The Limits of Reciprocity: Tolerance Thresholds in Superpower Conflict

Supplemental Appendices: Text, Tables, and Figures

The following is a detailed discussion of methodological issues and robustness tests in my article, "The Limits of Reciprocity: Tolerance Thresholds in Superpower Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 40(2): March 2003.

Methodology

A Binary Dependent Variable

Whereas the norm in studies of action-reaction models is to study continuous independent and dependent variables, I employ a binary dependent variable because accurate conflict tolerance thresholds might not be discernable with a continuous dependent variable. Conclusions derived from traditional models can be misleading when behavior thresholds are calculated from estimates of A's responsiveness to B across the spectrum of B's behavior, including high degrees of conflict. These high values of received conflict may contribute little useful data for determining threshold effects (differences in extreme values may have only a small marginal effect on the probability that the recipient will respond with conflict) yet they can bias judgments about whether A will cooperate or conflict when the intensity of B's conflict is low. (Also, judgments will be biased if A adjusts its proportional responses from target-to-target or crisis-to-crisis more than it varies its basic decision to cooperate or to conflict.) Given these problems, modeling effects on a binary dependent variable offers clear advantages.

First, in a binary model, the conflict that A returns to B is assumed to be useful only to the extent that it provides information about the *point* at which A starts (ceases) to conflict. Second, the discriminating power of a binary model is enhanced because maximum likelihood estimates of these models give added weight to received behavior in the vicinity of the threshold value. With the probit model used here, calculations are most sensitive to the influence of x

values that produce probabilities (that y=1) around the mid-point of the (cumulative normal) probability distribution than to values at the extremes: around Pr(y=1|x)=.5, the probability is most sensitive to changes in x; when Pr(y=1|x) is close to 0 or 1, the probability is less sensitive to changes in x. Third, a binary model allows sensitivity tests to determine whether threshold values change significantly with the definition of accommodation, e.g., whether accommodation is presumed to occur when a state starts conflicting or, instead, when it ceases to cooperate.

Using a binary dependent variable does require the selecting of a cutting point for that variable. Where the cutting point lies is a different issue than where the reaction threshold lies. Defining cutting points is a matter of identifying one or more meaningful transition points in A's behavior -- perhaps between cooperation and neutrality, neutrality and conflict, or low and high level conflict. Consequently, the choice of a cutting point is somewhat subjective in that it requires prior judgment about the points at which A's behavior becomes unacceptable, risky, provocative, or unproductive. (In contrast, the value of the threshold is not assumed, *it is estimated*. It is the value of B's behavior that induces, in A, a shift across the behavior threshold defined by the cutting point.) The presumed value of the cutting point does not bias the calculations, but it does affect where an analysts *looks for* A's responsiveness. It could thus bias research conclusions, if A or B crafts its behavior with a different standard in mind: if, for instance, norms suggest that a failure to cooperate is effectively an act of conflict.

Whether discerned thresholds depend on the stipulated value of the transition points can be determined by testing whether threshold values with one designated transition point fall within the statistical confidence intervals of values derived around another. By initially setting the transition point to net behavior > 0, I impose a harsh test upon the accommodation thesis: an actor cannot just accommodate conflict through *inaction*, its net behavior must actually favor

cooperation. Indeed, moving the transition point downward greatly increases the number of instances in which NB_S obtains a value of 1 and thus potentially accommodates conflict.

Time Aggregates

I use 3-month periods (quarters) as the time unit in the analysis. Quarterly aggregates are advisable because the propensity of an actor to accommodate conflict likely reflects the overall intensity of the conflict that exists between an actor and target, and a three-month aggregation provides a better gauge of the overall conflictive or cooperative state of a relationship with a given target than do, say, daily or weekly summaries. If conflict is the exception or the rule in a relationship in a given quarter, an actor might be less inclined to excuse another's transgressions; conversely, the gravity of failing to respond to provocations from an adversary with which the actor is heavily engaged might incline the actor not to forgive the adversary's transgressions. In any case, quarterly aggregations are a compromise between monthly and yearly aggregations, both of which are commonly employed in event data analysis (as are shorter time aggregates). Smaller time units can produce unstable results while longer time units can wash out variation.

Robustness Tests

Taken together, these various tests confirm that the US was more inclined to absorb low level conflict than the Soviet Union was and that US absorptive tendencies were especially strong in the detente atmosphere of the Johnson and Nixon-Ford years. They also provide considerable support for the argument that the actors absorbed both HL and LL conflict.

First, solving equation (2) for HL_R absorption reveals that the US and Soviet Union accommodated HL conflict, not just LL conflict. The periods and conditions under which HL accommodation occurred largely track those discerned in Table I (discussed in the main text). See Supplemental Table I.

Second, tests established that the findings changed when the dependent variable was re-coded: actors absorb conflict more readily when absorption is defined to include neutral behavior. This is especially true of the US when it had not previously cooperated with a target. With the revised transition point, when $HL_R = 0$ and $NB_{S(t-1)}=0$, the US absorbed a high of 100 units of LL conflict in the Nixon-Ford years and a low of 21 units in the Truman years. Indeed, in the HL range of ± 100, the US absorbed some level of LL conflict with or without prior cooperation, almost without exception. (The differences between the sets of thresholds generated with different definitions of absorption are statistically significant; on this, see below.) Conversely, moving the transition point does not change the time periods in which, or the conditions under which ($NB_{S(t-1)}=0$ or 1), the Soviet Union accommodated LL conflict. See Supplemental Table II and III.

