidates. However, the issue is in fact more complex.

First, for those politicians and scholarly experts who deem the traditional political parties too closed and hegemonic, easier entry into the presidential contest is a positive, not a negative (see the results of the questionnaires with legislators in Tables 6 and 7 below). Also, Humala's victory in the first round of the 2006 Peruvian elections shows that an outsider can win in a contest with the plurality rule as well as a contest with a runoff rule.

### Legitimacy and Governability

The concept of "legitimacy" is complex. In interviews, several top Peruvian and Mexican scholars emphasized that "legitimacy" is not simply a function of the percentage of the vote that a candidate earns. A good number of Latin American presidents who did not win more than 50 percent of the vote went on to secure legislative majorities, govern well, and achieve legitimacy--and vice versa. Also, legitimacy is based in part on consensus about the rules of the democratic game, rather than the outcome of the game.

However, in questionnaires distributed to Peru's legislators in May 2006 and Mexico's legislators in June 2006, the reason overwhelmingly chosen for preferences for runoff rules was "enhances legitimacy" (see Tables 6 and 7). In these legislators' views, legitimacy is derived from the fact that a majority of voters has endorsed the presidential candidate. Also important in cases where candidates are at political extremes, a majority of voters has endorsed the policy agenda of the presidential candidate.

These premises about legitimacy are illustrated in the 2006 Peruvian and Mexican elections. If Humala had won the presidency in the first round with only 31 percent of the vote and 37.5 percent of the congressional seats, it is very doubtful that his election would have been considered legitimate. During the two months between the first round and the runoff, most political experts and Peruvians who disliked Humala doubted Humala's appeal beyond the 31 percent of Peruvians voting for him in the first round. Although Humala in fact got 47.4 percent of the vote in the runoff, this result was a surprise. As a candidate to the far left in Peru's political spectrum on economic issues whose primary appeal was his anti-corruption agenda and outsider status, it seemed unlikely that Humala would have been able to fashion a governing majority. Almost all the other parties were well to Humala's right on economic issues; also, Humala's bellicose foreign-policy positions were not shared by other Peruvian parties.

By contrast, APRA's Alan García was positioned more or less at Peru's political center during the first round, and in part for this reason just edged out the free-market candidate, the UN's Lourdes Flores, to reach the runoff. During the period between the first round and the runoff, he moved toward the political right, adopting more business-friendly policies. He won the explicit endorsement of only one other significant political leader, the Alliance for the Future's Martha Chávez, but the implicit endorsement of almost all others. With these "borrowed votes"--a "false majority"--he won the runoff,

but to date he has maintained the center to center-right positions that he espoused during the campaign and has concomitantly also maintained the support of these other parties.

In Mexico, the two leading candidates were to the right or to the left on the political spectrum, not at the center. The Mexican electorate appeared almost equally divided between these two candidates, Calderón and López Obrador. Madrazo, the presidential nominee of the party more or less at Mexico's political center, the PRI, was perceived as a traditional PRI politician, corrupt and authoritarian, and he was unable to rally centrist voters to his candidacy as García had in Peru.

Obviously, the razor thin margin between Calderón and López Obrador in the Mexican election has provoked intense doubt about which candidate actually won, seriously eroding the legitimacy of either eventual president. However, it is not only the photofinish that is problematical for the legitimacy of the next president, but the fact that neither candidate can declare that he, and his agenda, are supported by a majority of Mexicans. Rather, both PAN and PRD militants appear to believe that, in a runoff, their candidate would have secured more votes from the PRI and other parties and, accordingly, would have won. Indeed, the PRI includes disparate political groups--the technocrats from the more recent PRI governments and the populists from earlier eras, as well as the relatively free-market PRI leaders in the north of Mexico and the more anti-free-market leaders in the south--and it was difficult to know whether they would have cast more votes for Calderón or López Obrador in a runoff. At least at the time of the election, it appeared that either Calderón or López Obrador would be able to build a governing coalition with sectors of the PRI, but the policies advanced by this coalition still might not have been considered legitimate by the losing party.

