

Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror

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Abstract

We investigate Americans' stereotypes of both Muslims and Muslim-Americans. We find that negative stereotypes relating to violence and trustworthiness are commonplace and that little distinguishes Muslims from Muslim-Americans in the public's mind. Furthermore, these stereotypes have consequences: those with less favorable views of Muslims are more likely to support several aspects of the War on Terror.

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Since September 11, 2001, American politics and governance has largely focused on the “War on Terror” and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite many differences, these wars have a common feature: an interaction between the United States and the Muslim world. This interaction raises two important but overlooked questions: First, what do Americans think about Muslims living in the United States and elsewhere? And second, do these attitudes toward Muslims shape attitudes toward the War on Terror and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq?¹

Political issues often have a group-centric basis, whereby the group directly implicated by an issue is central to the politics of that issue and to attitudes about that issue. The War on Terror may be such a group-centered political issue, and yet relatively little research has explored the group-centric basis of American attitudes toward the War on Terror. In particular, no study has examined Americans’ views of Muslims themselves—a curious omission given that the “enemy” in both wars has been repeatedly identified by its religious identity. References to Islam range from sweeping generalizations—e.g., when the Reverend Franklin Graham called it “a very evil and a very wicked religion”—to more nuanced differentiations of mainstream Muslims from violent extremists—e.g., when President Bush singled out “Islamofascists.” Although it is clear, both in reality and often in the rhetoric of American political leaders, that the War on Terror implicates a small subset of Muslims, in the minds of some Americans this distinction may give way to a generalized conception of the enemy that implicates Muslims more broadly. Thus, despite attempts to differentiate extremists like al-Qaeda from Islam writ large, group-centrism may affect public opinion about the War on Terror, with those holding stereotypic beliefs about Muslims more likely to support these wars.

Before we can clarify the effect of attitudes toward Muslims on support for the War on Terror, we must first understand how Americans view Muslims themselves. Although survey data reveals unfavorable attitudes toward Muslims, Muslim-Americans, and Islam generally, political scientists know very little about the specifics of these attitudes or their consequences. Our first goal is to investigate the content of attitudes toward Muslims and Muslim-Americans. We investigate both groups because the War on Terror includes measures against terrorism abroad and in the United States. We focus on stereotypes, or generalizations

¹ For economy of expression, we refer to these wars collectively as the “War on Terror,” mindful of the controversy over this label and over whether the Iraq War is truly part of the fight against terrorism.

about the traits of both groups. What stereotypes do Americans have of Muslims and Muslim-Americans? Do they differentiate these groups, evaluating one more favorably than the other? Do they evaluate these groups more favorably along one trait dimension than another? Moreover, do they evaluate these groups more or less favorably than other ethnic and religious groups? With this information in hand we examine how stereotypes structure support for the War on Terror.

Understanding stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans and their effects on public opinion toward the War on Terror has obvious relevance for current politics. Such an understanding also speaks to theoretical questions within political science. One question concerns the extent and nature of prejudice in the United States. The literature on prejudice has focused mainly on racial groups, and in particular African-Americans, although there is important work on religious groups, primarily Jews. Attitudes toward African-Americans have changed dramatically over the past several decades, with traditional forms of racism—those that emphasized innate deficiencies in intelligence—becoming increasingly rare, if self-reported attitudes are to be trusted. These shifts have sparked a debate about how much and what kind of prejudice persists. We suggest that a more complete understanding of modern prejudice requires focusing on all groups that are salient to politics, including Muslims and Muslim-Americans. There is also a debate about the influence of prejudice on policy preferences. We argue that prejudice continues to play an important role in structuring citizen attitudes.

A second question concerns the multi-dimensionality of attitudes toward groups. Evaluations of outgroups are not uniformly negative across all traits and all outgroups. In other words, people value and devalue different groups for different reasons. Even more importantly, these dimensions of evaluations of outgroups may have varied effects on policy attitudes. We therefore compare and contrast stereotypes of different groups, including not only Muslim and Muslim-Americans but also other American ethnic groups. We examine the effects of different stereotypes in order to clarify the relationship between group-based attitudes and policy attitudes. The result is a more theoretically and empirically refined portrait of group-centrism in public opinion.

A third question concerns the origins of foreign policy attitudes. Although relatively little research has identified the group-centric origins of these attitudes, group-centrism is potentially relevant to many foreign policy issues. In this case, the War on Terror has made Muslims salient to foreign policy debates, which in turn have made attitudes toward Muslims salient to the public's foreign policy preferences. People reason, in part, from their evaluations of Muslims and Muslim-Americans to determine the anti-terrorism policies the government should pursue. As we will show, people who consider Muslims to be violent and untrustworthy are more likely to support various measures that are part of the War on Terror. Salient groups can inform foreign policy attitudes, just as they do domestic policy attitudes.