Third, tests were performed to determine whether apparent US and Soviet accommodation rests in a mis-specified lag structure: that is, whether behavior attributed to a reaction to target behavior is actually a response by the US or Soviet Union to their own behavior in prior quarters. Likelihood ratio tests were thus performed on each model to determine the appropriate lag structure for $NB_{S(t-n)}$ in each period and, based on these tests, multiple lag models were estimated. A series of thresholds were then derived (with HL_R set to 0) by progressively setting the value of the lag terms to 1 (starting with the first-quarter lag and moving to *n*th-quarter lag). The results show that single-lag models overstate the US and Soviet tendency to absorb conflict compared to models that assume explicitly that the actor conflicted with a target, two, three, or more quarters ago. When the first several lag terms are set to 1, though, the US (but not the Soviet Union) is often shown to have accommodated considerably greater amounts of conflict than was revealed in prior tests, and even greater amounts of conflict when more

remote lags are set to 1. These findings are made more noteworthy by the typically longer lag length of the US models which mitigates against higher US absorption levels in any US-Soviet comparison (distant lags that are present only in the US model are assumed to obtain a 0 value). See Supplemental Table IV-VI.

Fourth, tests for simultaneity between LL_R and NB_S were performed using the two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS) and two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) methods described in Alvarez and Glasgow (2000). In these tests, a reciprocal relationship was assumed to exist between NB_S (the binary dependent variable) and LL_R, and each of these variables was assumed to be a function of its respective value in each of the prior four quarters (lags1-lag4). (To calculate thresholds from the derived parameters in the 2SCML model, the value of the residual variable in the model was set to 0.) The 2SCML results suggest that simultaneity is present in the US analysis in the first three periods but not in the last three; and both methods have the effect of reducing the apparent US ability to absorb LL conflict in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy years. Conversely, accounting for simultaneity increases somewhat the apparent US ability to absorb LL conflict in the Johnson, Nixon-Ford, and Carter years. Applied to the Soviet model, the 2SCML method implicates simultaneity in the results for all but the last period; moreover, both tests indicate that the uncorrected probit analysis overstates the Soviet ability to absorb LL conflict in the Kennedy and Johnson years. In turn, 2SPLS tests performed to correct for possible simultaneity between HL_R and NB_S in both the US and Soviet models do not alter the basic patterns observed in Tables I and II (in the main text). Taken together, then, these tests reinforce the argument that the US and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union absorbed conflict. See Supplemental Table VII-XI.

Fifth, tests using a continuous dependent variable point again to a strong US tendency and

weaker Soviet tendency to accommodate conflict. To obtain these results, OLS regression was performed on the models in each of the six periods using continuous dependent and lagged endogenous variables; then, threshold values were calculated by 'neutralizing' the effect of the lagged variable (setting it to zero) to impose a harsh test that nonetheless permits comparison with the findings in Tables I and II (when $NB_{S(t-1)}$=0, in the main text). These results elude, however, to different amounts and periods of absorption than do the prior findings. See Supplemental Table XII-XIII.

Sixth, simulations were performed to determine whether the calculated threshold values are actually near the mean threshold values that would obtain if model parameters varied randomly within their (.95) confidence intervals and whether the upper bounds (*upper* because the threshold values are *negative*) of point confidence intervals obtained from simulations in which model parameters are assumed to vary randomly within their (.95) confidence intervals are lower than the values at which no absorption occurs. To obtain the mean values and .95 confidence levels for a probabilistic distribution of threshold values, Monte Carlo exercises were performed by randomly drawing each parameter a thousand times from a normal distribution of values (with means equal to the given parameter value, the standard deviation equal to the standard error of a parameter, and the correlation structure among the parameters defined by the covariance matrix), and then multiplying each of these thousand sets of parameters by the given values of HL (50, 0, or -50) and $NB_{S(t-1)}$ (0 or1). (The simulations were performed using corr2data in STATA 7.0.) The confidence interval was thus defined by the model threshold values that delimited the top 2.5 % and bottom 2.5% of the 1000 threshold estimates for each set of HL and $NB_{S(t-1)}$ values. See Supplemental Table XIV-XVI. (I thank Langche Zeng for suggesting these procedures.)

These simulations demonstrate that, compared to these *probabilistic* values, the *calculated* absorption values in Tables I and II (in the main text) consistently *understate* the US and Soviet capacity to absorb conflict. In all these simulations, the mean absorption thresholds fall below the calculated threshold value and show the US and Soviet Union to have absorbed at least some LL conflict in every period, whatever the HL and $NB_{S(t-1)}$ value. The probabilistic thresholds support the prior findings, then, in specific respects. First, the periods in which these actors were most and least accommodative follow the patterns in Tables I and II (in the main text). Second, most of the parenthetical threshold values in those tables are shown to be statistically significant: in almost all instances, the thresholds in the table are near or below the upper bounds of the confidence intervals obtained probabilistically. Third, the US absorbed more conflict than the Soviet Union did in the Johnson and Nixon-Ford years: in that period, the upper bounds of the US confidence intervals are still higher than the mean Soviet threshold values. Fourth, the amount of LL conflict that these two actors absorbed varied with the operational definition of accommodation: in all but the Kennedy years, the mean US threshold values obtained when absorption is defined as neutral behavior are consistently lower (*lower* because negative values of greater magnitude mean more absorption) than the lower bounds of the probabilistic confidence interval when absorption is defined as cooperation. Finally, whereas correcting for simultaneity can reduce the amount of LL conflict that these actors appear to have absorbed, tests on the US model reveal that probabilistic thresholds obtained with the 2SPLS method are typically higher than those in Table I (in the main text).

Seventh, tests established that the results hold up in dyadic analysis. What prior tests cannot reveal is whether the 'one size fits all' approach offered by a CSTS analysis overstates US accommodation in some dyads -- the important US to Soviet Union dyad among them. For that

reason, I take the analysis a step further by estimating probit models for the US to Soviet Union and Soviet Union to US dyads and then plotting the threshold values over time to disclose their changing properties.

