

Business Interests and the Party Coalitions:
Industry Sector Contributions to U.S. Congressional Campaigns

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We identify the economic interests in the US that are aligned with the two major political parties. We disaggregate corporate and trade association political action committees by economic sector, using the most fine-grained classifications available. We then analyze the campaign contributions from each sector to House incumbents, controlling for the majority party, economic geography, committee membership, and electoral competition. We find wide variation in how economic sectors relate to the parties. Around half have an evident party tilt, with far more leaning toward Republicans than to Democrats. The other half have no partisan preference, either giving without reference to party or opportunistically to the majority. Republican-leaning sectors concentrate in particular enterprises, especially natural resources extraction, while most retail and service sectors are nonpartisan. Business is not a monolith, to be contrasted with “labor” or “ideological interest groups,” but embedded in economic sectors that are more or less *politicized* in partisan terms.

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This research investigates how different types of business interests in the United States relate to the two major political parties. Although corporations tilt toward Republicans in aggregate, we know much less about how or whether specific businesses or economic sectors are aligned with the parties. Scholars typically characterize the broad-based peak organizations representing business interests, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Business, as siding with the Republican Party in a manner analogous to the way labor unions are allied with the Democratic Party. On the other hand, a dominant tradition of research portrays particular business interests as donating to powerful officials regardless of party in order to facilitate access and win favorable treatment on narrow policy issues of special concern (Lowery and Brasher 2004, 130-3; Truman 1955).

Rather than contrasting the behavior of “business” as a group with labor or ideological interest groups, we instead examine corporations as parts of economic sectors that may be more or less *politicized* in partisan terms. To do so, we analyze the campaign contributions that corporate and trade association political action committees (PACs) make to members of the House of Representatives across different industry sectors. We disaggregate all the business interests that are consistently active in congressional elections using a fine-grained classification scheme, drawing on the most detailed data available from the U.S. Census Bureau.¹ We examine a full decade of contributions, encompassing two congresses controlled by Democrats and three by Republicans. In doing so, our aim is to pinpoint which sectors have a measurable preference for a political party and which do not, after controlling for other factors that drive

¹ In compiling the County and Zip Code Business Patterns dataset, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Census Bureau queries all known business establishments with a fixed address located in the U.S. every year, collecting such information as kind-of-business activity, number of employees, and firm location. In defining commercial-industrial sectors, we employ the 6-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code, the most detailed classification available.

campaign contributions, such as majority control of Congress, economic geography (as in, where the economic sector has firms and employees), committee membership, and the competitiveness of seats.

In recent years there has been a revival of scholarly interest in partisan political economy, with a number of major new studies examining how partisan politics affects economic inequality in American society at large (Bartels 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Kelly 2009; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006). This literature focuses on what the parties mean for entire economic classes or for the gap between the haves and the have-nots. It has not delved into how disparate economic interests relate to the major parties. Instead, social science scholarship typically portrays “business” either as a common bloc of political interests generally aligned with the Republican Party or as aloof from partisanship but eager to curry favor with members in powerful party or committee positions. Rather than supposing business to be a monolith, our research reveals businesses to be a more variegated constellation of interests than commonly thought, exhibiting contrasting stances toward the political parties across sectors of economic activity.

The lack of recent work on the partisan coloration of different business interests is surprising because party systems in the U.S. are traditionally characterized not just by their different social bases and policy positions, but also by the economic interests included in the party coalitions. The first party system, for example, is typically described as pitting New England mercantile and manufacturing interests in the Federalist Party against the agrarian interests represented by the Democratic-Republicans. The cleavage of the party system of 1896-1932 is similarly rendered as southern and western agricultural interests (along with northern Catholics and immigrants) in the Democratic Party vying against the Republicans, the party of

American business and industry. Today's party system expresses no such tension between agriculture and industry. But this does not mean that varied economic interests remain uniformly neutral between the parties or that they are all, as a group, generically Republican-leaning. The contemporary U.S. economy is heterogeneous and complex. A close look at how different business interests ally themselves with or remain aloof from the parties is required to gain a better understanding of the contemporary party system.

A new look at the partisan leanings of economic sectors becomes particularly pressing in a polarized era in which the parties define themselves in opposition to one another in so many other ways. Partisan voting in Congress is at levels not observed in a hundred years (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006). Voters themselves are choosing sides with more clarity, with split-ticket voting having declined. Geography has become a sharper line of cleavage (Oppenheimer 2005, Theriault 2008). To what extent do particular economic interests in the United States take sides in party politics, also?

Although not focusing on economic interests per se, Sinclair (2006, 308) writes: "Interest groups are increasingly firmly aligned with one or the other of the major parties, and, in many cases, are functioning as full-fledged members of one of the two party teams." Similarly, journalist Jeffrey H. Birnbaum (2004) has observed, "More than any time I can remember, business interests have decided to choose sides. . . . Everywhere you look, there are signs that corporate America is growing less and less evenhanded, and more and more Republican." Taking a global look at all the economic sectors that regularly participated in campaign contributing to House members across a decade, this paper seeks to gauge the extent to which party polarization extends to American business interests and to identify specifically which sectors are affected.

We find substantial variation in the extent to which industry sectors are allied with the parties. Almost half of the sectors (47%) analyzed exhibit a party preference. Far more favor the Republican (39.5%) than the Democratic Party (7.4%). On the other hand, slightly more than half of the sectors (53%) conformed to a pattern of giving consistent with political pragmatism or showed no discernible partisan preference at all. Some sectors favor members of whatever party holds a majority. Others give without any apparent attention to members' party affiliation.

Furthermore, we find that the industries that prefer one party are highly concentrated in particular industries. In particular, businesses in natural resource extraction and raw materials manufacturing have a marked and pervasive Republican tilt. In fact, one fifth of all the business sectors that we identify as having a Republican orientation are in these industries alone. Others sectors, such as finance, insurance, and administration and business support services, also slant toward the Republican Party. Almost no sectors exhibit a strong preference for Democrats, but vast swaths of the economy do not take sides in party politics. The bulk of the service economy is largely nonpartisan, in that that most enterprises in service sectors treat the two parties equitably. Nonpartisan sectors include retailing; health care and social assistance services; utilities; and most professional, scientific and technical services. This research sheds new light on the rich assortment of economic interests that make up the party coalitions in the U.S. and suggests interesting implications for both partisan political economy and the study of political influence.

Prior Work on Economic Interests and the Parties

The existing interest groups literature fails to address the relationship between *particular* economic interests and the political parties. Research on corporate political activity rarely

distinguishes among different kinds of business enterprises. Instead, scholars have focused on how corporate interests align differently than labor or ideological groups (Brunell 2005; Herrnson 2012; Rozell, Wilcox, and Franz 2012; Wilcox 1989). Corporate PACs have long given more heavily to Republicans than labor or nonaffiliated PACs; the tilt became more pronounced after the 1994 election (Herrnson 2005, 38). Very few scholars, however, have examined variability across different economic interests. Gopoian (1984), as one exception, compares the contribution behavior across four economic sectors in the 1978 elections. Handler and Mulkern (1982, 7-34), as another, detail variation in corporate contribution strategies in 1980.

What is most striking about the scholarly literature on corporate political activism is the relative lack of interest in the partisan leanings of specific economic interests. An extensive, often sophisticated literature emerged out of theories of collective action, addressing when and why corporations will be active in politics at all (Andres 1985; Grier, Munger and Roberts 1994; Hansen and Mitchell 2000; Hart 2001; Humphries 1991; Masters and Keim 1985; Pittman 1977). But once individual corporations do engage in politics, the relative partisan orientation of that involvement has not been a subject of much research. The *Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups* (2010), a current and comprehensive survey of the literature, contains no chapter on the extent to which political parties in the U.S. encompass or exclude particular economic interests. The lack of such a chapter is not an omission; it is simply not an active area of inquiry in recent political science.

Compared to political scientists, sociologists have devoted more attention to how different economic interests relate to the political parties. Burris (2001) and Burris and Salt (1990) examine corporate giving to Republican and Democratic candidates and find that

contributions from defense, transportation, banking, and utilities firms are less Republican-leaning than other types of industries. Sociological studies, however, fail to control for factors that are known to shape corporate giving, such as party control of Congress, economic geography, electoral competition, and committee structure. The lack of such controls makes it impossible to ascertain the extent to which an industry's campaign contributions to a particular party are merely an artifact of other considerations, such as giving to members who represent districts where a sector's firms and employees are located, or giving to members locked in hard-fought reelection campaigns. Most of this work also predates the far more polarized political parties of the contemporary era.

Campaign Contributions as a Window on Partisan Alliances

Following Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff (2006, 80) we view campaign contributions as a signal that “the group has policy objectives in common with the legislator.” Birnbaum (2006) explains the intuitive logic, “The best way to identify Democrats' friends and foes is to examine patterns of campaign contributions. Groups that have given much of their money to Democrats can be considered their true allies and will likely benefit from the items that Democrats push on Capitol Hill. Groups that have been delivering most of their campaign largesse to Republicans will probably see their druthers suffer under a more Democratic-leaning Congress.” This view has a solid grounding in the empirical literature in that PACs are known to give primarily to political allies, rather than to opponents or fence-sitters (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Wright 1985).² PAC directors are also well aware that the staffs of party leaders and other House members scrutinize FEC disclosures to ascertain any partisan biases (Rozell, Wilcox, and

² For a review of this literature, see Baumgartner and Leech (1998), as well as Baumgartner et al (2009), chapter 10.