Group-Centrism and the War on Terror

At least since Converse's (1964) seminal work, political scientists have recognized that attitudes toward groups can structure public opinion. Although Converse found little evidence that Americans' beliefs were structured by ideology, he found considerable evidence that the public evaluates issues in terms of their association with "visible social groups." Group-centric reasoning allows citizens to make political decisions without much detailed information or more sophisticated abstract reasoning. Of course, as Converse recognized, groups matter only when citizens grasp the relationship between the group and the policy: "The individual must be endowed with some cognitions of the group as an entity and with some interstitial 'linking' information indicating why a given party or policy is relevant to the group" (Converse 1964: 237). This suggests that issues can be more or less group-centric and that the influence of groups can be heightened or diminished depending on the information provided by elites or the media. Particular issues, specific events, and political debates can "prime" attitudes toward a group, making them central to policy preferences.

Converse's insight has received much empirical support. For example, whites' opinions about racial policies depend on their views of black Americans (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Winter 2001). Black support for redistributive economic and racial policies depends upon ingroup identification (Dawson 1994; but see Kinder and Winter 2001). Tolerance for free expression depends on evaluations of the group demanding speech rights (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982); and opinion on gay rights is influenced by

attitudes toward gay people (Brewer 2003). Issue framing accentuates the importance of group evaluations (Mendelberg 2001; Nelson and Kinder 1996). In sum, when group cues are salient and clear, beliefs and feelings about social groups are important ingredients in policy choices (Conover 1988; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Nelson and Kinder 1996).

Much of this previous research has looked at domestic policy, rather than international and foreign policy attitudes.² The lack of attention to groups strikes us as somewhat surprising since international conflicts often revolve around the identification of friends and enemies, of “us and them.” Two recent research projects do suggest that “groups matter” in foreign policy opinion. Berinsky (2009) demonstrates that attitudes toward specific social groups as well as one’s own ethnic group membership influenced opinion on World War II and on South African sanctions in the 1980s. Most applicable to our work is Kam and Kinder (2007), who suggest that ethnocentrism—“prejudice broadly conceived” (322)—helps explain support for the War on Terror. Kam and Kinder argue that those inclined to see the world in us-them terms should be especially likely to support policies targeting this “strange and shadowy enemy” (321), and find that ethnocentrism is associated with a variety of attitudes related to the War on Terror. While we agree with Kam and Kinder (2007) that attitudes toward groups should matter, we are less convinced that the enemy is indeed so shadowy. Indeed, the enemy is frequently depicted in very concrete terms: as extremist Muslims, whether embodied in Osama bin Laden himself, various al-Qaeda leaders, or nameless others depicted in news stories of violence in the Middle East and elsewhere. Thus, we focus on attitudes toward the specific group most directly associated with the War on Terror: Muslims.

Attitudes toward Muslims should be a central ingredient in opinions about the War on Terror. In the context of both wars, the “enemy” has often been identified by its religious affiliation, even as political leaders sought to separate this enemy from the whole of Islam (see Schildkraut 2002: 520-522). We expect that many Americans have a more generalized conception of “the enemy” that implicates all Muslims. In turn, negative stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans should bolster support for the Iraq War, efforts

² International and foreign policy attitudes are usually attributed to party identification, ideology, and other values (e.g., isolationism), although black-white differences have been noted by some (e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996; Holsti 1996).

to fight terrorism, and perhaps George W. Bush himself, as his presidency has been so defined by these wars. The only research that connects attitudes toward Muslims and the War on Terror, that of Schildkraut (2002), finds a significant relationship: in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, favorable views of Islam were associated with decreased support for allowing the police to stop and search anyone at random, anyone who appears to be Arab or Muslim at random, and anyone who fits the profile of a suspected terrorist. Our analysis shares this focus on group-centrism, but goes further by identifying the specific stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans that Americans hold, and by linking particular dimensions of stereotypes to a broader range of policy preferences.

We do not, of course, regard stereotypes of Muslims as the sole influence on support for the War on Terror, which have been shown to derive from elite cues, party identification, political values, perceptions of threat, and ethnocentrism (Berinsky 2007; Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav 2005; Kam and Kinder 2007).³ Republicans and conservatives are more likely to support both wars. Authoritarianism has also been linked to support for military intervention, restrictions on civil liberties, and spending for anti-terrorism in the years immediately following the terrorist attacks (Kam and Kinder 2007; Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav 2005). Support for such policies is also stronger among those who consider further terrorist attacks likely (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav 2005).⁴ And, as we noted earlier, ethnocentrism, or generalized dislike of outgroups, is associated with support for taking military action in Iraq; approval of how President Bush is handling 9/11 and foreign affairs; feeling thermometer ratings of the president, and support for spending on homeland security, the war on terrorism, border control, and defense (Kam and Kinder 2007). We believe that stereotypes of Muslims should play an independent role, over and above these other factors, in predicting opinion on these issues.

³ We do not engage the debate about how much support for the Iraq War depends on events on the ground (casualties, battlefield success), perceptions of success and eventual victory, or the nature of the policy objectives.

⁴ As Huddy and colleagues show, perceptions of threat and anxiety are different, though related concepts which have different effects. We treat perception of threat as cognitive concept—that is, as evaluations of the likelihood that another attack will occur. The expectation that perceptions of threat will matter is also an implication of realistic group conflict theory.

