The holy land divided: Defending Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars

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THE HOLY LAND DIVIDED:
DEFENDING PARTITION AS A SOLUTION TO ETHNIC WARS

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IN THE DECADE since the cold war ended, ethnic civil wars around the
globe have captured the attention of scholars and policymakers alike.¹
Several high-profile clashes, such as those in Bosnia, Rwanda, Chechnya,
and Kosovo, have generated casualties or refugees numbering in the hundreds
of thousands.² Ethnic cleansing, a euphemism for campaigns of intimidation,
terror, rape, and murder designed to "get rid of the 'alien' nationality, ethnic, or
religious group and to seize control of the territory they had formerly inhabited," has entered our everyday vocabulary.³

This deadly humanitarian toll has prompted widespread debate on how the
United States and the international community should respond to ethnic wars,
debate complicated by the tendency of these conflicts to resist easy solutions.
To date, policymakers and academics have favored ending these conflicts with
arrangements such as ethnic reconciliation and reintegration, consociational-
ism, and regional autonomy or federalism. At the heart of these preferred solu-
tions is the belief that the retention of multiethnic states is compatible with

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versity of Chicago.

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1. A leading scholar of ethnic violence tallied 59 armed ethnic conflicts ongoing as of
early 1999. This number is down slightly from a peak of 70 in the early 1990s. Overall, the
number of ethnic groups that used violent methods dropped during the 1990s from 115 to
95. See Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (May/June
2000): 53; and Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the

2. Other ongoing or recently concluded ethnic civil wars with high casualty or refugee to-
tals include Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Burma/Myanmar, Bur-
rundi, Chechnya, East Timor, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan. Gurr, "Peoples
Against States," 369–75, provides a list of the fifty most serious ethnic conflicts as of 1993–
94.

3. Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cam-
ending ethnic wars, and can be accomplished by promoting benign ethnic identities, sharing state power among groups, or devolving self-governance to ethnic groups either by creating an autonomous region or transforming the state into a federation.⁴

Because the conventional view strongly favors preserving multiethnic states, its advocates oppose partition under almost any circumstances. Partition, in their view, has three major flaws: it is unnecessary since ethnic identities can change so as to foster cooperation between groups;⁵ it causes immediate violence and contains the seeds of future wars;⁶ and it sets a precedent that en-

⁴. Reintegration attempts to rebuild multiethnic societies by returning ethnically cleansed refugees to their homes, constructing power-sharing institutions, and defusing ethnic rivalries by promoting benign ethnic identities and civic notions of nationalism. See Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990); and Jane M. O. Sharp, “Dayton Report Card,” International Security 22, no. 3 (winter 1997/98): 101–37. Reintegration often requires occupation and administration by outside authorities. United Nations conservatorship, where the UN takes over failed states and runs them until they are ready to become self-governing again, is increasingly recommended and undertaken. Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo are examples. See Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy no. 89 (winter 1992/93): 3–20. Other approaches focus on managing ethnic differences rather than transforming them. The most ambitious of these is consociationalism, known more generically as power-sharing. Originally proposed by Arend Lijphart, consociationalism is government by a cartel of elites from a society’s different ethnic groups who share executive power in a grand coalition cabinet or rotating presidency. Consociationalism also calls for group autonomy; proportionality in representation, the civil service, and distribution of state funds; and a credible minority veto on issues of vital concern. See Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (January 1969): 213; and Lijphart, “The Power-Sharing Approach,” in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990), 491–509. Finally, an increasingly popular pair of solutions is regional autonomy and federalism. Both of these techniques devolve self-governance to territorial regions by giving them institutions, such as regional assemblies and sometimes elected regional governors, and authority, such as the power to tax and spend, to determine the language in which education will be provided, and to control a police force. The difference between the two is that what I call regional autonomy is an agreement between one ethnic group and the state to grant autonomy to one specific region (by giving it special status in a unitary state, or by creating a new federal unit in a federation), while federalism transforms the structure of the entire state from unitary to federal. All regions are then given the institutions and powers enumerated above, but central state institutions are also altered to give regions greater influence over state policy, such as creating a bicameral legislature with equal representation for regions (like the U.S. Senate), or amendment procedures that require approval by regional representatives to change the constitution. Advocates of these two solutions include Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993): 298–305; Gurr, “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane”; Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 601–28; Mwangi S. Kimenyi, “Harmonizing Ethnic Claims in Africa: A Proposal for Ethnic-Based Federalism,” Cato Journal 18, no. 1 (spring/summer 1998): 43–63; and Alicia Levine, “Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence,” in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 331–33.


⁶. T. G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine: Theory and Practice (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984); Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 590; Radha Kumar, “The Troubled History of
courages other ethnic groups to demand independence, contributing to the proliferation of economically unviable mini-states. Radha Kumar neatly summarizes the orthodox view: "partition has more often been a backdrop to war than its culmination in peace; although it may originate in a situation of conflict, its effect has been to stimulate further and even new conflict."

Other scholars have recently challenged these claims. They argue that rebuilding multiethnic societies after ethnic civil wars may not be possible or desirable, and that the reason past partitions have been so violent is because of inadequate partition plans that imposed new borders without planning to disentangle intermingled populations. Two schools of thought have emerged in the pro-partition camp. One, which I label "security dilemma realism," holds that anarchy produced by state collapse, combined with ethnic intermingling on the ground, both causes ethnic wars and prevents them from ending until ethnic groups have been separated. State breakdown forces ethnic groups to behave like states in the international system and be on the lookout for threats to their security. Nationalist groups are stronger, and thus more threatening—a perception that is exacerbated if the groups are intermingled, or if pockets of one group are stranded in the territory of another. This demographic pattern creates incentives for groups to rescue their diasporas, and thus for the local


majority preemptively to cleanse such diasporas to remove this incentive, both of which can lead to war. Moreover, ethnic cleansing operations are easy for the attacker in intermingled situations because civilians are vulnerable and hard to defend, making for offense dominance. Since both sides have incentives to cleanse enemy civilians, the war is unlikely to end until regional homogeneity is achieved. The preferred solution of the security dilemma school is to use demographic separation and regional autonomy to mitigate the interethnic security dilemma caused by intermingling and anarchy.

A second view, which I call “standard realism,” focuses only on the conduct of war, since the causes of ethnic wars are so diverse. This view holds that the very process of fighting the war makes reconstructing a multiethnic state afterwards problematic because it destroys the parties’ ability to trust each other not to violate any agreement negotiated. Unlike security dilemma realists who posit state breakdown and extensive intermingling, standard realism acknowledges that most ethnic wars do not occur in complete anarchy or between densely intermingled groups. Indeed, most ethnic wars are fought between a state and a regionally concentrated ethnic group that cannot rely on the state to protect it, and which must, therefore, rely on its own resources for security. Thus, the security dilemma, while applying to a few cases, is unlikely to provide much explanatory leverage in most ethnic wars. Moreover, the lack of trust and plentitude of hatred generated by such wars renders solutions that aspire to retain a single state problematic, and creates or enhances desires for an independent state.

Resolving this debate over solutions to ethnic wars is important not only to people who live in countries torn by ethnic strife, but also to policymakers in states such as the United States, which may consider intervention in such wars. To date, American diplomacy and military action in ethnic conflicts has promoted negotiated settlements that provide ethnic groups with greater rights in the context of a multiethnic state. The U.S.-brokered Dayton Accords in Bosnia follow this model, as do NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the West’s discouragement of Montenegrin independence, and its support for greater autonomy for ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Partitionists of both stripes, on the other hand, argue that should NATO ever leave the Balkans, war would be less likely to recur if efforts to reintegrate Bosnia and Kosovo were abandoned and these territories divided along ethnic lines. Partition’s advocates would also allow Montenegro to separate from Serbia should its people so desire. Some even recommended the division of Macedonia before additional hostilities erupted there, although most would favor partition if a full-scale war (one larger than the skirmishes that took place in the spring and summer of 2001 between Albanian guerrillas and the Macedonian government) were to break
out. Security dilemma realists would prefer states of homogeneous, autonomous regions, while standard realists would argue for independent states.

The purpose of this article is simple: to make the case that partition—defined as separating ethnic groups into independent states—deserves serious consideration as a policy aimed at stopping ethnic civil wars. I do this in two steps: I make a standard realist argument that the conduct of ethnic wars makes it unlikely that such wars will end short of military victory for one side or the other, and I show that partition is a better solution than the multiethnic alternatives put forward by anti-partitionists, and that such a solution is also better than the security dilemma realists' preference for separation and autonomy. I argue that regardless of the specific causes of any particular ethnic war, each of these conflicts has similar dynamics that place significant obstacles in the way of putting a multiethnic state back together when the war is over. Once an ethnic war gets underway, ethnic groups must fight for their survival in an environment in which they cannot rely on the state to protect them. The act of fighting the war has two effects that reinforce the belief among group members that they need to control a state of their own to ensure their survival. First, fighting hardens ethnic identities, causes nationalism to become more widespread, and adds real hatred of the ethnic enemy to previous fears. Second, war makes it nearly impossible to trust one's adversary in the future, which is a vital precondition for all solutions to ethnic wars that seek to preserve a multiethnic state. The war provides each side with incontrovertible evidence of the other side's malign intentions and causes groups to fear betrayal by other groups, which would be especially devastating should the group disarm, as it must if a single state is to be shared.

Given that war radicalizes both sides and makes trust well-nigh impossible, I argue that partition is superior to solutions based on a multiethnic state once a civil war is underway. Partition, however, must be implemented properly to reduce violence. Correctly conceived, partition separates ethnic groups into independent states, endows each new state with defensible borders, and establishes a balance of power between them. This conception of partition is different from the security dilemma realist view, which begins and ends with demog-
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Once separation is achieved, security dilemma realists give little thought to political arrangements, holding that autonomy within a multiethnic state is sufficient to end the fighting. This view overlooks the possibility that war itself creates conditions under which it becomes nearly impossible to trust the other side, and that it is thus necessary to create independent states in order to end the conflict. Independence satisfies an ethnic group's perceived need to control a state of its own to ensure survival. Organized population transfers reduce the incentive for residual ethnic cleansing or to rescue co-ethnics trapped behind borders. Defensible borders and a balance of power raise the costs of aggression and lower the likelihood that aggression will succeed, both contributing to deterrence. Partition implemented in this way cannot guarantee peace; this is beyond the ability of any proposed remedy to ethnic wars. Partition can, however, significantly drive down the likelihood that war will recur by removing two key causes: fear for group security, and the inability to trust the enemy. Reducing ethnic intermingling removes the fuel that stokes the fire of war, and defensible borders and a balance of power reduce the incentives to return to war by raising the costs of such a war.

My purpose is to show that partition deserves a place on the policy agenda as a means to stop ethnic wars, and I illustrate my argument by examining the war between Arabs and Jews that occurred after the United Nations voted in 1947 to partition Palestine. This case shows both how the realist logic of survival and self-help drives the conduct of ethnic wars and makes them difficult to end short of military victory for one side or partition, and how partition implemented poorly contributes to perpetuating conflict rather than resolving it. Palestine was home to two fundamentally incompatible nationalist visions: the Palestinian Arabs wanted an independent state in all of Palestine, which they would dominate by virtue of their numerical majority, while the Zionists preferred a partition that would split Palestine into two states, one for each community. War was thus likely regardless of whether the UN endorsed the Palestinian or the Jewish vision. In the event, the UN opted for partition, but the specific plan it adopted was fatally flawed: it failed to disentangle the two intermingled communities, drew borders that were indefensible, and divided the land inequitably, giving the minority Jews the majority of the Palestinian Mandate. Arabs refused to accept this verdict, and set out to realize their goal

14. My argument does not seek to explain the deep causes of ethnic conflict. Rather, I focus mainly on the implications that the properties, conduct, and consequences of ethnic wars have for the types of settlements that are possible. Specifically, I argue that no matter what the specific cause of any particular war, the way hostilities unfold in ethnic wars dictates the solutions that are possible, not the war's specific causes.

15. By the Palestine Mandate I mean Palestine west of the Jordan River. The original Palestine Mandate, granted to Britain in 1920, included both this area and Transjordan, located
of a unitary state by subduing the Jewish community. The Yishuv ("settlement" in Hebrew, the name used by Jews to describe the Jewish community in Palestine) fought back, but with the added necessity that it had to remove the substantial Arab minority from the area of the future Jewish state to be secure. The consequences of this war have made a single Jewish-Palestinian state impossible, and the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians will not end until the partition is completed and a Palestinian state is born alongside Israel.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The first section explains the security dilemma realist argument for separation with autonomy, criticizes it, and then lays out the theoretical foundations of my argument for partition as encompassing separation, independence, defensible borders, and a balance of power. The second section addresses in detail a number of counter-arguments that critics have leveled against partition, and shows that each is largely without merit. The third section specifically assesses the problems with the multiethnic alternatives to partition—consociationalism, autonomy, and federalism—and argues that the evidence does not support the claims that these arrangements bring peace after ethnic wars. Judgments regarding appropriate solutions to ethnic wars are relative, and thus part of arguing for partition is showing that the alternatives are no better, and perhaps worse. In the fourth section I turn to the partition of Palestine in 1947, and demonstrate that the end of British control forced Jews and Arabs to resort to self-help to achieve their respective goals. Intermingled populations made ethnic cleansing a certainty. The fifth section argues that the best solution to the current Israeli-Palestinian impasse is to complete this interrupted partition, and I briefly sketch the outlines of how this should be done. Finally, I conclude by summarizing my argument and drawing policy implications.

REALIST THEORY AND ETHNIC CIVIL WARS

Scholars have begun to use insights from realist international relations theory to explain both the origins of ethnic conflict and the dynamics of ethnic wars once they get underway.16 This section argues that a standard realist theory focusing on the conduct of ethnic wars offers a better explanation of
such wars and how they end than a version of realism that concentrates on the security dilemma. I begin with a discussion of the security dilemma explanation of ethnic conflict, identify its weaknesses, and then lay out my alternative.

SECURITY DILEMMA REALISM AND ETHNIC WAR

The security dilemma is a feature of interstate relations. It describes the fact that the measures one state takes to protect itself threaten other states because these states interact in an anarchic environment, which means that no higher authority exists to protect them from each other. In this environment, steps taken for purely defensive reasons, meant to increase one's own security, actually decrease the security of others.17 Perceiving a threat to their security, other groups respond with measures to increase their own security, which causes a spiral effect of arms races, increasing tensions, and suspicions about the opponent's motives for arming.18 Furthermore, the security dilemma is more intense—and hence more likely to lead to war—if weapons useful for offense and defense are indistinguishable, and if offense has an advantage, because this gives both sides incentives to strike first in a crisis.19

Applied to ethnic wars, security dilemma realism holds that when state authority begins to break down, and hierarchy is replaced by anarchy, ethnic groups must be concerned about their security. Behaving like states in the international system, these groups evaluate the threat environment. In anarchy, nationalist mobilization undertaken with defensive intent threatens other groups. Ethnic groups imbued with nationalism are more cohesive, and thus more powerful and better able to defend themselves. They also present a greater threat to neighboring groups: "the military capability of groups will often be dependent on their cohesion, rather than their meager military assets. This cohesion is a threat in its own right because it can provide the emotional

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power for infantry armies to take the offensive."\(^{20}\) This means nationalism aids both offense and defense and is thus indistinguishable, a situation compounded by the fact that most weapons can be used offensively and defensively. Moreover, the more that ethnic populations are intermingled, the greater the advantage for the offense, as it is much more difficult to defend isolated towns and neighborhoods than it is to seize them.\(^ {21}\) Demographic intermingling thus gives both sides incentives to rescue their ethnic brethren behind enemy lines, and hence also preemptively to purge enemy civilians who live in the group's purported homeland.