Franz 2012, 74-75) so that donating more to candidates of one party than the other sends a political message visible to both sides.

Before drawing any inferences about the partisan leanings of economic sectors, however, it is essential to take account of other considerations that drive business campaign contributions. Corporations also give to campaigns in order to curry favor with powerful members of Congress. They exhibit a longstanding preference for giving to members of the majority party (Cox and Magar 1999; Rudolph 1999). They donate to members of committees with jurisdiction over the policy issues of most concern (Bennett and Loucks 2011, Rozell, Wilcox and Franz 2012). They step up contributions to members facing difficult election campaigns (Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005; Jacobson 1980, Herndon 1982). Perhaps most importantly, economic interests donate to members who represent districts where they have firms and employees (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Wright 1985).

Failing to account for appropriate controls in the analysis can, in some cases, lead firms to appear to have a partisan preference even when they do not. It is especially necessary to take into account the geographic distribution of an economic sector's firms and employment as a possible source of spurious correlation. For example, oil and gas interests are concentrated in states that vote solidly Republican, such as Texas, Oklahoma, Alaska, and Louisiana (Kirkland 2008). One would expect such an industry to donate heavily to Republican House members as a consequence of economic geography, independently of partisanship. Similarly, if a particular party's incumbents face a more challenging electoral climate, one would expect contributions to its members to rise as corporations donate additional funds to those who are actively asking for help. The partisan preferences of economic sectors can be appropriately ascertained only via multivariate analysis of the manifold forces at work.

Data

Our contribution data originate from the FEC detailed files on committee contributions to candidates for five election cycles beginning in 2000, the election of the 107th Congress; and ending in 2010, with the close of the 111th Congress.³ These files contain information on the names and addresses of the interest groups and PACs that contributed to federal candidates during each cycle. The contribution recipient, the recipient's political party, and the amount contributed are recorded. For this paper, we examined only general election contributions to incumbents. Challengers receive a very small percentage of PAC contributions, and the considerations driving contributions to incumbents and challengers are sufficiently different as to require separate analysis.

The major task of data preparation was to classify the PACs into industry sectors, according to the North American Industry Classification System (hereafter NAICS) codes utilized by the U.S. Census.⁴ These codes are a standard used by federal agencies to classify businesses for data collection. NAICS classifications range in their level of specific detail from 2-digit codes, for very broad industry sectors (e.g., Finance and Insurance, Health Care and Social Assistance) to highly specific subsectors coded with 6-digit codes (e.g., Commercial Banking; Offices of Physicians). Our goal was to assign the FEC reported committees and PACs as closely as possible to their appropriate NAICS 6-digit codes. While arduous and time-

³ Files are downloadable from this site: <http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml>, accessed June 30, 2012.

⁴ For more on NAICS codes, see this site: <http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/>, accessed June 30, 2012. New NAICS codes are added as the U.S. economy becomes increasingly diverse, and wholly new industries emerge. For this analysis, we used the 2002 NAICS coding scheme.

consuming, the effort was successful, as we were able to classify 3,478 PACs out of 4,017 listed in the original files (~87%).⁵

This fine-grained classification of economic sectors permits far more accurate controls, particularly for the economic geography of employment. In order to capture corporate PACs' well-known tendency to donate to House members representing districts where they have an industry presence, we are able to use the Zip Code Business Patterns dataset to estimate the number of firms and employees for each sector within every congressional district. Similarly, a detailed classification allows for more accurate determination of the committee of jurisdiction most relevant to an economic interest. The more one aggregates sectors together, using broader classification schemes, the less precise such indicators will be.

In most cases, classifying PACs according to industry sector was surprisingly straightforward. The government watchdog site, www.OpenSecrets.org, sponsored by the Center for Responsive Politics, lists industry codes associated with many business-related PACs and we drew on their coding in many cases.⁶ In other instances, however, we had to use Internet search tools to identify the appropriate industry, or dominant sector of business.

It is important to note that these are industry codes, *not* occupation codes. The codes do not single out, for example, nurses as an occupation, but would instead capture nursing under a variety of detailed medical industry sectors (e.g., Nursing Homes; Hospices; Home Health Care;

⁵ These problem cases proved difficult due to the extraordinarily mixed or heterogeneous nature of their mission and market, but some may yet be classifiable with more extensive research. In less muddled cases, when businesses were discovered to be involved in the production of multiple goods and services across several industry sectors, we classified them within the sector that constituted their largest market.

⁶ In a small number of instances, our choice of industry sector differed from OpenSecrets.org, and in other cases they did not provide an industry code. We drew upon Dun and Bradstreet's business and industry website, Hoovers.com for appropriate NAICS coding. With these procedures and admonitions set forth, we cannot claim that every one of the 2,556 PACs included in the final analysis have been correctly classified by NAICS sector, or that there were not some "informed guesses" that went into the classification.

Offices of Physicians). PACs formed to represent occupations that run across multiple sectors, such as actuaries or aerospace engineers are coded as business or professional associations.

We also classified union membership entities separately. Many previous studies have analyzed labor union campaign contributions (e.g., Francia 2010; Herrnson 2012; Rozell, Wilcox and Franz 2012), and there is little question about the nature of their relationship to the national party system. The exclusion of union organizations here does not mean, however, that the PACs we include are only those associated with firm ownership and management. Some employee groups are represented, such as organizations representing workers in a segment of the health care or aerospace industries, but in all cases the ones we included are non-unionized.⁷

After coding PACs and committees into industry sectors, we made the additional decision to restrict our analysis to the sectors that participated in each of the five cycles and contributed at least \$200,000 in total across this period. By including only the sectors that consistently participated, we could have greater confidence that any patterns in contributing were not attributable to the idiosyncrasies of a particular election cycle. The \$200,000 minimum is a low floor, allowing us to examine the contribution behavior of a wider array of industry sectors than has been attempted in any previous study. The average sector in our data contributed \$4.5 million over the decade. The smallest sector in the analysis contributed \$205,950 across the period; the largest contributed \$50.1 million.

⁷ Helpfully, the FEC data provide a designation of which PACs and committees are union affiliated and which are not.

A First Look

Figure 1 displays each economic sector's ratio of giving to Republican or Democratic House members across the five election cycles between 2000 and 2011. Sectors are ranged left to right from most Democratic to most Republican-leaning.

[Figure 1 here]

We have grouped the sectors using three colors. “Strongly Republican-leaning Sectors,” shown in red, include all sectors (n=66) that donated at least 1.5 as much to Republican members as to Democratic members over the entire decade. “Modestly Republican to Neutral Sectors,” shown in purple, displays all sectors (n=63) with a Republican-to-Democrats donation ratio of 1.49 to 1. “Neutral to Modestly Democratic-leaning Sectors,” shown in blue on the far left of the graph, includes all sectors (n=33) that gave more money to Democrats than to Republicans. A few of the larger contributors in each category are labeled, for purposes of illustration. A complete list of all sectors and the amount they contributed is available in an online appendix.⁸

Just a cursory look at Figure 1 makes an obvious case for closer analysis of the relationship between economic interests and the political parties. It is clear from the data that there is wide variability in how corporate interests relate to the parties. A marked overall preference for Republicans is evident, in that there are far more sectors that give more to Republicans than to Democrats.⁹ But within this broad picture, business interests are not by any means uniformly Republican-leaning. The range is wide, with a few sectors (10%) giving at least three times as much to Republicans as to Democrats and 34 sectors (21%) giving at least

⁸ Web Appendix A containing a list of all sectors, along with their total amounts donated and their Republican: Democratic ratio of giving is downloadable at <https://sites.google.com/site/onlineappendix/>. We do not include it with the text because of its large size.

⁹ There are 66 sectors that gave at least 1.5 times as much to Republicans as to Democrats, but only 3 sectors that gave 1.5 times as much to Democrats as to Republicans.

twice as much. At the same time, there are many venues of economic activity that are generally neutral between the parties.

Multivariate Methods and Models

As discussed above, it is not possible to infer the partisan preferences of economic interests from the basic descriptive data on their campaign contributions. It is necessary to control for other factors that are known to shape resource allocation decisions. To that end, we employ traditional regression analysis, examining PAC giving for each economic sector separately.

The dependent variable in these analyses is the individual PAC's contribution (or non-contribution) to each member of Congress in each election cycle. Because PACs typically give to only a small number of members, rarely to even half the House membership, the distribution of contributions exhibits a right-skew. To facilitate regression estimation, we took the natural log of contribution amounts, adding an offset to account for the zeros. When this data edifice was finally constructed, it summed to just over 3.5 million observations, totaling almost \$750 million in contributions.¹⁰

We organized the data using a standard cross-sectional time-series design, with election cycle as the temporal variable, and the PAC id code as the between subjects or "panel" variable. Since not all PACs participate in every cycle, the data are considered unbalanced for most of the 162 sectors we report.¹¹ The number of cases analyzed varies by sector, depending on the

¹⁰ While this may seem like a modest sum—the two major party nominees for president easily surpassed this level of fundraising and spending in 2012—bear in mind that federal contribution limits permit a multicandidate PAC to give a maximum of only \$5,000 to each candidate per election cycle. Since many PACs give less than the maximum, there are more contributions spread across more candidates than one might appreciate at first glance.