Table 6 shows electoral rule preferences among Peruvian and Mexican legislators. In May 2006, after the first round of the elections but before the runoff, and with the invaluable assistance in Peru of former president of the congress Henry Pease García, we achieved 53 questionnaires, for a response rate of 44 percent. The response rate was relatively proportional across the various political parties in the legislature. In June 2006, just prior to the elections in Mexico, and with the invaluable assistance of Rafael Fernández de Castro, we achieved 38 questionnaires in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, for a response rate of 8 percent. Thirty-two of the respondents indicated their party affiliation; among these, the PRD was under-represented. Sixteen respondents (21

percent) were from the PRI, 8 (21 percent) from the PAN, 4 (11 percent) from the PRD, 2 from the Partido del Trabajo and 1 from Convergencia.

As Table 6 indicates, in Peru the runoff procedure was robustly endorsed by the country's legislators; 75 percent favored the runoff, versus 15 percent preferring plurality. When asked about additional electoral rules that they favored, however, a considerable number of Peruvians recommended that the runoff procedure be changed to lower thresholds; almost half of all the additional rules recommended were for thresholds in the 40%-45% range (see Table 9). Mexico's legislators favored the plurality rule, but by a relatively small margin.

Legislators were asked the reason(s) for their electoral-rule preferences. Table 7 shows the reasons cited for the preference for the runoff in Peru and Mexico. The reason cited most often in both countries—by a wide margin in Peru and a smaller margin in Mexico—was the enhancement of the president's legitimacy. Another reason cited (39 percent of the total in Mexico and 18 percent in Peru) was political moderation—the greater probability of majority support for a president closer to the political center. Table 8 provides the reasons cited for the preference for plurality. The time and expense of a runoff was the most common reason in Mexico (65 percent of the total) and half the total in Peru. A greater likelihood of a congressional majority was the reason constituting the other half of the total in Peru, but was only 23 percent of the total in Mexico. Explanations with respect to access to the presidency for outsider candidates were rare in both countries.

Table 9 indicates additional electoral rules that were recommended by legislators in both countries. A 40 percent or 45 percent threshold was the additional rule most favored by legislators in both Peru and Mexico.

Table 6

Election Rules Preferences

Rule	Mexico (N=38)	Peru (N=53)	Total (N=91)
	<i>P</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>P</i>
Plurality	55	15	31
Second Round	39	75	62
Unsure	5	8	7
No response	0	2	1

Note. The survey asked, “With which of the following are you in agreement with?”  
Single Round respondents answered, “It is better to have only one vote and the candidate who gets the most votes should win, even if that candidate were to obtain less than half of the votes.”

Second Round subjects responded, “If no candidate obtains half plus one of the votes, it is better that there be a second round between the two highest candidates.”

Unsure respondents answered, “I don’t know, I’m not sure, or it depends on the entire set of rules.”

Table 7

Reasons Given for Preferring a Second Round

Reasons	Mexico (N=18)	Peru (N=49)	Total (N=67)
	<u>P</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>P</u>
Legitimacy	55	67	64
Political moderation	39	18	23
Access to the presidency for outsiders is not too difficult	0	10	9
Other	6	4	5

N = Number of responses given. Some respondents gave more than one reason.

Legitimacy = “The president elect will have more legitimacy.”

Political Moderation = “A president that does not have the support of the majority of the citizens will not be elected. The president will have to be more to the center of the political spectrum.”

Access = “It is more democratic because a less well-known candidate can get more attention from the media, gain support, and get elected.”

Table 8

Reasons Given for Preferring Plurality

Reasons	Mexico (N=26)	Peru (N=10)	Total (N=36)
	<i>P</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>P</i>
Time and expense of runoff	65	50	61
Increased possibility of congressional majority	23	50	31
Access to the presidency for outsiders is not too easy	4	0	3
Other	8	0	6

N = Number of responses given. Some respondents gave more than one reason.

Time and expense = “The second round takes too much time and money.”

Increased possibility of congressional majority = “When there is a second round, it is likely that the elected candidate will not have an absolute majority in the parliament (because the parliamentary election ended in the first round, or for other reasons). This negatively affects governance.”

Access to the presidency for outsiders is not too easy = “When there is a second round, less well-known candidates can garner the attention of the media in the campaign, earn support, and be elected.”