The Content of Stereotypes toward Muslims

Much of how we think about stereotypes was first articulated by Walter Lippmann in his 1922 book *Public Opinion*:

The real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, and so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it. To traverse the world men must have maps of the world. (11)

Stereotypes are one such map of the world. Most social psychologists agree that stereotyping exemplifies the universal human tendency to categorize (Fiske 1998, Allport 1954). We classify individuals into distinct groups in order to simplify, structure, and give meaning to our world. The problem, as Lippmann recognized, is that the pattern of group stereotypes is rarely neutral. Stereotypes are affectively charged and often involve positive generalizations about one's own group and negative generalizations about out-groups.

Although the tendency to stereotype is well-known, we know less about the content of stereotypes and why that content varies across target groups and over time. For example, blacks are often stereotyped as lazy and as violent (Sniderman and Piazza 1993), while Jews are stereotyped as devious and untrustworthy (Berinsky and Mendelberg 2005). What, then, are the crucial dimensions of stereotypes?

One prominent typology of stereotype content emphasizes two dimensions: warmth and competence (Fiske et al. 2002). Each of these dimensions serves an important purpose. Warmth signifies the intention of the group. Will this group try to help or hurt me? Competence signifies capability: how able is a group? As Fiske and colleagues show, the combination of these two dimensions corresponds to the content of stereotypes of many different groups. For example, a "paternalistic" combination (high warmth, low competence) is manifest in attitudes toward elderly people, who are presumed to have good intentions but not necessarily much competence. "Contemptuous" prejudice (low warmth, low competence) is manifest in attitudes toward the poor. "Envious" prejudice is common in attitudes toward Asians and Jews, who are believed to be competent (e.g., intelligent) but not necessarily warm (e.g., untrustworthy). These

combinations are associated with particular emotions and particular behavioral tendencies (Cuddy, Fiske and Glick, 2007). This suggests that the different dimensions of stereotyping may have differential effects on opinion, a possibility we take up below.

How do Americans evaluate Muslims and Muslim-Americans on these two dimensions? We expect stereotypes about each group to implicate warmth but not competence. Negative stereotypes about Muslims and Muslim-Americans should center on their ostensible intentions, specifically a belief that they seek to harm others. In part, such beliefs reflect tendencies in both the entertainment and news media, which some have argued depicts Muslims as alien and violent (Karim 2003; Said 1997; Shaheen 1984). Content analysis of news coverage of Muslims does not necessarily support the strongest claims of negative media bias but does find patterns that may contribute to the perception that Muslims are threatening. Sheikh, Price, and Oshagan's (1995) study of newspaper coverage found that stories about Muslims often involved crises, war, and conflict and tended to refer to Muslims in aggregated rather than differentiated ways, e.g., as a religious group ("Muslims") or by religion and nationality ("Iranian Muslims"). Most importantly, although most stories were positive or neutral in overall tone, slightly more than half of these stories also included terms such as "fundamentalist," "militant," "terrorist," "radical," or "extremist." Similarly, Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2007) find that, in the year prior to September 11, voices alleging American Muslim and Arab support for terrorism were twice as common as those rejecting this allegation prior to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. In this period, 31% of textual depictions of American Muslims and Arabs were negative and 44% were neutral or ambiguous. In the six months after September 11, coverage became somewhat more positive in the six months (see also Schildkraut 2002: 523-25; Weston 2003)—due in part to sympathetic stories about the challenges American Muslims faced—but this shift proved short-lived. A year after September 11, the plurality of coverage (43%) was negative and most of the remainder (37%) of coverage was neutral or ambiguous.⁵

⁵ Of course, simply because coverage was negative does not mean that it portrayed Muslims negatively in terms of the warmth dimension. However, we expect a significant portion of coverage focused on Muslims' intentions. For example, Nacos and Torres-Reyna find that a prominent topic in both print and broadcast media before the attacks was political candidates' relationships with American Muslims or Arabs and with groups allegedly tied to terrorist organizations.

By contrast, there are arguably fewer negative stereotypes about the competence of Muslims or Muslim-Americans. The prevailing discourse does not emphasize capability—whether defined as intelligence, self-reliance, or other such traits—as much as it does warmth. On the one hand, Said (1997) argues that the “Orientalist” perspective historically framed Islam as underdeveloped and irrational and thus in need of Western influence. This could be read as suggesting a lack of capability. However, a contrasting set of images—notably, the wealthy sheik—suggests that the stereotypes in terms of competence are less universal and one-sided. Thus, we expect that Americans will tend to evaluate Muslims and Muslim-Americans negatively in terms of warmth but not necessarily in terms of competence. This is consistent with what Fiske et al. (2002) report when they included “Muslims” among a number of groups in their study of stereotype dimensions (although their findings are based on non-random samples).⁶

Should we also expect differences between evaluations of Muslims and evaluations of Muslim-Americans? Depictions of violence, particularly terrorism, involve Muslim perpetrators much more often than Muslim-American perpetrators. In the wake of September 11, news accounts of Muslim-Americans tended to be favorable, often discussing the backlash against Muslim-Americans during this time (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003, 2007; Weston 2003). Although there have been examples of Muslim-Americans who have been linked to the Taliban or al-Qaeda since September 11—such as John Walker Lindh and Jose Padilla—these are the exception not the rule. Muslim-Americans are thus likely to be evaluated more positively than Muslims, particularly in terms of their warmth.