For the dyadic analysis, I look for continuity and change in accommodative patterns by deriving model parameters for a 'moving window' of data. To account for change over time, I obtain estimates for US to Soviet behavior and Soviet to US behavior with a (50-quarter) window that moves across the 1948-78 (COPDAB) and 1966-91 (WEIS) periods. The first window is composed of an actor's behavior by target in the 2nd quarter of 1948 through to the 3rd quarter of 1960 (the first quarter is dropped because of the lagged dependent variable), the second window is composed of an actor's behavior by target in the 3rd quarter of 1948 through to the 4th quarter of 1960, and so on. The last window, then, is composed of the actor's behavior by target from the 3rd quarter of 1966 through to the last quarter of 1978. Therefore, I conduct the analysis by deriving estimates for a 5-year period, dropping the last quarter in the 20-quarter sequence and adding the next, and then re-estimating the model. Because it is more useful to present results by quarter than by window and because results for a given quarter can vary greatly from window-to-window, I express the accommodative capacity of an actor per quarter using the median value of the thresholds from all windows that include that quarter (the mean is overly influenced by extreme values in some periods).

Supplemental Figure 1 displays the predicted capacity to accommodate LL behavior in the US to Soviet Union and Soviet Union to US dyads (1948-78), both with and without prior cooperation. (The three lines in the figures represent the capacity predicted when HL_R behavior assumes a value of 50, 0, and -50 on the COPDAB scale.) The figure reveals a startling difference in US to Soviet Union and Soviet Union to US accommodative tendencies. Before the

early 1960s, the US was unwilling to accommodate Soviet LL conflict even if it had cooperated with the Soviet Union in the prior quarter. But, by the mid-1960s (1a), without prior cooperation, and the early 1960s, with prior cooperation (1c), the US accommodated some amount of Soviet LL conflict (at these points, the 0 HL_R behavior line crosses the 0 value of LL_R behavior and stays below 0 through to 1978). In fact, by the mid-1970s, all three lines in 1c dip below 0 indicating that the US accommodated Soviet LL conflict whether it was paired with HL cooperation (+50) or conflict (-50). In contrast, the Soviet Union assumed a consistently non-accommodative stance. Regardless of prior cooperation, the Soviet Union required some level of HL cooperation from the US before cooperating. Indeed, when HL_R behavior is neutral (the middle line), Soviet (LL) accommodative capacity remains above 0 indicating that the Soviet Union does not accommodate conflict. While the +50 line drops below 0 in the mid-1960s in Figure 1d, this establishes only that the Soviet Union accommodated small amounts of US (LL) conflict (< 50 units) when receiving more than offsetting US (HL) cooperation (50 units). Re-estimating the thresholds by substituting CP_R for HL_R and CF_R for LL_R (equation 5) basically supports the prior findings. However, the revised estimates alter the periods in which changes in accommodation occur. A US capacity to accommodate Soviet conflict (absent Soviet cooperation) is now shown to occur in the mid-1950s with prior cooperation and in the early 1960s without it. In contrast, the single threshold value calculated for NB_R (equation 6) closely tracks the threshold calculated for an HL_R value of zero (equation 3): then, the point at which the US starts accommodating Soviet conflict is no more than two quarters removed from those in Figure 1 and, as before, the Soviet Union does not accommodate US conflict.

Supplemental Figure 2 displays the results when the dyadic analysis is extended into the last years of the Cold War, using WEIS data for the 1966-91 period. While the WEIS data do not

show the US to have been as forgiving of Soviet conflict as the COPDAB data do, the WEIS data again indicate a greater US than Soviet willingness to absorb conflict (a smaller, -15 to +15, range in HL_R behavior is used in the analysis of the weighted WEIS data because of the limited range over which the latter vary). With prior cooperation (2c), the US consistently absorbed at least some level of Soviet conflict throughout the 1966-91 period: with a +15 value of HL_R behavior, the US always absorbed conflict in excess of cooperation received; with neutral HL_R behavior, the US absorbed conflict in all but a brief period in the late 1980s. Without prior cooperation (2a), however, absorption is more limited. Indeed, by the mid-1970s, the effects of renewed US-Soviet Cold War tension are evident; and, by the mid-1980s, with the hard-line policies of the Reagan administration, the US is shown quite unwilling to absorb LL_R conflict even when the Soviets were generally cooperative (a +15 value of HL_R behavior). Not until the final years of the Cold War does the US revert to its accommodative self. Still, the US, when least forgiving, was as willing to absorb conflict as the Soviet Union was when it was most tolerant. Without prior cooperation (2b), the Soviet Union did not absorb conflict; with prior cooperation (2d), the Soviet Union did not absorb conflict until the early 1980s.

Finally, because it is hard to rely on hypothetical thresholds derived from a mathematical model without some sense of whether these thresholds provide a more valid measure of the willingness of these actors to accommodate conflict than the zero point in the net behavior they receive, visual tests were performed on the calculated threshold values to see whether they are better predictors of actor behavior than the threshold values of the naive model. If the neutral point actually serves as a valid probabilistic threshold, accommodation will occur with greater relative frequency, on the positive side of the threshold, as the values of LL_R increase as much as non-accommodation will occur with greater relative frequency, on the negative side of the

threshold, as the values of LL_R decrease.

Supplemental Figure 3, for the US (by target-quarter), shows a neutral value of net behavior does not satisfy these requirements. Figure 3a plots the difference between the neutral point (the line) and the actual value of overall net behavior received by the US separately for observations where US accommodation occurred (the upper line) and for observations where US non-accommodation occurred (the bottom line). What is clear from the distribution of points around these lines is that overall value of net behavior received is a biased predictor of whether the US accommodates conflict. Although the likelihood that received net behavior will be accommodated increases as the value of net behavior stands further above the neutral point (compare the density of points above the top line with that above the bottom line), the probability that received net behavior will not be accommodated does not increase as the value of net behavior drops further below the line (compare the density of points below the top line with that below the bottom line).