The consequence of offensive advantages in ethnic wars is that ethnic groups will separate in the course of the conflict. Security dilemma realists thus argue that if third parties want to intervene effectively in these wars, they should adopt a policy of ethnic separation to create homogeneous, autonomous regions. Since separation of ethnic groups eliminates the security dilemma, and thus removes incentives to attack, the precise political arrangements are relatively unimportant, or, as one proponent of this view puts it, "[s]overeignty is secondary."\(^ {22}\) As long as groups are no longer intermingled, and possess sufficient autonomy to protect their core interests, separation and autonomy will prevent future conflict.

The security dilemma explanation for ethnic conflict suffers from four weaknesses. One problem is that the theory applies to few actual cases because it requires both state breakdown and significant intermingling of diverse populations. As others have noted, however, most civil wars "do not occur in the environment of anarchy," but rather in situations "where governments continue to exercise some degree of control."\(^ {23}\) Furthermore, geographically concentrated ethnic groups are far more likely to be involved in ethnic civil wars than dispersed or urban groups, which have little ability to act collectively and but a few resources on which to draw. Concentrated groups, on the other hand, can mobilize greater physical and human resources, and can make a plausible claim to territory.\(^ {24}\) Focusing solely on the security dilemma would thus omit most ethnic wars, and hence most cases of interest.


\(^{22}\) Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," 137.

\(^{23}\) David, "Internal War," 561.

\(^{24}\) This argument was first proposed by Monica Toft, and is most fully developed in Monica Duffy Toft, "The Geography of Ethnic Conflict" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1998). Others have since confirmed her findings. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin,
A third weakness is that state breakdown and the anarchy it induces—to which security dilemma realists ascribe causal force—are just as often the product as they are the cause of ethnic assertiveness, a fact that reduces the importance of anarchy as a cause of ethnic wars. Finally, the focus on demography in security dilemma realism leads its proponents to neglect political considerations when designing settlements to ethnic wars. Separation removes incentives for ethnic cleansing by eliminating intermingling, but autonomy is an afterthought that is not grounded in the theory. As I shall argue, however, autonomy does not usually provide a stable end to ethnic wars because it still requires groups to trust each other and share institutions.

A STANDARD REALIST THEORY OF ETHNIC WAR

I propose an alternative realist argument that does not rely on the security dilemma and that, therefore, applies to both intermingled cases and the more frequent cases in which ethnic groups are geographically concentrated. I make no attempt to explain the deep causes of these ethnic wars. Rather, my argument focuses on the effects of the actual fighting, holding that no matter what the specific cause of conflict, war creates conditions which make reconstructing a multiethnic state afterward very difficult.

Properties of ethnic wars. I define a civil war as a conflict among “geographically contiguous people concerned about possibly having to live with one another in the same political unit after the conflict.” An ethnic civil war is a conflict between two or more separate ethnic communities, one of which controls the state, over the power relationship between them: “Opposing communities in

“A Cross-Sectional Study of Large-Scale Ethnic Violence in the Postwar Period” (typescript, University of Chicago, September 1997).

25. According to security dilemma realists, the breakdown of Yugoslavia, for example, forced Slovenes, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims to provide for their own security (Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”). It was, however, precisely the assertiveness of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, in reaction to Serbian nationalism and efforts to recentralize the state, that caused Yugoslavia to disintegrate in the first place. Moreover, increased Serbian nationalism can be traced to the struggle for leadership within Serbia stemming from the need for a new legitimating device for postsocialist politicians. For this criticism of security dilemma realism, see David, “Internal Wars.” For the argument that intraethnic conflict (among Serbs) led to interethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, see V. P. Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 130–66.

26. Roy Licklider, “How Civil Wars End,” in Roy Licklider, Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 9. In addition, most studies agree that to be counted as a civil war, a conflict must cause a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths; be fought within generally recognized boundaries; involve the government as a major party in the war; and have effective resistance by both government and rebel forces. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816–1992 (Ann Arbor: ICPSR, 1994).
ethnic civil conflicts hold irreconcilable visions of the identity, borders, and citizenship of the state.”27 By definition, being involved in a war means the parties want to survive and wish to control their own destiny. In ethnic wars, control can take one of two forms: seizing governance of the existing state, or breaking away to form a separate state. As Donald Horowitz puts it, “[c]ontrol of the state, control of a state, and exemption from control by others are among the main goals of ethnic conflict.”28 All parties to the conflict wish to avoid being subjected to rule by the others, and one or more of the parties may wish to accomplish this goal by seceding and forming its (their) own independent state(s). Ethnic civil wars—contested between two (or more) different communities—thus differ from civil wars contested over ideological beliefs or economic doctrines, in which factions of the same community fight each other and compete for the loyalties of members of that single group. The main difference thus is that in ethnic civil wars the possibility exists that the parties to the conflict will not share the same state after the war is over.29

The differences between ethnic and political identities also distinguish ethnic conflicts from ideological ones. Unlike political views, which are fairly changeable and transparent to observers, ethnic loyalties are both difficult to change and easy to identify. Each group can only recruit from its own community, which makes eliminating the enemy’s source of manpower by conquering its territory and purging its people an attractive option. This fact also removes the need to appeal to members of opposing groups.30 The perception that, once a person is born a Hutu, he is always a Hutu, means that in ethnic civil wars there are no gray areas: someone is either a friend or an enemy based on his ethnicity.31

Moreover, ethnic identity is rather easy to determine. This is so not just because of recognizable differences in appearance, dress, language, or accent, but

27. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions,” 138 n. 7. An ethnic group is a group of people who believe themselves to form a distinctive community because of characteristics that they hold in common, including a myth of common descent, shared historical memories, an association with a homeland or historic territory, cultural attributes such as language, religion, appearance, or color, and a sense of solidarity. See Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), 22–31.


30. For example, while former communist fighters for the Viet Cong could credibly renounce their previous beliefs and “rally” to the side of the South Vietnamese government, it is commonly perceived that people cannot similarly change their ethnicity, at least not quickly or under duress. Such rallying by members of one ethnic group to the cause of the other hardly ever occurs in ethnic wars.

31. This does not mean ethnic identities actually are fixed, just that this belief is widespread.
also because ethnicity is recorded in a plethora of public documents, such as local voting rolls, census documents, or even church records.\textsuperscript{32} Failing that, local residents almost always know the ethnic identities of their neighbors and friends, and can provide valuable intelligence—coerced or uncoerced—to those looking to cause trouble.\textsuperscript{33} Cases of mistaken identity in ethnic cleansing are rare.

Once an ethnic group becomes involved in a war against the state, it can no longer rely on that state to protect it, and must therefore rely on self-help to ensure its survival. This does not mean that state authority has totally collapsed and that anarchy—as the term is used in international politics—reigns, although it may mean that. More common is a situation in between the two poles of total hierarchy and anarchy, in which an ethnic group cannot count on unbiased state power to protect its interests because a hostile group controls state institutions. This situation of biased control means that groups must rely on their own means to provide for their security.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{How war drives groups apart.} Regardless of the specific causes of any particular ethnic civil war, the conduct of the war invariably reinforces a group’s belief that it must control a state to ensure its survival. This process occurs in two ways. First, war hardens ethnic identities and causes groups to become more nationalistic. Fear of the other side is joined by hatred induced by wartime passions and actual atrocities. The result is that the enemy comes to be viewed as killers and murderers, and the ethnic group believes it can only be secure among its own kind, with a state of its own for protection.

Anecdotal evidence from the Serbian attempt to expel Kosovo’s Albanian population supports this view. The hatred between the two communities is visceral, as recounted by UN special representative Bernard Kouchner: “Here I discovered hatred deeper than anywhere in the world, more than in Cambodia or Vietnam or Bosnia. Usually someone, a doctor or a journalist, will say, ‘I know someone on the other side.’ But here, no. They had no relationship with

\textsuperscript{32} Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions,” 145–47.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 146.
\textsuperscript{34} Other analysts agree: “In between these two extremes [of hierarchy and anarchy], states exist and shape the course of ethnic politics. In many political systems, the state may be biased toward or against particular ethnicities, so competition is waged among different ethnic groups for control of the state. If my group does not capture the state, someone else’s will, and then we will be at the mercy of the state....If the state cannot protect the interests of all ethnic groups, then each group will seek to control the state or secede so that they can control their own state, decreasing other groups’ security and decreasing the state’s ability to provide security for any group.” Stephen M. Saideman, “Is Pandora’s Box Half Empty or Half Full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration,” in Lake and Rothchild, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, 135.
the other community."35 "The hatred runs so deep," one journalist reported during the war, "many have said they can barely imagine living together with the Serbs in Kosovo."36 Similar sentiments are expressed by both sides in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. One Azeri woman, asked for her views of Armenians, stated simply "[w]e hate them." Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh reciprocate this feeling, refusing to contemplate a settlement that would allow Azeris to return to the enclave: "If they lived here," an Armenian woman asked, "then where would we live?"37

The experience of violence, atrocities, and fear of potential genocide hardens ethnic identity and creates real fears of living with a former enemy. Violence and atrocities eliminate any ambiguities of identity until a harsh "us or them" mentality prevails. Several factors contribute to this process: sanctions imposed by co-ethnics against those who fail to conform; opponents who impose ethnicity on others; massacres of civilians; and fear of genocide.38 All of these elements cause groups to polarize into opposing camps: all co-ethnics become friends, all ethnic others become enemies. People can no longer choose their friends or associates, but find these choices made for them. In this environment, people are unlikely to "deconstruct social identities defined by animosity," as posited by certain optimists.39

Moreover, war contributes to the belief that the group needs to control its own state to survive. As outlined above, ethnic conflicts are about controlling one's own destiny, or avoiding being controlled by someone else. The more severe the conflict becomes, the more likely it is that this desire for control will

39. Schaeffer, Warpaths, 263. This problem is obviously worse the greater the level of ethnic intermingling when the war starts because the fighting will cause more ethnic cleansing of civilians. In a wartime environment, the presence of enemy civilians in one's territory represents a threat, a potential fifth column that could menace supply lines or engage in sabotage. They also constitute a reason for the enemy to launch an attack to rescue them. Ethnically homogeneous land is thus the key to survival in ethnic civil wars, which means that enemy civilians will be driven out or killed in the course of hostilities. This is just a fact of war; the security dilemma is not needed to explain it. Winning battles in war certainly increases your security and decreases that of the enemy, but this is not a very meaningful observation. Extensive ethnic cleansing, however, worsens the chance that two groups can live together after the war because the torture, rape, and murder of noncombatants generates tremendous resentment and hatred, as do the stories told by the survivors, who become hard-liners and resist accommodation.
take the form of nationalism, the political doctrine that holds that each nation (a mobilized ethnic group) deserves its own state. The structure of the international system reinforces nationalist beliefs and gives groups incentives to achieve statehood by sanctioning states as the principal actors in international politics. Achieving a state also increases the chance that a nation will survive by allowing it to control its own army and raising the likelihood that other states will come to its defense if attacked.

The more nationalistic a group is, the less likely it becomes that such a group will accept a war outcome that denies it control of a state. While nationalism can lead to conflict, the experience of war often causes groups to want their own state even if they did not want one before the war began. For example, according to some analysts, Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians preferred only greater autonomy within Yugoslavia as late as 1998. Increasing Serb repression, however, combined with the all-out expulsion attempt of March 1999, rendered autonomy a dead letter and independence for Kosovo inevitable. In effect, the brutality of ethnic cleansing convinced the Kosovo Albanians that they could never be secure living in a Serb-run state; safety could only be had in an Albanian state. The words of an Albanian man, returning to view the remains of his wrecked home in the town of Pec, bluntly capture the sentiment: “The Serbs were killing before...but when NATO came, they went wild, screaming that we all had to leave. Only independence is possible now. Nothing else.”

The second way that ethnic war undermines the possibility of maintaining a multiethnic state is that it makes trusting the adversary in the future nearly impossible. In international politics, states can never be certain of each other’s intentions; there is never a guarantee that today’s benign intention will not turn malign tomorrow. There is a powerful tendency either to assume the worst about other states’ intentions or, because they cannot be ascertained with confidence, to disregard them entirely and focus on material capabilities, which are more easily measured.

42. Similarly, Bosnia declared independence only reluctantly in April 1992. After three years of brutality at the hands of the Bosnian Serbs, however, and with the war swinging their way, the Bosnian Muslims proved to be the group most reluctant to end the war. See Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 193, 195–98.
44. On these points, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 10–11. Neorealism in general abstracts away from the intentions of individual states—posing them to be like units inter-
Before an ethnic war breaks out, each side might be suspicious of the other's intentions, but fighting a war teaches both sides that their suspicions were correct. This certainty about the current malign intentions of the opponent makes trusting that his future intentions will be benign difficult. After all, ethnic war involves not only large-scale killing of combatants, but often extensive depredations against civilians. Negotiated settlements to civil wars, however, assume that the groups which have just fought will bury the hatchet and share the same state once the war is over. Indeed, the key assumption of solutions such as consociationalism, autonomy, and federalism is that former wartime adversaries will be able to trust each other enough to cooperate once hostilities end. The problem is that the war just concluded has provided each combatant with a great deal of evidence of its opponent's malign intentions. Even if the enemy agrees to end hostilities now and to negotiate in good faith, there is nothing to prevent him from later going back on his word and restarting the war after his forces have rested and rearmed.

The major difference that distinguishes civil wars from interstate wars, and makes negotiated settlements to the former harder to attain than the latter, is that former combatants cannot go back to their respective states, but must share one state, its institutions, and its army. The inability to trust the enemy makes it extremely difficult for former combatants to disarm, as they must if they are to share one state. Indeed, the lower rate of negotiated settlements in civil wars as opposed to interstate wars does not indicate that civil wars are inherently more intractable or intense than interstate wars, but rather that disarming when the war is over without credible security guarantees leaves the combatants vulnerable. Lacking third-party intervention to mitigate combatants' fears that the other side will use the respite provided by a settlement to rearm and prepare to attack them, a settlement is unlikely to be negotiated, or to hold if a deal is made. In other words, neither side can credibly commit not to take advantage of the other during the transition period that follows a settlement.

Settlements to civil wars that seek to retain a single state also must overcome the problem of how to integrate the former combatants' military forces. Walter asserts that "the single most detrimental condition operating against cooperation is that civil war adversaries cannot maintain independent armed
forces if they decide to reconcile." As mentioned above, disarming renders groups vulnerable to attack if the other side cheats; it also makes it impossible for them to coerce the other side to adhere to the agreement. The negotiations must invent some formula acceptable to both sides of how to create a united army. If separate armies are allowed to exist, then the state does not possess a "monopoly over the concentrated means of physical coercion within its territory." Rather than one state, the result is the emergence of multiple states.

Third-party intervention to guarantee a settlement is not sufficient to resolve this dilemma. Such intervention is relatively rare, but even when it occurs, agreements still sometimes fail because a third-party presence only postpones—but does not eliminate—the day when groups must disarm, unite their armies, and trust each other. Because this requires cooperation with former bitter enemies, groups will naturally worry about their future security since disarming leaves them open to attack and without recourse to arms should their rival renege on its commitments. This dangerous and potentially deadly outcome gives groups incentives to cheat on the agreement and hold onto their weapons, which torpedoes the deal and leads to new hostilities.