Measuring Stereotypes of Muslims

As noted earlier, there are little extant data on stereotypes of Muslims. Public polling speaks only in broader terms, suggesting that many Americans do not hold Muslims, Arab-Americans, Muslim-Americans, or Islam in high regard (see Nisbet, Ostman, and Shanahan 2007; Panagopolous 2006). For example, a series of Pew surveys from 2002-2006 found that only about half of respondents had a favorable opinion of Muslims. Beliefs that Islam is violent are also prominent: in a March 2006 ABC Poll, about one-third said

⁶ Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2007) find that Arabs are also rated low on the warmth dimension but near the midpoint of the competence dimension.

that Islam “encourages violence,” and 58 percent said that there are more “violent extremists” within Islam than in other religions. Opinions of Muslims and Arabs living in the United States are similarly mixed. In a March 2003 Princeton Survey Research Associates poll, 51 percent of respondents said their opinion of Muslim-Americans was favorable, while 24 percent said that it was unfavorable. But suspicions were also evident: in a September 2002 CBS/*New York Times* poll, 33 percent said that Arab-Americans are “more sympathetic to terrorists” than other Americans; in a September 2002 Gallup/CNN/*USA Today* poll, 44 percent said that they had less trust in “Arabs living in this country” after September 11.

These findings are suggestive but insufficient in two respects. First, Americans’ assessments of Muslims and Muslim-Americans are rarely juxtaposed with their assessments of other ethnic or religious groups. It is thus difficult to tell whether American views of Muslims or Muslim-American are distinctive. Lukewarm or unfavorable ratings will be less notable if they are equivalent to ratings of other groups. Second, although some extant survey questions mention traits that speak to the content of stereotypes—e.g., questions about whether Islam is a violent religion—there is no systematic comparison of different traits. Thus, a more suitable set of indicators would involve multiple traits and also provide comparisons among Muslims, Muslim-Americans, and other groups.⁷

The former issue—that of comparison to other groups—can first be addressed by drawing on data from the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES). For the first time, the ANES added “Muslims” to the long list of groups that respondents evaluate on the familiar “feeling thermometer”—a 0-100 scale where 0 indicates a very cool feeling, 100 a very warm feeling, and 50 a neutral feeling. The ANES thus allows us to compare feelings toward Muslims to those toward whites, blacks, Catholics, Jews, and a host of others.

⁷ Traugott et al. (2002) examine feelings toward Muslim-Americans, Arab-Americans, “Arabs in the Middle East,” and Palestinians using feeling thermometers. Similarly, Davis (2007) analyzes feelings toward Arabs and “Islamic Fundamentalists.” Each set of results suggests that attitudes toward these groups are more unfavorable, relative to other American ethnic and religious groups (whites, blacks, Jews, Christian fundamentalists, etc.)—results which dovetail with what we report below. However, these prior studies do not attempt to measure stereotype content. Huddy et al. (2005) examine stereotyping of Arabs as a part of their larger study of the effects of threat and anxiety on antiterrorism policy. Their measures of stereotyping call upon respondents to evaluate how well four characteristics—trustworthy, honest, violent and extremist—describe Arabs. They do not report the distribution of responses on these items. Their approach differs from ours in that they asked about Arabs rather than Muslims and in that they focus on the origins of these stereotypes rather than their consequences. They find that education, gender, perceived threat, authoritarianism, and conservatism are associated with negative stereotyping.

However, the NES does not enable us to investigate the specific stereotypes that people have, or to compare both Muslims and Muslim-Americans to each other and to other groups. To accomplish these tasks, we collected data as part of the 2006 and 2007 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES). These surveys were administered on-line to a cross-section of American adults and included both pre- and post-election waves. (See Appendix 1 for more details.) We pool the two surveys in the analysis that follows.

In the pre-election wave, respondents were asked to rank groups on four different trait dimensions: peaceful-violent, trustworthy-untrustworthy, hardworking-lazy, and intelligent-unintelligent. The latter three dimensions are borrowed directly from the ANES; the peaceful-violent dimension has also figured in previous work on stereotypes (Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Huddy et al. 2005).⁸ Taken together, these four items nicely capture the two dimensions of stereotypes. Both “peaceful-violent” and “trustworthy-untrustworthy” speak to warmth; they indicate whether a particular group is considered to have helpful or harmful intentions. “Hardworking-lazy” and “intelligent-unintelligent” speak to competence, specifically whether groups have motivation and capacity. Thus, we can test our primary expectation that Muslims will be evaluated less favorably in terms of their warmth than in terms of their competence.⁹

CCES respondents were asked to evaluate 5 different groups on each trait dimension. The first four groups, whites, blacks, Hispanic-Americans, and Asian-Americans, are the traditional focus of the ANES. They also provide a baseline against which to compare attitudes toward Muslims and Muslim-Americans, as most research on racial attitudes in the United States has focused on these groups and especially on blacks. After evaluating these groups, respondents were randomly assigned to evaluate either Muslims or Muslim-

⁸ The battery of stereotype items began with the hardworking-lazy dimension and this preamble: “Now we have some questions about different groups in our society. We’re going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group are ‘hard-working.’ A score of 7 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are ‘lazy.’ A score of 4 means that you think the group is not toward one end or the other, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.” The remaining traits were asked in this order: intelligent, trustworthy, and peaceful. This follows the ANES order (hardworking, intelligent and trustworthy).