¹¹ Note that all the analyzed industry sectors participated in every cycle, but not every individual PAC included within each sector participated across all five cycles.

number of PACs encompassed by the sector, ranging from a minimum N of 1,991 to a maximum of 295,123. The reported regression estimates were generated using generalized least squares with fixed effects for individual PACs described by Wooldridge (2002), adjusted for clustering of the observations by PAC (Stock and Watson 2008; Kohler and Kreuter 2009). Ordinary least squares estimation is inappropriate because key assumptions about the behavior of the error term are violated (Baltagi 1995; Beck and Katz 1995; Kmenta 1986). Although there are variables in the model that are nearly constant within units across election cycles, the Hausman specification test indicated that fixed effects were superior to assuming there is no correlation between the errors (u_i) and the explanatory variables (\mathbf{X}).¹² Comparing random and fixed effects models, the fixed effects estimates, predictably, proved to be less efficient. But econometric theory maintains that they are more consistent, or less biased, and econometric practice dictates that such trade-offs be decided in favor of unbiasedness.¹³

The model below was estimated for each economic sector. The model is designed to identify whether economic sectors have a consistent preference for a political party, after controlling for other factors. Controls are included to account for the fact that corporate PACs tend to donate more to members (1) of the majority party in Congress, (2) who represent districts where the industry has firms or employees, (3) who face competitive races for reelection, (4) who serve on standing committees important to the industry's interests, and (5) in party or committee leadership positions.

¹² Admittedly, direct examinations of the tenability of this assumption for a number of random effects models for various sectors demonstrated that the correlations between u_i and \mathbf{X} were small in magnitude, typically $r \leq 0.10$. Such modest correlations suggest that there would not be vast differences between fixed and random effects estimation.

¹³ The authors will make the random effects estimates available upon request. All models were estimated with the *Stata*TM xtreg routine.

$$\begin{aligned} \ln Amount_{it} = & \alpha_{it} + \beta RParty_{it} + \beta Partycont_{it} + \beta RParty * Partycont_{it} + \\ & \beta Cycle_{it} + \beta Firms_{it} + \beta Employ_{it} + \beta Compete_{it} + \beta Compnext_{it} + C_{mte_{kit}} \beta_{it} \\ & + \beta Cmtchair_{it} + \beta Majlead_{it} + \beta Minlead_{it} + \mu_{it} \end{aligned}$$

where:

$i = 1 \dots n$ PACs in each economic sector (N varies by sector)

$t = 1 \dots 5$ time points

$k = 1 \dots 15$ standing congressional committees

$\alpha = 1 \dots n$ PAC specific intercepts (not shown)

μ = the error term

$\ln Amount$ is the natural log of the individual PAC's contribution (or non-contribution) to each member of Congress in each cycle.

$RParty$ is a 1,0 nominal variable indicating the member is a Republican.

$Partycont$ is a 1,0 nominal variable indicating that Republicans have a majority in the House.

$RParty * Partycont$ is an interaction term to gauge increased funds flowing to Republicans when they are in the majority.

$Firms$ is the number of establishments or firms in the sector in the congressional district, as reported by Zip Code Business Patterns, an annual count.

$Employ$ is the number of employees per firm in the sector, using the mid-points of employee estimate ranges as reported in the Zip Code Business Patterns data.

$Compete$ is designed to measure district competition in the last election, measured as 100-|(Republican vote %-Democratic vote %)| in the previous House election.

Compnext is coded 1,0 indicating races that are designated as competitive or leaning by the *Cook Political Report* in early-September estimates of each election year.

Cmte_k are a series of 1,0 nominal variables indicating that the incumbent member serves on particular standing committees of Congress, namely Agriculture; Budget; Education & the Workforce; Energy; Financial Services; Government Reform; Homeland Security; International Relations; Judiciary; Armed Services, Natural Resources; Science, Space & Technology; Transportation; and Ways and Means.

Cmtechair is a 1,0 nominal variable indicating that the incumbent member chairs a standing committee of Congress.

Majlead is a 1,0 nominal variable denoting the House speaker, majority leader, and whip.

Minlead is a 1,0 nominal variable denoting the minority leader and whip.

Cycle is the election cycle, or panel variable, taking values from 1 to 5, employed as an explanatory variable chiefly to account for increasing contribution amounts over time.

With the intention of identifying the precise effects for the Democratic Party, the above model was re-estimated a second time for each sector, with the party control dummy variables re-coded so as to reflect when Democrats have a majority in Congress. This was necessary because the interaction term (*Partycont* \times *RParty*) in the above model cannot identify when the contribution recipient is a Democrat under conditions of Democratic majority control. The advantage of running the model twice, isolating contributions to Democrats and Republicans separately, is ease of interpretation. The coefficients for the two party variables (*RParty* and *RParty*Partycont*) in the Republican model indicate whether the sector contributed more to

Republicans than to the typical Democrat (regardless of party status) over the course of the decade, after controls were included. Similarly, the coefficients for the party variables in the Democratic model indicate that the sector donated more to Democrats relative to the typical Republican during the period. A positive coefficient on the interaction term in both the Democratic and Republican models indicates that the sector gave more to whichever party is in the majority.

The presentation of results for 162 cross-sectional time-series regression models is challenging within the conventional confines of an article-length manuscript. Full results are available for closer inspection in a web appendix.¹⁴

Results for Control Variables

Before turning to our main emphasis, the partisan leanings of economic sectors, we briefly address the results for the important control variables in the model. These controls perform largely as expected, though there is variability across sectors. Figure 2 summarizes the frequency with which these control variables had the expected, statistically significant effects across the various regression analyses.

[Figure 2 here]

Most economic sectors exhibit a preference for giving to members of a particular congressional committee. The favored committee varies in unsurprising ways, with mining sectors donating more to members of the Energy and Natural Resources committees, transportation sectors preferring members of the Transportation committee, health care sectors

¹⁴ Web Appendix B containing all model results is downloadable at <https://sites.google.com/site/onlineappendix/>.

contributing more to members of Ways and Means, banking and finance sectors giving more to members of the Financial Services Committee. Overall 77% of sectors showed a preference for members of a particular committee or set of committees.¹⁵

Similarly, a large share of business PACs focused their contributions on members representing districts where their commercial-industrial sector has firms or employees. For 51% of sectors, one of the two measures of economic geography, number of sector firms (*Firms*) or average number of employees (*Employ*), had a statistically significant, positive effect on contributions. Typically, one but not both of these variables would perform as anticipated. Given that some industries are far more labor-intensive than others, it is not surprising that the performance of these two measures varied across types of economic enterprise, though we were not able to predict *a priori* which of the two would perform better for any given sector.¹⁶ Impressionistically, the results suggest that capital intense sectors with large investments in factories or facilities (e.g., manufacturing and mining sectors) were more likely to target contributions toward members according to economic geography. Meanwhile, sectors that have a presence across most parts of the country (e.g., real estate agencies, grocery stores) were less likely to show a geographic effect.

Consistent with previous research (Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe and Bartels 2005, Herndon 1982, Jacobson 1980), electoral competition had an undeniable influence. Most sectors stepped up their giving to incumbents facing tough races. The variable designating the races rated as competitive or leaning by the *Cook Political Report*, takes a positive, statistically

¹⁵ It appears that the sectors that were less likely to show a preference for members of a particular committee were ones where jurisdictional lines are less clear. For example, only 63% of the sectors in retail favored a particular committee, given that policy matters affecting retail are handled by a variety of committees. Meanwhile, all of the sectors in agriculture, mining, and utilities had a committee preference, all areas where jurisdictional authority are more clear.

¹⁶ There is some correlation between the number of firms and employees across congressional districts, though not extremely high (for 2009-10 cycle, $r=.379$; $p\leq.01$).

significant coefficient in 46% of the models. The measure reflecting the competitiveness of the district in the previous election, *Compete*, was a statistically significant predictor of additional contributions for 33% of sectors. At least one of these measures of competitiveness had the expected effect in 58% of the models, indicating that most business sectors sought to assist embattled incumbents, but used different contribution strategies for targeting them, some relying on early indicators of past electoral performance, other sectors reacting to indicators of electoral competition as the race unfolds.

Finally, a substantial share of sectors rewarded congressional leaders with additional funds. Model results indicated that 49% of sectors allocated additional funds to the majority party's elected leaders and 47% contributed more to the minority party's elected leaders. Around half (48%) of sectors contributed more to members who chaired standing committees.

Results for the Partisan Leanings of Economic Sectors

After having taken into account these influences that are known to shape how businesses allocate campaign contributions, we are now in a position to determine which economic sectors have a partisan tilt and which do not. As discussed above, our model employs an interaction term to take account of the fact that the partisan preference of economic interests is likely to be mediated by which party holds a majority in the House of Representatives. Interaction terms, however, complicate the task of model interpretation. Including the interaction term means that the models do not have a single, summary coefficient indicating the unique effect of an incumbent's partisan affiliation.

Including the interaction term in the model makes the effect of a member's party affiliation contingent upon which party is in the majority. Hence, it is necessary to consider four

coefficients for each sector in order to ascertain its partisan preference (if any): *RParty*, which reflects the effect of being a Republican under conditions of Democratic party control; *Rparty x Partycont*, which shows the effect of being a Republican when Republicans have a chamber majority; *DParty*, which reflects the effect of being a Democrat under conditions of Republican party control; and *Dparty x Partycont*, which measures the effect of being a Democrat when Democrats hold a majority.

