Virgin Lands Campaign. However, settlers used the state’s regime to their own ends, determining when to move and where to settle. As with other forms of migration considered in this study, family networks were key sources of support and information. The next chapter looks at seasonal migration, finding that it took “remarkably consistent forms” despite political changes in Russia, though the people engaged in it, their itineraries, and the type of work they performed changed (p. 66). The third chapter examines migration to the city, which saw three main periods of growth: before the First World War, during the Soviet state’s industrialization drive in the 1930s, and after the Second World War. Urban migration ebbed and flowed, though the authors rightly note that in general the city “has been the winner of the twentieth century” (p. 393). The next two chapters look at professional forms of migration, the first examining the peregrinations of career migrants in state service, the second considering the often chaotic movement of millions of Russian and Soviet soldiers.

Subsequent chapters look at more compulsory forms of migration, though not without losing sight of the strategies employed by refugees, evacuees, and deportees. The authors argue persuasively that Russia’s vast size allowed for a range of migrant experiences, even as the state engaged in unprecedented efforts to relocate its citizens and relied on geographic relocation as a form of punishment. The final chapter is dedicated to itinerants, a term that encompasses groups that do not quite fit in the authors’ typology, from roving beggars to reindeer herders in the Far North. As the authors point out, these were populations the state sought to settle, rather than to move. While itinerants used creative techniques to elude state control, over time most ultimately lost out to state policies.

So what does this sprawling survey of internal migration tell us about the broader history of twentieth-century Russia? As one might expect, war played a central role in Russia’s evolution, though Siegelbaum and Moch’s account illuminates how the First World War, the Civil War, and the Second World War shaped lives far from the battlefield, and it makes the case that the Second World War in particular marked a dividing line in terms of migrant experiences. In terms of political changes, the Stalinist period looms larger than 1917 or 1991, emerging as an exceptional era in which “state attempts to control the movement of people assumed unprecedented proportions”; by contrast, some forms of late Soviet and post-Soviet migration, such as the seasonal movement of workers, have come to more closely resemble global trends (p. 3).

As a whole, this volume is a rather impressive achievement: part synthesis of preexisting scholarship placed in a new interpretive framework, part original scholarship on a subject that is only beginning to receive the attention it deserves. Throughout, the authors skillfully balance between macro-level analyses of migration and the unique stories of individual migrants. If some parts of the book have a provisional quality, it is only because there is a need for additional research on this expansive topic, something the authors readily admit in their conclusion. Future scholars might make more sustained comparisons between internal migration in Russia and in other countries, or might look more closely at cases where internal processes of Russian mobility spilled across state borders. Yet Broad Is My Native Land will still offer a sweeping and authoritative overview for students and scholars of Russian history as well as those interested in migration more generally.

Erik R. Scott, University of Kansas


Most studies seeking to explain the roots of South Caucasian “frozen conflicts”—Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh—focus on the ethnic politics and violence of the last years of the Soviet Union and the first years of Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani independence. With their emphasis on the sudden eruption of conflict and its rapid escalation, however, these studies beg for a prehistory of the conflicts that helps us make sense of the institutions, interests, and perceptions that led to conflict—and in these particular places but not in others.
Arsène Saparov’s *From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus* joins only a few other works to offer such a prehistory. Starting in the nineteenth century and extending through the outbreak of violent conflict in 1988–92, Saparov’s monograph draws on an extensive Russian (and, in part, Armenian) historiography, supplemented by archival research.

The centerpiece of the volume is a study of Soviet state-formation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1920s. The objective is to explain why—and how—the new Bolshevik leaders established the Soviet (later Autonomous Soviet) Socialist Republic of Abkhazia and the Autonomous Oblasts (regions) of South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Saparov argues that the establishment of these institutions did not reflect a Bolshevik “divide-and-rule” strategy of ethnic administration: the intentional entanglement of diverse ethnic groups, in the South Caucasus as elsewhere, in ways that positioned local groups at odds with each other and ensured the dominance of central authorities as ethnic balancers.

On the contrary, drawing on a close reading of institution-building in the newly Soviet South Caucasus and a brief survey of the history of the regions immediately prior, Saparov holds that the autonomous formations were “not some deliberate attempt at long-term manipulation, but rather a practical, albeit often clumsy, compromise to contain violent conflicts” (p. 173). The Red Army conquest of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in 1920–21 had come on the heels of bitter, often violent, ethnic conflicts that were still simmering when the Bolsheviks arrived on the scene. The new leadership resolved these conflicts, not by favoring one or the other group by separating regions from their “parent” republics or enforcing their total subordination, but by brokering compromise solutions that provided for distinctive if hierarchical units of governance.

Saparov’s treatment of the early Bolsheviks as conflict-resolution practitioners provides a welcome counter to conventional wisdom, which tends to assume that seemingly arbitrary Soviet boundary-making decisions were truly insidious in nature. The accounts Saparov provides of autonomous institution-building are painstakingly and impressively researched. In particular, his work on the process of boundary delimitation, including maps of different boundary projects and village-by-village ethnic demography, are likely to stand as the definitive treatment of the issue (for those that have difficulty securing the full monograph, the three chapters on South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh are reproduced with only minor updates from earlier journal articles).