Table 9

Additional recommended rules

Rules	Mexico (N=15)	Peru (N=28)	Total (N=43)
	<i>P</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>P</i>
40%-45% Threshold	67	43	51
“Second round” within Congress	7	32	23
Vote for Congress after the first round	7	25	19
“Instantaneous” Second Round	20	0	7

N = number of responses given. Some respondents recommended more than one additional rule. Other respondents did not favor additional rules, or perhaps were not sufficiently engaged with the questionnaire to read the list of alternatives.

40-45% threshold = “Have a second round only when no candidate has 40% or 45% of the vote and/or hasn’t exceeded second-most voted candidate by 5 or 10 points.”

“Second round” within Congress = “If no candidate gets half plus one of the votes, the new congress picks the president between the two or three most popular candidates.”

Vote for Congress after the first round = “Have an election for the congress the day of the second round, or months after the first election once there is a new government. Since people will know who is going to be president, they will be able to vote for better governance.”

“Instantaneous” 2nd Round = “Have an ‘instantaneous’ second vote. The citizenry rates all of the candidates by rank of preference. If no candidate gets half plus one of the votes, the candidate with the least votes is eliminated. The votes given to the eliminated candidate are assigned to the next most-desired candidate as indicated on those ballots originally cast for the eliminated candidate.”

## V. CONCLUSION

Scholars' dire predictions about the negative effects of the runoff rule in Latin America are not borne out in this study. While runoff rules are associated with a larger number of political parties, a larger number of parties is not necessarily problematic; if the number is problematic, a smaller number may be achieved through threshold rules for seats in the legislature. In most Latin American elections, there is probably little to gain or lose from either electoral rule; the impact of these rules on party alliances and on outsiders does not appear to be very significant. However, in certain elections, such as the 2006 Peruvian and Mexican elections, where voters were quite equally divided among three or more candidates and one or more of these candidates was at a political extreme, the runoff rule is advantageous. In these cases, the runoff rule helps to achieve the election of a president who is closer to the political center and more legitimate.

Appendix 1  
Presidential Election Results 1980-2006

Country	Election Rule	Election Year	First-Round	Second-Round	Inverted Results?
<b>Argentina</b>	Electoral College (1853)	1983	UCR: 51.9% PJ: 40.23%	-	-
		1989	PJ: 47.3% UCR: 32.44%	-	-
	45% wins with 10% lead (1994)	1995	UCR: 49.8% FREPASO: 29.23%	-	-
		1999	Alianza: 48.5% PJ: 38.09%	-	-
		2003	Front for Loyalty Alliance: 24.34% Front for Victory Alliance: 21.99%	Menem (Front for Loyalty Alliance) withdrew	YES
<b>Bolivia</b>	Absolute Majority, with second round by Congress (1967)	1980	UDP: 38.74% MNR: 20.15% ADN: 16.83%	UDP:36.31%	NO
		1985	ADN: 32.83% MNR: 30.36% MIR: 10.18%	MNR: 47.77%	YES
		1989	MNR: 25.65% ADN: 25.24% MIR: 21.83	MIR: 55.41%	YES
		1993	MNR: 35.56% AP: 21.06%	MNR: 61.78%	NO
		1997	ADN: 22.26% MNR: 18.2%	ADN: 60.51%	NO
		2002	MNR: 22.46% MAS: 20.94%	MNR: 53.5%	NO
		2005	MAS: 53.74% PODEMOS: 28.59%	-	-
<b>Brazil</b>	Absolute Majority (1988)	1989	PRN: 30.48% PT: 17.19%	PRN: 52.19 PT: 47.81	NO
		1994	PSDB: 54.28% PT: 27.04%	-	-
		1998	PSDB: 53.07% PT: 31.71%	-	-