The realist, zero-sum logic of ethnic civil wars I have outlined predicts that the likely outcome of such wars will be military victory by the government or the rebels, resulting in either suppression, secession, or state capture. It also predicts that negotiated settlements will be rare, and that agreements actually implemented will likely fail. The empirical record supports these predictions. Negotiated settlements to ethnic wars are relatively scarce, occurring in only about 20 to 25 percent of cases. While both ethnic and ideological civil wars are about equally likely to end in negotiated settlements, the key difference is that settlements to ethnic wars much more often collapse into renewed war than do ethnic wars ended by military victory. One study found that 67 percent of negotiated settlements to ethnic wars eventually broke down into war between the same combatants over the same issues, while this occurred only 21 percent of the time after a military victory by one side or the other. By comparison, none of the ideological wars in that study reignited, whether settled by negotiations or victory.
RAMIFICATIONS: WHY INDEPENDENCE IS SUPERIOR

My argument suggests that once an ethnic civil war starts, ethnic groups in conflict can no longer rely on the state for protection, and hence a situation of quasi-anarchy exists. Since solutions short of partition, such as autonomy, federalism, and power sharing, have a poor track record (as shown below), the dangers of this situation can be ameliorated in one of two ways: reestablishing hierarchy—helping one side to crush the other and establish a strong state to deter future internal challenges—or formalizing the anarchy that already prevails and seeking to minimize its adverse effects. Since the former may result in mass killing or genocide, I argue that the latter is preferable on humanitarian grounds, and can be defended against potential objections.

Partition should rest on the four pillars of independence, separation of populations, defensible borders, and a balance of power. Partition implemented in this way cannot guarantee peace; no solution to ethnic conflict can make that promise. Partition, however, can lower the likelihood of a return to war by removing two key factors that perpetuate conflict—the desire for control and ethnic intermingling—and by raising the costs of resuming the war.

**Independence.** Constituting rival ethnic groups into independent states goes a long way toward reducing conflict because groups no longer have to share the same state. Independence grants groups control over their own destiny, which satisfies nationalist desires and provides the best means to ensure the group’s survival. Independence also means that the ethnic group’s survival no longer hinges on the other side keeping its word. Former combatants are not required to disarm or integrate their armed forces, which is difficult to do in an environment of low trust, and also makes each catastrophically vulnerable to cheating by the other side.

**Separation.** As discussed above, ethnic conflict between intermingled groups causes ethnic cleansing. Groups in conflict cannot afford to allow actual or potential enemies to remain in the territory they hope to control. Implementing partition without separating the groups in conflict to reduce or eliminate the number of minorities left behind is sure to see them cleansed, or for conflict over the intermingled region to continue. Examples of this problem include Kashmir in India, a Muslim-majority state that joined India instead of Pakistan at the time of partition and has been the site of recurrent warfare, and Northern Ireland, which was left with a substantial Catholic minority after the partition of Ireland. Thus, planned population exchanges should be an integral part of partition, not left to ethnic cleansing.

51. Ibid., 686–87.
Defensible borders. To reduce the risk of war further, implementers of partition should strive to create—insofar as is possible—incentives that discourage aggression. To maximize the possibility that war will not be renewed, borders between postpartition states should be drawn so as to make them as defensible as possible. Defensible borders offer two significant benefits. On the one hand, they increase a state's perception of its own security, thus reducing the need to expand to more defensible frontiers to enhance security. On the other hand, defensible borders contribute to deterrence because they make conquest difficult, raising the costs of attack and lowering the likelihood of success. Should the terrain between the two states present few natural obstacles to attack, deterrence may fail because the aggressor believes it can win a quick and decisive victory.

Borders should be drawn along natural barriers, such as rivers or mountain ranges. Potential attackers have been deterred from invading Switzerland owing to its mountainous terrain, not its military capability. Similarly, rivers or other bodies of water can serve as effective defensive lines. River crossings present invading armies with significant operational and logistical problems not only because temporary bridges must be constructed to replace the ones usually destroyed by the defender, but the attacker's forces must concentrate and render themselves vulnerable to artillery and air attack at the crossing point. It is precisely for this reason that Israel was reluctant to part with the Sinai Peninsula: mounting a defense on the Suez Canal, a water barrier at a distance from Israel proper, was easier than stopping an Egyptian invasion from the Sinai into the Negev, where there are few natural obstacles to a mechanized advance. Borders that present attackers with significant obstacles and give defenders tactical and strategic advantages increase the likelihood that potential aggressors will be deterred.

54. This factor similarly explains Israel's current reluctance to cede control over the Jordan River Valley to a Palestinian state.
55. Of course, the existence of defensible borders alone cannot guarantee that a determined or aggressive adversary will be deterred. The Egyptian decision to attack Israel across the Suez Canal in 1973 is a case where several factors converged to cause deterrence to fail: domestic political pressures on Egyptian president Sadat; a clever limited-aims strategy; and new Soviet weaponry (surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and antitank guided missiles) to neutralize Israeli air and armored forces. See Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 158, 161. Separation and partition may cause domestic pressures for war by giving rise to border disputes or because transferred populations demand their old land back. The military balance, however, may still discourage resort to war, as it has in Palestine and Cyprus, where neither the Palestinians nor the Greek Cypriots have had the ability to act on their desires to retake territory. Moreover, as Kaufmann points out, it is much more difficult for group lead-
Where natural barriers are lacking, however, man-made obstacles may help deter war. Fortifications, walls, barbed wire, minefields, and artillery all raise the costs to attackers of an assault. Particularly helpful are demilitarized zones (DMZs), such as the one that divides North and South Korea. Demilitarized zones increase stability because they reduce the likelihood of a surprise attack being launched, and the chance that it would succeed if tried, by providing an open area that the attacker must cross while vulnerable to the concentrated firepower of the defender. Placing international peacekeepers along a DMZ also helps because it forces potential attackers to risk a confrontation with not only the peacekeepers but also their home countries. To avoid this possibility, the attacker must demand the peacekeepers’ evacuation, which alerts the defender of the impending assault and removes the advantage of surprise.56

**Balance of power.** A second condition that lessens the chance of postpartition conflict is a balance of power. When two states are roughly equal in power, war between them is less likely than if one were preponderant because, without a significant material advantage, the likely result is a brutal war of attrition that is both costly and unlikely to lead to quick victory. In this situation, deterrence is likely to obtain unless one side comes up with an innovative and daring strategy. While this sometimes occurs, such strategies are hard to come by, and do not always succeed. Should one side be much stronger than the other, the risk of war increases because the preponderant state can simply overwhelm its weaker foe directly at low cost without the need for strategic innovation. Thus, war will be less likely if the states formed by partition are strong enough to stand a reasonable chance of being able to defend themselves against an attack from the other side.57 A balance of power does not mean that security competition—or even war—will be absent. It does imply, however, that such

56. This is what occurred before the Six-Day War in 1967. Egypt’s request that UN peacekeepers withdraw from the Sinai helped convince Israel that the Egyptians were not bluffing. See Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), 197.

57. These new states will not always be equal in terms of territory, population, and economic and military might. Moreover, in the long term, power ratios between states tend to change due to uneven growth rates, sometimes causing one to lag behind in its ability to sustain military forces adequate for deterrence. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). States, however, need not be dauntingly powerful in order to deter potential adversaries; they must simply be capable of holding their own, raising the potential costs of the adversary’s aggression. Postpartition states should be able to stand a reasonable chance of not losing a war, which may be enough to deter one from starting. These states can also form alliances should they begin to fall behind their rivals.
competition will be less likely to result in war than where one state is preponderant, because a balance increases the costs and risks of an attack.

Balancing can be done by either internal means—building up one’s economy and military forces—or external means—forming alliances with other states. Sometimes two states created by partition are equal enough that they can balance each other internally. More frequently, however, the balance will be maintained by an external power, either by providing significant military or economic aid to the weaker side, or with a formal alliance to intervene militarily if the smaller state is attacked.\(^{58}\) American support for Israel fits in the former category, while Turkey’s commitment to Northern Cyprus since 1974 exemplifies the latter. The capability provided by this ally, or its promise to intervene, helps deter or defeat potential revisionism by the larger postpartition state.\(^{59}\)

**COUNTERARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES**

CriticS FAULT partition on three grounds. First, they argue that because identity is fundamentally malleable, there is no need for partition because states can be kept intact by fostering change in identities, which would remove the source of conflict. Identity is changeable since it is not primordially given from birth, but socially constructed from cultural practices, which can and do change. Second, in cases in which partition has been implemented, critics assert that it not only caused violence, perpetuating the problem it was meant to solve, but also made the situation worse by sparking new and different strife.

\(^{58}\) This commitment can be further solidified by stationing troops in the small ally’s territory.

Third, partition’s critics contend that carving up multiethnic states along communal lines sets a precedent that imperils other multiethnic states nearby. In essence, critics fear that once the ethnic splintering process begins, there will be no stopping the fragmentation of political space into ever smaller, economically less viable units.

IDENTITY IS MALLEABLE

Critics argue that because national identity is malleable—that is, relatively changeable, responsive to external forces, and manipulable by elites—it is erroneous to assume that rival ethnic groups cannot be melded into one, or that ethnic identities cannot be altered to facilitate cooperation between groups. Robert Schaeffer, for example, argues that “[t]he identity of majority and minority groups is, after all, a social construction.... [A]s these ad hoc social constructions change over time, the meaning of self—of national identity—changes as well.”60 Amitai Etzioni agrees: “new ethnic ‘selves’ can be generated quite readily, drawing on fracture lines now barely noticeable.”61 By implication, then, the whole project of national self-determination is flawed since self-determination based on a constant national identity is a myth, and bounded, homogeneous nations do not exist. As Schaeffer puts it, “the realization of self-determination by a particular people or nation in a given state is itself problematic, even utopian.”62

This line of argument is drawn largely from the work of Benedict Anderson on the socially constructed origins of the nation and nationalism.63 Instead of basing his definitions of the nation on shared biological traits (skin color, physical appearance, identity of parents), or shared residence on a given piece

60. Schaeffer, Warpaths, 255. The claim that identities are socially constructed means roughly that “social categories, their membership rules, content, and valuation are the products of human action and speech, and that as a result they can and do change over time.” See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (autumn 2000), 848. The constructivist view disassociates social categories (such as ethnicity) from genetic, inherited, so-called natural traits, and relocates it in human practice and discourse. Constructivism arose in reaction to the view, known as primordialism, that ethnic identity is a genetic trait transmitted by birth, and as such is fixed and unchanging, independent of human beliefs or actions. See Edward Shils, “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties,” British Journal of Sociology 8, no. 2 (June 1957), 142. This view is largely discredited in the academic literature, but remains popular in journalistic accounts of ethnicity which attribute ethnic conflicts to “ancient ethnic hatreds.” A good example is Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993).


62. Schaeffer, Warpaths, 255.

63. In this context, nation does not mean state, but rather is the equivalent of a mobilized ethnic group.
of territory, Anderson argues that the nation should be defined as "an imagined political community" which requires conscious effort by nationalists to construct. In this formulation, the nation is imagined "because even the members of the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion." Thus, because nations exist primarily in the minds of their imaginers, the composition of nations can change.

This argument suggests that nations, far from being stable, bounded, discrete entities, are instead always in a state of flux. National identity responds to shifting social conditions, and savvy nationalist entrepreneurs construct national communities out of existing social and cultural materials. Because national identity is so changeable, it cannot serve as a reliable guide for partition: the nations we think are stable today could transform tomorrow. Partition is thus arbitrary, random, and unlikely to produce coherent, cohesive communities.

Response. The notion of identity as socially constructed represents the conventional wisdom in academia, but it suffers from three flaws that make its practical utility questionable. The claim that nations are socially constructed is no doubt accurate, but it is not true that nations are imaginary, and thus arbitrary or ephemeral. “The constructed nature of nationality or national consciousness,” comments Ronald Suny, “should not be taken to mean that these are ‘artificial’ entities and therefore are illegitimate in some sense.” The boundaries of such groups may be open to contestation, but their core beliefs and practices remain remarkably stable over time. Moreover, national identity is not constructed out of thin air; it is almost always built on some seemingly natural foundation, such as skin color, religion, parentage, or language. The

65. Ibid., 6.
66. Donald Horowitz presents a more sophisticated view of this argument. He agrees that “ethnic identity is not static,” but rather than being highly malleable, he writes, “it changes with the environment and especially with territorial boundaries.” Thus, when political space is subdivided into ever smaller units in pursuit of homogeneity, this effort will be foiled by the tendency for “[s]ubgroup cleavages” to “assume heightened importance.” In essence, as territorial horizons shrink, so does the locus of ethnic identity. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 589.
67. Indeed, the view that nations are a social construction and thus a product of choice is news to most people. Far more common is the view that nationality is bestowed by birth, what has been termed “everyday primordialism.” Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 848.
apparent "reality" of these characteristics thus contributes to the common view that national identity is also real, and rigid rather than malleable.

Furthermore, Schaeffer's assertion that, because "imagined communities" exist in the mind, they are easily changed after having been imagined, does not follow. While correctly pointing out that ethnic identity is not fixed by birth and thus is changeable in theory, these constructivist critics fail to consider identity's staying power once awakened in practice. This mistake leads these critics to overestimate not only the feasibility of such change, but also the rate of change. Daniel Byman has shown that fostering identity change to end ethnic wars is of limited utility because it can take generations to work, is often incomplete and fragile even when successful, and requires a high degree of governmental coercion and cooptation, which many would regard as inhumane. Byman further argues that identity manipulation "is often not a feasible strategy for states seeking to overcome a legacy of communal violence," or when groups do not share a common culture, two conditions that are usually the case after ethnic wars.

Theories of psychology and perception confirm Byman's finding by showing that human belief systems are notoriously resistant to change, and often seemingly impervious to the most blatant contradictory evidence. Instead of rationally updating their beliefs to take account of disconfirming evidence, people, for psychological reasons, often interpret such evidence in ways that makes it consistent with their preexisting beliefs. These cognitive biases sup-

69. Daniel Byman, "Forever Enemies? The Manipulation of Ethnic Identities to End Ethnic Wars," Security Studies 9, no. 3 (spring 2000): 149-90. Byman elaborates three models of identity change—destruction, division, and inclusion—and demonstrates their varying degrees of success in Iran, Morocco, and Israel (Byman also discusses a failed attempt at identity change in Iraq). When it works, identity change occurs by "interfering with communal organization, improving the status of individuals, and reducing group security fears"; ibid., 184. Unfortunately, according to Byman, governments must apply significant coercion over generations to achieve results.

70. Ibid., 189.

71. These ideas are most familiar to students of international relations from the work of Robert Jervis. See Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, and Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

72. Two forms of biases cause such cognition: unmotivated and motivated. Unmotivated biases stem from the effort to make sense out of a complex environment and from the restrictions of human cognitive capacities. Motivated biases, on the other hand, are driven by individuals' emotional needs, primarily the need to minimize "the discomfort that would be created by a full appreciation of the negative attributes of objects the person values, such as his or her country or favored policy." Robert Jervis, "Introduction: Approach and Assumptions," in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 4. Whatever the reason, people are subject to strong psychological pressures to assimilate new information into preexisting beliefs and minimize the disparities between the two.
port the idea that beliefs about national identity, once formed, will resist change instead of adapting to new conditions.

