Domestic sources of alliances and alignments: the case of Egypt, 1962–73
Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy

Although the theoretical and empirical study of international conflict and security policy has long suffered from the relative neglect of domestic social and political variables, the last few years have witnessed a virtual explosion of theoretical and empirical research in this area. This recent research covers a fairly wide variety of topics, but it has yet to address the question of alliances, which are a central component of state security policies and which continue to be analyzed almost exclusively from a traditional realpolitik perspective. Moreover, in spite of the fact that the subject matter of this new research involves considerable overlap with that of the international political economy, the traditional barriers between these two subfields have yet to be overcome, and scholars in each subfield have failed to build on important theoretical developments in the other.

With these considerations in mind, we examine the domestic sources of international alignments and alliances. Although there are multiple causal

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1. We distinguish between societal-level variables, which have basically been ignored in the literature, and decision-making variables at the bureaucratic-organizational, small group, and individual levels, which have each received considerable attention. See James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27–92. Contemporary historians have given far more attention to the causal importance of societal-level variables in the processes leading to war and the mobilization of resources for war. See Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988), pp. 653–73; and Michael Barnett, "High Politics Is Low Politics: The Systemic and Domestic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967–77," World Politics 42 (July 1990), pp. 529–62.


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paths through which various domestic variables influence alliance formation and the choice of alliance partners, we give particular attention to the impact of the domestic political economy on state trade-offs between alliances and internal mobilization as alternative means for enhancing security. We explore two related arguments. First, domestic political and economic constraints may limit a state’s ability to mobilize internal resources for external security without adversely affecting the domestic political interests of the elite in power and thus may provide powerful incentives for leaders to prefer external alignments to internal mobilization as a strategy to provide for their security in the face of external threats. Second, internal—as opposed to solely external—threats to government rule provide additional incentives for state leaders to seek an external alliance, for they might secure material resources that can then be used to counter domestic threats to the regime. We apply the model to Egypt and follow a research design based on a longitudinal controlled comparison over the periods 1962–67, 1967–71, and 1971–73.

Theoretical considerations

For the purposes of this study, we use the term “alliance” in its broadest sense to refer to a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more states and involving mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future. Neither the degree of commitment nor the specific form of policy coordination or conditions under which it would take place need be explicit.  

The theoretical literature on alliances is dominated by a realist perspective and downplays the role of state-society relations in shaping the state’s security


3. States may shun alliances in general because of domestically generated preferences for isolationist policies, and they may reject certain states as potential alliance partners because of ideological differences, religious considerations, or exclusionary trade or financial policies that are driven by domestic interests or by ethnic politics.

policies. There is nearly unanimous agreement that alliances are driven by expediency rather than principle, that their primary motivation is to enhance state security in the face of some immediate or future external threat, and that ideological and domestic interests are of secondary importance. In this view, states seek alliances primarily to enhance their capabilities through combination with others, which helps to deter a potential aggressor and avoid an unwanted war, to prepare for a successful war in the event that deterrence fails, or more generally to increase one’s influence in a high-threat environment or maintain a balance of power in the system. Although this widely accepted capability aggregation model of international alliances has several limitations, the most important for our purposes here is its failure to emphasize (1) the trade-offs that states make between arms and alliances in their security policies, (2) the impact of domestic economic and political factors on these trade-offs, and (3) the value of alliances as sources of military and economic resources as well as security guarantees.

We must recognize, first of all, that the state generally has alternative policy instruments for dealing with external security threats. Under certain conditions, the state may choose to expand its security preparedness through internal mobilization of military resources rather than through external alliances,
creating a trade-off or substitution effect between armaments and alliances in the security policies of states. Although traditional balance-of-power theories have acknowledged this potential trade-off, arms races and alliances have generally been studied separately in the literature, with the result that relatively little attention has been given to the critical question of the conditions under which a state pursues one strategy rather than the other.

The subject of arms-alliance trade-offs has recently attracted some attention in the formal theoretical literature, but far more empirical work is needed to shed light on the various factors involved in the choice to pursue a particular strategy. While some of the recent studies have recognized that domestic budgetary constraints have an effect on the choice between internal mobilization and alliance, they have tended to ignore factors such as the political implications of these economic constraints and the potential loss of autonomy involved in the pursuit of alliances.

There is a tendency in the literature to conceive of alliances only in terms of the external security guarantees they provide and to neglect the ally's role as a source of economic resources, military equipment, and—particularly in earlier times—manpower. There is also a tendency to focus on relatively well endowed and politically stable great powers, and this gives inadequate attention to domestic resource constraints and the political fragility of many


9. This lack of systematic treatment of the trade-offs that exist is evident in such classic works as Gulick’s Europe’s Classical Balance of Power and Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. In the last decade, however, many realpolitik theorists have followed the argument set forth by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). According to Waltz, “external balancing” through alliances is more common in multipolar systems, while “internal balancing” through arms production is more common in bipolar systems. But this hypothesis has yet to be empirically confirmed, and it ignores the central role of alliances in the bipolar systems of early sixteenth-century Europe and ancient Greece. See Jack Levy, “The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis,” in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., Polarity and War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 41–66.


regimes, either of which might provide a powerful reason for seeking an alliance. These issues are particularly evident in the Third World, but the theoretical literature is relatively silent on Third World alliances in general and on how state and state-society relations peculiar to the Third World might give rise to distinctive patterns of alliance behavior. By recognizing that the state is embedded in both systemic and domestic structures, we are better able to analyze the arms-alliance trade-offs that states make not only as a response to external security threats but also as a means to secure scarce resources for pressing domestic needs.

The realist assumption that external security is the most important state goal may be true in the sense that the territorial and constitutional integrity of the state is a prerequisite for the achievement of all other important objectives. This does not mean, however, that external threats to the very existence of the state are either frequent in occurrence or immediate in their expected impact. The solidification of the state system has made threats of territorial eradication fairly remote (the recent case of Kuwait notwithstanding), but at the same time the stability and survival of governments in many states, particularly in the Third World, have become increasingly problematic.

Because state survival is rarely at stake while regime stability or survival frequently is, because state decision makers generally attend to immediate threats first, and because their risk orientations toward threats involving high values but low probabilities vary considerably, we hesitate to assume a priori that external security goals are always given priority in the foreign policy calculations of states. We assume that state officials pursue goals of social welfare, economic development, and political stability as well as power, security, wealth, and autonomy; that the relative priority given to these goals, as well as the trade-offs made among them, varies under different conditions for different states; and that this is an empirical question to be investigated rather

12. In Alliances and Small Powers, for example, Rothstein focuses primarily on European small powers that face direct threats from a great power and says little about alliances involving two or more small powers. See also Marshall Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers (New York: Free Press, 1972); Richard Rothstein, The Weak in the World of the Strong (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); and Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981). In “Explaining Third World Alignments,” World Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 233–56, Steven David develops the concept of “omnibalancing” and shows how Third World states attempt to balance external and internal threats. The great power and Eurocentric bias in the alliance literature is shared more generally by the American theoretical literature on international conflict.

13. See Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35 (October 1982), pp. 1–24; and Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 179–82. Weak states facing immediate security threats from great powers or other stronger states may have no choice but to give priority to security matters and to seek external support from another great power, but these great power threats to small states are not very common. See Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 247.