Contrast these results with those in Figure 3b when 0 (the line) represents the *moving* threshold value derived from the probit coefficients (remember that the threshold changes because an actor's capacity to absorb conflict changes with the value of the model variables). Now, the chances of the US accommodating (LL_R) behavior increase as the value of that behavior rises above the line (becoming more cooperative) and decrease as the value of received behavior drops further below the line (becoming less cooperative). (The intense clustering of points above both the top and bottom line might obscure this point. However, within 50, 100, and 150 units above the line, the probability of accommodation occurring is 64, 79, and 88 percent, respectively.) True, non-accommodation occurs more frequently above than below the probit threshold (b) and more frequently above the probit threshold than above the naive model

threshold (a); but this does not impugn the value of the probit predictor. There is no reason to suppose the US receives as much behavior below as above its threshold value. (Although the two sets of figures do not portray the "fit" of the two thresholds with the same set of data points -- the naive model threshold predicts accommodation from the received value of overall *net behavior*, the probit threshold predicts accommodation from the received value of *low-level* net behavior -- the improved fit is not due to switching measures.)

How do these results compare with those specific to the US-Soviet Union dyads (obtained from the moving time-series analysis)? Supplemental Figure 4 displays the naive model results for the US capacity to accommodate Soviet net behavior (4a) and Soviet capacity to accommodate US net behavior (4b); for comparison, it presents the probit results for the US capacity to accommodate Soviet LL net behavior (4c) and Soviet capacity to accommodate US LL net behavior (4d). In the figure, the naive model appears especially inadequate for predicting US accommodation throughout the 1960s, a period in which the US consistently accommodated Soviet conflict (note the cluster of pluses under the top line in 4a in this period). Resetting the threshold (4c), using a probit model, "lowers" the threshold value in the 1960s (there are more pluses above the top line than below it) while not increasing the chances that non-accommodation will occur above the bottom line. ("Lowering" the threshold value, here, is equivalent to what is commonly meant by "raising" the conflict threshold: a positive value, in this analysis, indicates cooperation.) In the parlance of medical testing, the threshold is made more "sensitive" (it now picks up more pluses above the threshold, reducing the false negative problem), although it is no less "specific" (the false positive problem). (Again, the change in result is not explained by the fact that 3a predicts the US accommodation of net behavior while 3c predicts the US accommodation of LL behavior.)

Supplemental Table I. Accommodation Thresholds: High-Level Conflict

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Threshold Values: Amounts of HL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed , Equation (3)						
US Absorption						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
LL_R=						
100	-86	(-127)	(-155)	(-102)	(-102)	(-125)
50	-38	(-75)	(-83)	(-65)	(-63)	(-64)
0	11	(-23)	(-10)	(-29)	(-24)	(-2)
-50	59	(28)	63	(7)	(15)	60
-100	108	(80)	135	(43)	(54)	122
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
LL_R=						
100	(-113)	(-152)	(-206)	(-143)	(-153)	(-140)
50	(-64)	(-101)	(-133)	(-107)	(-114)	(-78)
0	(-16)	(-49)	(-61)	(-71)	(-76)	(-17)
-50	(33)	(3)	(12)	(-35)	(-37)	(45)
-100	(81)	(54)	(85)	(1)	(2)	107
Soviet Absorption						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
LL_R=						
100	-61	(-111)	-26	-54	(-105)	(-141)
50	-22	(-56)	-8	-17	-47	(-73)
0	17	(-2)	11	21	11	(-4)
-50	57	53	30	58	69	64
-100	(96)	108	48	95	127	132
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
LL_R=						
100	-79	-136	-53	-91	(-127)	(-152)
50	-40	(-81)	-34	(-54)	(-69)	(-84)
0	(-1)	(-26)	(-15)	(-17)	(-11)	(-16)
-50	(39)	(29)	(3)	(20)	(47)	52
-100	(78)	(83)	(22)	(57)	106	121

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Supplemental Table II. Accommodation Thresholds: With Transition Point Set to Neutral Behavior

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
*Threshold Values: Amounts of LL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed (*Equation (3))						
US Absorption						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
100	-95	(-118)	(-103)	(-149)	(-253)	(-115)
50	(-58)	(-82)	(-72)	(-103)	(-177)	(-77)
0	(-21)	(-45)	(-42)	(-56)	(-100)	(-39)
-50	(16)	(-8)	(-11)	(-10)	(-23)	(-0)
-100	(54)	(28)	(19)	(37)	(53)	(37)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
100	(-169)	(-159)	(-134)	(-225)	(-380)	(-140)
50	(-132)	(-122)	(-104)	(-178)	(-304)	(-102)
0	(-95)	(-85)	(-73)	(-132)	(-227)	(-63)
-50	(-57)	(-49)	(-43)	(-86)	(-150)	(-25)
-100	(-20)	(-12)	(-12)	(-39)	(-73)	(13)
Soviet Absorption						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
100	(-291)	-77	(-387)	(-103)	-82	-40
50	(-127)	-37	(-175)	-49	-44	-0
0	37	4	37	5	(-5)	39
-50	200	44	248	58	(34)	78
-100	364	84	460	112	(72)	118
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
100	(-486)	(-143)	(-556)	(-220)	(-139)	-97
50	(-322)	(-102)	(-344)	(-166)	(-100)	(-58)
0	(-159)	(-62)	(-132)	(-112)	(-61)	(-18)
-50	(5)	(-22)	80	(-58)	(-23)	(21)
-100	169	(18)	291	(-4)	(16)	(61)