Finally, constructivists overlook the impact of fear and violence on identity. Between the fixity of primordialism and the extreme malleability of constructivism lies a wide range of relative identity strength. In high-conflict environments, where people fear or have experienced violence at the hands of out-group members or extremists within their own community, ethnic identities are likely to lie near the fixed end of the spectrum, and are unlikely to be re-imagined in benign ways as long as people continue to fear for their safety, or while memories of atrocities linger. Indeed, in such situations, any “choice” regarding identity is eliminated because one’s ethnicity becomes a marker of friend or foe.

In sum, while the assertion that national identity is a social construction is no doubt true, it does not follow that identity changes easily or quickly. The difficulty that some states experience fostering civic identities which overarch ethnic ones shows the staying power of identities once invoked. Thus, the supposed malleability of identity does not invalidate partition as a potential solution to ethnic wars.

PARTITION CAUSES, PERPETUATES, AND AGGRAVATES CONFLICT

Critics also attack the view that partition is the lesser of two evils, preferable to the state of “constant civil war” which would presumably prevail if a multi-ethnic state were to be held together. This criticism has three parts. First, critics argue that partition causes further violence, war, and refugee problems. Radha Kumar, for example, maintains that “[a]lthough described as the lesser of two evils, the partitions in Cyprus, India, Palestine, and Ireland, rather than separating irreconcilable ethnic groups, fomented further violence and forced mass migration.” The partition of British India, critics argue, led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and created over ten million refugees; the division of Cyprus in 1974 saw at least 1,000 die and 260,000 people flee; and the war for Palestine in 1948 killed 16,000 and displaced about 750,000 Palestinians.

Second, critics claim that partition not only causes immediate violence, but that it fails to solve the basic rivalry at issue between the groups involved. T.

73. For example, the proportion of those identifying themselves as “Yugoslavs” on the Yugoslavian census topped out at 5.4 percent in 1981. See Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), 32.
75. Ibid., 24.
76. These numbers are taken from Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails,” 140, 151, 144.
G. Fraser points out that partition failed significantly to dampen conflict in any of the cases he examined: “If, as this book has argued, partition was seen as a means of resolving conflict, then it has been less than successful.” Indeed, it is argued that partition did not resolve the deeper problems that caused conflict in these societies, but only created new spaces and frameworks in which these problems could be contested. “Not only was partition an immediate failure,” Schaeffer contends, “it has proved to be an enduring problem. Decades have passed since these countries were divided, yet the conflicts between them have, in most cases, grown more bitter over time.” Thus, the partition of South Asia into predominantly Hindu and Muslim states not only caused the death of hundreds of thousands, but India and Pakistan remain locked in an enduring rivalry that erupted into war in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1998, and has led each to develop and test nuclear weapons. On Cyprus, too, de facto partition did not ease tensions between Greeks and Turks on the island. As Kumar points out, “the division of Cyprus is little more than a long standoff that remains volatile and continues to require the presence of UN troops.”

Third, critics contend that, in addition to prolonging the existing strife, partition usually makes things worse because it spawns entirely new conflicts that otherwise would not have occurred. Donald Horowitz argues, for example, that partition in the presence of ethnic heterogeneity causes situations in which “movements to restrict, disenfranchise, expel, or exterminate ethnic strangers can be expected after independence. Increased conflict—or much worse—is the likely result.” Purported examples of such conflicts from twentieth-century partitions include the intra-Catholic civil war in the Irish Free State, 1922–23; the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974; the secession of East Pakistan to become the state of Bangladesh in 1971; the Arab-Israeli wars; and the Palestinian intifadah.

Empirical evidence that partition does not lessen the probability of war recurrence has recently been offered by Nicholas Sambanis. In a quantitative analysis of 125 civil wars, Sambanis found that “the evidence does not support the assertion that partition significantly reduces the risk of war recurrence. Hence there is no support for partition as a policy option if the rationale advanced is that it will prevent future ethnic wars.”

77. Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine*, 192.
78. For example, by changing civil wars into interstate wars.
82. Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” 473–74.
Response. The short answer to this set of criticisms is that they mistakenly attribute to partition what is actually a consequence of anarchy following the withdrawal of central authority (imperial rule) and intermingled demography. As argued above, partition is characterized by violence where it does not also separate intermixed ethnic populations. Failure to plan for and implement population transfers properly led to people being driven out by force, as in Palestine (discussed at length below) and the Indian subcontinent, or to chronic conflict where they remained in substantial numbers, as in Northern Ireland or Cyprus before 1974. Once groups were separated, or minority populations reduced to insignificant numbers (usually less than 10 percent), violence died away, as it has for the most part in the Republic of Ireland; India; Pakistan; Cyprus after 1974; and Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria after the population exchanges between them in 1923.

Where conflict within or between the new states (or political entities) has continued after partition, this too is due to continued intermingling of antagonistic groups. In Ireland, for example, conflict between Catholics and Protestants is endemic to life in Ulster, where Catholics comprise about one-third of the population. In the Irish Republic, however, dominated by Catholics and less than one-tenth Protestant, conflict between the two communities has been nonexistent. Furthermore, the region that India and Pakistan continue to contest—Kashmir—is the one territory where separation of Hindus and Muslims did not occur at the time of partition. Also, while Cyprus may suffer continued tension, only twelve people have died there from ethnic violence since separation was completed in 1974.

The critics' claim that partition sparked new wars that otherwise would not have occurred is also doubtful. The 1922–23 intra-Catholic civil war in the Irish Free State, sparked by disagreement over whether to accept partition, simply demonstrates how deeply some Catholics in the south cared about their northern brethren. The fault here was a partition agreement that included a 34 percent Catholic minority in Ulster, not the principle of partition itself. Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus was caused by the incomplete nature of the 1964 de facto partition of the island, which left Turkish and Greek Cypriots intermingled. The Turkish minority (20 percent) was thus terribly vulnerable when Nicos Sampson (a leader of massacres in 1963–64) became president after a coup in 1974. East Pakistan's secession to become Bangladesh in 1971.

83. The enduring problem between Israel and the Palestinians stems from a different problem, but one which is foreseen by my argument: the lack of a Palestinian state. While these two populations are mostly separated, conflict between them will continue until the Palestinians receive their own state. Conflict has also resulted from higher levels of intermingling due to increased Jewish settlement of Palestinian areas in the West Bank and Gaza.
had nothing to do with the separation of Hindus and Muslims in 1947, and rather more to do with Pakistan's divided geography and linguistic communities. Nor can the Arab-Israeli wars be traced to partition: they stem from Arabs’ unwillingness to countenance any Jewish state in the Middle East, while the intifadah “was caused in large part by Israel’s policy of planting Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, in effect remixing populations that had been separated.”

Finally, Sambanis’s large-N results, which he argues provide damning evidence against partition, suffer from three flaws that undermine his claims. First, Sambanis defines partition as “a war outcome that involves both border adjustment and demographic changes.” As he acknowledges, however, this definition conflates what are normally treated as two distinct phenomena: partition—dividing an existing state into one or more successor states accomplished by agreement between the parties or imposed by a third party; and secession—a unilateral move by one group to withdraw from an existing state to form its own state. This redefinition not only violates conventional usage, but, because the majority of “partitions” in his dataset are actually “secessions,” it directly affects the results of the analysis. Secession means withdrawal, a unilateral move that implies resistance by the state. Partition means division, which can be done with or without agreement by the parties involved, and does not always imply conflict. Combining the two phenomena thus artificially inflates the probability of observing war recurrence.

Furthermore, because Sambanis fails to control for the level of ethnic intermingling between combatant groups after partition, his results actually confirm the expectations of partition’s proponents. Sambanis simply codes whether a partition occurred (according to his definition) and then observed whether war between the same parties took place after the partition. Partitions that do not also reduce ethnic intermingling, however, do not lower violence, but in fact cause future conflict. Without investigating the extent to which such intermingling was reduced, Sambanis’s analysis tells us little about the effect of partition on war recurrence.

A third limitation of Sambanis’s inquiry is that his research design excludes cases of peaceful partition, since his dependent variable is not war, but war recurrence. This design neglects the possibility that these partitions prevented wars that would have occurred had partition not happened. It also overlooks

84. Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails,” 147. Kaufmann reviews the four big cases—Ireland, India, Palestine, and Cyprus—in detail; see ibid., 125–52. My summary of this evidence draws extensively on his analysis.
86. Ibid., 439 n. 8.
the importance of demography, as peaceful partitions normally occur between ethnic groups that are not significantly intermingled.

Overall, it seems that critics have assigned blame to partition for something actually caused by ethnic intermingling. Where this intermingling remains after partition, violence occurs; where it does not, conflict is absent. Separation does not produce intergroup harmony, but it does remove a major reason for war— insecurity. The critics' focus on the violence associated with past partitions simply highlights the importance of separation to peace.

PARTITION SETS A BAD PRECEDENT

Partition's critics argue that carving up multinational states to accord with the wishes of separatist ethnic groups sets a bad precedent. Amitai Etzioni warns, for example, that "[i]t is impossible to sustain the notion that every ethnic group can find its expression in a full-blown nation-state.... [T]he process of ethnic separation and the breakdown of existing states will then never be exhausted."87 Once the international community begins to grant the right to national self-determination clear priority over the norm of states' territorial integrity, who is to say when the fragmentation will end? As David Laitin puts it, "the more you appease nationality groups making claims for political recognition, the more actors appear making national claims."88 Where should the line be drawn which endows some groups with states and denies this privilege to others?

Carl Bildt, former High Representative for Peace Implementation in Bosnia, offers a statement of this ethnic domino theory in response to a proposal for the redivision of Bosnia by Ivo Daalder that is worth quoting at length:

But this would not be the most damaging effect of Daalder's proposed solution—the signal it would send to other parts of the region would be even worse. If the ethnic cleansers of the Drina valley can obtain their new Serb state, how could one justify not giving the Bosnian Croats of Herzegovina their state, eventually to be unified with Croatia? The Franjo Tudjmans of the world would wonder why they were not given their share when the Slobodan Milosevics of the world were.

The process would not be limited to Bosnia. After a Bosnian deal like this, would there be anything to prevent the Albanians of Kosovo from demanding independence? Having thus in all probability triggered war in Serbia, it would only be a matter of time until the Albanians of western Macedonia would demand these same rights, thus effectively ending the

existence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and entering into a conflict in south-eastern Europe—an area historically far more unstable than Bosnia. Given the ethnic mosaic of south-eastern Europe, partition would be a short-term recipe for long-term wars throughout the region.\footnote{89}

Bildt fears that to grant one group’s wish for its own national state (in this case, the Bosnian Serbs) would send a message to all other minority nationalist groups that if they just killed enough people, their wish for statehood would eventually be granted. In effect, partitions will inspire a domino effect by which one group after another, having witnessed their predecessors’ success, will rebel in the hope of gaining their own state. Central state governments, however, will resist these movements for fear of their demonstration effect on other groups, especially if other potential candidates for secession are present in the state. This dynamic will generate never-ending warfare.

The danger of the ethnic domino effect is compounded, it is said, by a further objection to partition: that the diminutive states produced by the fragmenting process will not be economically viable. Critics argue that multiethnic states should be maintained because their larger internal markets will help them to survive economically. Charles Boyd, for example, lists economic viability as one of three reasons not to partition Bosnia: “Partition would also result in a more substantive problem than embarrassment for the Clinton Administration. Two of the three entities would not be economically viable if they were completely independent.”\footnote{90}

\textit{Response.} The success or failure of a neighboring group to attain its own state undoubtedly exerts some effect on the likelihood that similarly motivated groups in nearby states will follow, but this influence is not decisive. Because the supposed precedent of partition is interpreted through the lens of each group’s domestic situation, the fear of ethnic dominoes falling to rebellion is probably unfounded.\footnote{91} As Maynard Glitman argues, “each ethnic conflict is \textit{sui generis}.... The Chechens would have fought for their independence regardless
of how the U.S. and its allies dealt with Yugoslavia.”

Indeed, a recent quantitative study found no evidence to support the proposition that civil wars proliferate from one country to its neighbors. Achieving autonomy or independence often requires prolonged warfare, a cost not all groups are equally willing to pay. Where one group draws inspiration from a partition to realize its own goals, other groups may view the long struggle it takes to get there as too onerous.

Moreover, if the argument that partition leads to ethnic fragmentation is false, so too is the claim that intervening to retain a single, multiethnic state would discourage other groups from aspiring to independence. As Michael O’Hanlon puts it, “holding to the goal of a unified Bosnia has not deterred or ended numerous other civil wars going on in the world today.” Indeed, precedents are rarely set in international politics because they require common interpretations by many actors from a variety of viewpoints, followers who abide by the resulting convention, and a lack of ambiguity regarding whether the relevant convention applies to a given situation. As Stephen Saideman points out, however, “[a]ny event provides a great deal of data to observers, who can then absorb a variety of lessons from the event. Arguments concerning demonstration effects often assume that politicians and followers will learn only one kind of lesson—one that encourages further political action, leading to repeated occurrences of the same event, that is, positive spatial diffusion.”

Recent events in the Balkans demonstrate the weakness of the precedent argument. Western policymakers have repeatedly invoked the need to set a precedent against aggression, ethnic cleansing, and state fragmentation as a justification for intervening in and occupying Bosnia. Specifically, they argue that allowing Bosnia to disintegrate would encourage assertiveness by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia. Bosnia has been held together firmly by

94. For example, even though Russia lost its 1994–96 war in Chechnya, the fact that it brutally contested the Chechens’ bid for independence helps explain why no other subjects of the Russian federation have tried to secede. See Gail W. Lapidus, “Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 15, no. 1 (January–March 1999), 76.
95. O’Hanlon, “Turning the Bosnia Ceasefire into Peace,” 42.
96. Because it does poorly on these three conditions, Elizabeth Kier and Jonathan Mercer argue that “[p]olicy-makers should reject the argument that military intervention (or a failure to intervene) will set a precedent, and should base their decision on other factors.” Elizabeth Kier and Jonathan Mercer, “Setting Precedents in Anarchy; Military Intervention and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 99–100.
97. Saideman, “Is Pandora’s Box Half Empty or Half Full?” 129. Saideman argues that demonstration effects are only likely to spread conflict within a state, not between states.
the international community since late 1995, but this has not discouraged Kosovar Albanians from demanding independence from Serbia, democratic or not. This has put NATO in the embarrassing position of having to crack down on the very people it intervened to protect in 1999. Moreover, forbidding independence for Kosovo has not prevented Macedonia's ethnic Albanians from agitating for greater rights, or inhibited Montenegro's push for sovereignty. Clearly, international opposition to partition in rhetoric and policy has not dampened movements for ethnic independence.98

Finally, while critics repeatedly raise the economic viability issue, they cannot identify a single state that failed for economic reasons. States are largely immune to this problem. Nationalism inspires people to endure significant pain and hardship in the name of independence and self-determination. Nationalism also helps to endow a state with legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and enables it to extract resources from them to avoid extinction. Furthermore, states need not have large internal markets or be autarkic because all states can enjoy benefits from international trade.99 Many small states are actually quite wealthy, including Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Those who criticize the economic viability of small postpartition states fail to explain why they could not trade for what they need, or receive loans from states or international organizations to rebuild damaged economies.100 Moreover, the trend of the last century has been toward a proliferation of states due to the breakup of multiethnic empires and decolonization. UN membership has nearly quadrupled in the half century since that organization's founding. Opponents of partition have not articulated why this trend is harmful now when it was not in the past.