14. By political stability, we mean both the maintenance of state structures and the maintenance of state managers’ own positions of political power. These are analytically distinct but can be combined for the purposes of this article.
than a purely theoretical question to be established axiomatically. Our focus here is on the trade-offs that states make between the pursuit of external alliances or alignments and the mobilization of internal resources as alternative strategies for dealing with external security threats in the context of internal threats to social welfare and political stability. 

Although our analysis is concerned primarily with Third World states with significant resource constraints, several aspects of our analysis may also be applicable to great powers. External alliance formation and internal resource mobilization each have advantages and disadvantages. Of the two strategies, the first is more flexible in that an alliance can be formed quickly to provide security guarantees in response to an immediate security threat and can be discarded if necessary when the threat recedes. While the process of developing and producing resources within a threatened state can be slow and difficult, alliance formation can bring a rapid infusion of funds and other resources, including military expertise and equipment. These external resources can in turn benefit either the economy as a whole or certain supporters of the regime in power and can be used for internal as well as external security purposes. If a regime allies with a militarily powerful or ideologically respected state, the benefits can also include prestige.

Nevertheless, alliances involve potential costs in terms of security and autonomy. The risks include abandonment by an ally that fails to fulfill its commitment, entrapment in a war involving the ally's interests rather than one's own, and a general loss of autonomy or freedom of maneuver. Thus, Machiavelli advised weak states to avoid allying with stronger states, and Hans

15. See Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action." Like these authors, we assume that states have internal and external strategies as well as internal and external goals, and we also assume that internal strategies can facilitate the achievement of external goals and vice versa, though our conceptualization of state goals differs from theirs. Note, however, that while Mastanduno and his colleagues mention a hegemon's extraction of resources from the world economy to increase state wealth, they neglect territorial expansion and economic or military assistance through alliances as other means available to many states pursuing the same objective. (But see Lake, "The State and Grand Strategy.") They also mention external validation of internal legitimacy through an alliance with a stronger state, but they neglect the potential autonomy costs of such alliances and make only a brief reference to the utility of the diversionary use of force to enhance internal legitimacy. See Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 259–88.

16. See Most and Siverson, "Substituting Arms and Alliances," p. 135. The termination of an alliance may, however, involve some diplomatic and domestic political costs. An alliance, once formed, may create a set of vested political interests within the state or society or may come to be seen as an end in itself, transcending the security interests or other purposes for which the alliance was initially established. See Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, pp. 34–35.


Morgenthau advised policymakers to follow the rule of never allowing a weak ally to make decisions for them.  In the words of the King of Siam (from Rodgers and Hammerstein, The King and I),

   Shall I join with other nations in alliance?  
   If allies are weak, am I not best alone?  
   If allies are strong with power to protect me,  
   Might they not protect me out of all I own?20

The loss of autonomy also has an important domestic dimension. Extensive alignment concessions can involve substantial domestic political costs to the regime in power, particularly if these concessions involve the presence of foreign troops or are otherwise perceived as infringements on the sovereign independence of the state.21 The costs may be especially high for Third World states with a history of external dependence, with tenuous claims to domestic authority, and with popular sensitivity toward any symbol of external domination or influence. External military assistance increases the influence of the indigenous military establishment in a state’s political process, and there is some evidence that it also increases the risk of a military coup.22

Although an internal mobilization of military resources avoids the risks of abandonment, entrapment, and loss of autonomy inherent in a strategy of external reliance, there are several reasons why states, particularly in the Third World, might turn to alliance formation when responding to a security threat. First, some states simply lack the resources to support a military establishment adequate to deal with their security threats23 and thus have little choice but to rely on external support.

Second, even if a country does have the necessary resources, extraction of them may provide short-term military security at the cost of weakening the long-term strength of the economy and therefore the long-term military potential and security of the state.24 Military spending can also reduce a state’s ability to satisfy important domestic welfare goals in the short term as well as the long term (the guns-butter trade-off), and the inability to satisfy these goals

21. See Liska, Nations in Alliance, chap. 5; Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, chap. 8; and McGinnis, “A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry.”
22. See Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers, pp. 303–6. On the other hand, the allocation of increased domestic resources to the military establishment would also increase its leverage and the risk of political destabilization. See Handel, Weak States in the International System, p. 81.
at some minimal level can generate social discontent and undermine political support for the regime in power.

Third, military expenditures can lessen the ability of the ruling elite to maintain its basis of political support by diverting resources that might otherwise be used to distribute financial rewards and privileges to its coalition partners. This issue is particularly salient in the Third World, since many of the states have tenuous claims to legitimacy owing to their historical evolution in relationship to outside powers and colonial authorities. Because many of the governing elites in Third World states stand alien from society, their rule is often maintained by a narrow base of political support and fragile coalitions that are solidified more by material benefits and less by a mobilizing ideology. Moreover, the politics of domestic survival leads governments to reward supporters and bribe or pacify dissidents through short-term consumption-oriented strategies, which undercut the potential for economic development and thereby further accentuate the "resource gap" confronting Third World states. As Richard Rothstein concludes, "The concern for political stability always prevails over a concern for economic development" for Third World states. A heavy defense burden, then, while increasing the state's ability to confront external threats, may leave it exposed to domestic ones.

Fourth, in addition to resource shortages, there are political and economic structures that limit the access of political authorities to the resources of society and generally impose substantial political costs on access to those resources. Both the ability of state managers to extract or mobilize resources from society and the political costs they must pay for access to societal resources vary across states and across types of resources. It is particularly useful to distinguish between men, money, and material as distinct components of societal resources that underlie military power and potential. These variations in state extractive capacities and the associated political costs for central decision makers affect state choices between self-reliance and the reliance on others for security.

It is well recognized that most Third World states have little infrastructural capacity and thus have few policy instruments to extract from and penetrate society. Therefore, most Third World leaders tend to rely on indirect methods

29. See Eprime Eshag, Fiscal and Monetary Problems in Developing Countries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Lewis Snider, "Identifying the Elements of State Power: Where Do We Begin?" Comparative Political Studies 30 (October 1987), pp. 314–56; and John Due, Indirect Taxation in Developing Countries (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).
of resource extraction. Indirect methods offer a dual advantage. Not only are they less visible and thus less likely to generate societal resistance, but they are also regressive and thus less likely to go against the interests of the dominant classes. In general, the extraction of revenue is one of the most controversial and politically explosive issues confronting Third World leaders, and overzealous efforts as extraction can easily undercut the government's foundations.

Domestic production of armaments is constrained principally by the state economic structure. The only countries that have achieved self-sufficiency in the production of major weapons systems are those with a large gross national product, an expansive industrial base, and numerous high-technology industries. Although many Third World governments would like to develop an independent arms production capacity and thereby preserve their autonomy, this goal is constrained by an insufficient industrial base, an inability to achieve the desired economies of scale, and a lack of appropriate technology, all in an age in which military technology has become increasingly sophisticated and expensive.

Although the domestic economic and political constraints on the ability of Third World governments to mobilize money and material are well recognized, their impact on the mobilization of manpower is equally important but more often ignored. States may exempt certain elements of the population from conscription in order to allow them to remain in economically productive sectors or to avoid alienating politically influential groups, and only when the state is confident of its hold on power is it willing to allow subordinate classes access to instruments of coercion that might also be used for rebellion. Moreover, in the modern era, there tends to be a direct positive relationship between a state's legitimacy and its ability to conscript widely. Because of the low levels of legitimacy and political stability of many Third World regimes, most of them avoid mass conscription and rely instead on an army drawn from individuals that have demonstrated their loyalty to the ruling elite either

30. A direct tax is one "collected directly (or via withholding) from the persons expected to bear the burden of the tax, in the sense of a reduction of real income," whereas an indirect tax is one "collected from persons other than those expected to bear the burden." See Due, Indirect Taxation in Developing Countries, p. 19.


