from such difficult issues as the status of minorities in the Middle East, the Huntington thesis, or the question of Islam and women’s rights, to take some examples. The book ends with the anecdote of Zhou Enlai who reportedly said that it is ‘too early to tell’ what type of impact the French revolution had. Equally, McHugo argues, it is far too early to predict what type of significance the so-called Arab Spring might have for the region. After all, ‘[i]t has only just begun’. This open-ended conclusion is important because it shows that change is a long and painful process whose end is never a given. As a historian, McHugo carefully shows the reader that much can be learned from the past, and that while this knowledge can be used to understand the present and to analyze possibilities that may eventuate, it cannot be used to predict the future.

Jørgen Jensehaugen


Why is it that some ethnic groups experience exclusionary policies, such as genocidal campaigns or deportation, and others do not? What motives underlie political elites’ decisionmaking (or policy output) in a given host state toward ethnic groups? Mylonas sheds some light on these complex phenomena by offering a new theory on nation-building policies toward ethnic groups – which he recasts as ‘non-core groups’. Applying a rational-choice approach, he generates various predictions and evaluates them by using historical examples from the era of the Balkan Wars at the beginning of the 20th century. Based on comprehensive archival research, the main argument that Mylonas develops is that the occurrence of three types of policies toward ethnic groups (accommodation, assimilation, and exclusion) in a given host state are not merely related to the discord between ruling political elites and ethnic groups. Rather they result from the complex interactions between the host state, ethnic groups, and intervening external powers, stressing the importance of the international and geostrategic context of nation-building policies. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, Mylonas examines the cross-national, subnational, and long-term implications of his propositions. In conclusion he argues that nation-building policies are dynamic in nature ‘depending on the international system, and vice versa’ (p. 199). Although the study purports to apply ‘very careful Process-Tracing’ (p. 74), the operationalization of this method in the qualitative case studies becomes blurred, making the historical sections arduous to follow. However, honestly underlining the odd cases and caveats, overall Mylonas’s interdisciplinary research design and new typology of policy choices toward ethnic groups provide a new perspective for better understanding the conventional literature on ethno-political conflicts.


Further developing a topic successfully explored in his 2009 Is This a Private Fight or Can Anybody Join? The Spread of Interstate War, Zachary Shirkey’s recently published book unpacks the relationship between military intervention and civil wars by asking the questions of ‘when do states decide to intervene in civil wars?’ and ‘what drives and conditions this decision?’ To begin with, Shirkey grounds his work in filtered rationalist arguments. He equates the process driving intervention with the process driving war initiation and termination. This, combined with the lack of formal models, makes for both points of departure and innovative contributions to the rationalist bargaining theory. Secondly, the concept of intervention is subject to terminological and definitional clarifications which conclude with the narrowing of the focus on direct intervention. Against this background, Shirkey sets out to demonstrate that some characteristic of a war must change for a party to decide to join. With this particular purpose in mind, Shirkey develops a theory whose main hypothesis contends that revealed information and commitment problems account for changes in interventionist attitudes. The chosen case studies – the Hungarian Revolution (1848–49), the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90), the First and Second Congo Wars (1996–2003), and the Afghan Civil War (1979–2001) – support the theory by explaining, in an analytic and insightful manner, how the accumulation of information and commitment issues are part of the process of the continual bargaining endemic in any war. The theory also acknowledges the role of alliances and institutional patterns of interaction, as well as elements of strategy delay. In doing so, the book becomes a significant and intellectually refreshing addition to the existing literature.

Vladimir Rauta