In sum, the criticisms that partition divides people unnecessarily; causes and perpetuates violence, old and new; and leads to ethnic dominoes tumbling are generally without merit. Identity, while socially constructed, does not change quickly or easily. Violence normally attributed to partition is actually produced by the lack of separation. Moreover, the success or failure of neighboring

98. Some might argue that rather than setting the intended precedent against state frag- mentation, NATO's military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo set a different precedent, namely that NATO would rescue imperiled ethnic groups, at least in Europe, and then might later have to accept their goal of statehood. This position does not seem convincing, as NATO has opposed efforts by all parties since Dayton to divide Bosnia, and never endorsed anything other than autonomy for Kosovo before or after intervening there. The fact that the precedent could be contested, however, highlights the difficulty of setting precedents in international politics.


100. "At any rate," argues Lind, "an argument for the benefits of scale is an argument against small states of any kind—against small multinational states, like Switzerland, as much as small nation states like Slovenia." Lind, "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," 94.
groups to achieve statehood is but one factor groups consider when pondering the idea of a state of their own. Criticism notwithstanding, partition, if implemented correctly, is potentially an effective way to reduce conflict.

ALTERNATIVES TO PARTITION AND THEIR DRAWBACKS

The conventional wisdom holds that granting an ethnic group greater self-governance through power sharing, regional autonomy, or the creation of a federal state is sufficient to ameliorate ethnic grievances. These solutions are superior to partition because they seemingly represent a happy medium between protecting group rights and preventing state fragmentation.101 Ted Gurr argues that a "new global strategy to contain ethnic conflict" is on the rise: "threats to divide a country should be managed by the devolution of state power and...communal fighting about access to the state's power and resources should be restrained by recognizing group rights and sharing power."102 Security dilemma realists, too, claim that once separation is a fact on the ground, autonomy for ethnic regions within a single state is adequate. As long as the ethnic groups are sufficiently autonomous to protect their interests, the particular political arrangements make little difference.103 Below I briefly elaborate the flaws in each of these proposed solutions to ethnic civil wars, and examine the empirical evidence.

Consociationalism. The first alternative to partition is consociationalism, a technical term for power sharing, which provides for cultural or regional autonomy; proportional representation in governing institutions, the civil service, and the armed forces; and a minority veto on issues of vital concern. This system requires not only a great deal of confidence and trust to work effectively, but also a tremendous amount of cooperation between competing ethnic elites, who must be able effectively to aggregate the diverse interests of

101. See the references in n. 4.
103. Kaufmann argues that "local autonomy must be so complete that minority groups can protect their key interests even lacking any influence at the national level," and that regions must be so strong militarily that it would be too costly for the central government to conquer them. See Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," 162.
Table 1
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS TO ETHNIC WARS SINCE 1945
THAT RESULTED IN A MULTIETHNIC STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Dates of Conflict</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power Sharing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Ireland</td>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>1968–94</td>
<td>Conflict diminished*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Christians, Muslims</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>War resumed (1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Ovimbundu</td>
<td>1975–91</td>
<td>War resumed (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Southerners</td>
<td>1965–79</td>
<td>War resumed (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Majority Rule</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>1976–94</td>
<td>Conflict ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>1972–80</td>
<td>Conflict ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Autonomy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>1973–94</td>
<td>Conflict ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Tuaregs</td>
<td>1990–95</td>
<td>Conflict ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Southerners</td>
<td>1963–72</td>
<td>War resumed (1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechens</td>
<td>1994–96</td>
<td>War resumed (1999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Good Friday agreement, signed on 10 April 1998, called for a power-sharing government between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, which was inaugurated the following year. Disputes over a number of issues, however, especially how the Irish Republican Army should be disarmed, forced Britain to suspend the government in February 2000, and those opposed to the agreement on both sides have since gained strength. The future status of power sharing in Northern Ireland is thus unclear.

**Agreements in South Africa and Zimbabwe included only minimal power sharing: white former prime minister F. W. de Klerk became second deputy president under the South African settlement, while whites in Zimbabwe were guaranteed 20 out of 100 seats in the national assembly. De Klerk and his National Party, however, later quit the government because the new South African constitution did not include power-sharing arrangements, while Zimbabwe’s whites have not been able to prevent government encroachment on their lands, and many have left the country. One reason the shift to majority rule in these countries succeeded without recurrent war is that the white populations are so small that they do not represent a threat to the black majority (Zimbabwe’s whites are less than 1 percent of the population, while South African whites are about 13 percent).
Data for this table is from Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” *World Politics* 52, no. 4 (July 2000). This article contains the largest and most current compilation of civil wars: the full dataset includes 125 civil wars fought since 1945, 80 of which are ethnic/religious in nature. Sambanis coded 20 of these 80 cases as having ended by negotiated settlements (settled by a formal treaty); the remaining 60 cases resulted either in victory for one side, an informal truce or cease-fire, or ongoing war. I deleted 8 of these 20 cases, however, for reasons described below, leaving the 12 that appear in the table. Of the 8 cases deleted, Rwanda (1990–94) was a rebel victory: the Hutu government and the Tutsi rebels did reach an agreement (the Arusha Accords of August 1993), but the deal was not yet implemented when President Habyarimana died in a plane crash. This event marked the beginning of the genocide perpetrated by Hutu opponents of sharing power with the Tutsi, a slaughter which was only stopped when the Tutsi rebels conquered the country and drove out those responsible. Tajikistan (1992–94) and Croatia (1995) were government victories. In Tajikistan, forces favoring the old guard communist elite, primarily from the Kulyab and Leninabad regions in the western part of the country, defeated the Islamist-democratic rebels, which drew their support mostly from the Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan regions of eastern Tajikistan, by the end of 1992. The war was thus decided by a military victory. A negotiated settlement did occur later, though, when the government concluded a power-sharing agreement with the United Tajik Opposition in 1997. Many instances of violence have followed the signing of this agreement, however, and the accord has not been faithfully implemented by the government. In Croatia, the war in 1995 was decided by two government offensives that recaptured Croatian Serb–held western Slavonia and Krajina and sent hundreds of thousands of Serbs fleeing east to Serbia. An agreement was later reached by which the Croatian Serbs surrendered eastern Slavonia to Croatia, but by then the war had been won by military action. Wars in Bosnia (1992–95) and Lebanon (1982–92) were settled by agreement, but the settlements—and the peace that has followed—resulted primarily from the coercion and continuing presence of a third party. In Bosnia, the United States coerced Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims to terminate the war, and peace after Dayton has been kept by NATO troops. In Lebanon, Syria fears the disintegration of the Lebanese state and thus maintains a large occupation force to prevent another outbreak of war. India (1946–48) was a partition, and thus did not retain a single multiethnic state. Guatemala (1974–94) was primarily an ideological war by leftists seeking to overthrow right-wing, military-dominated governments. This case is difficult because class and ethnic lines coincide: the country is dominated by the minority Spanish-descended *ladinos*, while the native Mayan peoples are the majority but form the underclass. I code the Guatemalan rebellion as an ideological/economic war because the leading guerrilla groups were motivated by Marxist-Leninist ideology and, while they recruited heavily from the repressed Mayan population, they never articulated a clear ethnic platform. The reason the native peoples were the war’s primary victims was that the government assumed they sympathized with the guerrillas, and thus targeted them in brutal counterinsurgency campaigns designed to destroy the rebels’ base of support in the population. Finally, Namibia (1965–89) was not a civil war at all, but rather a war of national liberation. Namibia was never formally annexed to South Africa, being first a League of Nations mandate after South Africa conquered the area in the First World War, and then an occupied territory after the South Africans refused to place Namibia under UN trusteeship but was not allowed to annex it. The war in Namibia is thus properly considered an anti-imperial war.

Ethnically divided societies, however, tend to be dominated by ethnic parties. Elections thus resemble censuses, with each group mobilizing its members their own groups and bridge wide ethnic cleavages to cooperate with their rivals.

104. Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy.” Horowitz, in his critique of consociationalism, points out that Lijphart’s “premise that each group is cohesive and has unitary leadership” is often incorrect. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 574.
in order to maximize its voter turnout.\textsuperscript{105} Since each party need only appeal to its own group, it need not moderate its rhetoric, which becomes increasingly shrill, playing on the fears of group members and tending to raise the level of conflict in the society. Any attempt by a group’s leaders to cooperate with a party on the other side of the ethnic divide generates flanking—accusations that the leadership is betraying the group’s true interests—which has the potential to scuttle cooperation. Moreover, instituting consociationalism after a war is even more difficult given that fighting radicalizes ethnic groups and reduces their ability to trust each other.

Table 1 shows that while a few wars were settled by the institution of power-sharing techniques, most of these wars resumed at a later date. Power-sharing settlements to wars in Lebanon (1958 and 1976), Angola (1991), Chad (1979), and Rwanda (1993) did not prove stable; three collapsed relatively quickly, and one (Lebanon 1958) lasted for seventeen years. It should be noted that the power-sharing agreement in Lebanon contributed to the outbreak of war in 1975 because it fixed the numbers of Muslim and Christian government ministers and high military officers to reflect the population ratio between the two communities. This formula, however, proved inflexible when this ratio changed owing to the growth of the Muslim population. The events in Rwanda proved even bloodier: the August 1993 Arusha Agreement was fashioned to end the three-year civil war in Rwanda by allocating cabinet, civil service, and military positions between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. Extremist Hutus, claiming that the agreement allowed the Tutsis a disproportionate share of high positions, launched, on 6 April 1994, a nationwide massacre of the Tutsis. In one hundred days, the Hutus killed about 800,000 Tutsis. The only success for power sharing—Northern Ireland—is currently in doubt due to Catholic-Protestant disputes over disarming the Irish Republican Army, which led to the suspension of the agreement in 2000.\textsuperscript{106}

\textit{Autonomy.} Autonomy refers to an agreement between the government in a unitary or federal state and an ethnic group that grants that group significant self-rule in a particular region, but does not change the constitutional framework of the state. Autonomy generates political problems that can hinder its effectiveness, however. Autonomy agreements, for example, usually do not institutionalize restraints on the central government, such as creating federal institutions like a bicameral legislature with regional representation or constitutional amendment procedures that require regional approval. These deals suf-

\textsuperscript{105} Horowitz, \textit{Ethnic Groups in Conflict}, 326.

\textsuperscript{106} The settlements to wars in Zimbabwe and South Africa, while incorporating minimal power-sharing features, are more properly viewed as resulting in majority rule for the Africans in these countries. Thus, they do not count as examples of consociationalism.
fer from the flaw that state officials may simply tear up the deal and eliminate a group’s rights. Regional autonomy is thus not a credible commitment because nothing prevents the state from going back on its word. Moreover, autonomy does not decisively end ethnic conflicts because it usually induces a split between moderate and extreme elements in groups’ leaderships. While the former sign on to the agreement, the latter tend to carry on the fight.

The empirical evidence does not support the claim that autonomy leads to ethnic peace. Table 1 shows that five ethnic wars have been settled by a grant of autonomy since 1945. In three of these conflicts, however, autonomy did not prevent a return to war. In Sudan, Southerners were given autonomy in 1972, but the government later undermined the agreement by dividing the region into three parts and imposing Islamic law (sharia) throughout the country, which caused the South to take up arms again. Chechnya won autonomy in 1996 by defeating a Russian invasion, but the war reignited in 1999. Palestinians gained autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza in 1993, but widespread violence erupted in 2000. On the plus side of the ledger, the Chittagong Hill People gained autonomy in Bangladesh in 1997, which has curtailed their rebellion, and autonomy ended a minor uprising by the Tuaregs of Mali.

Data provided by the foremost advocate of regional autonomy, Ted Gurr, also fails to vindicate the claim that autonomy is effective at ending ethnic civil wars. Table 2 lists twenty-four conflicts in which Gurr found that autonomy was implemented. Of these twenty-four cases, autonomy led to a clear and lasting cessation of hostilities in only five of them. In the vast majority, autonomy either failed to prevent later conflict, provided a temporary end to rebellion but could not forestall an eventual return to conflict, or did not end the conflict at all. Thus, the case for autonomy as a solution to ethnic wars is based on weak evidence.

Federalism. Federalism, while representing a stronger commitment by governments to respect a region’s autonomy, can lead to conflict in three other ways. For one, if the dominant group in a federal region feels its demographic advantage being eroded by immigration of other ethnic groups, it may strike out violently against them, or against the state in an effort to secede. This

107. Examples of states revoking regional autonomy include Pakistan (Baluchistan, 1973), Yugoslavia (Kosovo and Vojvodina, 1989), and Sudan (1983). This problem is particularly acute when the state is not democratic, as leaders feel less compelled to abide by agreements.

108. See Gurr, Minorities at Risk, 300–305. Two examples of this phenomenon include the split induced in the ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom) by the federalization of Spain, and the splintering of Moro rebel groups by Philippine grants of autonomy. Gurr views this as an effective conflict management technique; I do not.

109. For a fuller elaboration of these points about federalism and ethnic conflict, see Alexander B. Downes, “Federalism and Ethnic Rebellion: A Quantitative Analysis” (unpub. ms., University of Chicago, May 2000).
dynamic underlies revolts by Tripuras and Assamese in northeast India, as well as violence in the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh. Federalism can also generate conflict over distribution of state revenues. If relatively advanced regions believe they are being drained of resources to subsidize more backward regions, they may seek to exit the federation. Subsidizing the poor at the expense of the rich was a common developmental strategy in socialist federations, a practice that bred resentment among advanced regions in these states and contributed to their collapse. Finally, federal systems provide a robust institutional base for ethnic groups that improves their mobilizational and organizational resources, which in turn increases their capacity to rebel. Specialists on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe note that the only states to break up after the fall of authoritarian governments at the end of the cold war were federations.

Table 2

AUTONOMY AS A SOLUTION TO ETHNIC WARS SINCE 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Dates of first conflict</th>
<th>Year autonomy granted</th>
<th>Dates of later conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Mizos*</td>
<td>1962-86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Miskitos*</td>
<td>1981-88</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz*</td>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Tuaregs</td>
<td>1990-95</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Chittagong</td>
<td>1975-96</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


111. For an outline of this tendency, and the problems it leads to, see Levine, “Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence,” 317–20.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Suppressed by Third-Party Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Serbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Croats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomy—Low-Level Conflict Continued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain Basques*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti Afars*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomy—Serious Conflict Later</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India Sikhs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Baluchis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomy—Serious Conflict Resumed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India Kashmiri Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Nagas*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Tripuras*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Southerners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia Chechens</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomy—Serious Conflict Continued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines Moros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia Afars*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka Tamils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Assamese*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Bodos*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia Somali*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia Oromo*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Gurr defines low-level conflicts as those that scored 1 or 2 on his rebellion scale (political banditry or campaigns of terrorism). The rebellion indicator ranges from 0 (none re-

Serious conflicts score 3 or above on the rebellion scale, and thus range from local rebellions to protracted civil war. Ibid., 202, 31.

Gurr codes conflict in the case of the Afars in Ethiopia as having ended by autonomy in 1985. Gurr’s *Minorities at Risk Dataset*, however, lists the Afars as continuing to rebel at levels 5 and 6 (intermediate and large-scale guerrilla activity) through 1990, and again at level 3 (local rebellion) in 1996 and 1997. Therefore, I code the case as having continued conflict.

Note: Data for this table is from Ted Robert Gurr, *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2000), 198-202. Cases denoted with an asterisk (*) are cases that are not listed in any other civil war dataset.