32. Although Prussia is a classic example of a militarized society in which domestic welfare is sacrificed for the sake of the military power of the state, Michael Howard notes that King Frederick William I (1713-40) organized the Prussian army "with infinite care to impose the least possible strain on the fragile economy of his lands." See Howard, War in European History, p. 69. The fear of the revolutionary potential of mass armies and the conviction that the Napoleonic style of warfare was more conducive to overturning the system of European states than to preserving it were the primary reasons that at the end of the Napoleonic wars most great powers reverted to the eighteenth-century pattern of "aristocratic officers and long-serving professional troops kept isolated from the rest of the community." See Howard, ibid., p. 84. See also Richard Preston and Sydney Wise, Men in Arms, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1979), pp. 203-9; and Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 81 and 85. That is, the army was seen as an instrument of the dominant class for the maintenance of social order as much as a Clausewitzian instrument of national policy.
through kinship ties or patron-client relations. These economic and political constraints on the state’s mobilization of societal resources can be a powerful incentive to make alignment concessions to others in return for military support to deal with external threats to security and for economic support to deal with threats to the domestic political economy.

There is a fifth reason why Third World leaders might prefer alliances over internal mobilization. If internal threats to the government are more salient than external ones, as is frequently the case in Third World countries, political leaders are often tempted to try to secure the material resources necessary to deal with those threats (by placating disgruntled societal groups or by other means) through external alliance formation rather than through internal extraction from a society that is already economically stretched and politically alienated. That is, Third World states often form external alliances as a means of confronting internal threats.

In summary, our argument is that these multiple and costly domestic political and economic objectives often provide state officials with an incentive to rely on external alignments and the security guarantees or material resources they can provide, rather than on costly internal efforts to deal with external security threats. Although external security concerns may dominate in many cases, particularly for wealthy and politically stable states, a general explanation of alliances and alignments must include internal budgetary constraints and the domestic political interests of the regime in power as well as external security goals, particularly for Third World and other states facing severe resource constraints and potential threats to domestic political stability.

Our aim, however, is not to propose a separate “domestic politics model” of alliance formation. A model limited to either domestic or systemic variables cannot provide an explanation for alliance behavior that is adequate or valid for all states. Both sets of variables must be included in an integrated theoretical framework. In the remainder of this study, we examine the role of external security threats, the domestic economy, and concerns for domestic political stability in shaping the Egyptian government’s choices between the strategy of external alignment and that of internal mobilization of resources in


34. See Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion.”

35. In “Explaining Third World Alignments,” Steven David refers to this as an act of “omnibalancing.” In *Capital, Coercion, and European States*, pp. 207–8, Tilly argues that military aid allows rulers to “bypass bargaining with their subject population” for access to the means of war making. But by turning to external support, they lose the opportunity to generate domestic consent and are likely to be viewed by their subjects as less legitimate than before.
the 1962–73 period. We have selected the Egyptian case in part because it has recently been used to demonstrate the strength of neorealist theories of alliance formation.

**Egypt’s search for security and domestic stability**

For our analysis of Egyptian alignment policy, we constructed a research design that involves a longitudinal controlled comparison over three periods: (1) from early 1962 to June 1967, (2) from June 1967 to May 1971, and (3) from May 1971 to October 1973. This design incorporates ample variation in the three variables of primary interest in explaining why the extent of Egypt’s reliance on external alignments for security guarantees and resources varied over time: the degree of perceived external threat to the state, the nature of the domestic resource constraints, and the perceived threats to the government’s political stability. Briefly, during the 1962–67 period, the degree of external and internal threats was low, and Egyptian officials consequently demonstrated no strong inclination to secure a greater commitment from foreign actors. In the four years following the June 1967 war, however, there were increased threats to security from Israel and to domestic stability from internal forces, and this two-pronged challenge led to an increased reliance on the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, regional actors. Beginning in late 1971, under the threat of increased domestic challenges but with no appreciable change in the external threat from Israel, Sadat initiated various diplomatic maneuvers designed to tighten external alignments and to secure additional resources that could be channeled to satisfy domestic goals and to prepare for war to overturn the status quo.

**1962–67: the calm before the storm**

During this period, Nasser’s foreign policy activism and designs for the Arab state system created tremendous intra-Arab conflict. There were constant maneuverings between the Nasser regime and the other radical regimes in Iraq and Syria, and Nasser’s rhetoric and policies placed him in direct conflict with the conservative Arab states. Nasser’s adventures culminated in his foray into the Yemen civil war in 1962, which did little to advance Egypt’s interests but did contribute both to the army’s disastrous showing in the June 1967 war (since nearly half of the Egyptian troops were in Yemen at the time of the war) and to the economic downturn (since the war placed a heavy burden on the

36. We begin in 1962 because that year inaugurated a relatively stable period in Egyptian politics. It followed the dissolution of the United Arab Republic and the sweeping nationalizations of 1961, and it preceded Egypt’s entry into the war in Yemen.

37. See Walt, *The Origins of Alliance*; and Telhami, *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining*. Telhami in particular goes to great lengths to distance himself from a body of Egyptian historiography that argues that Egyptian foreign policy was significantly affected by domestic political and economic factors.

state’s budget). Moreover, the concentration on intra-Arab politics left little time for concerns about Israel. Although there were moments when the Arab–Israeli conflict heated up, notably in 1964 over Israel’s plan to divert the Jordan River to Israel, for the most part the Arab states were too consumed with each other to pay much attention to the Israelis. It was not until May 1967 that the Arab–Israeli conflict gained prominence. 39

Initially, Nasser’s foreign policy adventures must have looked affordable, since the Egyptian economy was exhibiting relatively strong growth rates during the early 1960s. Any potential resource shortage was temporarily solved by a wave of nationalizations in 1961, 40 which centralized the state’s role for investment and capital accumulation and gave it direct access to a tremendous resource base. The economic optimism of the early 1960s quickly evaporated, however, with a balance-of-payments crisis in 1964, produced by the U.S. suspension of PL480 (a U.S. program that granted concessional aid to Egypt for American wheat imports) in that year, the costs of the war in Yemen, and public sector inefficiencies. After 1964, when the government’s sterling reserves were depleted, Egypt looked to foreign assistance to cover the bill. The need for foreign assistance, however, was not so dire that it necessitated either a turn to the United States or increased reliance on the Soviet Union. In short, the economic crisis of the mid-1960s did not lead to any major economic reforms, 41 and it did not appear to undercut Nasser’s political standing. 42

Nor was there any appreciable shift in Egypt’s alignment patterns during this period. Although Nasser turned to the Soviets after 1964 for help in covering the balance-of-payments deficit, his economic needs were relatively modest, and his request was not accompanied by any expectation of Soviet military commitment or security cooperation. The Egyptian–Soviet entente had existed since the Soviet Union had become Egypt’s primary arms supplier in 1955, but both sides were still wary of each other’s motivations and the potential costs of any closer association or level of commitment. 43 With the decline of the rigid