To determine which sectors exhibit a party preference, we use these coefficients to look for sectors that do not treat the two parties even-handedly. A sector has a party tilt when the estimated coefficients indicate:

- (1) it gives more to members of one party than to the other, even when the preferred party is in the minority (a positive, statistically significant coefficient for one of either *RParty* or *DParty*), OR
- (2) it penalizes only one party when it is in the minority (a negative, statistically significant coefficient for one of either *RParty* or *DParty*), OR
- (3) gives more to one party's members when it holds a majority, but does not do likewise for the other party when it holds a majority (a positive, statistically significant coefficient for either *Rparty x Partycont* or *Dparty x Partycont*, but not both).

In many cases, a sector shows a definite party inclination, as indicated by one or more of the above criteria, but will also engage in pragmatic giving for the opposing party when it holds a majority (as indicated by a positive, statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term for the opposing party). Sectors without a party tilt fall into two categories: those that give without reference to party (no statistically significant coefficients for any of the party variables), and

those that boost their giving to whichever party is in the majority (statistically significant coefficients for both interaction terms, but not for either *RParty* or *DParty*).

Table 1 lists the sectors that fall into each category. (For additional information, Appendix A displays all the party-related coefficients for each sector.) A sector's placement in these categories is based simply on the sign and statistical significance of the party support variables discussed above. In making these classifications, we do not impose a particular threshold requirement regarding the extent of the partisan preference (as in, the relative size of the coefficients). A sector is identified as partisan, even if the additional amount it contributes to the members of its preferred party is not large, as long as the coefficient(s) for the key party variables is (are) statistically different from zero. The sectors included in each category make sense, given the raw data on sectors' ratio of donating to Republican and Democratic House members, displayed in Figure 1. Most of the sectors donating more than 1.5 times as much to Republicans overall were found to have a Republican preference after estimating the model with the control variables included. Nearly all of the sectors that were found to have a Democratic preference had given more to Democratic incumbents than to Republicans.

[Table 1 here]

Still, it is important to note that the inclusion of the control variables reveals that many sectors that contributed more to Republican than to Democratic House members did not have a genuine party preference, once other influences on their giving were factored into the model. About half of sectors (49%) that gave lopsidedly to Republicans overall were shown not to have a party preference, once the control variables like majority party, electoral competition, economic geography, and committee membership were taken into account.

The results indicate considerable variability in the relationship between economic interests and the political parties. There are some industrial-commercial sectors that clearly prefer one political party across the board. For purposes of illustration, Figure 3 displays giving patterns for three major donor sectors with a consistent partisan preference. The figure shows the predicted contribution amounts for House members, under varying conditions of party control, along with confidence intervals around the estimates.¹⁷

[Figure 3 here]

Each of these sectors prefers one party to the other, regardless of which party has a House majority. After taking account of all the other factors that influence its giving, the Meat Processing sector (which encompasses firms that slaughter animals, and render, cut, can, and freeze meat products) donates approximately 1.3 times as much to Republicans as to Democrats, even when Democrats control the House. Similarly, Support Operations for Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction (which includes firms that explore, survey, prepare, and maintain wells) still gives 13% more to Republicans than to Democrats even when Republicans are in the minority; its tilt toward Republicans is steeper when Republicans have a majority. On the other hand, Sugarcane Mills prefer Democrats, who are more favorable to the import tariffs that raise the price of U.S. sugar.¹⁸ “Big Sugar” may have been more pragmatic in its giving in the past, but it gave more to Democrats than to Republicans no matter which party had a House majority throughout the 2000-2010 period. The results suggest that the sugar industry gives more to

¹⁷ Predictions calculated while holding all other independent variables at their means for continuous variables or at their modes for categorical variables. The dependent variable displayed is the predicted contribution amount; 90% confidence intervals are displayed because most of the hypotheses in the analysis are directional.

¹⁸ Prominent Republicans, including Presidential candidate Mitt Romney and Republican Agriculture Committee Chairman Sen. Richard Lugar, have supported measures to end the sugar subsidy, as have key Republican-leaning interest groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and Americans for Tax Reform, headed by Grover Norquist (Green 2012).

Republicans when they are in the majority than when they are in the minority, but the relevant coefficient ($R_{party} \times Partycont$) is not statistically significant.

[Figure 3 here]

Figure 4 illustrates the donation patterns of three sectors that reveal a party preference, but also engage in pragmatic giving to the opposing party. As is evident here, and from the coefficients in Appendix A, each of these sectors boosts giving to its non-preferred party when it controls the House. Note that all three also step up contributions to its preferred party when it holds the majority. The Pharmaceutical Preparations sector, for example, strongly prefers Republicans in that Republicans are always predicted to receive more than Democrats. Nevertheless, the sector contributes 30% more to Democrats when they are in the majority compared to when they are in the minority. Similarly, it donates more than 25% more to Republicans when they are in the majority, compared to when they are in the minority. Similarly, the Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction sector prefers Republicans across the board, but it gives more to Democrats when they are in the majority. Finally, the Offices of Lawyers sector (which encompasses private practices and law firms)¹⁹ shows a slight tilt toward the Democrats. Note that this sector appeared strongly Democratic when only the raw contributions were examined,²⁰ but it exhibits a more modest Democratic preference after taking account of the controls.

[Figure 4 here]

Figure 5 illustrates the contribution patterns for sectors with no party preference. Two are sectors that engage in pragmatic giving to the majority party, the third gives without regard to

¹⁹ Unfortunately, the NAICS coding system does not permit us to differentiate between firms or attorneys primarily representing plaintiffs or defendants or specializing in civil or criminal cases.

²⁰ As shown in Figure 1, the Republican:Democratic ratio of total contributions for Offices of Lawyers is .57, making it one of the most strongly Democratic of all economic sectors.

party. There is no statistically significant difference between the two parties in the amounts that the Credit Unions sector contribute to House members, once other considerations that shape their contribution strategies have been taken into account. The Offices of Physicians and the Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation sectors are pragmatic, in that they raise their contributions to the majority party, but they do not have a consistent party preference.

[Figure 5 here]

Taken together, our results make known the extensive variation in how different economic interests relate to the two parties. More than half the sectors (n=86, 53%) make campaign contributions without any discernible preference for a political party. Of these, the majority (n=76) show no responsiveness to political party *at all*, once other factors influencing their allocation decisions have been taken into account. The rest engage in pragmatic giving (n=10), in which the majority party receives an increase, regardless of its identity. On the other hand, the other half of economic sectors (n=76, 47%) has a party preference. Of these, the vast majority (n=66, 87%) favor the Republican Party. Among sectors with a party preference, however, we also see variation in the extent to which they respond to shifts in party control of the House. Most partisan sectors (65%) will give a boost to their non-preferred party when it controls the House. But there is also a substantial group of partisan sectors (n=27) that does not adjust its behavior when its less preferred party has a House majority.²¹

Every one of these categories is important for a complete picture of how economic interests participate in campaign contributing. All the categories encompass major sectors in terms of total campaign contributions. Across the board, the pragmatic sectors are the largest contributors. Figure 6 compares the total amounts contributed by Republican, Democratic, and

²¹ There are not systematic differences between partisan and nonpartisan sectors in terms of how well the control variables perform. The allocation decisions of all sectors, both partisan and nonpartisan, are shaped to some extent by factors such as economic geography, electoral competition, and committee jurisdiction.

nonpartisan sectors, depending on whether they also engaged in pragmatic giving. Pragmatic Republican sectors are much bigger contributors than Republican sectors that do not exhibit pragmatic giving; the same is true among the sectors that lean toward the Democrats. Similarly, among sectors with no party preference, the sectors that systematically increase their contributions to the majority party are much larger givers than those that do not. These findings reveal that the largest “players” in the campaign contributing universe are also more strategic in that they take greater cognizance of whatever party is in power.

[Figure 6 here]

Broader Patterns in Partisan Political Economy

The detailed analysis of contributions to House members presented here provides insight into the ways different economic interests relate to the contemporary party system. Using campaign contributions as a window into partisan alliances reveals that a subset of economic interests are politicized in partisan terms. Although corporate campaign contributions do favor Republicans overall, closer, disaggregated examination shows that this preference is not uniform across all sectors of the economy and is, in fact, concentrated within a relative few industries.

[Table 2 here]

Table 2 groups our findings on the partisan preferences of individual sectors under wider industry categories, as measured by 2-digit NAICS codes. These broader industry categories are ranged from most-to-least Republican leaning, as measured by the difference between their share of subsectors tilting Republican and the share favoring Democrats. These subsets of similar cases reveal clear patterns. At the top of the listing in Table 2 are the strongly Republican-leaning extractive industries: *all* of the politically active sectors in mining show a preference for

Republicans. Included in this category are crude petroleum and natural gas extraction; bituminous coal underground and surface mining; support for oil and gas operations (which includes exploration, surveying, drilling, and treating wells), and support for metal mining (prospecting and site preparation services for extracting metal ores).

The effect apparently carries downstream through related sectors of the economy. The manufacturing interests that are closest to the extractive industries also lean Republican. Among raw materials manufacturing sectors, those that tend Republican bear a close relationship to mining in its various forms: petroleum refineries and nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing (involving mined or quarried minerals and chemical manufacturing).

Other Republican-leaning sectors in raw materials manufacturing are pesticides and other agricultural preparations, pharmaceutical preparations, and basic inorganic chemicals (such as gases, dyes, alkalis, bleaches, and fertilizers). The nonpartisan sectors in raw materials manufacturing are generally smaller, specialized industries farther removed from mining interests, such as manufacturing glass, polish, adhesives, paper, and commercial lithographic printing.