		2002	PT-PL: 42.44% PSDB-PMDB: 23.2%	PT-PL: 61.27% PSDB-PMDB: 38.73%	NO
<b>Chile</b>	Absolute Majority (1980)	1989	PDC: 55.17% Alianza por Chile: 29.4%	-	-
		1993	CPD: 57.98% Alianza por Chile: 24.41%	-	-
		1999	PPD: 47.96% Alianza por Chile: 47.51%	PPD: 51.31% Alianza por Chile: 48.69%	NO
		2005	CPD: 45.95% RN: 25.41%	CPD: 53.49% RN: 46.5%	NO
<b>Colombia</b>	Plurality	1982	PCC-PSC: 46.79% PLC: 41.05%	-	-
		1986	PLC: 58.7% PCC-PSC: 36.05%	-	-
		1990	PLC: 48.81% MSN: 24.2%	-	-
	Absolute Majority (1991)	1994	PLC: 45.59% PCC-PSC: 45.27%	PLC: 51.07% PCC-PSC: 48.93%	NO
		1998	PLC: 35.18% PCC-PSC: 34.777%	PLC:48.06% PCC-PSC: 51.94%	YES
		2002	PL: 53.04% PC: 31.72%	-	-
		2006	PC: 62.35 % PDA: 22.03%	-	-
<b>Costa Rica</b>	40% wins (1949)	1982	LN: 58.8% USC: 33.64%	-	-
		1986	LN: 52.34% USC: 45.77%	-	-
		1990	USC: 51.49% LN: 47.2%	-	-
		1994	LN: 49.62% USC: 47.74%	-	-
		1998	USC: 46.96% LN: 44.56%	-	-
		2002	USC: 38.57% LN: 30.99%	USC : 57.96% LN: 40.04%	NO
		2006	LN: 40.51% AC: 40.29%	-	-
<b>Dominican</b>	Plurality	1982	PRD: 46.19% PRSC: 38.2%	-	-

<b>Republic</b>		1986	PRSC: 41.54% PRD: 39.22%	-	-
		1990	PRSC: 35.05% PLD: 33.79%	-	-
		1994	PRSC: 42.29% PRD: 41.55%	-	-
	Absolute Majority (1994)	1996	PRD: 45.94% PLD: 38.93%	PRD: 48.7% PLD: 51.2%	YES
		2000	PRD: 49.87% PLD: 24.94%	PLD withdrew	-
		2004	PLD: 57.11% PRD: 33.65%	-	-
<b>Ecuador</b>	Absolute Majority (1978)	1979	CFP: 27.7% PSC: 23.86	CFP: 68.49% PSC: 31.51%	-
		1984	PSC: 27.2% PID: 28.73%	PSC: 51.54% PID: 48.46%	YES
		1988	PID: 24.48% PRE: 17.61%	PID: 54% PRE: 46%	-
		1992	PUR: 31.87% PSC: 25.03%	PUR: 57.32% PSC: 42.68%	-
		1996	CFP: 27.17% PRE: 26.28%	CFP: 45.53% PRE: 54.47%	YES
	40% wins with 10% lead (1998)	1998	DP: 34.92% PRE: 26.6%	DP: 51.17% PRE: 48.83%	-
		2002	SPS/MUPP-NP: 20.32% PRIAN: 17.4%	SPS/MUPP-NP: 54.79% PRIAN: 45.21%	-
<b>El Salvador</b>	Absolute Majority (1983)	1984	PDC: 43.4% ARENA: 29.8%	PDC: 53.6% ARENA: 46.4%	NO
		1989	ARENA: 53.8% PDC: 36.5%	-	-
		1994	ARENA: 49% FMLN: 24.9%	ARENA: 68.3% FMLN: 31.7%	NO
		1999	ARENA: 52% FMLN: 29.1%	-	-
		2004	ARENA: 57.73% FMLN: 35.63%	-	-
<b>Guatemala</b>	Absolute Majority (1985)	1985	DCG: 38.64% UCN: 20.23%	DCG: 68.37% UCN: 31.62%	NO
		1990	UCN: 25.72% MAS: 24.14%	UCN: 31.92% MAS: 68.08%	YES
		1995	PAN: 36.5% FRG: 22.04%	PAN: 51.21% FRG: 48.78%	NO
		1999	FRG: 47.72% PAN: 30.32%	FRG: 68.3% PAN: 31.69%	NO
		2003	GANA: 34.46% UNE: 26.48%	GANA: 54.13% UNE: 45.87%	NO