⁹ These items straddle the distinction between “old racism,” which involves a perceived lack of intelligence, and “symbolic racism” or racial resentment, which involves perceptions of laziness in particular (see, *inter alia*, Kinder and Sanders 1996).

Americans. This experiment within the survey will demonstrate whether respondents differentiate these two groups.¹⁰ We expect Muslim-Americans to be evaluated more favorably than Muslims.

The Contours of Stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans

We begin by comparing attitudes toward Muslims and other groups, drawing on the ANES feeling thermometer items. Figure 1 presents the mean thermometer scores for 10 different groups. Each data point is accompanied by a horizontal line that indicates the 95 percent confidence interval around the mean. Here we focus only on white non-Hispanic respondents, none of whom are Muslims. This is only to provide clean comparison between the in-group (whites) and the various other groups.

[insert Figure 1 about here]

The figure shows that these white respondents rated whites themselves most favorably, but rated most other ethnic groups warmly as well. The mean ratings of blacks, Asian-Americans, and Hispanic-Americans, while lower than those of whites ($p < .05$), are all in the “high 60s.” White respondents also tend to feel warmly toward two other religious groups, Jews and Catholics, but less warmly toward Christian Fundamentalists. The most important finding from these data is the relatively cool feelings toward Muslims, whose mean thermometer score is only slightly above 50 and well below the rating given to Catholics and Jews. Only gays and lesbians and illegal immigrants were evaluated less favorably. Black and Hispanic respondents also rated Muslims less favorably than most of these groups (data not shown). Thus, while their feelings toward Muslims are slightly favorable in absolute terms, Americans appear to like Muslims less than most other groups—a finding that dovetails with those reported by Traugott et al. (2002) and Davis (2007).

Does this lack of favorability reflect negative stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans? Figure 2 presents the means of the CCES stereotype items for each of the five target groups. Again, we focus on non-Muslim white respondents to ensure clearer comparisons among groups. In Figure 2 higher averages

¹⁰ For each trait, respondents were asked to evaluate whites first. The order of blacks, Hispanic-Americans, and Asian-Americans was then randomized. This also mirrors the ANES. Muslims or Muslim-Americans were always last group in the sequence. Because the CCES was conducted on-line, we ensured that the group-trait combinations (20 in all) were displayed on-screen one at a time, which minimizes the likelihood that the rating of one group will affect the rating of other groups (Tourangeau et al. 2007: 94).

indicate more unfavorable beliefs (i.e., more violent and less peaceful).¹¹ Each plot in Figure 2 is scaled from 3 to 5, with a vertical line at the midpoint (4). These averages thus fall closer to the midpoint of the underlying scale than to the extremes (1 or 7), suggesting that most respondents do not think any group strongly embodies either positive or negative stereotypes.¹²

[insert Figure 2 about here]

Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence of negative stereotypes and of differences among target groups. First, and most importantly, our primary expectation is confirmed: respondents rated Muslims and Muslim-Americans much less favorably in terms of warmth than in terms of competence. On average, respondents saw both Muslims and Muslim-Americans as more violent than peaceful, and as more untrustworthy than trustworthy. However, with regard to competence, the opposite is true: on average, Muslims and Muslim-Americans were perceived as more hardworking than lazy, and as more intelligent than unintelligent.¹³

¹¹ The 95 percent confidence intervals are wider for the Muslim and Muslim-American items because these items were asked only of half-samples. In Figure 2 we pool respondents from the 2006 and 2007 CCES; the pattern of results holds when each survey is examined separately.

¹² The percentage of respondents who did not evaluate Muslims or Muslim-Americans is somewhat higher than the percentage of respondents who did not evaluate the other groups. In the pooled 2006-2007 CCES, the level of item non-response was, on average, 7 percent for whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, and 18 percent for Muslims and Muslim-Americans. This latter figure is somewhat lower than the level of non-response in public poll questions about Muslims and Islam; for example, averaging over 5 Pew surveys conducted from 2001-2004, 25 percent of respondents chose “don’t know” when asked whether they were favorable or unfavorable toward Islam. It is noteworthy, however, that non-response among CCES respondents with regards to Muslims and Muslim-Americans was significantly lower on the peaceful-violent dimension (11% and 13% respectively). This suggests that more people felt they had enough information to evaluate Muslims and Muslim-Americans on this dimension—an intuitive finding given the historical prevalence of violence in media stories about Muslims. The presence of item non-response may indicate that some people are cloaking potentially prejudicial sentiments with a “don’t know” response (see Berinsky 2004). However, we found little evidence that the likelihood of evaluating Muslims and Muslim-Americans was systematically related to any key correlates of prejudice. For example, we calculated the correlations between the respondent’s level of formal education and dichotomous variables capturing whether the respondent provided an answer for each group-trait combination. These correlations were never higher than .07 in absolute magnitude; only 3 of 24 were statistically significant at $p < .05$; and those 3 significant correlations were not all of the same sign. Thus, we do not think that non-response is significantly affecting the aggregate distribution of opinion.