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Supplemental Table III. Probit Model: US and Soviet Response to Behavior Received from Targets when Transition Point Set to Neutral Behavior

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
US Response						
Intercept	.353	.709**	.618**	.527**	.512**	.710**
	(.333)	(.233)	(.220)	(.198)	(.201)	(.200)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	.013**	.012**	.009**	.009**	.008**	.014**
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.003)
Low Level	.017**	.016**	.015**	.009**	.005**	.018**
	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)	(.001)	(.001)	(.003)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	1.244**	.637**	.463**	.714**	.649**	.443**
	(.158)	(.114)	(.170)	(.108)	(.084)	(.143)
Chi-Sq	278.32**	353.17**	148.64**	311.00**	235.46**	103.84**
N	985	1968	915	1757	2675	748
Soviet Response						
Intercept	-.152	.070	-.241	-.054	.103	-.771**
	(.130)	(.266)	(.153)	(.257)	(.266)	(.281)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	.014**	.016**	.028**	.013**	.016**	.016**
	(.003)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.002)	(.004)
Low Level	.004*	.020**	.007**	.012**	.021**	.020**
	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)	(.005)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	.807**	1.296**	1.109**	1.357**	1.186**	1.138**
	(.146)	(.109)	(.167)	(.134)	(.127)	(.210)
Chi-Sq	119.28**	455.67**	176.45**	271.57**	377.68**	114.72**
N	512	1388	608	1197	1706	399

* p<=.10, ** p<=.05
( )=standard error

Supplemental Table IV. US and Soviet Accommodation Thresholds when Expanding the Number of Endogenous Lag Terms

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
*Threshold Values: Amounts of LL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed (*Equation (3), when HL_R=0						
US Absorption						
Number of Lags Set to 1						
1	33	(-2)	(-6)	(-33)	(-29)	61
2	11	(-14)	(-14)	(-52)	(-51)	(-8)
3	(-20)	(-34)	(-33)	(-78)	(-56)	(-14)
4	(-50)	(-52)	(-32)	(-91)	(-70)	(-17)
5	.	(-62)	(-46)	(-103)	(-104)	(-28)
6	.	(-65)	(-56)	(-125)	(-111)	.
7	.	(-65)	(-60)	(-132)	(-131)	.
8	.	(-74)	(-66)	(-136)	.	.
9	.	(-88)	(-90)	(-156)	.	.
10	.	.	.	.	.	.
Soviet Absorption						
Number of Lags Set to 1						
1	14	(-9)	2	19	8	4
2	10	(-10)	(-58)	(-5)	2	(-2)
3	0	(-7)	(-93)	(-27)	1	(-11)
4	(-14)	(-13)	.	(-47)	(-7)	(-27)
5	(-16)	(-12)	.	.	(-11)	.
6	(-28)	(-25)	.	.	(-12)	.
7	(-2)	(-28)	.	.	(-22)	.
8	(-10)	(-31)	.	.	.	.
9	(-1)	(-32)	.	.	.	.
10	(-32)	(-41)	.	.	.	.

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Supplemental Table V. Probit Model: US Response to Behavior Received from Targets when Expanding the Number of Endogenous Lag Terms

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Intercept	-.764**	-.019	-.182**	-.042	-.107	-.204
	(.223)	(.180)	(.169)	(.159)	(.164)	(.156)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	.017**	.012**	.007**	.011**	.009**	.020**
	(.002)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.003)
Low Level	.017**	.013**	.011**	.008**	.008	.028**
	(.004)	(.002)	(.002)	(.001)	(.008)	(.003)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	.211*	.050	.245**	.304**	.339**	.187*
	(.109)	(.074)	(.105)	(.073)	(.061)	(.112)
$NB_{S(t-2)}$	.376**	.147**	.091	.154**	.172**	.230**
	(.114)	(.075)	(.109)	(.075)	(.063)	(.114)
$NB_{S(t-3)}$	.516**	.252**	.196*	.207**	.036	.185
	(.119)	(.076)	(.109)	(.075)	(.063)	(.116)
$NB_{S(t-4)}$	.508**	.230**	-.006	.108	.113*	.080
	(.125)	(.076)	(.113)	(.075)	(.063)	(.114)
$NB_{S(t-5)}$	.	.124**	.143	.094**	.271**	.293**
	.	(.076)	(.114)	(.077)	(.063)	(.117)
$NB_{S(t-6)}$	.	.046	.109	.175**	.051	.
	.	(.076)	(.113)	(.078)	(.063)	.
$NB_{S(t-7)}$	.	.002	.046	.056	.158**	.
	.	(.077)	(.114)	(.077)	(.062)	.
$NB_{S(t-8)}$	.	.113	.057	.031	.	.
	.	(.078)	(.114)	(.077)	.	.
$NB_{S(t-9)}$	.	.170**	.264**	.161**	.	.
	.	(.076)	(.114)	(.075)	.	.
$NB_{S(t-10)}$	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
Chi-Sq	325.55**	460.13**	179.43**	413.08**	575.71**	218.14**
N	985	1968	915	1757	2675	748

* p<=.10, ** p<=.05
( )=standard error

Supplemental Table VI. Probit Model: Soviet Response to Behavior Received from Targets when Expanding the Number of Endogenous Lag Terms