39. Ibid.
40. The wave of nationalizations was a reaction to the industrial elites’ lack of investment despite the tremendous enticements offered by the state. It also represented an effort to protect the Nasser regime from potential enemies after the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in 1961. See Raymond Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978).
42. The Muslim brotherhood’s protests in 1965 did produce some concern and a wave of domestic repression by the government.
43. This arrangement did not translate immediately into a greater level of commitment by the Soviets. After the Anglo–French attack on the Suez Canal, for example, the Soviets informed Nasser that while they admired Egypt’s courageous resistance, the only thing they were willing to mobilize for the Egyptians was world opinion. See Mohammed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 68–71.
bipolarity of the 1950s, Egypt's leverage had begun to wane. Nasser was worried that the Soviets might attempt to use their leverage to control Egypt's domestic and foreign policy, and in order to minimize constraints on Egyptian autonomy he limited his reliance on Soviet financial assistance. In fact, the Soviets attempted to maintain a tight rein over Nasser so that he would not upset any future détente with the United States, and they were so concerned about becoming embroiled in a Middle East conflict that when the June war erupted they refused to immediately resupply the routed Arab armies. Thus, neither side wanted to formalize or even extend the level of commitment.44

In summary, the 1962–67 period was one marked by regional activity, few threats from Israel, a weak economy, and domestic political stability. The war expenses in Yemen and other foreign policy costs were covered by relying on domestic means and past commitments from the Soviets. At this point, with a slight foreign threat and domestic stability, Nasser opted to forgo any additional financial assistance that the Soviets might offer, since it might come at the expense of Egyptian autonomy.

1967–71: from Nasser's defeat to Sadat's consolidation of power

The 1967 war was disastrous for the Arabs, for Egypt, and for Nasser. It threw the Egyptian political system into a serious crisis and accelerated those forces already working to undermine Nasser's regime.45 Egypt's dismal, halfhearted performance in the war raised questions regarding Nasser's ability to defend Egyptian territory (let alone advance the cause of Palestinian nationalism), though not to the point of undermining his legitimacy, as evidenced by the tremendous outpouring of support and demand for his reinstatement following his resignation on 9 June 1967. The masses distinguished between the failures of the military and the failures of Nasserism and were determined to deny the Israelis an even greater victory, which would have been the case had they toppled Nasser.46

The government quickly decided that the Sinai must be retaken. The immediacy behind the government's decision was not due to its fears of any new threats from Israel but, rather, to its belief that the Israeli occupation represented a significant threat to the Nasser regime.47 This was as much a consequence of domestic politics as it was of Arab–Israeli politics, since Nasser tied his government's survival to the successful reversal of the Israeli position.

44. See ibid., pp. 148–71 and 183; and Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 31 and 43.
Admittedly, Egyptian–Israeli hostility escalated during the 1969–70 war of attrition, but even this conflict can be traced largely to Nasser’s desire to demonstrate some activity on the Arab–Israeli front and thereby shore up his domestic standing. ⁴⁸

Although the continuing Israeli occupation of the Sinai was totally unacceptable to Nasser, whose highest priority had become recovery of the lost lands and his own prestige, he was nevertheless aware that the goal of territorial recovery should not proceed so far as to challenge and undercut his domestic goal of political survival. In March 1968, a series of protests soon turned into an uncontrollable mass demonstration against the state’s security apparatus and, in particular, against the dismal performance in the June war and the meager sentences given to military officers held responsible for it.⁴⁹ These societal disturbances made the government’s balancing act that much more difficult. Although the regime’s popularity was now dependent on its ability to successfully confront the Israelis, those very domestic mobilization activities that were needed to do so, if prolonged too long, could undercut the government’s viability. Nasser thus had to walk a tightrope between the Israelis and domestic oppositional forces.

If the government was determined to recapture the Sinai and right the wrongs of the Arab–Israeli conflict, it would have to do so in the context of a fiscal crisis that would have existed even in the absence of the need for additional military resources.⁵⁰ Egypt’s foreign exchange and balance-of-payments difficulties had worsened substantially since 1965, and the state had lost its three major sources of revenue in the 1967 war—the Suez Canal, the Sinai oil fields, and tourism—which together provided $400 million to $500 million annually.⁵¹ Previous government policies and the ideology of the Nasser regime further narrowed the government’s actions. It could not increase the burden of the corporate sector, since the nationalizations of 1961 had effectively rid the country of this revenue source. It was deterred from increasing taxation of the already impoverished masses by the fear of societal resistance.⁵² Moreover, Nasser’s regime was based on a redistributive ethic, one that promised to secure material gains for the lower classes.⁵³ To deviate from this posture might unravel the state’s ideological foundations and alienate an important component of the government’s coalition. Consequently, the govern-

⁴９. See Rubenstein, Red Star on the Nile, pp. 47–48; and P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), p. 185. Vatikiotis observes that “a common popular complaint in those days was ‘We accept the regime did not do much for us, but being a military one, it could at least have given account of itself in the war against Israel.’”
⁵³. Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat.
ment’s primary domestic target was the public sector, which was the least visible and the most accessible and would therefore provoke the least amount of resistance.\textsuperscript{54}

In the context of these political imperatives and societal constraints, such limited domestic measures could not narrow the resource gap, and Nasser was compelled to turn to foreign actors to fund his war effort.\textsuperscript{55} His external search was complicated with respect to the Arab world, since Nasser’s pre-1967 foreign policy had been designed to undermine the same oil-rich states that he now needed for financial salvation. In order to win their support, Nasser changed his ideological position from champion of the pan-Arab movement and Arab radicalism to leader of the anti-Zionist movement.\textsuperscript{56} Egypt’s new image as a frontline confrontational state led to the Khartoum Agreement in autumn 1967. Three oil-rich Arab states—Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia—agreed to pay Egypt roughly $250 million a year as partial compensation for revenue losses associated with the closure of the Suez Canal, the capture of the Sinai oil fields, and the drop in tourism; in “exchange,” Nasser agreed to withdraw his troops from Yemen.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, Nasser attempted to bolster the regime’s regional legitimacy in order to increase foreign assistance, which would serve his domestic political interests as well as his security needs.

This assistance of the oil-rich states did not continue smoothly. The first sign of trouble came at the Rabat summit meeting in December 1969, when


\textsuperscript{55} See Ajami, The Arab Predicament, p. 91. Arms transfers and financial assistance data are generally not available on an annual basis, as Walt notes in The Origin of Alliances, p. 219, fn. 3. There are a number of reasons to question the reliability of the data that are available. First, the post-1967 defense costs were placed in three different areas: the regular budget, the supplemental budget, and the emergency budget. Annual data on the emergency budget, which probably housed the majority of the post-1967 defense burden, are generally unavailable. For instance, in The Defense Burden in Egypt, p. 122, Efrat, who probably has the most reliable figures, says little more than that the burden rose from £E 60 million in 1967 to £E 399 million in 1973. Second, calculations regarding Soviet assistance would have to take into account not only the number of arms transferred but also the terms of the transfers. Egyptian Chief of Staff Saad al-Shazli argues in The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Middle East Research, 1980) that it is anyone’s guess how much assistance actually arrived. Third, Arab financial assistance was transferred through a variety of Egyptian locales, some of which were more visible than others. And, fourth, Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Arab states began purchasing Soviet weapons to supply the Egyptians after 1972, and this adds to the difficulties of obtaining accurate data.

\textsuperscript{56} On Nasser’s new realism, see Ajami, The Arab Predicament, p. 86; and Hameid Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1987), p. 150. Ansari suggests that Nasser’s change in attitude led to his acceptance of the Rogers Plan to end the war of attrition and also led to his backing of the Jordanian government’s efforts against the Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1970.