<b>Honduras</b>	Plurality (1957)	1985	PLH: 51% PN: 45.5%	-	-
		1989	PN: 52.3% PLH: 44.3%	-	-
		1993	PLH: 53% PN: 43%	-	-
		1997	PLH: 52.6% PN: 42.8%	-	-
		2001	PN: 52.21% PLH: 44.26%	-	-
		2005	PLH: 49.9% PN: 46.17%	-	-
<b>Mexico</b>	Plurality (1917)	1982	PRI: 74.31% PAN: 16.42%	-	-
		1988	PRI: 50.74% FDN: 31.06	-	-
		1994	PRI: 50.13% PAN: 26.69%	-	-
		2000	PAN+PVEM: 43.43% PRI: 36.88%	-	-
		2006**	PAN: 35.89% PRD: 35.31%	-	-
<b>Nicaragua</b>	Plurality (1987)	1984	FSLN: 67% PCDN: 14%	-	-
		1990	UNO: 54.74% FSLN: 40.82%	-	-
	45% wins (1995)	1996	AL: 50.99% FSLN: 37.83%	-	-
	40% wins, or 35% wins with 5% lead (2000)	2001	PLC: 56.2% FSLN: 42.3%	-	-
<b>Panama</b>	Plurality (1946)	1989	ADOC: 71.19% COLINA: 28.38%	-	-
		1994	Alianza Pueblo Unido: 33.30% Alianza Democratica: 29.09%	-	-
		1999	UPP: 44.81% NN: 37.82%	-	-
		2004	PRD: 47.43% PS: 30.85%	-	-

<b>Paraguay</b>		1989	ANR: 75.88% PLRA: 20.41%	-	-
	Plurality (1992)	1993	ANR: 41.63% PLRA: 33.51%	-	-
		1998	ANR: 55.35% AD + PLRA- EN: 43.88%	-	-
		2003	ANR: 37.14% PLRA: 24.72%	-	-
<b>Peru</b>	Absolute Majority (1979; applied in 1985)	1980	AP: 46.49% APRA-PAP: 28.19%	-	-
		1985	APRA-PAP: 53.1% IU: 24.69%	-	-
		1990	FREDEMO: 32.57% CAMBIO 90: 29.09%	FREDEMO: 37.62% CAMBIO 90: 62.38%	YES
		1995	CAMBIO 90: 64.42% UPP: 21.81%	-	-
		2000	Peru 2000: 51.02% Perú Posible: 41.16%	Peru 2000: 74.33% * Perú Posible: 25.67%	NO
		2001	Perú Posible: 36.51% PAP: 25.78%	Perú Posible: 53.08% PAP: 46.92%	NO
		2006	UPP: 30.616% PAP: 24.324%	UPP: 47.375% PAP: 52.625%	YES
<b>Uruguay</b>	Plurality	1984	PC: 41.22% PN: 35.02%	-	-
		1989	PN: 38.87% PC: 30.29%	-	-
		1994	PC: 32.35% PN: 31.21%	-	-
	Absolute Majority (1996)	1999	EP: 40.11% PC: 32.78%	EP: 45.87% PC: 54.13%	YES
		2004	EP-PA: 51.94% PN: 34.89%	-	-

<b>Venezuela</b>	Plurality (1947)	1978	COPEI: 46.64% AD: 43.31%	-	-
		1983	AD: 58.43% COPEI: 33.53%	-	-
		1988	AD: 52.94% COPEI: 40.44%	-	-
		1993	Convergencia Nacional: 30.45% AD: 23.61%	-	-
		1998	MVR: 56.19% PRVZL: 39.98%	-	-
		2000	MVR: 48.11% LCR: 18.95%	-	-

\* Peru Posible called for nullification of ballots due to fraudulent character of the elections.

\*\* Preliminary results

Sources: J. Mark Payne, Daniel Zovatto G., Fernando Carrillo Flórez, Andrés Allamand Zavala, Democracies <sup>1</sup>in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002)*IFES Election Guide* (<http://www.electionguide.org/>).

Martínez, Rafael (ed.), DV: La Elección Presidencial Mediante Doble Vuelta en Latinoamérica. Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, (2004).