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Intercept	-.712**	-.184	-.417**	-.661**	-.460**	-.170**
	(.090)	(.219)	(.088)	(.189)	(.212)	(.229)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	.032**	.020**	.021**	.017**	.019**	.018**
	(.005)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)
Low Level	.025**	.024**	.007**	.013**	.023**	.024**
	(.005)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.005)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	.368**	.401**	.400**	.414**	.271**	.076
	(.170)	(.091)	(.125)	(.104)	(.080)	(.162)
$NB_{S(t-2)}$	.103	.020	.417**	.308**	.140*	.144
	(.090)	(.094)	(.128)	(.104)	(.083)	(.060)
$NB_{S(t-3)}$	.229	-.068	.237*	.287**	.030	.207
	(.201)	(.098)	(.126)	(.102)	(.084)	(.160)
$NB_{S(t-4)}$	.358*	.145	.	.253**	.181**	.379**
	(.202)	(.101)	.	(.102)	(.086)	(.157)
$NB_{S(t-5)}$	.047	-.029	.	.	.082	.
	(.209)	(.100)	.	.	(.085)	.
$NB_{S(t-6)}$	.314	.307**	.	.	.018	.
	(.215)	(.101)	.	.	(.087)	.
$NB_{S(t-7)}$	-.654**	.059	.	.	.236**	.
	(.239)	(.102)	.	.	(.087)	.
$NB_{S(t-8)}$	.197	.087	.	.	.	.
	(.227)	(.101)	.	.	.	.
$NB_{S(t-9)}$	-.217	.013	.	.	.	.
	(.233)	(.105)	.	.	.	.
$NB_{S(t-10)}$	.766**	.221**	.	.	.	.
	(.251)	(.103)	.	.	.	.
Chi-Sq	212.90**	525.24**	176.10**	422.16**	493.23**	110.10**
N	512	1388	608	1197	1706	399

* p<=.10, ** p<=.05
( )=standard error

Supplemental Table VII. US Accommodation Thresholds: Tests for Simultaneity between LL_R and NBs

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Threshold Values: Amounts of LL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed, Equation (3)						
2SPLS Method						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
100	-82	-85	-70	(-190)	(-204)	(-104)
50	-39	(-51)	-39	(-116)	(-120)	(-51)
0	4	(-17)	(-9)	(-42)	(-37)	2
-50	(48)	(17)	(21)	(31)	(46)	55
-100	(91)	(51)	(52)	105	129	108
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
100	(-101)	-97	-97	(-247)	(-282)	(-120)
50	(-57)	(-63)	(-67)	(-173)	(-198)	(-67)
0	(-14)	(-30)	(-37)	(-99)	(-115)	(-14)
-50	(29)	(4)	(-6)	(-25)	(-32)	(39)
-100	(73)	(38)	(24)	(48)	(51)	(92)
2SCML Method						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
100	-52	-72	-60	(-158)	(-203)	-100
50	-24	-44	-34	(-97)	(-121)	-50
0	3	(-15)	(-8)	(-36)	(-38)	0
-50	(31)	(13)	(19)	(25)	(44)	50
-100	(58)	(42)	(45)	(86)	126	100
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
100	-64	-84	-85	(-208)	(-289)	(-115)
50	-36	(-55)	(-59)	(-147)	(-207)	(-65)
0	(-9)	(-27)	(-32)	(-86)	(-124)	(-15)
-50	(19)	(2)	(6)	(-26)	(-42)	(35)
-100	(46)	(31)	(20)	(35)	(40)	(85)

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Supplemental Table VIII. Soviet Accommodation Thresholds: Tests for Simultaneity between LL_R and NBs

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Threshold Values: Amounts of LL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed, Equation (3)						
2SPLS Method						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
100	(-222)	-92	(-108)	-94	-54	-73
50	(-87)	-47	-49	-36	-24	-38
0	48	(-3)	9	21	6	(-3)
-50	183	(41)	67	78	(36)	32
-100	319	(86)	126	136	(66)	67
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
100	(-275)	(-111)	(-133)	(-133)	-63	-80
50	(-140)	(-67)	(-75)	(-76)	-33	-45
0	(-5)	(-23)	(-16)	(-18)	(-3)	(-10)
-50	130	(22)	(42)	(39)	(27)	(25)
-100	266	(66)	100	(96)	(57)	(60)
2SCML Method						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
100	-76	-68	-99	-81	-43	-59
50	-31	-34	-45	-31	-19	-31
0	14	(-1)	8	19	5	(-3)
-50	59	(32)	61	68	(29)	(25)
-100	104	(65)	115	118	(53)	(53)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
100	-91	-82	(-123)	(-115)	-51	-64
50	-46	-48	(-70)	(-66)	-27	-36
0	(-1)	(-15)	(-16)	(-16)	(-3)	(-8)
-50	(44)	(18)	(37)	(33)	(21)	(20)
-100	(89)	(51)	(90)	(83)	(45)	(48)

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Supplemental Table IX. US Second-Stage Probit Results: Tests for Simultaneity between LL_R and NBs

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
2SPLS Method						
Intercept	-.097	.358**	.126	.357**	.239	-.029
	(.206)	(.174)	(.157)	(.148)	(.158)	(.140)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	.020**	.014**	.008**	.012**	.011**	.019**
	(.002)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.003)
Low Level	.022**	.021**	.014**	.008**	.006**	.018**
	(.005)	(.003)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.006)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	.411**	.268**	.385**	.479**	.503**	.291**
	(.102)	(.067)	(.098)	(.067)	(.056)	(.103)
Chi-Sq	255.24**	386.66**	140.06**	328.52**	467.57**	118.90**
2SCML Method						
Intercept	-.106	.358**	.120	.356**	.234	-.004**
	(.204)	(.173)	(.157)	(.148)	(.158)	(.151)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	.018**	.014**	.008**	.012**	.010**	.022**
	(.002)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.003)
Low Level	.033**	.024**	.016**	.010**	.006**	.022**
	(.006)	(.003)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)	(.006)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	.396**	.271**	.397**	.491**	.523**	.334**
	(.103)	(.067)	(.098)	(.067)	(.056)	(.109)
First-stage Residual						
	-.018**	-.015**	-.006*	-.002**	.002**	.006**
	(.005)	(.003)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)	(.007)
Chi-Sq	275.60**	407.03**	152.06**	348.94**	497.05**	197.90**
Likelihood ratio test	13.18**	32.22**	3.31*	1.52	.66	.80
N	985	1968	915	1757	2675	748