Those consulted include Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” *World Politics* 52, no. 4 (July 2000): 437-83; Royticklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681-90; Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (summer 1997): 335-64; T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, “How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 546-68; and J. David Singler and Melvin Small, *Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data*, 1816-1992 (Ann Arbor: ICPSR, 1994). Because all of these studies define a civil war as either incurring 1,000 battle deaths per year, or 1,000 battle deaths total over the course of the conflict, some of Gurr’s cases may have been omitted from these datasets because they have low casualties, or because casualty data are unavailable. For example, two cases in which autonomy has been successful—Miskitos vs. Nicaragua and Gagauz vs. Moldova—each incurred less than 1,000 deaths, while another—the Basques vs. Spain—has always been (before and after the federalization of Spain in 1979) a low-level terrorist campaign prosecuted by a relatively small number of committed activists, killing only about 1,000 people over 40 years. Aside from those cases that are not examples of autonomy, such as power sharing, independence, ceasefires, limited concessions, or ongoing wars, I have omitted cases coded by Gurr as de facto regional autonomy or independence because this status was won by rebel military victory, not agreement with the government (Issaqs vs. Somalia, South Ossetians vs. Georgia, Abkhaz vs. Georgia, Kosovar Albanians vs. Serbia). Additionally, I omit the Trans-Dniester Slavs vs. Moldova, coded by Gurr as regional autonomy, because it, too, is an example of rebel military victory and de facto independence.

Again, while federalism might help to manage nonviolent or minor conflicts, as in Belgium or Spain’s Basque and Catalan regions, there is little evidence for federalism as a tool to end major ethnic wars. In general, federal states are not less likely than unitary states to experience ethnic violence.114 In fact, ethnic groups that comprise majorities in federal regions—and hence should benefit the most from the self-rule provisions of federalism—are more likely to rebel than groups that are in the minority, suggesting that increased autonomy in federal systems foments rather than ameliorates conflict.115

Federalism has been implemented after civil wars on two occasions: Ethiopia (1994) and Bosnia (1995). Unfortunately, its effectiveness in these cases is

114. See Downes, “Federalism and Ethnic Rebellion.” India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Russia, and Yugoslavia are among the federal states that have experienced major ethnic rebellions and civil wars.

115. Ibid.
The Holy Land Divided: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars

Difficult to judge. In Ethiopia, federalism was instituted following the defeat of the country’s Marxist dictatorship by a coalition of ethnic groups that included Eritreans, Tigrayans, Afars, and Oromos. The rhetoric of ethnic self-determination, however, has been dispelled by the reality of Tigrayan hegemony over Ethiopia: Tigrayans, who comprise only 7 percent of Ethiopia’s population, dominate the federal and regional governments, and ethnic rebellions begun against the old regime have continued or resumed under the new one. In Bosnia, the presence of NATO troops has made it impossible to judge whether that country’s federal compact will keep the peace.

In summary, the multiethnic solutions to partition are not supported by evidence that they reliably end ethnic wars. This undermines the claim that partition is an unnecessary, overly radical solution because solutions that preserve a single state are effective.

The Partition of Palestine

Thus far I have argued that partition deserves a place on the policy agenda as a solution to ethnic civil wars. The process of fighting an ethnic war hardens identities on both sides and causes them to be unable to trust each other, both of which make it difficult for them to share a multiethnic state after the war. For partition to lower the likelihood of war recurrence, however, ethnic intermingling must be reduced, and independent states with defensible borders and a balance of power should be created.

A good case to illustrate all the facets of my argument is an ethnic civil war in which a partition was implemented. One such case is the un-sanctioned partition of Palestine in 1947 and the war between Arabs and Jews that soon followed, and the likely completion of that partition with the founding of a Palestinian state in the near future. This case allows me to demonstrate how


117. Space limitations prevent me from examining other twentieth-century partitions in detail. Kaufmann does so from a security dilemma realist perspective in “When All Else Fails.” This particular case was chosen primarily for its contemporary importance: completing the 1947 partition by founding a Palestinian state is likely in the near future. Thus, an examination of why the earlier partition failed, but why independence for Palestine is the solution most likely to end this conflict, may assist policymakers in avoiding similar pitfalls today. Of course, a single case cannot provide definitive evidence for or against a theory.
fighting proceeds in ethnic civil wars, and how hostilities affect the various possibilities for peace afterwards. Furthermore, since partition was attempted in Palestine, I can evaluate the role of partition in causing war, ethnic cleansing, and later conflicts in the region. This section sketches the origins of the conflict and how it was fought, and assesses the culpability of partition in causing the war and later Arab-Israeli conflicts. The following section argues that the effects of the war, Palestinian exile, and Israeli repression make options short of Palestinian independence and separation of Jews and Palestinians unlikely to end this conflict. Autonomy, recommended by security dilemma realists, has not curtailed this conflict, which will not end without an independent Palestinian state.

ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT IN PALESTINE

Palestine, once part of the Ottoman Empire, but ruled after the First World War by Great Britain as a League of Nations Mandate, was home to two incompatible national communities, Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Conflict between the two groups arose during the years of British rule owing to increasing Jewish immigration and British favoritism to the Zionist cause, which inspired Arab resentment and fears of becoming a minority in their homeland.118 After failing to find a solution to this conflict that satisfied both Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs, Britain turned the question over to the United Nations in early 1947, which established a commission to study the question. The report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), issued in September 1947, proposed a partition. UNSCOP’s plan, approved by the General Assembly on 29 November, was accepted by the Jewish leadership but rejected by the Palestinians, and was never implemented. Violence had already broken out in Palestine, and neither Britain (nor any other great power) was willing to intervene and impose the plan’s provisions. The ensuing war resulted in the founding of the state of Israel—which annexed about half of the proposed Palestinian state’s land—and the disenfranchisement of the Palestinians.

This exercise is not meant to constitute a crucial test, but rather an attempt to demonstrate that partition is a better solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than its multiethnic alternatives, and that my argument for why ethnic civil wars are better solved by partition defined as separation and independence explains the case better than security dilemma realism. On the use of case studies in this way, see Alexander L. George and Timothy J. M. Keown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decisionmaking,” in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2, ed. Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), 34–41.

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750,000 of whom fled or were expelled, and saw the remainder of their land (the West Bank) annexed by Transjordan (today’s Jordan).

The roots of this conflict lay in Jewish immigration to Palestine, which began in earnest in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, instigated by the brutal wave of anti-Semitic pogroms that swept across Russia. In 1881, Jews in Palestine numbered a scant 24,000, a number which grew to 85,000 on the eve of the First World War. Jewish immigration was further spurred in this period by the Dreyfus Affair in France and subsequent founding of the Zionist movement in 1897 by Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian-born lawyer turned journalist. The Jewish population in Palestine continued to grow during the interwar years as fascism and Nazism gained ascendency in Europe, but even this rapid population growth (due to immigration) could not equal the (mostly natural) rate of increase of the native Palestinian Arabs, who still outnumbered Jews 2:1 at the time of the partition in 1948.

119. Most Jews at this time lived within the “Pale of Settlement” in the Russian Empire. The first wave of pogroms began in 1881 after the assassination of Czar Alexander II, rumored to have been committed by Jews. A second, even more violent wave swept across Russia and Eastern Europe from 1903 to 1906, initiated by the attack at Kishinev in April, 1903. See Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York: Knopf, 1999), 15-16, 24-25.


121. For the tremendous importance of the Dreyfus Affair in shaping Herzl’s views on the Jewish problem, see Morris, Righteous Victims, 20; and Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: Norton, 2000), 2. Zionism was not religious in nature but rather was a secular political movement which aimed “to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law” (Shlaim, Iron Wall, 3, quoting the program of the First Zionist Congress, held in 1897). In essence, Zionism was the Jewish expression of the same nineteenth-century European nationalism that brought unification to Germany and Italy. For the Jews of Europe, nationalism was a double-edged sword: it “posed a problem to the Jews by identifying them as an alien and unwanted minority” in European countries, but simultaneously “suggested a solution: self-determination for the Jews in a state of their own in which they would constitute a majority.” Shlaim, Iron Wall, 2. See also Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State, 5th ed., Sylvie D’Avigdor, trans. (London: H. Pordes, 1967), 15.

122. The majority came from Poland and Romania, victims of those countries’ “quasi-official Judeophobia,” but substantial numbers also fled from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. See Sachar, History of Israel, 189.

123. According to 1948 estimates, there were 1.38 million Arabs (Muslim and Christian) and 700,000 Jews in Palestine. See Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine, 4th ed. (New York: Olive Branch, 1991), 49. British policy after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917 tended to advance the Zionist cause. The declaration stated in part that “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Shlaim, Iron Wall, 7. As J. C. Hurewitz has pointed out, though, “the concept of a national home was unprecedented in international law,” and the Balfour Declaration shed no light on what political form it would ultimately take. See J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: Schocken, 1976), 18-19. Moreover, the declaration contradicted previous British promises of independence made to the Arabs in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1915-16.
The continuing Zionist settlement effort and vocal national aspirations proved a volatile mix with the attitudes of the Palestinian Arabs, who never accepted the idea of any type of Jewish polity in their midst, calling instead for the British to grant independence to the Mandate as a whole, which would then be governed by its Arab majority. This fundamental conflict led increasingly to violence between Arabs and Jews—as in May 1921 and August 1929—and later to an all-out Arab revolt against British authority in 1936.

While the Jews comprised one-third of Palestine's population in 1948, they were not geographically concentrated in one region. The subdistricts that contained the main areas of Jewish settlement—Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Tiberias—were separated by districts in which Arabs comprised overwhelming majorities. Moreover, only in Jaffa district did Jews constitute an actual majority of the population. Nadav Safran points out that “even in areas of heavy Jewish concentration, Arab settlements often occupied intruding positions from which Jewish communications could be harassed.” In order to negate the possibility of piecemeal defeat, and gain the state they so desperately desired, the Yishuv needed to reduce, if not remove altogether, the Arab presence within Jewish areas and link these areas by eliminating the Arab enclaves that isolated them. As Safran puts it, the Jews “needed to capture and hold positions occupied by Arabs along main arteries linking Jewish settlements, and to subdue the Arab enclaves within the thickly inhabited Jewish areas.”

The collapse of impartial central authority in Palestine set this conflict in motion. Britain’s efforts to escape the quandary created by its simultaneous commitment to found a Jewish home in Palestine and grant independence to the Arabs had come to naught by 1947. Any plan that proposed partition (Peel

124. Arab nationalists rioted on 1 May 1921 after a Jewish march in Jaffa. Almost 100 people were killed as Arabs besieged several Jewish rural communities. See Morris, Righteous Victims, 101–2; and Sachar, History of Israel, 125. The second violent outburst started in Jerusalem in late August 1929. Originally a local conflict over rights of worship at the Western (Wailing) Wall, the violence spread as Arabs attacked Jews in several other towns. The final death toll: 133 Jews, 116 Arabs. See Richard Allen, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Fertile Crescent: Sources and Prospects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 299–300; and Morris, Righteous Victims, 112–16.

125. Fears of becoming a minority in Palestine due to the upsurge in Jewish immigration set off the rebellion. Extending from April to October 1936, the revolt caused about 1,300 casualties. See Sachar, History of Israel, 196–201. The rebellion erupted again after the Peel Commission recommended partition in July 1937, lasting until 1939.

126. The only contiguous stretch of Jewish-majority territory was the coastal plain stretching from Tel Aviv to Haifa.

127. Safran continues: “Furthermore, several of the largest cities, including Jerusalem, Haifa, Tiberias, and Safed had mixed populations living in mixed or crisscrossing neighborhoods; and even the entirely Jewish city of Tel Aviv was situated cheek by jowl with the wholly Arab city of Jaffa and shared with it the same outside lines of communication.” Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap, 1978), 46.

128. Safran, Embattled Ally, 46.
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Commission, 1937; Jewish Agency, 1946) infuriated the Arabs, while plans that called for a bi-national unitary state (White Paper, 1939; Anglo-American Committee, 1946) or regional autonomy (Morrison-Grady Plan, 1946) were spurned by both sides. Amid increasing violence, Britain turned the Palestine problem over to the UN in early 1947, and then decided to withdraw its civil and military presence rather than stay and implement partition. This decision created a quasi-anarchic environment in the early stages of the war in which British forces would sometimes intervene temporarily to slow the fighting or protect one side, but never put a decisive stop to it. Even this partial involvement soon ended as the British withdrew. The power vacuum this created in Palestine forced both sides, but especially the Jews, to rely on self-help for their security. This was the decisive difference between the hostilities in 1936 and those in 1947: "In 1936, the Yishuv had confidently expected the British to quell the Arab riots and continue with its mandatorial regime. In 1947 it was quite evident that the British were not prepared to defend the Yishuv against the Arabs, and that the very existence of the Yishuv would now depend on its own skills and determination." 129

MILITARY OPERATIONS TO ACHIEVE A CONTIGUOUS, HOMOGENEOUS JEWISH STATE

In order to accomplish the goal of a contiguous, homogeneous Jewish state, the Jews needed to go on the offensive. The Yishuv, however, spent the early months of the war, which began in December 1947, simply trying to hold onto what it already had in the face of attacks by Palestinian regular and irregular forces, spearheaded by the Arab Liberation Army. 130 Finally, on 2 April 1948, the Haganah (the Yishuv's official military organization) kicked off its own offensive (Plan D) with Operation Nahshon, an attack on the village of al-Kastal east of Jerusalem. Benny Morris, the foremost Israeli historian of the Palestinian exodus, summarizes the goals of Plan D:

Its aim was to take over strategic areas vacated by the British, gain control of the main towns and the internal lines of communication, and secure the emergent state's border areas in preparation for the expected invasion by the Arab armies. Implementation in effect meant crushing

130. The Palestinians had the advantage early on. In March 1948 they blocked the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway and bombed the Jewish Agency headquarters in Jerusalem; by the end of the month "[t]he Negev, Jerusalem, and parts of western Galilee were...isolated from the main Jewish centres of Palestine." Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982), 26.
the Palestinian Arabs’ military power and subduing their urban neighborhoods and rural settlements in the areas earmarked for Jewish statehood. The various areas held by the Haganah were to be soldered together by conquest of those lying in between into a single geographic-political-military continuum. Blocs of settlements outside the statehood areas...were also to be secured and linked up. Brigade and battalion commanders were given permission to raze or empty and mine hostile or potentially hostile Arab villages.131

Implementation of Plan D temporarily opened the road to Jerusalem, allowing supplies through to sustain the city’s beleaguered Jewish population; occupied the new sections of that city; and captured all of the Arab villages and towns within the Jewish state’s UNSCOP borders (including Haifa on 22 April), as well as several outside of those borders (such as Jaffa and Acre, on 13 and 17 May, respectively).