Utilities is one broad industry category that is bifurcated along party lines, with two of its sectors leaning Democratic and two leaning Republican. This appears to relate to the parties' different positions on energy issues. The two Republican-leaning utilities sectors involve electric power, an industry reliant on fossil fuels confronted by many environmental regulations. The two Democratic-leaning sectors are Water Distribution Systems, which receive considerable infrastructure grants from government to which Democrats are more favorable, and Alternative Energy Production- Wind and Solar.

Finance and Insurance is a clearly Republican-leaning sector of the economy. In fact, all of the insurance sectors active in campaign contributing favor Republicans, including those for life, medical, title, and crop insurance. Financial services sectors either lean Republican in their giving or are nonpartisan or pragmatic; none are Democratic-leaning. The Republican-leaning financial sectors are commercial banking, credit card issuing, investment banking, and sales financing. Among the financial subsectors, only five are nonpartisan or pragmatic in their giving: credit unions, farm mortgage lenders, savings institutions, non-depository credit intermediation,²² and “miscellaneous intermediation.”²³

Outside the extractive industries, finance and insurance, the sectors that lean Republican are more varied. Generally speaking, it appears that Democratic Party positions on specific regulatory issues play a role in driving some sectors to the Republican Party. In food manufacturing, tobacco products and meat processing are supportive of Republicans, probably relating to partisan divisions over tobacco and the many workplace regulations affecting meat processing. Alone among accommodation and food service sectors, hotels and limited service (i.e., fast food) restaurants are Republican-leaning, likely stemming from Democratic Party positions on minimum wage and other labor regulations.

Economic interests that are largely nonpartisan, however, include massive swaths of the U.S. economy, including most all the retail trade and service sectors: health care and social assistance services; professional, scientific and technical services; information; arts, entertainment and recreation. A few categories of health care providers have a Republican tilt (nursing homes, home health care, general hospitals), but most sectors in this area are either

²² This sector includes consumer cash lending secured by personal property, short term inventory credit, and agricultural lending (except for real estate lending).

²³ “Miscellaneous intermediation” are establishments that act as principals in buying or selling of financial contracts on a spread basis, such as venture capital companies, investment clubs, dealers in mineral royalties.

nonpartisan or pragmatic, including offices of physicians, mental health therapists, optometrists, chiropractors, dentists, and offices of physicians. Several health care sectors show a notable preference for Democrats, including nurse practitioners, physical and speech therapists, dialysis centers, and diagnostic laboratories. Among professional, scientific, and technical services, only administrative management consulting services, accounting services, and outdoor advertising are Republican-leaning. Meanwhile, veterinarians, public relations firms, architects, and tax preparers are either pragmatic or nonpartisan, and lawyers and engineers lean Democratic. Retail is entirely nonpartisan. The major retailing interests, including pharmacies, grocery stores, gasoline stations, clothing, and motor vehicle dealers are all nonpartisan according to the multivariate analysis.

“The Business Community” and the Contemporary Party System

This study exploits the campaign contribution behavior of corporate PACs over a decade in order to gain systematic insight into the economic interests that align with the contemporary political parties. By differentiating among economic sectors using the maximum amount of detail available in Census Bureau industry classifications, we were able to ascertain the extent to which particular industry sectors exhibit a preference for a political party, while using the most precise measures available to control for other factors known to affect corporate giving.

This detailed differentiation of industries allows for the most disaggregated look to date at the way different corporate interests orient themselves to political parties in the U.S. We uncovered a wide variety of relationships and strategies that corporate interests pursue. Notably, some show a distinct preference for a party regardless of its majority or minority status in Congress. Others have a party preference, while allocating contributions pragmatically when

their non-preferred party commands a congressional majority. Others just give more to whatever party is in power, without a preference between them. Still others do not seem to even take party into account in their contributions.

“Business” is not monolithic. Even though corporate campaign contributions lean Republican in the aggregate, much insight can be gained by taking a closer look at precisely which industries favor one of the parties and which do not, and by how much. We might not go quite as far as David M. Hart (2004, 49) in concluding that “there simply is no such thing as ‘business’ in American politics.” But we fully agree with his call for political science to pay more attention to the variety of economic interests in the U.S. and the different relationships they bear and forge to contemporary political parties.

Differing types of relationships between economic interests and the parties are not distributed randomly throughout the entire economy. The most partisan sectors are greatly concentrated in a relatively small share of broad industry classifications. Expansive parts of the U.S. economy employing millions of people remain undefined by partisan cleavages, including most retail trades and nearly all service sectors outside of finance, insurance, and real estate. To return to the question of the party polarization of economic interests in the U.S., only around half the sectors that are consistently active in campaign contributions exhibit any partisan preference. Of those that do, these alignments evidently have much to do with the parties’ diverging issue positions on energy issues and other labor and regulatory controversies.

One clear picture that emerges from this study is the centrality of environmental issues to how different economic interests relate to the present party system. Industries either engaged in or bearing a clear relationship to natural resource extraction alone account for more than one fifth of all the economic sectors identified as having a Republican preference. If one adds

Finance and Insurance and Primary Metal Manufacturing, just three broad types of economic enterprises account for around half of all the sectors that lean Republican. Plainly, partisan differences on regulatory and labor issues lie at the root of such Republican loyalties.

Finally, this variation in the way different economic interests interact with the parties sheds light on the specific interests that make up the parties themselves. After all, political parties exist to represent particular interests and policy preferences expressed within society. When specific industries exhibit a systematic and enduring preference for one party over another, the pattern contains information on what the party system is all about. Simultaneously, when whole segments of the economy seem to exhibit no partiality to party, we can also learn, to a great extent, what the party system is simply *not* about.

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Table 1: Campaign Donations to Republicans and Democrats, controlling for Party in Power and other Factors, by Sector, 107th-111th Congresses

Republican Preference, No Pragmatic Giving to Democrats (n=22)

Couriers	Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations	Textile and Fabric Finishing (except Broadwoven Fabric) Mill
Bio Fuel and Petroleum Refining	Business Support Services: Credit Bureaus	Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing
Gas pipeline operation	Motion Picture and Video Production	Other Engine Equipment Manufacturing
Credit Card Banking	Direct Title Insurance Carriers	Machine Tool (Metal Cutting Types) Manufacturing
Logging	Rice Milling	Greeting Card Publishing
Computers Manufacturing	Credit and Collection Agencies	Forest Fire Prevention
Meat Processed from Carcasses	Security Services	Automatic teller machines (ATM) manufacturing
Administrative Management and General Management Consulting Services	Advertising Outdoor	

Republican Preference, W/ Pragmatic Giving to Democrats (n=42)

Commercial Banking	Tobacco Product Manufacturing	Home Health agencies
Pharmaceutical Preparations	Lessors of Residential Buildings and Dwellings	Support Activities for Metal Mining
Aircraft Manufacturing	Consumer Credit Unsecured Cash Loans	Sales Financing
Accounting	Nursing Care Facilities	Audio and Video Equipment Manufacturing
Direct Life Insurance Carriers	All Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing	Carburetor, Piston, Piston Ring, and Valve Manufacturing
Investment Banking and Securities Dealing	All Other Miscellaneous Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	Plastic Packaging Film and Sheet Manufacturing
Insurance Agencies and Brokerages	Crop Insurance	Photographic film, cloth, paper, and plate, sensitized, man
Electric Power Distribution	Software Publishers	Truck Trailer Manufacturing
Business Associations	Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation	Magazine Printing and Publishing
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, and Direct Health and Medical Insurance Carriers	Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless	Current-Carrying Wiring Device Manufacturing
Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control	Bituminous Coal and Lignite Surface Mining	Real Estate Appraisers
General Hospitals	Health Maintenance	Commercial property managing
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction	Pesticide and Other Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing	
Limited Service Restaurants	Distilleries	
	Hotels (except Casino Hotels) and Motels	

Democratic Preference, No Pragmatic Giving to Republicans (n=5)

Sugarcane Mills
 Beet Sugar Manufacturing
 Breakfast Cereal Manufacturing
 Diagnostic Laboratories

Democratic Preference, W/ Pragmatic Giving to Republicans (n=7)

Offices of Lawyers
 Offices of Physical, Occupational and Speech Therapists, and
 Nurse Practitioners
 Engineering Services
 Alternative Energy Production – Wind & Solar
 Kidney and Liver Dialysis Centers
 Water Distribution

Pragmatic Sectors W/ No Party Preference (n=10)

Offices of Physicians	Freight Trucking
Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation	Forging Steel
Surgical Appliance and Supplies Manufacturing	Deep Sea Passenger
Commodity Contracts Brokerage	Construction, Mining, and Forestry Machinery and Equipment Rental
Public Relations Agencies	Financial Transaction Processing

Sectors W/ No Party Preference (n=76, columns are continuous through next page)

Offices of Real Estate Agents and Brokers	Savings Banks	Clothing Accessories Stores
New Car Dealers	Semiconductor devices manufacturing	Beverages Soft Drinks
Credit Unions	Dairy Canning	Automotive Engines and Parts
Offices of Dentists	Cosmetics, Beauty Supplies, and Perfume Stores	Polish and Other Sanitation Good Manufacturing
Farm Mortgage Lending	Other Sound Recording Industries	Tax Preparation Services
Instruments and Related Products Manufacturing for Measuring	Offices of Mental Health Practitioners (except Physicians)	Architectural Services
All Other Nondepository Credit Intermediation	Nuclear Electric Power Generation	Waste Collection
Pharmacies	Veterinary Services	Commercial Lithographic Printing
Ship Building and Repairing	Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and Tank Component Manufacturing	Bakeries