\textsuperscript{57} See Rubenstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 38; and Mohammed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins Press, 1975), p. 52. The Khartoum Agreement, however, only covered approximately one-half of Egypt’s capital imports in the period immediately following the 1976 war, so the annual net loss was still from $165 million to $185 million. See Efrat, The Defense Burden of Egypt, p. 152.
intra-Arab rivalry was high and the Egyptian representative announced that Egypt's forces "were in no way prepared to face a war with Israel at that stage or in the near future." The Saudis were also suspicious of Nasser's growing ties with the Soviet Union, and as a result, Saudi and other Arab assistance came with increasing difficulty. Indeed, Arab financial assistance declined from a high of $320 million in 1969–70 to $283 million the following fiscal year.

Because of Egypt's meager economic infrastructure, lack of science and technology base, and rapidly expanding resource gap, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for assistance following the June war of 1967. In contrast to his earlier attitude, Nasser's attitude was now one of willingness to accept the risks of some loss of autonomy that might accompany an increased Soviet presence. According to Mohammed Heikal, Nasser's strategy was to involve the Soviets more deeply in Egyptian affairs to "ensure that they felt Egypt's defeat was their defeat; that their prestige was bound up with that of Egypt's." The Soviets, whose lack of assistance during the June war had hurt their reputation in the Arab world, were now willing partners. They subsidized Egyptian arms purchases by selling weapons at discount rates, provided long-term and low-interest contracts, and traded equipment for Egyptian commodities. In general, Soviet military assistance, which had begun in 1955, expanded rapidly after the June war. But there were limits to the Soviet commitment and to Egyptian tolerance of increased Soviet presence. Before 1970, the Soviets rejected the Egyptian request that they expand their responsibilities to include taking a hand in Egypt's air defense, while the Egyptians were determined that the Soviet presence would never include a Soviet base because of the symbolic

60. Egypt's military industries had fallen on hard times during the 1960s and, as a result, were limited to production for the civilian economy and to the maintenance of imported weapons. See Efrat, The Defense Burden of Egypt, p. 16; and Joe Stork, "Arms Industries in the Middle East," MERIP, January–February 1987, p. 13.
63. During the 1967 war, Egypt lost 80 percent of its military weapons to the Israelis. The Soviets replaced these weapons free of charge. Other weapons received a discount of 50 percent, with a 10- to 15-year payback period, low interest rates (usually 2.5 percent per annum), and repayable in Egyptian currency. This continued the terms established under the first Soviet–Egyptian weapons agreement in 1955, in which Egypt financed its weapons partly by exporting cotton and other agricultural goods and partly by long-term debt financing at low interest rates. See Efrat, The Defense Burden of Egypt, pp. 34, 36, and 95. When Sadat took office in 1971, Egypt owed the Soviets $380 million in nonmilitary and $1.7 billion in military debt. See Mohammed Heikal, Autumn of Fury (New York: Random House, 1983), pp. 86–87.
loss of autonomy that this would entail. In general, both sides seemed to acknowledge at this early stage that material assistance was one thing and troops were quite another.

Egypt's military manpower potential was far greater than its material and production base, and it changed the most after the June 1967 war. According to the Egyptians and the Soviets, Egypt's disastrous performance in the 1967 war was attributable in part to the fact that the Israeli military was better educated and less class-determined than that of its Arab neighbors. Egypt's regressive conscription policies had effectively excused the educated upper classes from military service, and this not only hurt the quality of the Egyptian army but also limited the number of troops that could be mobilized. The Egyptian government therefore moved to alter the military's social composition.

That Nasser was able to mobilize the manpower resources of society following the 1967 war must be attributed to his recognized political legitimacy and to the implicit agreement between the government and society on the need to recover the Sinai. The government's conscription arm extended in a number of directions. Most critical to any future military success was the shortage of officers. By 1969, the officer corps was enlarged by nearly 35,000 members, the vast majority of whom were college graduates. This infused the army with technological expertise, which had previously been absent, and represented a major move toward egalitarianism. Both the scope and the duration of service were extended. The army continued to grow, expanding from 800,000 in 1971 to 1.2 million in 1973. All who entered the army after 1967, including college graduates, could expect to serve until the Sinai was recaptured. Although these new and extensive requirements initially met with little overt resistance, it would not be too surprising if this uninterrupted military service eventually produced a societal outlash against the state.

While Nasser could overcome the military's societal bias, he could not as easily correct the lack of expertise. The Soviets therefore became critical for retraining the Egyptian army. The number of Soviet troops and advisers stationed in Egypt increased from about 500 in 1967 to about 15,000 in 1972, and the level of their responsibilities also increased. In late 1967 and 1969, Nasser had asked the Soviets to participate directly in Egypt's air defenses, but the Soviets refused. Burdened with war preparations and motivated in part by domestic political conditions, Nasser renewed his request. By this time, he had become acutely aware of Egyptian dissatisfaction with the "no war and no peace" situation and believed that Soviet reinforcements would help stabilize the situation. In January 1970, at the height of the war of attrition and in

64. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 46-47.
response to Israel’s bombardments of centrally located Egyptian positions, the
Soviets agreed to Nasser’s request.68

By the time of Nasser’s death in September 1970, the Soviets were involved
in all levels of Egyptian defense planning. They had bankrolled Egypt’s war
effort, fulfilled nearly all its weapons needs, retrained its army, and even taken
a hand in its air defenses. But this involvement was still less than Nasser had
requested69 and was subject to periodic manipulation, cessations, and uncertain-
ties concerning the amount of assistance and the conditions attached to it.
Nevertheless, the manipulations and possible loss of autonomy appeared
palatable when contrasted with the possible domestic political repercussions
associated with an extensive mobilization effort. Thus, Egypt’s external
orientation was attributable not only to the limitations imposed by the domestic
economy but also to Nasser’s belief that however solid his political support,
such support might quickly erode in the face of a heavy societal burden.

1971–73: the domestic front heats up

Little notable change occurred in Arab–Israeli relations after the termina-
tion of the war of attrition in August 1970. In fact, Sadat’s first major move on
the Arab–Israeli front was his surprise “peace initiative” in early 1971, which
was then followed by the uneventful passing of his proclaimed “year of
decision.” The combined effect of these two events was to leave most observers
with the impression that the Arab–Israeli conflict had moved from an exchange
of bullets to an exchange of words and had entered a “diplomatic” phase by
late 1971. Certainly, the Israelis no longer constituted as immediate a security
threat.