I would, however, add a few refinements. Saparov holds that Bolshevik “compromise” solutions were a matter of expediency, as the new leadership “lacked the resources to impose their will” (p. 137), whether to separate the three regions from the Georgian and Azerbaijani republics (themselves part of a “federative” South Caucasian republic until 1936) or fold them entirely into those units.

In fact, the historical record remains silent on the motivations of Bolshevik decision makers. We know what they decided, but not why. For instance, Saparov acknowledges that local Bolsheviks in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (but not Nagorno-Karabakh) helped precipitate the violent conflicts that the new Bolshevik leaders then had to arbitrate. It is plausible that this previous engagement (and the sympathies of local populations) influenced the “will” of the Bolshevik leadership to solve these conflicts by granting Abkhazia and South Ossetia higher political status than they otherwise might have. The text hints in some places at this possibility (pp. 51, 87), but if so it runs counter to the thesis.

Even the most exhaustively researched case of the three—Nagorno-Karabakh—remains a puzzle. We still do not know why the Caucasian Bureau decided overnight to reverse its decision to grant Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Armenia and instead leave it within Soviet Azerbaijan. The Bolshevik leaders evidently had the “resources” and the “will” to make a different decision, but in the end they decided against. Saparov surmises that this is because the situation on the ground had abruptly shifted in favor of Soviet rule in Armenia, removing the need to placate Armenians by granting them Nagorno-Karabakh. But this remains conjecture; in this case, like the others, the possibility that Bolshevik boundary creation represented a strategy of “divide and rule” remains on the table.

Saparov brackets his core five-chapter study of Soviet decision making with chapters on the Russian conquest and administration of the South Caucasus and the evolution of majority-minority
relations in Soviet times (as well as a brief introduction and conclusion). While somewhat detached from the study’s main focus, these chapters offer surveys for readers unfamiliar with the broader context. In particular, Saparov’s discussion of the identity-cultivating aspects of Soviet rule in the three autonomies stands out.

*From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus* is a valuable addition to the literature on institutions and ethnic conflict. It should be required reading for those seeking a more historical approach to the “frozen conflicts” of the South Caucasus.

Cory Welt, George Washington University


Physiologist Ivan Pavlov has desperately needed rescuing from the distortions of other scientists, politicians, and his own popular image. American behaviorists claimed him as one of their own, but Pavlov was no behaviorist. I personally came to Pavlov through close study of late Stalinist health care when, under the pressure of the early Cold War, his science was applied rapidly and crudely to every branch of Soviet medicine. Despite the claims of that time, neither dialectical materialism nor the inheritance of acquired characteristics drove his research, though Daniel Todes shows that Pavlov did at least believe in the latter. Most egregiously, the two universally known “facts” about Pavlov are both mistaken: his *conditioned reflex* is a mistranslation of *uslovnyi refleks*, or *conditional reflex*, and he almost never used bells to train his dogs.

Righting the translation of the scientist’s most famous concept stands for what Daniel Todes has achieved with the life of Pavlov as a whole. It is unusual for historians to devote most of their careers to a single project. The sheer length of time Todes has committed to this book (he began in 1989), the exhaustiveness of the research, and his aspiration to a comprehensive, definitive account stand in sharp, and very positive, contrast to the norm.

There are actually several narratives, if tightly linked, running throughout the book, but Todes shifts focus frequently and adroitly between chapters. In keeping with the more intimate turn of biography as a genre there are several chapters on Pavlov’s private life interspersed between those on his career. There is even one specifically on the dogs. Todes also writes vividly: I could smell the different breads and pastries delivered to the Pavlov family dacha during the summer but I winced at many of the experiments carried out on the laboratory dogs, which Todes describes bluntly, while frankly admitting that they amounted to torture.

One reason why Pavlov has been resistant to deeper understanding is that the lexicon he used, including conditional reflex, was rooted in the mechanistic materialism of Sechenov. Despite being on the cutting edge of twentieth-century physiology, and adjusting his own science to advances in other disciplines, Pavlov remained a “man of the sixties” (the 1860s) in important ways. Nevertheless, another of the threads running through the biography is that of Pavlov as a pioneer of Big Science. Pavlov’s success on digestion was achieved as the laboratory chief of a complex research collective, managerially driven and coordinated, but he also understood digestion itself as a kind of factory, including a strict division of labor within the body. Todes already elaborated this “factory metaphor” in *Pavlov’s Physiology Factory* (2002), the stepping stone to this biography, but here we additionally learn that Pavlov’s life itself was organized this way. He strove to compartmentalize, not only hermetically sealing his dogs in the Towers of Silence but also isolating various aspects of his own life from each other. Once he was established, nine months of research in the laboratory was always followed by three months with his family at the dacha, in which gardening replaced any thought of scientific work. Yet the strict division between professional and private life was ultimately contradicted by his long affair with co-worker Maria Petrova, and here both their love and work together are narrated with consummate skill.

Living until the age of eighty-six gave Pavlov ample time to act the curmudgeon, presenting special challenges for the biographer. At times, he showed the stereotypical intolerance of members