As a result of these losses, armed Palestinian resistance collapsed. This military breakdown instigated panic among Arab civilians, many of whom began to flee, a process significantly hastened by killings of civilians, particularly the massacre of approximately 250 Palestinian civilians by the Jewish paramilitary groups IZL and LHI at Deir Yassin on 9 April.132 Israeli intelligence viewed this atrocity as a “decisive accelerating factor” in promoting the flight of the Arab population.133 In the opinion of Avi Shlaim, “[m]ore than any other single event, it [Deir Yassin] was responsible for breaking the spirit of the civilian population and setting in motion the mass exodus of Arabs from Palestine.”134

Israel’s declaration of independence on 14 May 1948, the day before Britain’s mandate was set to expire, was immediately followed with an invasion by no less than five Arab armies, from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt.135 During this phase of the conflict, Jewish forces continued their at-

132. Irgun Z’vai Leumi (IZL or National Military Organization) was the military wing of Revisionist Zionism, the goal of which was to establish Jewish sovereignty over the entire land of Israel. Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), better known as the Stern Gang, was a radical offshoot of IZL.
135. The two sides were about even in numbers at the start. The Arab armies comprised about 35,000 troops, supplemented by the remaining Arab Liberation Army; which numbered around 10,000 troops (plus 50,000 irregulars for local defense). Facing these Arab forces initially were approximately 40,000 Jewish fighters. See Herzog, *Arab-Israeli War*, 23, 47-48. Israel would gain a substantial numerical advantage as the war continued, however, eventually reaching a ratio of about two to one. See Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 215-17; and Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, 35. The war unfolded in four distinct phases, punctuated by cease-fires,
tempts to attain a homogenous, geographically contiguous territory. Indeed, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) pushed hardest for Palestinians to flee from those areas of greatest strategic importance to Israel. During July 1948, for example, the IDF launched Operation Dani, designed to relieve Jerusalem by securing the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road. This necessitated attacking several Palestinian towns, including Lydda and Ramle. Benny Morris points out that “[f]rom the start, the military operations against the two towns were designed to induce civilian panic and flight—as a means of precipitating military collapse and possibly also as an end in itself.” When the towns’ inhabitants did not immediately flee, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister and commander-in-chief of the IDF during the war, decided to expel them. Explicit orders to this effect were issued by the IDF brass, a rarity in the war. The reasoning behind the expulsions supports realist logic:

The unexpected outbreak of shooting [by snipers in Lydda] highlighted the simultaneous threats of a Transjordanian counterattack and of a mass uprising by a large Arab population behind Israeli lines... This was the immediate problem. In the long term, the large hostile concentration of Arab population in Lydda and Ramle posed a constant threat to the heartland of the Jewish state—to Tel Aviv itself and to the road artery linking it to Jewish Jerusalem.

concluding on 7 January 1949. On the defensive in the first phase, the IDF went over to the offensive thereafter, eventually driving the Arab armies beyond Israel’s borders.

136. Kaufmann notes this phenomenon as well: “The pattern of ethnic cleansing during the war followed security dilemma logic. Israeli government leaders and military forces in some places encouraged Arab inhabitants to remain, in others harassed or frightened many into flight, and in yet others carried out forced expulsions, depending on the strategic needs at each place and time.” Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails,” 146. This assessment underestimates Israel’s offensive motives. For example, in the case of Haifa, Kaufmann contends that Jewish leaders opposed the Arab exodus because there were no Jews north of the city who needed to be rescued, and hence no strategic need. Morris, however, points out that although “local Jewish civilian leadership initially wanted the Arabs to stay...the attitude of some of these local leaders radically changed as they took stock of the historic opportunity afforded by the Arab exodus—to turn Haifa permanently into a Jewish city.” Morris, Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 88. Possessing more Arab-free land would increase the strength and survivability of the Jewish state.


138. Morris, “Operation Dani,” 90. Outright expulsions occurred mainly in areas of strategic importance. While nothing can be said with certainty, the number of refugees produced by these forceful evictions is probably less than the number who fled out of simple fear as the military balance tipped against the Palestinian forces, knowledge of Israeli atrocities spread, and Palestinian villages and towns came under Israeli attack. Jewish leaders accepted this mass flight, did nothing to stop it, and made it permanent by refusing to allow the refugees to return to their homes. Contrary to later Israeli claims, however, the exodus was not prompted to any significant degree by the Arabs themselves: no evacuation orders were ever issued by high Arab authorities. Arab leaders actually worked to stem the tide, but their ef-
The young Jewish state, fighting for its life, had to link up its dispersed population centers by expelling the intervening Arab communities in order to survive.\textsuperscript{139}

The gradual acknowledgement of this necessity is demonstrated by how David Ben-Gurion’s beliefs regarding the “transfer” of the Arab population changed over time from outright disavowal of the concept to pragmatic acceptance and then zealous implementation. For example, during the First World War, Ben-Gurion wrote that “[w]e do not intend to push the Arabs aside, to take their land, or to disinherit them.”\textsuperscript{140} By 1938, however, Ben-Gurion had embraced the idea of voluntary transfer: “The Jewish state will discuss with the neighbouring Arab states the matter of voluntarily transferring Arab tenant-farmers, labourers and \textit{fellahin} from the Jewish state to the neighbouring states.”\textsuperscript{141}

By the time of the 1948 War for Independence, Ben-Gurion’s attitude, although never stated explicitly, had moved from an embrace of voluntary transfer to advocating expulsion:

Ben Gurion clearly wanted as few Arabs as possible to remain in the Jewish State. He hoped to see them flee. He said as much to his colleagues and aides in meetings in August, September and October. But no expulsion policy was ever enunciated and Ben-Gurion always refrained from issuing clear or written expulsion orders; he preferred that his generals “understand” what he wanted done...In July, Ben-Gurion approved the largest expulsion of the war, from Lydda and Ramle, but, at the same time, IDF Northern Front, with Ben-Gurion’s agreement if

\textsuperscript{139} Another area in which the Arab-Jewish conflict played out was the harvest. Jews and Arabs in the northern Negev each feared the other would strike at their crops, and neither side proved able to withstand the incentives to destroy the other’s fields. As the Jews gained the upper hand in the war, the destruction of Arab crops, and later the harvest of fields abandoned by Arab farmers, became an additional method of ethnic cleansing. Prohibiting the Arabs who had not fled from harvesting their crops became a means of inducing this potentially subversive element to leave. See Benny Morris, “The Harvest of 1948 and the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” \textit{Middle East Journal} 40, no. 4 (autumn 1986): 671-85.

\textsuperscript{140} Morris, \textit{Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem}, 25. As Shlaim points out, “Ben-Gurion’s public pronouncements in the 1920s and early 1930s tended to conform to the labor movement’s official position, which held that the Arabs of Palestine did not constitute a separate national entity but were part of the Arab nation and that moreover, there was no inherent conflict between the interests of the Arabs of Palestine and the interests of the Zionists.” Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, 17.

\textsuperscript{141} Morris, \textit{Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem}, 26.
not at his behest, left Nazareth's population, which was mostly Christian, in place...\textsuperscript{142}

The change in Ben-Gurion's views was driven by a growing appreciation of the security problem the Jewish community faced. Thus, he and the Israeli military commanders capitalized on the fighting and the fear it induced in the Arab population to drive the unwanted Arabs out of the Jewish state, confiscate their land, and capture significant territory outside of Israel's partition borders.\textsuperscript{143}

ROLE OF UNSCOP'S PARTITION PLAN

Some have suggested that partition caused war in Palestine, but this is a profoundly ahistorical judgment.\textsuperscript{144} The two communities were on a collision course ever since the Balfour Declaration vowed to create a Jewish national home in Palestine. One observer has commented fatalistically that "[f]rom the start there were, then, only two possibilities: that the Arabs defeat the Zionists or that the Zionists defeat the Arabs. War between the two was inevitable."\textsuperscript{145}

Indeed, this is how Arab, Jewish, and British officials eventually viewed the conflict. Neither antagonist was receptive to a bi-national solution, and by the time partition was proposed in the late 1930s, it was probably too late to avoid war.\textsuperscript{146}

The partition plan actually adopted, however, was flawed in three ways that exacerbated (but did not create) the conflict. First, the UNSCOP plan envisioned a "Jewish" state that was half Arab. UNSCOP's plan failed to provide for any unmixing of Arabs and Jews. In fact, even though nearly the entire Jewish community in Palestine (520,000) was to be concentrated in the Jewish state, this state also would contain 350,000 Arabs, representing 40 percent of its

\textsuperscript{142} Ib., 292–93 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{143} Israel annexed 2,500 square miles of territory designated for the Palestinian state, while Transjordan annexed the remaining 2,200 square miles (the West Bank). Additionally, Israel's armed forces destroyed 418 Arab villages. Only 133,000 Arabs out of an estimated prewar population of 859,000 remained within Israel's borders. See Safran, \textit{Embattled Ally}, 60; Walid Khalidi, ed., \textit{All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948} (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), xxxi; and Hurewitz, \textit{Struggle for Palestine}, 319–21.

\textsuperscript{144} Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," 27–28.

\textsuperscript{145} Segev, \textit{One Palestine, Complete}, 6.

\textsuperscript{146} Indeed, Arab rejection of the 1939 White Paper, in which Britain abandoned its customary support for Zionism and promised an independent Palestinian state with majority rule within ten years and an eventual end to Jewish immigration, signaled that the Arabs would not take "yes" for an answer. They would accept nothing less than immediate independence and no further immigration of Jews.
No population transfers were scheduled to ease this demographic dilemma. Walid Khalidi has commented that the Palestinians “failed to see why it was not fair for the Jews to be in a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population—the indigenous majority on its own ancestral soil—to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule in the envisaged Jewish state according to partition.”

Second, the plan’s authors disregarded future defensibility when they drew the two states’ borders. As Shlaim has observed, “[t]he borders of these two oddly shaped states, resembling two fighting serpents, were a strategic nightmare.” Each state consisted of three noncontiguous parts that intersected each other at two points. Moreover, the Arab state included the city of Jaffa, which was wholly surrounded by Jewish territory.

Finally, UNSCOP divided the land unequally, which fanned the flames of Arab resentment. UNSCOP assigned 56.5 percent of the Mandate’s land to the Jewish state even though Jews owned a scant 6 percent of the total land in Palestine and constituted only one-third of the population. The Arab state comprised 42.9 percent of the land, while the Jerusalem International Zone took up 0.7 percent. Hadawi writes that this represented a “settlement which no self-respecting people would accept without protest.”

One partition plan was put forward that came close to following the guidelines articulated in this article: the Peel Commission plan, issued on 7 July 1937. The Commission endorsed a partition scheme that would divide Palestine into three entities: a small Jewish state based in the coastal plain and Galilee, a larger Palestinian state that included the West Bank, Gaza, and the Negev, and a British mandatory zone stretching from Jaffa to Jerusalem. The plan also called for a population exchange, consisting of 225,000 Arabs and 1,250 Jews, to remove the Arabs from the proposed Jewish state. The Peel plan (which was accepted by the Zionist leadership but rejected by the Palestinians) was far superior to the one UNSCOP eventually ratified because it created two states in one piece each with a shorter common border; because it

147. Morris, Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 28. Arab scholar Sami Hadawi puts the numbers close to even: 498,000 Jews to 497,000 Arabs. See Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, 67. Conversely, the Arab state contained almost no Jews, slightly more than one percent of a total population of over 800,000. See Sachar, History of Israel, 292.
150. Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, 67.
151. Ibid., 76.
152. Morris, Righteous Victims, 139.
planned for a reduction of ethnic intermingling; and because the size of the two states more closely reflected ownership and demographic realities on the ground. Thus, the partition of Palestine as envisioned by the UN simply proves that partition done badly can exacerbate preexisting conflicts, not that partition causes conflict.

RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTITION FOR LATER CONFLICTS

The war between Jews and Arabs in Palestine widened because other Arab states in the region intervened to support their ethnic brethren. This intervention, however, and the later Arab-Israeli wars were not primarily due to Arab states' devotion to the Palestinian cause. In fact, with the exception of Jordan, the Arab states never attempted to integrate the Palestinian refugees or allowed them to become citizens. Rather, they kept the refugees in poverty-stricken camps to be cared for by UN aid so as not to compromise their chances for return to their homes in Israel. The very existence of any Jewish state in the Middle East, not the particular one that was carved out by Jewish expulsion of the Palestinians, was the cause of the future Arab-Israeli wars.

The current Israeli-Palestinian violence that has derailed the peace process is due to two factors. First, Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza has reintroduced pockets of Jews into Palestinian territory. These settlements, many of them in isolated locations, are both vulnerable to attack and demand Israeli protection, which leads to violence and increasing Israeli encroachment on Palestinian land (such as the extensive network of access roads). Second, the violence continues because Israel has not allowed a meaningful Palestinian state to be born. These issues are explored at greater length below.

ISRAEL AND PALESTINE TODAY

The birth of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza offers the best chance of ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Al-Aqsa intifadah,

153. This is not to say that the Peel plan would have prevented war. Had it actually been implemented by international authorities, however, it would have created a situation with fewer incentives for aggression than had UNSCOP's plan been implemented.

154. As Sachar puts it, "[t]he refugee issue accordingly served as a useful obstacle to future discussions [with Israel] and as an effective lien on the world's conscience. The Arab governments were not about to drop it." Sachar, History of Israel, 441. See also Morris, Righteous Victims, 258.

sparked by Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000, underscores the importance of independence for the Palestinians. Israel cannot annex the occupied territories and retain its Jewish character, for it would gain over three million additional Arab citizens. Moreover, Israel would face unending rebellion because the Palestinians do not want to be under the sovereignty of those who made many of their ancestors homeless in what the Palestinians call the *Naqba* (catastrophe) of 1948. The experience of that and later wars, life in the refugee camps, and Israeli occupation since 1967 have taught the Palestinians that they cannot trust Israel to protect them. Moreover, Israeli governments, both Labor and Likud, have encroached even further on the 22 percent of Palestine west of the River Jordan—that portion comprising the West Bank and Gaza—by establishing settlements in the occupied territories, an effort that has only accelerated since Oslo.

The fact that the violence erupted over a visit by an Israeli to the Temple Mount has fostered the impression that the biggest issue impeding a peace agreement is who will control the holy sites and, more broadly, how the two parties will share Jerusalem. This impression is misleading. These and other items are negotiable. What is not negotiable is independence for a Palestinian state, and the reduction of ethnic intermingling represented by Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The latter is ineluctably linked to the former: a Palestinian state divided into cantons by Israeli settlements will be at Israel’s mercy and will not truly be independent. Independence and ethnic separation are the two most important lessons of 1948: “For all of Oslo’s problems, the ideas of separation and mutual recognition remain its core and its most important legacy. Peace will come to the region only through partition—not because it is an ennobling or lofty vision, but because there is simply no other way.”

INDEPENDENCE AND ETHNIC SEPARATION

To increase the likelihood of a durable end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is imperative that partition finally be completed with the creation of a Palestinian state. Contrary to what some believe, independence is the crucial piece of the puzzle. Clearly, Palestine will not be a normal state, but to discount the importance of statehood would be a mistake. The Palestinians are deeply na-


157. Anthony Lewis, “The Irrelevance of a Palestinian State,” *New York Times Magazine*, 20 June 1999, 58–59. Lewis argues that Palestinian statehood is a psychological necessity, but will make no practical difference because the state’s borders will be controlled by Israel, and its land dotted by Israeli settlements.
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...tionalistic, and violence is bound to continue as long as their land continues in its current ambiguously autonomous status.

The better the deal that Israel gives to the Palestinians, the greater the chance the conflict will actually end because “a squeezed, humiliated Palestine might be an irredentist Palestine.” Furthermore, Israeli settlements sprinkled across a Palestinian state would represent a constant threat of Israeli intervention, and face a constant threat from the surrounding Palestinians. As prime minister, Barak repeatedly proclaimed his willingness to cede up to 95 percent of the West Bank to a Palestinian state. Barak’s claim is belied by a look at the map Israeli negotiators have been using in their discussions with the Palestinians. This map clearly shows that the 95 percent figure is fiction. Israel intends to annex the Shomron and Jerusalem settlement clusters, and maintain temporary sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and its settlements. The area of Palestinian sovereignty would comprise no more than 65-75 percent of the West Bank, constricted by access roads and separated by Israeli-held areas into several noncontiguous chunks.