Beverages, beer, ale, and malt liquors, manufacturing	Guided missile and space vehicle manufacturing	Adhesive Manufacturing
Grocery Stores	Chiropractor's Clinics	Glass Fiber Manufacturing
Automobile Manufacturing	Passenger Car Rental	Berries Canning Mfg
Deep Sea Freight	Offices of Physicians, Mental Health Specialists	All Other Motor Vehicle Dealers
Aircraft Charter Services	Funeral Homes and Funeral Services	General Rental Centers
Offices of Optometrists	Specialty Canning	Computer and Office Machine Repair and Maintenance
Light Fixture Stores	Other Technical and Trade Schools	Ambulance Services
Miscellaneous Intermediation	Real Estate Property Management	Laboratory Equipment
Motion Picture and Video Distribution	All Other Miscellaneous Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing	Nuts Harvesting
Casino Hotels	Sports Teams and Clubs	Bus and Other Motor Vehicle Transit Systems
Snack and Nonalcoholic Beverage Bars	Securities and Commodity Exchanges	Glass Product Manufacturing Made of Purchased Glass
Gasoline Service Stations	Natural Gas Distribution	Other Metal Container Manufacturing
Automatic Vending Machine Manufacturing	Coated and Laminated Packaging Paper and Plastics Film Manufacturing	Food Service Contractors
Heavy Duty Truck Manufacturing	Construction Equipment	Carpet and Upholstery Cleaning Services
Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing	Investment Trust Management	Peanut Shelling
Paper (except Newsprint) Mills	Boat Building	
Convention Centers	Newspaper Publishers	


Source: Classifications are based on the regression results for each sector from the model shown on p. 14. Sectors are ranged in descending order of their total contributions down the columns, so the largest givers in each category are in the left hand column.

Table 2: Partisanship of Economic Sectors, Grouped By 2-Digit NAICS Code

	N	Republican- leaning	Democratic- leaning	Non- Partisan	Prag- matic	R-D Difference
Mining & Logging	4	100.0				100.0
Administration and Support Services	5	60.0		40.0		60.0
Information	7	57.1		42.9		57.1
Finance and Insurance	19	52.7		36.8	10.5	52.7
Agriculture and Forestry	4	50.0		50.0		50.0
Raw Materials Mfg	14	50.0		50.0		50.0
Accommodation and Food Service	5	40.0		60.0		40.0
Transportation & Warehousing	8	37.5		37.5	25.0	37.5
Primary Metal Mfg	29	38.0	3.4	58.6		34.6
Other services	3	33.3		66.7		33.3
Real Estate and Rentals	9	33.3		55.6	11.1	33.3
Food and Textile Mfg	14	35.7	21.4	42.9		14.3
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services	9	33.3	22.2	33.4	11.1	11.1
Retail	8			100.0		0
Utilities	7	29.0	29.0	28.0	14.0	0
Health Care and Social Assistance Services	15	26.7	26.7	40.0	6.6	0
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation	1			100.0		0
Educational Services	1			100.0		0


Source: Table 2 summarizes data in Table 1, listing the number and partisan tilt of the 6-digit NAICS sectors as grouped into broader 2-digit NAICS categories. These broader NAICS categories are ranged from most- to least- Republican leaning, as measured by the difference between the share of subsectors within each that tilts Republican and the share that tilts Democratic.

Figure 1: Partisanship of Campaign Donations to Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, by Economic Sector, 107th-111th Congresses




Note: Two outliers have been deleted due to extreme values.

Figure 2: Key Control Variables Affecting U.S. House Incumbents' Campaign Receipts, 107th-111th Congresses




Source: Bars identify the share of sectors in which the variables have a positive, statistically significant effect on House incumbents' receipts.


Figure 3: Predicted Contribution Amounts, Controlling for Majority Party, for Three Sectors With a Party Preference



Panel A




Panel B




Panel C


Figure 4: Predicted Contribution Amounts, Controlling for Majority Party, for Three Pragmatic Sectors With a Party Preference



Panel A




Panel B




Panel C


Figure 5: Predicted Contribution Amounts, Controlling for Majority Party, for Nonpartisan and Pragmatic Sectors



Panel A




Panel B



Panel C

Figure 6: Average Totals Contributed, Sectors Classified by Party Preference



T-test difference of means, ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Appendix A: Campaign Donations to Republicans and Democrats, controlling for Party in Power and other Factors, by Sector, 107th-111th Congresses

	Republican when Ds are in majority (RParty)	Democrat when Rs are in majority (DParty)	Republican when Rs hold majority (RParty x partycont)	Democrat when Ds hold majority (DParty x partycont)
Republican-tilting sectors (n=64)	Coeff (std. error)	Coeff (std. error)	Coeff (std. error)	Coeff (std. error)
<i>Republican Preference, No Pragmatic Giving to Democrats (n=22)</i>				
Logging	0.130 (0.090)	-0.343* (0.157)	0.208 (0.108)	0.186 (0.109)
Forest Fire Prevention	-0.088 (0.040)	-0.014* (0.002)	0.119 (0.050)	0.114 (0.040)
Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations	0.133* (0.053)	-0.202 (0.102)	0.074 (0.065)	0.076 (0.066)
Rice Milling	0.055 (0.033)	-0.095*** (0.011)	0.034 (0.032)	0.007 (0.028)
Meat Processed from Carcasses	0.184 (0.111)	-0.434** (0.115)	0.244* (0.090)	0.171 (0.083)
Textile and Fabric Finishing (except Broadwoven Fabric) Mill	0.0005 (0.057)	-0.094** (0.023)	0.104 (0.059)	0.084 (0.054)
Bio Fuel and Petroleum Refining	0.371 (0.242)	-0.396* (0.181)	0.021 (0.140)	0.023 (0.142)
Machine Tool (Metal Cutting Types) Manufacturing	0.152* (0.009)	-0.381 (0.171)	0.235 (0.175)	0.252 (0.188)
Other Engine Equipment Manufacturing	0.331* (0.162)	-0.841*** (0.132)	-0.297 (0.210)	0.326 (0.209)
Automatic teller machines (ATM) manufacturing	-0.193 (0.118)	-0.089 (0.096)	0.478** (0.153)	-0.311 (0.152)
Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing	0.195 (0.248)	-0.375 (0.244)	0.176* (0.007)	0.174 (0.024)
Gas pipeline operation	0.124 (0.063)	-0.212** (0.075)	0.100 (0.073)	0.108 (0.071)
Couriers	0.277 (0.221)	-1.712* (0.264)	1.448 (0.501)	1.434 (0.496)
Greeting Card Publishing	-0.072 (0.127)	0.115 (0.103)	0.510** (0.163)	0.113 (0.163)
Motion Picture and Video Production	0.070 (0.043)	-0.211* (0.076)	0.138 (0.103)	0.168 (0.102)
Credit Card Banking	0.243* (0.075)	-0.364* (0.114)	0.121 (0.197)	0.134 (0.179)
Direct Title Insurance Carriers	0.111* (0.042)	-0.158* (0.054)	0.041 (0.034)	0.027 (0.030)
Administrative Management and General Management Consul	-0.049 (0.043)	-0.073* (0.031)	0.119 (0.069)	0.138 (0.077)
Advertising Outdoor	-0.034 (0.064)	-0.206* (0.071)	0.236 (0.123)	0.242 (0.127)
Credit and Collection Agencies	0.203	-0.874*	0.702	0.632

	Republican when Ds are in majority (RParty)	Democrat when Rs are in majority (DParty)	Republican when Rs hold majority (RParty x partycont)	Democrat when Ds hold majority (DParty x partycont)
Business Support Services: Credit Bureaus	(0.293) 0.129 (0.129)	(0.015) -0.180* (0.053)	(0.310) 0.046 (0.100)	(0.304) 0.066 (0.101)
Security Services	-0.036 (0.050)	-0.233* (0.092)	0.277 (0.141)	0.287 (0.142)
<i>Republican Preference, w/ Pragmatic Giving to Democrats in the Majority (n=42)</i>				
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction	0.308* (0.120)	-0.592** (0.186)	0.290** (0.098)	0.290** (0.095)
Bituminous Coal and Lignite Surface Mining	0.166 (0.090)	-0.402* (0.153)	0.234** (0.082)	0.222** (0.077)
Support Activities for Metal Mining	0.039 (0.035)	-0.217* (0.068)	0.171* (0.073)	0.177* (0.068)
Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control	-0.013 (0.043)	-0.157*** (0.034)	0.176*** (0.048)	0.168*** (0.048)
Electric Power Distribution	0.025 (0.028)	-0.198*** (0.048)	0.175*** (0.046)	0.177*** (0.046)
Distilleries	-0.057 (0.043)	-0.086** (0.027)	0.152** (0.045)	0.154** (0.041)
Tobacco Product Manufacturing	0.400 (0.208)	-0.664* (0.249)	0.270* (0.112)	0.257* (0.113)
All Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing	0.042 (0.034)	-0.273*** (0.067)	0.225** (0.067)	0.223** (0.066)
Pesticide and Other Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing	0.063 (0.037)	-0.202*** (0.042)	0.137** (0.045)	0.136** (0.044)
Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing	0.030 (0.020)	-0.515*** (0.088)	0.484*** (0.082)	0.501*** (0.084)
Photographic film, cloth, paper, and plate, sensitized, man	-0.243 (0.167)	-0.241*** (0.135)	0.818*** (0.216)	0.220*** (0.215)
Plastic Packaging Film and Sheet Manufacturing	0.512** (0.164)	-0.560*** (0.133)	0.346 (0.212)	0.841*** (0.211)
All Other Miscellaneous Nonmetallic Mineral Product Mfg	0.142* (0.060)	-0.479*** (0.122)	0.319*** (0.086)	0.325*** (0.085)
Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communication	0.001 (0.036)	-0.273* (0.093)	0.287* (0.095)	0.299** (0.088)
Audio and Video Equipment Manufacturing	0.055 (0.091)	-0.562 (0.061)	0.533* (0.030)	0.543* (0.032)
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, and	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.190* (0.080)	0.219** (0.076)	0.239** (0.079)
Current-Carrying Wiring Device Manufacturing	-0.082 (0.152)	-0.259** (0.123)	1.213*** (0.197)	0.475** (0.196)
Truck Trailer Manufacturing	-0.031 (0.061)	-0.219** (0.031)	0.267** (0.041)	0.252** (0.030)
Carburetor, Piston, Piston Ring, and Valve Manufacturing	-0.239 (0.165)	-1.125*** (0.134)	0.607** (0.213)	1.233*** (0.212)