¹³ Although the number of Hispanic and black CCES respondents is small ($N=131$ and 127 , respectively), we can extract at least a tentative sense of their attitudes toward Muslims and Muslim-Americans. In general, these mirror whites’ attitudes in several key respects. As was evident in Figure 2, whites generally rate both Muslims and Muslim-Americans less favorably than they rate whites. Black respondents rate Muslims and Muslim-Americans as more violent and Muslims as less trustworthy than they do whites ($p < .05$), but they do

This finding comports with a variety of other evidence. It echoes some of the findings of the public polls cited earlier, such as the belief among about one-third of Americans that Islam promotes violence. In fact, if anything, these stereotype results suggest that perceptions of Muslim violence are even more prevalent. In the CCES sample, 45 percent of respondents placed Muslim-Americans on the “violent” side of the spectrum (at 5, 6, or 7 on the 7-point scale). Fifty-one percent placed Muslims on this side of the scale. These numbers are at or above the fraction of whites (44%) who placed blacks on this side of the scale—and this commonplace portrayal of blacks is widely regarded as evidence that “negative racial characterizations are openly and routinely expressed” (Sniderman and Piazza 1993: 37). Finally, that Americans tend to regard Muslims and Muslim-Americans as violent and untrustworthy appears to reflect the content of media messages about Muslims, which often center on the violent actions of Muslim extremists.

Do respondents differentiate Muslims from Muslim-Americans? Our results suggest that the answer is no.¹⁴ We find no evidence that respondents systematically differentiate Muslims from Muslim-Americans. To the degree that Americans attribute negative traits to Muslims, they see those traits as embodied in Muslim-Americans as well.¹⁵ This finding dovetails with evidence from other polls that a substantial number of Americans trust Arab-Americans less since September 11 and also support government monitoring of Arab and Muslim populations within the United States.

How do evaluations of Muslims and Muslim-Americans compare to those of these other ethnic groups? As we have seen, global evaluations of Muslims are generally less favorable than those of many other groups. However, evaluations vary across dimension. White respondents do consider both Muslims and

not rate them more or less hardworking or intelligent. Hispanic respondents rate both Muslims and Muslim-Americans less favorably than Hispanics on every trait. However, their evaluations of Muslims and Muslim-Americans on the peaceful and trustworthy dimensions are less favorable in the absolute than their evaluations on the intelligent and hardworking dimensions, suggesting again that negative stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans involve traits related to “warmth.”

¹⁴ Other surveys that have employed a split sample design have found that Muslims are rated less favorably than Muslim-Americans. For example, in a March 2002 Pew survey, 55% said their overall opinion of Muslim-Americans was “favorable.” The comparable figure for opinions of Muslims was 47% (the difference is significant at $p < .001$).

¹⁵ It is possible that respondents who were asked about “Muslims” were thinking of Muslims in the US. The contrast would perhaps have been clearer if we had asked about “Muslims outside the United States.” If so, then we are likely underestimating the prevalence of negative stereotypes of “Muslims.” Regardless, evaluations of Muslim-Americans are not particularly favorable.

Muslim-Americans significantly less trustworthy and more violent than any other group. (Blacks are almost as likely to be evaluated as violent.) With regard to competence, however, white respondents do not always evaluate Muslims and Muslim-Americans more negatively than the other groups we examine.¹⁶ Blacks are perceived more as lazy than as hardworking and indeed are the only group whose mean evaluation is on the “lazy” side of the scale. This finding confirms a variety of previous work (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Both blacks and Hispanics are perceived as slightly less intelligent than Muslims and Muslim-Americans (although in case of Muslim-Americans the differences are not significant).

In sum, we have uncovered three key findings. For one, stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans have specific content: they involve the sense that Muslims, whether in the United States or elsewhere, tend to be violent and untrustworthy, but not lazy or unintelligent. As a consequence, one cannot easily generalize about whether Muslims are evaluated more or less favorably than other groups in the United States. The answer depends on the dimension of evaluation. Second, Americans consider Muslim-Americans and Muslims similar on most dimensions. Despite the sympathetic treatment that Muslim-Americans received in post-September 11 media accounts, many Americans do not differentiate them from Muslims on these dimensions. Finally, and most importantly, negative stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans are prevalent. Large pluralities and even majorities of Americans describe both groups as “violent” and “untrustworthy.” Although accounts of racial attitudes often emphasize a secular trend toward less prejudice (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan 1997), our findings suggest that this trend may reflect changes in attitudes toward a particular group on particular dimensions, rather than declining prejudice overall.¹⁷ With regard to Muslims and Muslim-Americans, stereotypes are still commonplace.