An agreement along these lines will not end the conflict because it does not provide for the separation of Israelis and Palestinians that is required to eliminate the dangers of ethnic intermingling or give the Palestinians a real state. As one Israeli peace activist put it, “if you insist that all settlements and the roads to them remain under Israeli rule, there’s no chance to achieve peace.” Barak seemingly understood and endorsed the importance of separation to a lasting peace, according to a story reported during his campaign for prime minister in 1998: “Barak endorsed carrying out the peace agreement.... But he said his ultimate vision, reflecting what he said was a popular consensus, consisted of ‘physical separation’ between the Israelis and the Palestinians—’us here,
them there. Only such a physical separation will bring peace and mutual re-
spect,' he said."162

The Israeli plan does not accomplish Barak's vision of separation. In fact, it resem-
bles the 1947 partition plan, which attempted to draw borders around people rather than moving them to provide defensible, homogeneous territories. The main lesson of the war that followed is that partition without separation of populations does not lessen conflict, but actually increases it by leaving people vulnerable to ethnic cleansing. Thus, Israel should absorb those settlements that directly abut its territory, and compensate Palestine with land elsewhere. Jewish settlements deep in the West Bank, however—and the roads to and between them—must be abandoned because they are likely to provoke future conflict. At a minimum, Israel must give up the corridor connecting Shomron with the Jordan Valley; the settlements in that valley and east of Jerus-
alem; and the corridor extending to Kibbutz Arba in the south. Holding onto these areas will only antagonize the Palestinians and be the source of future conflict. The election of Sharon will not change these facts. Separation is re-
quired to end the violence, and separation entails abandoning these problem-
atic settlements.163

The issue of separation raises the question of whether it is necessary to transfer the Arab population out of Israel to achieve a lasting settlement. At present, I believe the answer is no. Jewish settlements must be removed from Palestinian territory because of the need for defensible borders; these settlements would be highly vulnerable and indefensible islands of Israeli sovereignty within a Palestinian state. These precarious islands would give Israel a reason to intervene in Palestinian affairs and would engender resentment among Palestinians. Moreover, the militant settlers have an interest in provoking incidents with the Arab population in order to draw Israeli military intervention and possibly renewed occupation or annexation. Finally, the Palestinians will simply not accept an agreement that leaves their country dotted with foreign enclaves and divided by roads connecting these mini-Israelis.

Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, recent events notwithstanding, are not nearly as mobilized as the Jewish settlers, nor do they have a powerful external government to back them. The events of 1948, as predicted, produced separation, leaving a demoralized, disorganized Arab community of 133,000, now grown to over a million owing to natural increase (about 20 percent of the to-

163 For a similar plan, see Makovsky, "Middle East Peace Through Partition," 41. Slightly less generous is Mark A. Heller, "Towards a Palestinian State," Survival 39, no. 2 (summer 1997): 5–22.
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Israel then instituted a successful system of control which impeded Arab mobilization. Had all Arabs fled or been driven from Israel in 1948, the situation would doubtless be more stable, but the small group that remained did not then represent a real security threat, and still does not: the imbalance of power is too great. However, should full-scale war break out between Israel and the Palestinians, and the Israeli Arabs become actively involved, they may have to be transferred out in order to end the conflict for good. Population transfers, however, while they save lives, are nevertheless traumatic, and should be kept to the minimum consistent with a stable outcome. In this case that means removing the Jewish settlements deep inside the West Bank and Gaza while leaving the Israeli Arabs where they are.

JERUSALEM, HOLY SITES, AND REFUGEE RETURN

The status of Jerusalem is crucial to both sides. As Charles Smith points out, “for most Israelis, Labor or Likud, retention of Jerusalem is deemed essential,” while “[f]or all Arabs, not just Palestinians, final peace with Israel is impossible so long as there is no Arab role in the governance of what they regard as East Jerusalem, essentially the old city.”

While the Israelis tend to represent their interests in Jerusalem as indivisible, there is nothing in reality that prevents the city from being shared. The Palestinian state should be allowed to declare East Jerusalem as its capital and govern those areas of Jerusalem where Palestinians live. Israel, in turn, would...
govern the remainder of the city, which would serve as its capital. This solution is possible because Jerusalem is already largely segregated. The lone area of intermingling—Jewish settlements in the Arab Quarter—should be abandoned by Israel to facilitate a settlement. Jewish, Christian, and Muslim holy sites would be administered by their respective religious authorities, and access to these sites would be guaranteed to all.

Another issue that remains to be dealt with is the right of Palestinian refugees to return to former homes now inside Israel. Refugee return was one of the issues that caused the breakdown of the Camp David talks in July 2000. The refugees, who numbered approximately 750,000 in 1948, now comprise over three million people. Israel has always refused to take any responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem and rejects the idea of taking these people back, arguing that they were not expelled, but rather fled at the direction of their own leaders.

A compromise is possible, but one that will no doubt disappoint the Palestinians: Israel should allow limited immigration in order to reunite families separated by the war (as is beginning to happen between North and South Korea), and should arrange for financial compensation to those not permitted back. Israel has little flexibility in this matter: it cannot accept three million more Arabs and retain its identity as a Jewish state. As one commentator has put it, "[t]o allow three million Palestinians to return to a nation of five million Jews and one million Israeli Arabs would be the death knell of the Jewish state."169

DANGER TO ISRAEL FROM A FUTURE PALESTINIAN STATE

One final issue remains. Some pessimists have recently argued, on realist grounds, that Israel will never agree to the creation of a viable Palestinian state. "Because of security needs," John Mearsheimer argues, "Israel cannot grant the Palestinians a truly independent state of their own.... Israel doesn't want a strong Palestinian state that might threaten Israel, either by itself or in an alli-

168. The model for such an agreement should be based on the principle of "scattered sovereignty," which prevailed in the city under the Ottomans and the British Mandate. In this plan, suggested by Chad Emmett, Jews and Palestinians would accept the current map as is, and then take sovereignty over those areas where they predominate: "Jews currently living in the Arab neighborhoods of the city would be free to remain in their homes only if they are willing to live under Palestinian sovereignty. Likewise, Palestinians would be allowed to buy and rent homes in Israeli-controlled areas if they are willing to submit to Israeli rule." Chad F. Emmett, "The Status Quo Solution for Jerusalem," Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no. 2 (winter 1997): 27.

ance with other Arab states."\(^{170}\) While granting the Palestinians' main demands might reduce their grievances against (and hence their main reason for attacking) Israel, intentions can always change in the future. Additionally, by granting these demands, the Palestinian state could become a security threat to Israel.

These fears are overblown. First, this view exaggerates the threats to Israeli security a Palestinian state would pose—alone or in combination with other Arab states—and ignores Israel's military superiority. Israel will dwarf its new Palestinian neighbor economically and militarily. Israel dominates the region militarily, and is quite secure today due to three factors: (1) the threat of war with the Arab states has decreased dramatically; (2) the Israelis are superior to all Arab armies in terms of military skill, especially in the air and in armored warfare; and (3) Israel possesses a robust nuclear deterrent. Thus, Israel dominates at every level of escalation, a fact that (especially when combined with the decreasing Arab commitment to eradicate the Jewish state) is likely to deter future aggression.\(^{171}\) The obstacle to creating a Palestinian state, then, is not Israel's objective security, however much hard-liners protest to the contrary; rather, the imbalance of power in Israel's favor allows the Israelis to be intransigent and force the Palestinians to make most of the concessions.\(^{172}\)

Second, the pessimistic view underrates the diplomatic and security advantages to be gained by pulling back. The main threat to most Israelis today is not a massed Arab invasion, but rather Palestinian terrorism. A deal that creates a viable Palestinian state would reduce incentives to perpetrate such attacks, and increase the likelihood that Israel would gain a real partner in Palestine to suppress terror attacks. Moreover, such a move would solidify American support for Israel, further reducing the likelihood of an Arab attack. Finally, bringing a real Palestinian state into existence would improve Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors, and increase the chances for an agreement with Syria on the Golan Heights.

Thus, a Palestinian state is not likely to threaten Israel, but Israel will have the capability to threaten the Palestinians and meddle in their affairs. To compensate for Israeli power, the following steps could help contribute to stability between the two countries. The Palestinians should be allowed to arm and


\(^{171}\) One analyst finds the very idea of a Palestinian attack laughable, and discounts the possibility of the Arab states going to war with Israel: "an armed attack against Israel by a Palestinian state would be suicidal madness, facing certain total defeat... [T]he likelihood of a major Arab assault on Israel is extremely low." See Jerome Slater, "A Palestinian State and Israeli Security," \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 106, no. 3 (fall 1991): 416, 420.

train a defense force able to contest an Israeli attack long enough for international pressure to be brought to bear to end the hostilities. This need not be very long, and thus the force need not be large—certainly not large enough to raise Israeli fears of invasion. Furthermore, Palestinian leaders should seek alliances with their more powerful Arab neighbors, such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The relaxation of tensions in the region and new, younger leadership in Syria and Jordan should prevent a repolarization of Arab-Israeli relations in the region. Israel and Palestine should conclude a nonaggression pact that rules out the use of armed force to resolve disputes between them. A demilitarized zone should be established along the Israeli-Palestinian border, and international peacekeepers placed in the Jordan Valley, the main natural barrier to a military advance into Palestine. Finally, both sides need security guarantees from the major powers. In particular, American sponsorship and approval of the negotiations leading to Palestinian statehood will impress upon both Israel and Palestine the need to resolve their differences peacefully. Of course, since Israel holds most of the cards, the simple fact that it would allow a Palestinian state to emerge at all would likely mean that Israeli leaders do not see it as a threat.

CONCLUSION

This article contends that partition does not deserve the bad reputation it has developed, and should be considered a plausible solution to some ethnic civil wars. The conduct of ethnic wars hardens ethnic loyalties, convinces ethnic groups of the need to control a state to ensure their survival, and reduces the ability to trust how the present adversary will behave in the future.

173. Most Israeli commentators argue that Israel should annex the Jordan Valley, or at least lease it for the foreseeable future from the Palestinians. For the former, see Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, “The Risks of Palestinian Statehood,” Survival 35, no. 2 (summer 1997): 31–32, 35–36; on the latter, see Heller, “Towards a Palestinian State,” 14. I disagree with both. These analysts exaggerate the military dangers to Israel of an immediate pull-back, and underestimate the potential cost, that is, that no deal will be made. The military benefits of keeping the Jordan Valley are debatable, especially since any troop movement across the river by another Arab state would be regarded by Israel as a casus belli, which would swiftly invade Palestine and take the high ground overlooking the valley, and thus engage any potential invader outside of Israel’s borders. Israel could act even more swiftly were international peacekeepers stationed in the valley, since an attacker would have to obtain their removal, which would alert the Israelis of its aggressive intentions. Finally, this scenario ignores the fact that consenting to a Palestinian state removes the main cause of conflict between Israel and the Arab world, making any attack less likely. Thus, the military benefits of retaining the Jordan Valley seem to be outweighed by the potential cost that insisting on its retention might bring: failure to make a deal, further Palestinian rebellion and terrorism, and no end to the conflict.
These forces combine to defeat negotiated solutions to ethnic wars that preserve a single multiethnic state, including power sharing, regional autonomy, and federalism. Contrary, however, to security dilemma realists, who argue that once demographic separation is achieved, autonomy is sufficient to keep the peace, I argue that partition properly understood should constitute not only ethnic separation but also independence, and should strive to endow each new state with defensible borders and establish a balance of power between them by either internal or external means. Potential interveners in ethnic wars should be much more circumspect about reintegrating populations separated by war, as in Bosnia or Kosovo, and should at least consider preemptive population movements rather than leave vulnerable people to be expelled by force or murdered.

The implication of my argument is that the United States, and international community members more generally, should consider partition and population transfers when ethnic civil wars break out, especially when populations are highly intermingled. Current practice on this issue is contradictory: the international community condones and sometimes promotes ethnic cleansing during war, but refuses to accept peacetime population transfers for preventive purposes, condemning this practice as unjust and inhumane. Evidence from the recent Balkan wars exemplifies this stance. American and European policymakers did nothing to stop Serbs from ethnically cleansing the Krajina region of Croatia in 1991 or the approximately 70 percent of Bosnia they eventually conquered. Nor did they prevent the purging of Bosnian Muslims from UN “safe areas” in Srebrenica and Žepa in July 1995, an inaction which, coincidentally, greatly facilitated the success of the Dayton Accords by helping to create ethnically homogeneous regions of Bosnia. The United States also turned a blind eye to the Croatian offensive that recaptured the Krajina and created 200,000 Serb refugees in August 1995. Moreover, Western officials actually encouraged ethnic cleansing when it suited their purposes. Richard Holbrooke, the lead U.S. negotiator, repeatedly urged the Croatians and Bosnian Muslims to

174. The fate of these two enclaves, swollen with Bosnian Muslim refugees but otherwise isolated, surrounded by Bosnian Serb–held territory in the eastern part of the country, would have vastly complicated the already bewildering map negotiations at Dayton. Evidence for this is provided by the profound complications introduced by the Bosnian Muslims' insistence that a third enclave (Goražde) that had not fallen to the Bosnian Serbs be included in the Federation. For details on this difficult episode in the negotiations, see Holbrooke, To End a War, 280–81, 283–86. On the fall of Srebrenica, and Western inaction in that tragedy, see David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre Since World War II (Boulder: Westview, 1997).

175. It is now well known that the United States facilitated the arming of the Croatians, and retired American military officers helped train the Croatian army for this offensive and an earlier one in western Slavonia. See Gütman, “U.S. Policy in Bosnia,” 73–75.
continue their offensive in western Bosnia and capture Serb-held towns before negotiations imposed a cease-fire. The fall of towns like Sanski Most and Bosanski Petrovac caused thousands of Bosnian Serbs to flee and shifted the territorial balance between the Serb and Federation forces from 70–30 to 50–50, undoubtedly making Holbrooke's job easier.

The drawback of a policy like this is that ethnic cleansing typically entails high levels of violence, sometimes degenerating into genocide. Organized population transfers, while distasteful, are a more humane way of separating populations at war. When an ethnic civil war occurs, realist logic dictates that intermingled populations will separate, but also that separated populations will have great difficulty trusting each other enough to share a single state. Unless the international community intends to prevent this by occupying every country that suffers an ethnic civil war, partition with separation should be on the policy agenda as a strategy for preventing humanitarian disasters in these conflicts. When populations are not extensively intermingled, as in Kosovo, the presumption in favor of partition should be even stronger since solving the demographic problem is easier. Independence in these cases, and independence with separation where intermingling does exist, supplemented with defensible borders and a balance of power, is less likely to lead to a resumption of hostilities than its multiethnic alternatives.

176. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 160–62, 165–66, 191, 193, 199. Holbrooke and his cohorts especially encouraged the Croatians, who monopolized the heavy artillery, to take Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Bosanski Novi, three towns in northwest Bosnia.

177. Holbrooke states this explicitly in a note sent to Warren Christopher on 20 September 1995: “In fact, the map negotiation, which always seemed to me to be our most daunting challenge, is taking place right now in the battlefield, and so far, in a manner beneficial to the map. In only a few weeks, the famous 70%–30% division of the country has gone to around 50–50, obviously making our task easier.” Holbrooke, To End a War, 168.