	Republican when Ds are in majority (RParty)	Democrat when Rs are in majority (DParty)	Republican when Rs hold majority (RParty x partycont)	Democrat when Ds hold majority (DParty x partycont)
Aircraft Manufacturing	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.278*** (0.060)	0.276*** (0.072)	0.286*** (0.075)
Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation	0.001 (0.089)	-0.210*** (0.053)	0.182** (0.054)	0.171** (0.050)
Magazine Printing and Publishing	-0.019 (0.009)	-0.131* (0.037)	0.156* (0.037)	0.178* (0.035)
Software Publishers	-0.036 (0.027)	-0.222* (0.085)	0.267** (0.090)	0.274** (0.090)
Commercial Banking	0.042** (0.015)	-0.124*** (0.024)	0.080*** (0.021)	0.082*** (0.020)
Sales Financing	0.131 (0.204)	-0.408*** (0.166)	0.698** (0.264)	0.507** (0.263)
Consumer Credit Unsecured Cash Loans	-0.078 (0.064)	-0.120* (0.050)	0.197* (0.070)	0.208** (0.069)
Investment Banking and Securities Dealing	0.024 (0.022)	-0.182*** (0.041)	0.160** (0.049)	0.172*** (0.047)
Direct Life Insurance Carriers	0.047 (0.043)	-0.197** (0.072)	0.155** (0.050)	0.159** (0.048)
Direct Health and Medical Insurance Carriers	0.048 (0.034)	-0.231** (0.074)	0.185** (0.057)	0.184** (0.058)
Crop Insurance	0.008 (0.029)	-0.177** (0.055)	0.166** (0.053)	0.162** (0.058)
Insurance Agencies and Brokerages	0.091* (0.037)	-0.289*** (0.059)	0.200*** (0.041)	0.203*** (0.041)
Lessors of Residential Buildings and Dwellings	0.050 (0.044)	-0.286** (0.081)	0.234* (0.087)	0.238* (0.088)
Commercial property managing	-0.090 (0.118)	-0.820*** (0.096)	0.383* (0.153)	0.705** (0.152)
Real Estate Appraisers	-0.082 (0.131)	-0.273* (0.107)	0.346* (0.168)	0.394* (0.167)
Accounting	0.395* (0.138)	-1.273** (0.330)	0.848* (0.289)	0.853* (0.283)
Health Maintenance	0.021 (0.034)	-0.207* (0.089)	0.186* (0.080)	0.191* (0.085)
Home Health agencies	0.017 (0.024)	-0.124** (0.041)	0.099** (0.030)	0.113** (0.030)
General Hospitals	-0.058 (0.040)	-0.062* (0.024)	0.126** (0.043)	0.126** (0.043)
Nursing Care Facilities	-0.080 (0.045)	-0.267* (0.107)	0.355* (0.132)	0.349* (0.134)
Hotels (except Casino Hotels) and Motels	0.038 (0.077)	-0.308* (0.119)	0.261** (0.071)	0.268** (0.073)
Administrative Management and General Management Consulting	0.086 (0.062)	-0.673** (0.183)	0.582*** (0.151)	0.575*** (0.146)
Business Associations	0.129	-0.300**	0.168***	0.161***

	(0.073)	(0.098)	(0.041)	(0.041)
	Republican when Ds are in majority (RParty)	Democrat when Rs are in majority (DParty)	Republican when Rs hold majority (RParty x partycont)	Democrat when Ds hold majority (DParty x partycont)
Democratic-tilting sectors (n=12)				
<i>Democratic Preference, No Pragmatic Giving to Republicans (n=5)</i>				
Breakfast Cereal Manufacturing	-0.074* (0.016)	-0.278 (0.109)	0.335 (0.095)	0.318 (0.082)
Sugarcane Mills	-0.250 (0.124)	0.316* (0.111)	-0.081 (0.073)	-0.083 (0.070)
Beet Sugar Manufacturing	-0.306 (0.140)	0.178* (0.070)	0.143 (0.102)	0.130 (0.102)
Computers Manufacturing	-0.089* (0.037)	-0.012 (0.052)	0.110 (0.062)	0.129* (0.057)
Diagnostic Laboratories	-0.078* (0.024)	-0.047 (0.045)	0.128 (0.054)	0.125* (0.046)
<i>Democratic Preference, w/ Pragmatic Giving to Republicans in the Majority (7)</i>				
Alternative Energy Production	-0.054* (0.021)	-0.038 (0.036)	0.105* (0.044)	0.104* (0.044)
Water Distribution	-0.089** (0.024)	-0.068 (0.046)	0.160* (0.061)	0.166* (0.062)
Offices of Lawyers	-0.113*** (0.034)	-0.024 (0.041)	0.128*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.023)
Engineering Services	-0.053 (0.033)	-0.106* (0.046)	0.155** (0.045)	0.162** (0.050)
Offices of Physical, Occupational and Speech Therapists, and Nurse Practitioners	-0.290* (0.092)	0.018 (0.070)	0.247** (0.057)	0.229** (0.051)
Kidney and Liver Dialysis Centers	-0.143* (0.049)	-0.066 (0.088)	0.199* (0.088)	0.197 (0.092)
	-0.124 (0.075)	-0.155* (0.051)	0.283** (0.053)	0.274** (0.047)
Pragmatic Sectors with No Party Preference (n=10)				
Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation	-0.099* (0.037)	-0.182* (0.075)	0.287** (0.087)	0.283** (0.086)
Forging Steel	-0.067* (0.029)	-0.122*** (0.033)	0.182*** (0.045)	0.180*** (0.046)
Surgical Appliance and Supplies Manufacturing	-0.066** (0.020)	-0.132** (0.046)	0.198*** (0.050)	0.197*** (0.048)
Deep Sea Passenger	-0.065 (0.037)	-0.132 (0.058)	0.159** (0.032)	0.186** (0.043)
Freight Trucking	0.016 (0.056)	-0.379 (0.191)	0.368* (0.151)	0.357* (0.146)
Financial Transaction Processing	-0.021 (0.058)	-0.277 (0.117)	0.315* (0.088)	0.309* (0.093)
Commodity Contracts Brokerage	-0.098 (0.088)	-0.279 (0.130)	0.371* (0.118)	0.384* (0.143)
Construction, Mining, and Forestry Machinery and Equipment Rental	-0.012 (0.042)	-0.343 (0.122)	0.341* (0.073)	0.353* (0.091)

	Republican when Ds are in majority (RParty)	Democrat when Rs are in majority (DParty)	Republican when Rs hold majority (RParty x partycont)	Democrat when Ds hold majority (DParty x partycont)
Public Relations Agencies	-0.095* (0.036)	-0.125** (0.046)	0.216*** (0.060)	0.224*** (0.064)
Health Screening in Physicians Offices	-0.112*** (0.030)	-0.270*** (0.049)	0.376*** (0.061)	0.378*** (0.061)
Sectors with No Party Preference (n=76)				
Nuts Harvesting	-0.022 (0.025)	0.013 (0.017)	0.014 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.072)
Peanut Shelling	-0.301 (0.059)	0.023 (0.070)	0.297 (0.136)	0.262 (0.101)
Nuclear Electric Power Generation	0.144 (0.056)	-0.195 (0.086)	0.055 (0.082)	0.076 (0.087)
Natural Gas Distribution	0.005 (0.082)	-0.094 (0.151)	0.087 (0.140)	0.084 (0.119)
Berries Canning Mfg	-0.077 (0.036)	-0.081 (0.095)	0.140 (0.100)	0.155 (0.111)
Specialty Canning	0.110 (0.106)	-0.457 (0.356)	0.347 (0.271)	0.363 (0.284)
Dairy Canning	0.235 (0.063)	-0.563 (0.287)	0.302 (0.344)	0.296 (0.378)
Bakeries	0.326 (0.250)	-0.547 (0.244)	0.223 (0.084)	0.221 (0.075)
Beverages Soft Drinks	0.008 (0.024)	-0.087 (0.060)	0.078 (0.054)	0.063 (0.044)
Beverages, beer, ale, and malt liquors, manufacturing	0.066 (0.133)	-0.440 (0.295)	0.375 (0.188)	0.431 (0.209)
Paper (except Newsprint) Mills	0.343 (0.167)	-0.716 (0.381)	0.364 (0.209)	0.298 (0.204)
Coated and Laminated Packaging Paper and Plastics Film Mfg	0.193 (0.088)	-0.389 (0.205)	0.188 (0.195)	0.169 (0.178)
Commercial Lithographic Printing	0.379 (0.288)	-0.459 (0.330)	0.071 (0.045)	0.099 (0.048)
Adhesive Manufacturing	0.222 (0.101)	-0.662 (0.267)	0.345 (0.216)	0.331 (0.251)
Polish and Other Sanitation Good Manufacturing	0.078 (0.041)	-0.135 (0.119)	0.055 (0.074)	-0.013 (0.081)
Glass Fiber Manufacturing	0.083 (0.012)	-0.349 (0.268)	0.286 (0.284)	0.280 (0.282)
Glass Product Manufacturing Made of Purchased Glass	-0.135 (0.059)	-0.200 (0.131)	0.336 (0.182)	0.337 (0.180)
Other Metal Container Manufacturing	0.056 (0.065)	-0.176 (0.165)	0.135 (0.114)	0.141 (0.117)
All Other Miscellaneous Fabricated Metal Product Mfg	0.125 (0.069)	-0.269 (0.133)	0.149 (0.080)	0.141 (0.073)
Automatic Vending Machine Manufacturing	0.092 (0.111)	-0.437 (0.329)	0.343 (0.232)	0.324 (0.233)