Yet alongside the decline in the Israeli threat and the flirtation with
nonmilitary solutions was a tightening of Egypt’s alignment patterns with the
Arab states in general and with the Soviet Union in particular. This presents
something of a puzzle, since it is not immediately evident why the alliance
patterns should tighten as the Israeli threat receded. Shibley Telhami has
recently argued that closer alignment with the Soviet Union after 1970 was due
to two factors: (1) Egypt’s traditional search for regional dominance, which
involved the avoidance of an excessive dependence on other Arab rivals; and
(2) the increased parity between the Soviets and the Americans, which no
longer permitted “nonaligned” states.70 We agree with Telhami that there was
a tightening alliance pattern with the Soviets and that the primary reason was

68. See ibid., p. 18; and Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt, p. 46. The Soviet
reinforcements did not come cheap. The Egyptians had to buy the equipment that they were to use
on Egyptian territory, provide them with food and field clothing, and cover their salaries by paying
Moscow the equivalent of 150 pounds sterling per soldier and 170 pounds sterling per officer. See
al-Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, p. 138.
69. Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt, p. 47.
70. Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining.
not the potential Israeli threat. But we reject his first explanatory factor because the Egyptians in fact increased their dependence both on the Soviets and on other Arab states in return for a substantial increase in economic aid, which was not only needed to bolster Egypt’s deteriorating economy and therefore Sadat’s own internal political support but was also necessary to maintain Sadat’s battle plans. Thus, the primary explanation for Egypt’s tightening alliance patterns lies in domestic economic and political conditions in Egypt, rather than in any increase in the Israeli threat or in other systemic-level changes.71

Sadat’s domestic challenge existed at two levels. The first was a cabinet-level power struggle that emerged soon after Nasser’s death and ended with Sadat’s consolidation of power in May 1971. This “corrective movement” alarmed Soviet officials, who were quite concerned about protecting their gains once Sadat purged the “pro-Soviet” Ali Sabri group from the cabinet. The event prodded the Soviets to request a formalization of their relationship with Egypt. On 27 May 1971, the two countries signed the Soviet–Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the first formal agreement of friendship between the Soviets and a noncommunist country. Because the terms ensured that the Soviets would continue to have a hand in Egypt’s economic path toward socialism and guaranteed that the Egyptians would receive further Soviet assistance, the treaty represented a continuation of past practices.72 Most important, the friendship treaty was a response not to any new threat from the Israelis but, rather, to the challenge that the cabinet realignment posed to Soviet gains in the area.

The second domestic threat was more broad-based. The Egyptian economy was rapidly deteriorating, and by January 1972 there was rising discontent among the Egyptian people.73 Domestic opposition forces registered three

71. An alternative explanation for the tightened alliance pattern might point to the idiosyncratic variables of Sadat’s personal belief systems, risk orientation, and bargaining strategy. However, we side with Waterbury, Hinnebusch, Ansari, and Ajami, all of whom emphasize the continuity of Egyptian policy from Nasser to Sadat and the importance of domestic constraints over the role of personality and other idiosyncratic factors. According to Ajami, “Throughout it all Egypt’s path has been navigated by two men, and there is a temptation to see the choices the two men made as idiosyncratic, personal ones. . . . The temptation to go after the personalities of the two “kings” in order to explain Egypt’s path must be checked, for there were constants that both men had to deal with: (1) an unacceptable military defeat that both men had to try to break out of; (2) a revolutionary legacy that had generated a great deal of noise and that now had to come to terms with the world.” See Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat; Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat; Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society; and Ajami, The Arab Predicament, p. 83.

72. Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt, p. 61.

73. For instance, Egypt’s overall deficit went from £E 194 million in 1971 to £E 315 million in 1972, and these figures do not include the bulk of the defense appropriations. See Khalid Ikram, Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). The observation that discontent was rising is supported by several historical narratives, including Ansari’s Egypt: The Stalled Society, Rubenstein’s Red Star on the Nile, and Ghali Shoukri’s Egypt: Portrait of a President (London: Zed Press, 1981), and by the autobiographical accounts of Egyptian officials, including al-Shazli’s The Crossing of the Suez, Heikal’s The Road to Ramadan, and Heikal’s The Sphinx and the Commissar. While Sadat acknowledged the domestic
principal complaints. The first concerned the nondemocratic character of Sadat’s regime. Sadat could not match Nasser’s legitimacy and was viewed as removed from the societal pulse. Therefore, many groups challenged the government’s authoritarian nature and called for greater societal representation and participation. The second complaint concerned Sadat’s efforts to incorporate into his coalition those groups which had been estranged from the Nasser regime. Sadat’s appeal to industrial capital and the landed elite caused the lower classes to worry that he would erase the gains that they had made under Nasser. The third complaint was about the government’s handling of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Many Egyptians felt that they were being asked to make a never-ending sacrifice for no apparent reason. Sadat’s 1971 “year of decision” had ended, and a settlement or war with Israel was still no closer at hand. The students were particularly confrontational, challenging the government’s continued indecisiveness as a way of demonstrating the bankruptcy of the regime. In general, Sadat was aware of the rising costs of inaction: not only would the economy not recover from this stasis, but severe domestic disturbances were likely to follow as well.

Because of this domestic unrest and the fact that he was newly installed and constantly fearful of his domestic standing, Sadat was not willing to extract additional resources from society. To maintain his domestic coalition, Sadat had to discover new methods for deflating societal pressures. While he tried to placate the lower classes by increasing the subsidies on basic staples, he also attempted to pacify the upper classes by relaxing foreign exchange controls to allow for the limited importation of personal consumption items and by providing some repatriation of previously sequestered landholdings. Such discontent, he attributed it to either Soviet-backed plots or journalists who were attempting to “create a sense of instability . . . in the country.” See Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 234 and 245. Whatever the source of discontent, the lasting impression is that Egyptian officials felt themselves to be under greater societal constraints and pressures after 1971.

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75. See Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society. While Nasser attempted to control the masses, occasionally using them against the upper classes and personally dispensing and administering his view of their interests, Sadat saw the bourgeoisie as a positive force, both in the economy and the polity, and tended to view with some hostility the demands of the masses. However much Sadat attempted to portray himself as defender and protector of the common people, the institutional mechanisms used by the masses to reach Nasser rarely reached to the upper branches of decision making under Sadat. See Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat, pp. 226–27.
77. See Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). According to Levi, a ruler wishing to extract revenue must convince the population that the promised goods will be delivered, and the failure to deliver will create difficulties for future revenue extraction. This analysis shifts our attention away from the personality of Sadat and toward the more enduring problems that confronted Egyptian rulers in general.
78. See Rubenstein, Red Star on the Nile; and Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society, p. 175. Ansari argues that Sadat’s efforts to bolster his sagging support included the increased use of religious symbols and the encouragement of the formation of Islamic groups.
policies, while politically expedient, could not conceivably narrow the resource gap. And, to make matters worse, in March 1972 the Soviets informed Sadat that all arms deliveries would now require payment in full and in hard currency, and this new policy effectively quadrupled the price of Soviet weapons.79

Sadat was caught in a vise. He needed to go to war in order to escape the costs of inaction, answer his domestic critics, and reorient resources away from war preparation and toward economic development, yet he was reluctant to preside over a 1967-type campaign. Sadat had to increase the flow of financial resources so that he could both shield the regime from domestic challenges and prepare for a war that was increasingly necessary for domestic reasons. In short, domestic factors contributed to Sadat’s decision to initiate a series of diplomatic maneuvers that were designed both to alter his relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union and to loosen the political noose by securing greater material assistance.

The most celebrated of these actions came in July 1972, when Sadat ordered the Soviets to reduce the number of advisers from 15,000 to under 1,000.80 Why evict the Soviet advisers, given Egypt’s dependence on the Soviets for its military and financial survival? And how does this behavior fit our hypothesized pattern of a tightening of Egyptian external alignments? Sadat himself states that he simply wanted to reduce Egyptian dependence on the Soviet Union and increase Egypt’s self-reliance.81 The idea of reducing dependence on the Soviet Union is plausible, since the emerging Soviet–American detente was undercutting Egypt’s leverage on the Soviets and at the same time increasing the Soviet incentive to make sure Egypt did nothing to disrupt the improved relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.82 The resulting Soviet caution toward Egypt was reflected in a change in Soviet arms policy, which placed greater restrictions on delivery dates and the type of weapons to be sold to Egypt.83

79. The reason behind the weapons policy shift may lie with the detente between the United States and Soviet Union, which meant that the Soviets no longer had to bargain as hard for allies. Moreover, the Kremlin’s belief was that the Saudis and Libyans would pay for the weapons in hard currency, which the Soviets could then use to pay for their imports of Western technology and food. Because of these new conditions, Egypt was forced to give up its purchase of some weapons (which were later made up by Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti assistance). See al-Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, p. 143.