Expectations about the Consequences of Stereotypes

Do these stereotypes of Muslims influence policy attitudes? As we have argued, the “enemy” in the ongoing War on Terror has often been portrayed as extremist Muslims. We therefore expect that stereotypes

¹⁶ White respondents evaluate Muslims and Muslim-Americans more negatively than whites and Asian-Americans on both traits reflecting competence and more negatively than Hispanic-Americans on the “hardworking” dimension.

¹⁷ See Mondak and Sanders (2003) for a similar argument about trends in political tolerance.

of Muslims will affect opinion on policies in these domains. In other words, opinion about the War on Terror will be group-centric.

What aspects of stereotyping are likely to matter? We expect stereotyping of warmth, not competence, to be the more important predictor for two reasons. First, psychological research suggests that “active” behaviors are more strongly related to the warmth dimension, whereas “passive” behaviors are more associated with the competence dimension (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2007). Active behaviors can be defined as “those that are conducted with directed effort to overtly affect the target group” (633), whereas passive behaviors, while important, reflect less directed effort (e.g., avoidance or neglect). Our focus is on attitudinal, not behavioral, measures. However, the attitudes we measure concern policies that directly affect Muslim and Muslim-American populations—e.g., the Iraq War, domestic eavesdropping, etc. Thus, these attitudes are better thought of as “active” rather than “passive.”

Second, evaluations along the warmth dimension more directly reflect assessments about the threat posed by a group. These evaluations therefore better illuminate the potential costs of interacting with that group, and are “more diagnostic because people who are not friendly are more dangerous to others than are people who are not competent” (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2007: 634). In this case, those who see Muslims as violent and untrustworthy should be most likely to support the War on Terror because these policies directly implicate concerns about violent intentions and reflect a desire to protect Americans from actual violence. It is less clear how stereotyping along the competence dimension might matter in these policy domains. Perceiving Muslims as hardworking and intelligent could be associated with the perception that more resources are necessarily to defeat such an enemy. Such a possibility would seem likely if perceptions of Muslims as competent were associated with perceptions of them as threatening. Yet we find little evidence for this. For example, those who evaluate Muslims as violent are more likely to evaluate them as unintelligent. In short, perceptions of Muslims and Muslim-Americans on the dimensions of warmth and competence are not negatively correlated such that negative stereotypes of warmth (violent and untrustworthy) are associated

with positive stereotypes of competence (intelligent, hardworking).¹⁸ Thus, we expect attitudes toward the War on Terror to be associated more with warmth stereotypes than with competence stereotypes.

Measuring the Consequences of Stereotyping

To test this claim, we examine a variety of measures in the 2006 and 2007 CCES that relate to the War on Terror. Similar measures figure in other analyses of attitudes toward these issues (e.g., Kam and Kinder 2007). Assessments of Iraq policy are based two questions: whether respondents considered the war in Iraq a mistake and whether they supported a troop withdrawal. A majority of respondents in 2006 and 2007 said that the war was a mistake (59%) and favored withdrawal (60% in 2006, the only year this question was asked). Six additional items tap views on the broader War on Terror. Three involve government spending: whether federal spending for defense, foreign aid, and the War on Terror should be increased, decreased, or kept the same. In the combined 2006 and 2007 CCES samples, the majority favored a constant or increased level of spending on defense (35 and 40%, respectively) and the War on Terror (30 and 34%). The majority of respondents wanted to decrease spending on foreign aid (69%).¹⁹ A fourth item asked whether respondents felt security or the preservation of civil liberties was more important.²⁰ In the combined sample, 62% favored preserving civil liberties. Two other items, present only in the 2007 survey, concerned specific measures intended to prevent terrorist attacks: allowing government agencies to monitor the phone and email of ordinary Americans and allowing courts to authorize secret searches of homes.²¹ The vast majority of respondents opposed both monitoring phone and email (77%) and secret searches of homes (85%) consistent with the finding that respondents favor the preservation of civil liberties over security.

¹⁸ Instead, the correlation between the two dimensions of stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim Americans is positive and statistically significant ($r=0.69$; $p<.001$).

¹⁹ The foreign aid spending question was asked only in 2006.

²⁰ This item is drawn from Davis and Silver (2004). The precise wording was “Which of these two statements you agree with most? ‘In order to curb terrorism in this country, it will be necessary to give up some civil liberties’; or ‘We should preserve our freedoms above all, even if there remains some risk of terrorism.’”

²¹ The exact wording was “Please tell me if you would favor or oppose each of the following as a way to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States: Allow government agencies to monitor the telephone calls and email of ordinary Americans on a regular basis” and “Allow courts to authorize federal law enforcement agents to conduct secret searches of Americans’ homes without informing the occupants for an unspecified period of time.”

Finally, because of the close association between the War on Terror and the Bush administration, we include overall presidential approval.²² The majority of the sample disapproved of the President in both 2006 (56%) and 2007 (62%)—figures close to the findings of other surveys from these periods.