* p<=.10, ** p<=.05
( )=standard error

Supplemental Table X. Soviet Second-Stage Probit Results: Tests for Simultaneity between LL_R and NBs

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
2SPLS Method						
Intercept	-.551**	.071	-.173**	-.351*	-.217**	.081**
	(.087)	(.208)	(.080)	(.182)	(.207)	(.210)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	.031**	.021**	.023**	.019**	.021**	.019**
	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)
Low Level	.011**	.023**	.019**	.017**	.035**	.027**
	(.005)	(.003)	(.005)	(.004)	(.005)	(.007)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	.605**	.462**	.494**	.655**	.333**	.180**
	(.148)	(.084)	(.119)	(.093)	(.075)	(.153)
Chi-Sq	158.46**	410.65**	165.32**	371.81**	444.50**	81.18**
2SCML Method						
Intercept	-.491**	.038	-.166**	-.355**	-.225**	.093**
	(.090)	(.211)	(.080)	(.184)	(.208)	(.210)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	.032**	.022**	.022**	.019**	.021**	.019**
	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)
Low Level	.035**	.033**	.020**	.019**	.043**	.034**
	(.008)	(.004)	(.005)	(.004)	(.005)	(.008)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	.522**	.465**	.501**	.664**	.344**	.179**
	(.153)	(.087)	(.120)	(.094)	(.076)	(.156)
First-stage Residual						
	-.010*	-.012**	-.016**	-.008**	-.024**	-.012**
	(.005)	(.004)	(.005)	(.004)	(.005)	(.008)
Chi-Sq	186.85**	501.01**	167.79**	387.19**	485.09**	101.53**
Likelihood ratio test	4.01**	10.67**	10.69**	4.24**	26.78**	2.30
N	512	1388	608	1197	1706	399

* p<=.10, ** p<=.05
( )=standard error

Supplemental Table XI. Accommodation Thresholds: Tests for Simultaneity between HL_R and NBs (2SPLS Method)

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Threshold Values: Amounts of LL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed, Equation (3)						
US Model						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
100	(-168)	(-150)	-77	(-351)	(-280)	-49
50	(-79)	(-89)	-43	(-202)	(-152)	-25
0	11	(-28)	(-10)	(-52)	(-24)	(-1)
-50	101	(33)	(24)	98	105	(24)
-100	190	(94)	(57)	248	233	(48)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
100	(-181)	(-168)	(-110)	(-376)	(-322)	-61
50	(-90)	(-107)	(-76)	(-226)	(-194)	-36
0	(-1)	(-46)	(-43)	(-77)	(-65)	(-12)
-50	89	(15)	(-9)	73	63	(12)
-100	178	(76)	(24)	223	191	(36)
Soviet Model						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
100	-49	-76	(-357)	(-204)	-47	-70
50	-17	-38	(-163)	(-92)	-20	-36
0	14	(-1)	32	21	7	(-3)
-50	(46)	(37)	227	134	(34)	(30)
-100	(77)	(75)	422	247	(60)	(64)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
100	-66	-93	(-373)	(-224)	-65	-77
50	-35	(-56)	(-178)	(-111)	-38	-43
0	(-3)	(-18)	17	2	(-11)	(-10)
-50	(28)	(20)	212	114	(16)	(24)
-100	(60)	(57)	407	227	(43)	(57)

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Supplemental Table XII. Accommodation Thresholds: OLS Analysis of a Continuous Dependent Variable

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Threshold Values: Amounts of HL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed, Equation (3)						
US Absorption						
$NB_{S(t-1)}=0$						
HL_R=						
100	1709	-93	-82	(-299)	(-239)	(-107)
50	819	(-67)	(-52)	(-183)	(-142)	(-61)
0	(-71)	(-40)	(-23)	(-67)	(-45)	(-14)
-50	(-962)	(-14)	(7)	(49)	52	(32)
-100	(-1852)	(12)	(37)	165	149	(79)
Soviet Absorption						
$NB_{S(t-1)}=0$						
HL_R=						
100	(-169)	-71	-47	(-107)	(-106)	(-137)
50	(-80)	-38	-24	(-56)	(-55)	(-71)
0	9	(-5)	(-2)	(-5)	(-4)	(-5)
-50	98	(29)	(20)	(45)	(46)	61
-100	187	(62)	(43)	(96)	(97)	127

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Supplemental Table XIII. OLS Analysis: US and Soviet Response to Behavior Received from Targets

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
US Response						
Intercept	-10.084**	18.240**	14.703**	12.547**	11.441**	8.969**
	(21.902)	(5.484)	(5.310)	(3.761)	(4.488)	(3.316)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	2.516**	.237**	.384**	.435**	.495**	.592**
	(.126)	(.027)	(.039)	(.022)	(.023)	(.041)
Low Level	-.141**	.452**	.647**	.187**	.255**	.635**
	(.155)	(.038)	(.055)	(.025)	(.035)	(.061)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	.414**	.334**	.247**	.268**	.236**	.184**
	(.023)	(.020)	(.028)	(.020)	(.017)	(.032)
F	58.20**	30.39**	54.81**	49.26**	33.02**	49.47**
R^2	.56	.35	.46	.38	.30	.40
N	985	1968	915	1757	2675	748
Soviet Response						
Intercept	-4.486**	3.922**	1.958**	3.145**	2.835**	1.973**
	(3.617)	(4.781)	(2.161)	(5.391)	(4.220)	(4.375)
Net Behavior Received$_t$:						
High Level	.875**	.565**	.468**	.583**	.665**	.489**
	(.102)	(.033)	(.070)	(.041)	(.021)	(.052)
Low Level	.491**	.848**	1.048**	.572**	.656**	.370**
	(.087)	(.035)	(.074)	(.048)	(.035)	(.066)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$	.376**	.187**	.356**	.327**	.156**	.284**
	(.035)	(.021)	(.030)	(.024)	(.018)	(.048)
F	290.56**	51.95**	244.73**	44.84**	78.73**	26.52**
R^2	.63	.57	.55	.46	.62	.41
N	512	1388	608	1197	1706	399