80. Egypt’s military establishment coordinated the Soviet departure in a manner that minimized the possible damage to its battle plans. The Soviets who operated Soviet equipment for which Egypt had no substitute were allowed to stay, provided that they remained under Egyptian command. See al-Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, pp. 164–65.

81. See Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 204–32. In Egypt: The Stalled Society, pp. 176–77, Ansari offers a similar interpretation. The explanation offered by Hafez Ismail (Sadat’s national security adviser) in an interview with Barnett on 3 January 1991 in Cairo also points to systemic factors: Sadat was intent on sending a clear signal to the Americans that he was willing to reopen his dialogue with them.


Given the unwillingness of the Soviets to be more forthcoming, Sadat decided to turn to the Arab states for economic and military aid. He believed that by distancing himself from the Soviets he could facilitate a rapprochement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and gain increased financial assistance. Alvin Rubenstein, for instance, claims that “Sadat knew that expulsion of the Soviets would find favor with the deeply anti-communist Faysal.”84 In fact, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states responded quite favorably. Saudi and Kuwaiti oil money was made available at a special session of the Arab Defense Council in Cairo in January 1973. Egypt was allocated from $300 million to $500 million in hard currency for weapons and from $400 million to $500 million in balance-of-payments support (in addition to the $250 million already stipulated in the Khartoum Agreement of 1967).85 This approximately doubled the amount of Arab financial assistance received the previous year. Moreover, Saudi Arabia helped finance the record arms shipment from the Soviets in March 1973.86

It is not difficult to understand the favorable Arab response to Sadat’s request for aid after his eviction of the Soviet advisers. The reaction of the Soviets is perhaps more surprising. Rather than further reducing their flow of arms and assistance to Egypt, they increased it. Soon after the eviction, the Soviets not only agreed to provide some of the very weapons systems that they had previously refused to supply, but they also opened the arms pipeline.87 Whereas the value of Soviet arms shipments declined from $656 million in 1970 to $360 million the following year, the Soviet response to the expulsion of advisers was to increase the value of the arms transfers to $550 million in 1972 (and it is likely that a vast percentage of this amount arrived after the July expulsion) and to $850 million in 1973.88 By April 1973, Sadat could declare that “the Russians are providing us now with everything that’s possible for them to supply. And I am now quite satisfied.”89 Moreover, Sadat suggests that unlike the pre-eviction period when his battle plans received an unsympathetic ear from the Soviets, now he believed that he gained their tacit acceptance.90 Whatever Sadat’s initial intentions, the outcome was clearly a tightened alignment between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

The interesting question, of course, is the extent to which Sadat fully anticipated this sequence of events and shrewdly implemented this brilliant strategy. Although we cannot be certain that Sadat correctly predicted the Soviet response, it is certainly plausible that he designed his strategy with

84. Rubenstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 196.
85. Ibid., pp. 241–42.
88. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, various years.
89. Sadat, cited by Dawisha in Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt, p. 65.
90. Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 246–47.
something like this in mind. If, as we have argued, Sadat was more concerned with economic and military aid than with security guarantees per se, it was not unreasonable to expect, in the worse case, that Arab aid would fully replace any loss of aid from the Soviets. 91 Moreover, given the concern of the Soviet Union with its image and credibility as a superpower,92 the Soviet determination to maintain influence in the Middle East, and the absence of other alternatives to Egypt, there was some chance that the Soviets might not abandon Egypt and might even attempt to minimize their losses by maintaining their economic and military support. This is precisely what happened, and some scholars have suggested that Sadat’s strategy was not even all that risky.93 Regardless of Sadat’s intentions and the possibility that his strategy succeeded beyond his expectations, it is clear that his diplomatic maneuvers were driven largely by the need for additional resources to prop up the ailing Egyptian economy and the war effort, along with the recognition that few resources could be mobilized domestically for these objectives because of the potential political costs attached to this action.94

Although Sadat’s diplomatic movements increased the flow of money and weapons that could be used to stabilize the domestic political situation and continue his preparations for war, additional societal pressures were being generated by the government’s conscription policy. Many groups were beginning to question the policy of uninterrupted service, particularly after the “year of decision” had passed uneventfully. On 12 October 1972, an army officer led some of his troops into a mosque in central Cairo and publicly demanded immediate war with Israel. The impatience of the army regarding the situation of no war and no peace mirrored that of society in general and the students in

91. Although this might be more true for financial assistance than for weapons, the Egyptians were already experiencing a decline in weapons sales.
92. See Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt, p. 64.
93. Rubenstein and Telhami both conclude that Sadat’s maneuver involved relatively low risks. Heikal argues that the Soviets perceived the situation in precisely these terms: “The military . . . argued repeatedly in the Politburo that there was no easy way out, and that the flow of military aid to the Arabs must be stepped up.” See Rubenstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 199; Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining, p. 68; and Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 253. Moreover, according to Hafez Ismail (interviewed by Barnett in Cairo on 3 January 1991), the military’s battle plans had by this point shifted from a strategy designed to recapture the entire Sinai to one intended to achieve a limited military victory by establishing an Egyptian presence on the East Bank of the Suez. This goal was within reach without a major infusion of Soviet arms into the Egyptian arsenal.
94. We do not deny that idiosyncratic variables played a role here, but we argue that they affected policy means rather than goals. Given the domestic economic and political constraints at the time, any Egyptian leader would have been forced into greater reliance on external actors for badly needed resources. The particular strategy selected by Sadat may have been influenced by his own belief systems, risk orientation, and bargaining strategy, but it would not have been put into play at all in the absence of domestic pressures. Thus, idiosyncratic variables probably played a role, but only through their interaction with domestic variables. That is, domestic pressures and idiosyncratic variables were individually necessary and jointly sufficient factors in the Egyptian eviction of the Soviets in 1972.
particular, with thousands of students protesting the situation and hundreds arrested in this period.95

The societal disturbances encouraged Sadat to look for ways to reduce the conscription-induced pressure, which was tipping an already delicate state-society balance against the government. He released some conscripts because of economic and “morale” considerations. Egypt now had a reserve system.96 In addition, Sadat solicited the assistance of other Arab states.97 No fewer than eight non-frontline Arab states sent forces to support Egyptian war preparations.98 Although the contribution to the war effort was minimal, this move provided Egypt with psychological relief and gave the Arab countries a sense of common purpose. The domestic forces that generated a change in conscription policy and a modest increase in reliance on external support contrast decidedly with the forces behind the pre-1971 policy, as Sadat partially reversed the internal mobilization strategy and began to embrace foreign contributions primarily because of societal pressures.