	Republican when Ds are in majority (RParty)	Democrat when Rs are in majority (DParty)	Republican when Rs hold majority (RParty x partycont)	Democrat when Ds hold majority (DParty x partycont)
Construction Equipment	-0.044 (0.036)	-0.053 (0.063)	0.111 (0.053)	0.102 (0.046)
Laboratory Equipment	-0.010 (0.056)	-0.095 (0.031)	0.108 (0.080)	0.117 (0.083)
Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing	-0.071 (0.061)	-0.105 (0.067)	0.180 (0.115)	0.173 (0.115)
Semiconductor devices manufacturing	-0.022 (0.025)	-0.194 (0.157)	0.230 (0.147)	0.245 (0.149)
Instruments and Related Products Manufacturing for Measuring	0.235 (0.030)	-0.439 (0.426)	0.194 (0.514)	0.247 (0.496)
Automobile Manufacturing	0.006 (0.103)	-1.152 (0.461)	1.171 (0.444)	1.168 (0.444)
Heavy Duty Truck Manufacturing	0.254 (0.194)	-0.786 (0.636)	0.538 (0.441)	0.537 (0.443)
Automotive Engines and Parts	-0.017 (0.036)	-0.337 (0.188)	0.362 (0.194)	0.350 (0.188)
Guided missile and space vehicle manufacturing	0.014 (0.036)	-0.032 (0.121)	0.030 (0.109)	0.030 (0.110)
Ship Building and Repairing	-0.014 (0.032)	-0.432 (0.225)	0.441 (0.262)	0.452 (0.269)
Boat Building	-0.077 (0.164)	-0.415 (0.233)	0.465 (0.401)	0.475 (0.410)
Military Armored Vehicle, Tank, and Tank Component Mfg	0.050 (0.031)	-0.216 (0.084)	0.183 (0.078)	0.177 (0.082)
New Car Dealers	0.296 (0.170)	-0.693 (0.408)	0.409 (0.264)	0.389 (0.257)
All Other Motor Vehicle Dealers	-0.030 (0.027)	-0.086 (0.052)	0.099 (0.079)	0.085 (0.077)
Light Fixture Stores	0.288 (0.136)	-0.568 (0.246)	0.275 (0.176)	0.322 (0.178)
Grocery Stores	0.067 (0.040)	-0.262 (0.129)	0.191 (0.120)	0.173 (0.113)
Pharmacies	-0.096 (0.077)	-0.076 (0.119)	0.160 (0.098)	0.167 (0.101)
Cosmetics, Beauty Supplies, and Perfume Stores	-0.053 (0.073)	-0.220 (0.240)	0.280 (0.258)	0.275 (0.256)
Gasoline Service Stations	-0.020 (0.143)	-0.464 (0.221)	0.480 (0.319)	0.452 (0.301)
Clothing Accessories Stores	0.007 (0.021)	-0.110 (0.058)	0.100 (0.051)	0.111 (0.052)
Aircraft Charter Services	-0.009 (0.040)	-0.584 (0.294)	0.546 (0.277)	0.615 (0.311)
Deep Sea Freight	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.018 (0.043)	0.039 (0.034)	0.043 (0.034)
Bus and Other Motor Vehicle Transit Systems	-0.253	-0.343*	0.133	0.574**

	Republican when Ds are in majority (RParty)	Democrat when Rs are in majority (DParty)	Republican when Rs hold majority (RParty x partycont)	Democrat when Ds hold majority (DParty x partycont)
	(0.144)	(0.117)	(0.185)	(0.184)
Newspaper Publishers	0.077	-0.074	-0.006	0.034
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.002)	(0.037)
Motion Picture and Video Distribution	0.211	-0.126	-0.073	-0.050
	(0.072)	(0.167)	(0.236)	(0.243)
Other Sound Recording Industries	0.051	0.045	-0.093	-0.084
	(0.026)	(0.171)	(0.188)	(0.174)
Savings Banks	-0.012	-0.027	0.043	0.038
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Credit Unions	0.006	-0.013	0.009	0.013
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Farm Mortgage Lending	0.004	-0.126	0.121	0.114
	(0.056)	(0.080)	(0.062)	(0.058)
All Other Nondepository Credit Intermediation	-0.203	-0.711	0.938	0.928
	(0.098)	(0.453)	(0.433)	(0.364)
Securities and Commodity Exchanges	0.088	-0.044	-0.043	-0.023
	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.065)	(0.076)
Miscellaneous Intermediation	0.115	-0.796	0.708	0.698
	(0.109)	(0.461)	(0.380)	(0.397)
Investment Trust Management	0.120	-0.305	0.175	0.182
	(0.063)	(0.137)	(0.093)	(0.100)
Convention Centers	0.512	-0.519	0.012	0.049
	(0.240)	(0.427)	(0.295)	(0.310)
Offices of Real Estate Agents and Brokers	-0.134	-0.187	0.313	0.322*
	(0.070)	(0.084)	(0.113)	(0.107)
Real Estate Property Management	0.233	-0.306	0.070	0.094
	(0.230)	(0.224)	(0.083)	(0.080)
Passenger Car Rental	-0.046	-0.277	0.331	0.307
	(0.045)	(0.077)	(0.111)	(0.085)
General Rental Centers	0.058	0.072	-0.136	-0.082
	(0.145)	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.086)
Tax Preparation Services	-0.128	-0.007	0.143	0.161
	(0.126)	(0.018)	(0.104)	(0.131)
Architectural Services	-0.030	0.009	0.018	0.026
	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Veterinary Services	-0.159	0.056	0.084	0.062
	(0.156)	(0.058)	(0.082)	(0.076)
Carpet and Upholstery Cleaning Services	-0.128	-0.068	0.206	0.213
	(0.105)	(0.087)	(0.135)	(0.134)
Waste Collection	-0.155	-0.126	0.281	0.266
	(0.032)	(0.098)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Other Technical and Trade Schools	-0.037	-0.050	0.095	0.092
	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Offices of Physicians, Mental Health Specialists	-0.239	0.149	0.061	0.104
	(0.191)	(0.078)	(0.117)	(0.118)

	Republican when Ds are in majority (<i>RParty</i>)	Democrat when Rs are in majority (<i>DParty</i>)	Republican when Rs hold majority (<i>RParty</i> x <i>partycont</i>)	Democrat when Ds hold majority (<i>DParty</i> x <i>partycont</i>)
Offices of Dentists	0.014 (0.069)	-0.197 (0.116)	0.177 (0.111)	0.159 (0.109)
Chiropractor's Clinics	-0.002 (0.026)	-0.093 (0.065)	0.086 (0.070)	0.084 (0.066)
Offices of Optometrists	-0.513 (0.393)	0.058 (0.027)	0.472 (0.392)	0.454 (0.383)
Offices of Mental Health Practitioners (except Physicians)	-0.174 (0.085)	0.316 (0.283)	-0.155 (0.219)	-0.153 (0.227)
Ambulance Services	0.041 (0.042)	-0.107 (0.053)	0.074 (0.069)	0.066 (0.061)
Sports Teams and Clubs	-0.052 (0.040)	0.053 (0.099)	0.006 (0.058)	0.020 (0.053)
Casino Hotels	-0.079 (0.065)	0.052 (0.052)	0.009 (0.078)	0.040 (0.081)
Snack and Nonalcoholic Beverage Bars	-0.169 (0.088)	-0.320 (0.215)	0.513 (0.227)	0.519 (0.236)
Food Service Contractors	0.076 (0.087)	-0.223 (0.205)	0.159 (0.129)	0.146 (0.114)
Computer and Office Machine Repair and Maintenance	-0.073 (0.039)	-0.099 (0.092)	0.184 (0.052)	0.188 (0.049)
Funeral Homes and Funeral Services	0.049 (0.034)	-0.038 (0.049)	-0.0002 (0.048)	-0.001 (0.046)

Source: Coefficients are drawn from the full model shown on p. 14.