* p<=.10, ** p<=.05
( )=standard error

Supplemental Table XIV. US Accommodation: Simulated Thresholds and Confidence Intervals

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Threshold Values: Amounts of LL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed, Equation (3)						
High Point of .95 Confidence Interval						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
50	(-110)	(-135)	(-123)	(-241)	(-244)	(-73)
0	(-41)	(-76)	(-75)	(-149)	(-156)	(-25)
-50	(6)	(-26)	(-37)	(-69)	(-80)	(10)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
50	(-151)	(-167)	(-176)	(-321)	(-336)	(-90)
0	(-79)	(-108)	(-128)	(-228)	(-247)	(-43)
-50	(-23)	(-55)	(-86)	(-142)	(-164)	(-6)
Mean Value						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
50	(-71)	(-98)	(-79)	(-172)	(-167)	(-54)
0	(-17)	(-48)	(-43)	(-101)	(-100)	(-13)
-50	(37)	(1)	(-8)	(-30)	(-34)	(28)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
50	(-99)	(-123)	(-115)	(-231)	(-235)	(-67)
0	(-46)	(-74)	(-80)	(-160)	(-169)	(-26)
-50	(8)	(-24)	(-44)	(-89)	(-102)	(15)
Low Point of .95 Confidence Interval						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
50	-31	(-60)	-35	(-103)	(-90)	-36
0	7	(-21)	(-12)	(-52)	(-44)	(-2)
-50	68	(27)	(22)	(9)	(12)	(45)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
50	-47	(-79)	(-54)	(-142)	(-134)	-43
0	(-12)	(-40)	(-31)	(-93)	(-90)	(-8)
-50	(39)	(6)	(-1)	(-37)	(-40)	(37)

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Supplemental Table XV. Soviet Accommodation: Simulated Thresholds and Confidence Intervals

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Threshold Values: Amounts of LL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed, Equation (3)						
High Point of .95 Confidence Interval						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
50	(-106)	(-96)	(-824)	(-144)	(-77)	(-81)
0	(-11)	(-44)	(-178)	(-54)	(-28)	(-33)
-50	(28)	(0)	(-254)	(9)	(12)	(0)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
50	(-146)	(-125)	(-1160)	(-220)	(-101)	(-98)
0	(-51)	(-72)	(-514)	(-125)	(-51)	(-52)
-50	(8)	(-26)	(-112)	(-46)	(-9)	(-16)
Mean Value						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
50	(-67)	(-71)	(-207)	(-94)	(-53)	-50
0	(-1)	(-24)	(-47)	(-24)	(-10)	(-12)
-50	66	(22)	112	(46)	(34)	(26)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
50	(-92)	(-93)	(-291)	(-146)	(-72)	(-60)
0	(-25)	(-47)	(-131)	(-76)	(-29)	(-21)
-50	(42)	(-1)	(29)	(-6)	(15)	(17)
Low Point of .95 Confidence Interval						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
50	-29	-45	409	-43	-30	-20
0	10	(-5)	83	6	9	9
-50	104	(44)	479	84	56	52
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
50	-37	(-62)	577	(-73)	-44	-20
0	1	(-22)	251	(-27)	(-6)	10
-50	76	(24)	170	(34)	(38)	50

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Supplemental Table XVI. Assorted US Simulated Thresholds (Mean Values)

Period	Truman 48-52	Eisenhower 53-60	Kennedy 61-63	Johnson 64-68	Nixon-Ford 69-76	Carter 77-78
Threshold Values: Amounts of LL_R Conflict (-) Absorbed, Equation (3)						
With Transition Point Set to Neutral Behavior						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
50	(-140)	(-124)	(-107)	(-182)	(-334)	(-104)
0	(-100)	(-87)	(-76)	(-135)	(-249)	(-65)
-50	(-61)	(-49)	(-44)	(-87)	(-164)	(-26)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
50	(-219)	(-165)	(-140)	(-260)	(-473)	(-129)
0	(-179)	(-128)	(-109)	(-213)	(-389)	(-90)
-50	(-139)	(-91)	(-77)	(-165)	(-304)	(-51)
With Simultaneity Correction (2SPLS Method)						
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=0						
HL_R=						
50	(-60)	(-64)	(-70)	(-182)	(-241)	(-75)
0	(-15)	(-30)	(-38)	(-135)	(-139)	(-15)
-50	(31)	(4)	(-7)	(-88)	(-37)	(44)
$NB_{S(t-1)}$=1						
HL_R=						
50	(-80)	(-77)	(-100)	(-260)	(-337)	(-94)
0	(-34)	(-43)	(-68)	(-213)	(-235)	(-34)
-50	(11)	(-9)	(-36)	(-165)	(-133)	(26)

( ) = Accommodation, the actor under-reacts to conflict relative to cooperation

Figure 1. Probit Predicted Accommodation Capacity, 1948-78



Figure 2. Probit Predicted Accommodation Capacity, 1966-91



Figure 3. US Accommodation of Behavior from All Targets, 1948-78, with Distance of Behavior from Defined Threshold



Figure 4. Capacity of the US and Soviet Union to Accommodate Each Other's Behavior with its Distance from the Defined Threshold