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<sup>1</sup>Most scholars consider electoral rules important, but also caution that electoral rules are one component of a complex network of political institutions and that countries' particular histories and contexts matter, too. See, for example, Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>2</sup>Electoral rules for Latin America for the period prior to 1979 are provided in Gabriel L. Negretto, "Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America," The Journal of Politics Vol. 68, No. 2 (May 2006), p. 422.

<sup>3</sup>Valuable syntheses of this literature include Charles D. Kenney, "The Second Round of the Majority Runoff Debate: Classification, Evidence, and Analysis," Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association meeting, Chicago, September 24-26, 1998.

<sup>4</sup>This argument originated with Maurice Duverger. See Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), pp. 88-102; and Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System," in Mainwaring and Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 394-439.

<sup>5</sup>First made by Maurice Duverger, this argument is advanced recently by John M. Carey, "Presidentialism and Representative Institutions," in Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter (eds.), Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 14.

<sup>6</sup>Negretto, "Choosing How to Choose." His focus is on Colombia, Argentina, and Ecuador.

<sup>7</sup>An excellent synthesis is provided by Kenney, p. 3, and also Peter H. Smith, Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 159.

<sup>8</sup>Carey, op. cit., p. 14; and Arturo Valenzuela, speaking at the conference "Chile's Road to Development, 1990-2005: Lessons Learned," under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 25, 2005. See also his article "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 5-19.

<sup>9</sup>Carey, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

<sup>10</sup>Michael Coppedge, "Presidential Runoffs Do Not Fragment Legislative Party Systems," Paper presented at the American Political Science Association conference, Washington, D.C., August 30-September 3, 2000.

<sup>11</sup>This argument is advanced in Cynthia McClintock and James H. Lebovic, "Correlates of Levels of Democracy in Latin America in the 1990s," Latin American Politics and Society Vol. 48, No. 2 (summer 2006), pp. 51-53.

<sup>12</sup>Michael Coppedge, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 2.

<sup>13</sup>Fabrice Lehoucq, "Costa Rica: Paradise in Doubt," Journal of Democracy Vol. 16, No. 3 (July 2005), p. 150.

<sup>14</sup>See Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers (eds.), The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 7.

<sup>15</sup>Smith, Democracy in Latin America, p. 159; Norris, Electoral Engineering, p.48.

<sup>16</sup>Carey, op. cit., p. 14, and Norris, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>17</sup>Norris, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>18</sup>The work by Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies, pp. 186-188, is dated.

<sup>19</sup>Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, "La reversión del resultado en la doble vuelta electoral: Una evaluación institucional del Balotaje," Paper presented at the Third International Congress of Latin Americanists in Europe, Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2002.

<sup>20</sup>Rafael Martínez (ed.), DV: La Elección Presidencial Mediante Doble Vuelta en Latinoamérica (Barcelona: Institu de Ciencies Polítiques i Socials, 2004), pp. 19 and 545-546.

<sup>21</sup>Martínez, op. cit., p. 541.

<sup>22</sup>J. Mark Payne, Daniel Zovatto G., Fernando Carrillo Flórez, Andrés Allamand Zavala, Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), p. 145. Our figures include Ecuador in the majority runoff category as it shifted to a qualified

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majority only in 1998. Colombia, Argentina, and Nicaragua are excluded because of their changes in the middle of the period and accordingly at this time the lack of data necessary for classification.

<sup>23</sup>Mark P. Jones, "The Role of Parties and Party Systems in the Policymaking Process," Paper prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank Workshop on State Reform, Public Policies, and Policymaking Processes," February 28-March 2, 2005, in Washington D.C., cited in the Inter-American Development Bank, The Politics of Policies (Washington, D.C.: The Inter-American Development Bank, 2005), p.37. The dates of the elections considered by Jones are not indicated, and accordingly we classified all countries according to their current electoral rules. We will determine the precise dates of these elections in the future.

<sup>24</sup>Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, Perú Político en Cifras 1821-2001 (Lima: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 2001), and [www.onpe.gob.pe](http://www.onpe.gob.pe).

<sup>25</sup>On the percentage of undecided voters, see Inés Flores, "A la caza de 41% de indecisos," La República, March 14, 2006, p. 2.

<sup>26</sup>[www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican\\_general\\_election\\_2006](http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election_2006), section entitled "polls," accessed August 22, 2006.