The domestic reprieve handed Sadat through this additional infusion of security assistance was, however, only temporary. The outward-looking policy could not fully protect the government from societal pressures. By autumn 1973, the government had spent society’s patience and the economy’s remaining resources, and all the slogans, speeches, and sacrifices could not mask the basic fact that there still was no concrete evidence that Egypt was any closer to confronting the Israelis. As Sadat observed, the economy had by this time reached a dire point: “Securing a loaf of bread in 1974 was not on the horizon. We had debts due for payment in December according to international regulations, and there was no way we could repay them. We did not have 1 mil’s worth of hard currency. This was one of the factors that contributed to my decision to go to war, because if 1974 were to come with us in that state, Israel would not have needed to fire a single shot.”99

There were substantial domestic pressures building on the government. Although there was considerable opposition by Egyptian chiefs of staff against initiating the October 1973 war, one of the chief counterarguments used by Sadat was that if Egypt did not go to war immediately, the government would face widespread societal insurrection.100 Moreover, unless Egypt abandoned its

95. In addition to these street protests, there was a renegade group of military officers intent on arresting the top Egyptian leadership, including Sadat. In The Crossing of the Suez, pp. 192–95, al-Shazli attributes this planned revolt, which was aborted, to the situation of no war and no peace.
96. See al-Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, pp. 71, 75, and 207.
97. According to Hafez Ismail (interviewed by Barnett in Cairo on 3 January 1991), key members of the Egyptian high command had been reluctant to include Arab forces for two reasons. First, the Egyptians wanted to feel as if they alone brought about the coming victory. Second, those Arab leaders who might send their troops to Egypt wanted the request for forces to come immediately prior to war initiation, which obviously would have undercut the military’s surprise attack strategy.
98. See al-Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, pp. 106 and 277–79.
current ambivalent stance toward the Israelis and went to war, it was unlikely that the Arab oil states would bail Sadat out of his fiscal mess. Sadat was thus confronted not only by a deteriorating economy from which no further resources could be extracted and which was beginning to undermine his domestic political support but also by an unacceptable status quo with Israel which was creating even further discontent among an impatient public and placing limits on the Arab states’ willingness to continue their economic assistance. He concluded that war remained the only lever that could increase his legitimacy at home and throughout the Arab world and could ensure the continued flow of Arab money that was essential for the economy and for his own political survival.

Summary and conclusions

Our comparative study of Egyptian security policy in the 1962–1967, 1967–71, and 1971–73 periods demonstrates that Egyptian external alignments cannot be explained exclusively by external threats and opportunities. They can only be explained by a combination of external security threats, constraints imposed by the domestic political economy, and domestic threats to the political stability of the government. In the 1962–67 period, the Egyptian regime was confronted by a relatively low degree of external threat, a troubled economic situation, a resource gap that was expanding but was not perceived to pose an immediate threat to the achievement of the regime’s basic objectives, and very few domestic challenges to Nasser’s reign. As a result, Nasser was not willing to convert his friendly relationship with the Soviets into a tighter alignment, which would have given the Egyptians firmer security guarantees and greater access to external resources but at the cost of some autonomy.

The June 1967 war challenged the government’s ability to protect Egypt’s security and its political future. While Nasser tied the regime’s political future to the overturning of the status quo and the recovery of the lost territories and his own prestige, the domestic resources at his disposal to accomplish these objectives had decreased dramatically because of the increasing balance-of-payments deficit, the steep drop in state revenues, and the general economic deterioration. Despite the fact that Nasser’s leadership was unchallenged, he was unwilling to narrow the gap between objectives and revenue base with domestic measures, since he feared that the imposition of further economic burdens or the reduction of the state’s welfare or warfare commitments might shake his regime’s foundations. Moreover, domestic arms production was severely constrained by the economy. For these reasons, Nasser turned to external alignments rather than internal mobilization, fully aware of the

modest autonomy costs that would follow. He was able to gain some assistance from the conservative Arab states by abandoning his earlier hostility toward them and becoming the symbolic champion of the struggle against Israel. The Soviets were willing to channel (within limits) Egypt’s requested material assistance because of Egypt’s symbolic importance in the East–West conflict. While Nasser was forced to look elsewhere for material support, he capitalized on the societal cohesion that followed the war and the society-wide determination to recapture the Sinai by widening the conscription base.

After 1971, just as the threat of a military encounter receded and Sadat began to explore the diplomatic path toward territorial recovery, domestic forces began to challenge the very foundations of the Egyptian regime and Sadat’s political future. Sadat’s longevity was further challenged by the downturn in the availability of foreign assistance, which meant that he would have a difficult time maintaining either his political base or his military preparations. Fearing that both a continuation of uninterrupted military service and an escalation in the economic burden might generate unacceptable political costs, Sadat tightened Egypt’s alignment patterns in order to increase the available resource pool. He correctly calculated that his eviction of the Soviet advisers would not jeopardize the flow of economic and military aid but would in fact increase it. In general, Sadat was willing to increase Egypt’s foreign dependence in return for the external resources that would allow him to avoid the possible repercussions associated with an internal mobilization policy.

These patterns are summarized in Table 1, which indicates the values of the key domestic and international variables in each of the three periods. In the 1962–67 period, there was little change in Egyptian alignment patterns owing to the relatively stable domestic political situation and the relatively low degree of perceived external threat. The alignment pattern tightened in the 1967–71 period, however, because of the internal pressures to regain the Sinai and the belief that an internal mobilization policy might substantially undercut Nasser’s political interests. The impact of domestic economic and political

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**TABLE 1. Sources of Egyptian alignment patterns**

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<th>Period</th>
<th>Degree of perceived external threat</th>
<th>Condition of domestic economy</th>
<th>Degree of perceived threat to domestic stability</th>
<th>Extent of external alignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962–67</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Relatively low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967–71</td>
<td>Moderate to high</td>
<td>Stagnant</td>
<td>Low to moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–73</td>
<td>Moderate to low</td>
<td>Deteriorating</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
variables is even more evident from a comparison of the second and third periods. While Sadat now had begun to explore diplomatic solutions to the Israeli occupation, both the deterioration of the economy and the domestic threats to the Sadat regime increased significantly, so that the tightening of Egyptian alignments in the 1971–73 period can be explained more by internal economic and political pressures than by independently generated external threats, which had not increased. Thus, although systemic and domestic explanations are each consistent with observed behavior in the 1962–67 and 1967–71 periods, only domestic explanations are consistent with observed behavior in the 1971–73 period. This suggests that, at a minimum, any general explanation of Egyptian alliance behavior must include domestic economic and political variables.

This argument can be generalized. Although analysts can undoubtedly find particular alliances that can be traced exclusively to systemic forces and can perhaps point to others that arise primarily from domestic factors, a general model of international alliance formation must include both systemic and domestic variables. The systemic component largely specifies the degree of the perceived external security threat, the availability of international allies, the nature of the security guarantees and economic or military resources that allies might provide, and the autonomy costs that must be sacrificed in return. But systemic variables alone are not sufficient for an explanation of the alignment behavior of states. The domestic objectives of state actors and the social, economic, and political constraints that limit the availability of resources in society and the government’s access to those resources at acceptable costs must also be considered. This is particularly true in the contemporary Third World, where internal threats to the stability of the regime are often perceived as greater in magnitude and immediacy than are external threats to national security and where external alignments are often valued as much for their contribution to internal economic and political stability as for their provision of external security. And if domestic politics profoundly influenced the Egyptian state—one that is routinely characterized as either “strong” or “authoritarian,” ruling over a relatively homogeneous and cohesive society, and confronted by serious external threats—then there are good reasons to believe that state-society relations must be central in the explanations of the alliance behavior of other Third World states, and there are strong incentives to conduct further research along these lines.