The key independent variables in our analyses are stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans on the dimensions of warmth and competence. We measure stereotyping as the deviation between assessments of Muslims or Muslim Americans and assessments of the respondent's own ingroup, averaging across the traits for warmth (violent and untrustworthy) and the traits for competence (intelligent and hardworking). In constructing these measures, we focus only on non-Muslim white, black and Hispanic respondents.²³ In principle, the measures can range between 1 and -1. Positive numbers reflect negative stereotypes of Muslims or Muslim-Americans vis-à-vis the ingroup—e.g., in the case of warmth, respondents scoring 1 see their own group as very peaceful and trustworthy and see Muslims (or Muslim-Americans) as very violent and untrustworthy. Those at the midpoint on the scale regard their own group as on average indistinguishable from Muslims. In line with the results in Figure 2, stereotypes of warmth are more unfavorable than stereotypes of competence for both Muslims and Muslim-Americans.²⁴ By comparing the effects of warmth and competence stereotypes, we test our expectation that warmth stereotypes matter more in these policy domains.

We employed two different specifications for each dependent variable, one using warmth and competence stereotyping of Muslims and the other using warmth and competence stereotyping of Muslim-Americans. (Recall that respondents were randomized to be asked about one or the other group.) Comparing these paired models allows us to examine whether the effects of views on Muslims and Muslim-Americans

²² The response options change slightly between the 2006 and 2007 CCES. In 2006 approval was measured with a four-category scale ranging from strongly approve to strongly disapprove; in 2007 a middle neutral category was added. We estimate our models of approval separately by year because of this change.

²³ In other words, stereotypes of Muslims on the warmth dimension are computed for a white respondent by taking the difference between her evaluations of whites and Muslims on the trust and violence questions and then computing the average of these deviations.

²⁴ Although the means of both competence and warmth are positive, negative stereotyping is much greater in the case of warmth. Collapsing across the two CCES surveys, we find very modest levels of negative stereotyping in terms of competence (for both Muslims and Muslim-Americans, a mean of .08). By contrast we find much more negative stereotyping on the warmth dimension (for Muslims, a mean of .21; for Muslim-Americans, a mean of .20).

differ. We expect attitudes toward Muslims to be a more potent explanatory factor. Although the overall level of derogation is similar for both groups, there is good reason to believe that the consequences of derogation may differ. Converse (1964) suggests that groups matter more when information links the group to the policy in question. Because the rhetoric of the War on Terror arguably centers much more on Muslims than Muslim-Americans, we expect Muslims to constitute a more salient threat in the minds of Americans than do Muslim-Americans. The possible exception concerns efforts directly targeted at potential terrorists living in the United States, which are captured in the survey items about monitoring phone calls and conducting secret searches. Here, stereotyping of Muslim-Americans may be more important, as they could be the targets of such policies.

The models also included ideological, attitudinal, and demographic factors known to affect opinion in these domains. The first is *ethnocentrism*. Including ethnocentrism in our models should ensure that the estimated effects of Muslim(-American) stereotypes are not picking up a more general hostility to outgroups. Following Kam and Kinder (2007), we use the stereotype measures related to whites, blacks, Asians, and Hispanics to compute ethnocentrism scores; these are the deviation between assessments of a given outgroup and assessments of the ingroup averaged across the three outgroups and four traits.²⁵ The measure is scaled between -1 and 1, with positive numbers indicating those who view their own group on average as possessing more favorable traits than the outgroups.

Other ideological predispositions in the model include *authoritarianism* and *conservative ideology*. We measured authoritarianism with four questions that ask about most important values for parents to emphasize in raising their children (see also Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005; Kam and Kinder 2007). Respondents were presented with pairs of values, one of which focused on authority of the parents and the other of which focused on autonomy of the child: independence or respect for elders, curiosity or good manners, obedience or self-reliance, and being considerate or well-behaved. An additive index combining

²⁵ For example, for a white respondent, we first compute the difference between her assessments of whites as a group and her assessments of each of the three outgroups (Hispanics, Asians and blacks) averaged across the four traits. Then we average these three differences to compute the ethnocentrism scale. The overall mean of this variable—0.06 on the -1/1 scale—indicates a modest degree of ethnocentrism, which is what Kam and Kinder also found. The mean is slightly higher for whites (0.07) than Hispanics (0.05) or blacks (0.02).

these items allows us to capture authoritarian tendencies.²⁶ We measured ideology by combining responses to four different issue questions: support for a ban on partial-birth abortion, for funding stem cell research, for increasing the minimum wage, and for extending capital gains tax cuts. Higher values on this measure indicate conservative positions on these issues.²⁷ We expect both of these measures to be positively correlated with support for the war in Iraq, the War on Terror, and President Bush (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2005; Kam and Kinder 2007).

Perceived threat is measured with a question that asks respondents how likely they think it is that the United States will suffer another terrorist attack in the next 12 months. Forty-seven percent of the combined CCES respondents said that it was somewhat or very likely—a figure somewhat lower than polls in earlier time periods. We also include *party identification*, with higher values indicating identification with the Republican Party. The other independent variables are religiosity (here measured with a variable assessing *church attendance*, with those who do not identify with a religion coded as not attending a place of worship); whether the respondent is *female*, and whether the respondent identifies as *non-white*. The models for presidential approval also include *evaluations of the national economy*, measured as whether respondents believed the nation's economy had gotten better or worse, or stayed the same, in the previous year.

All independent variables with the exception of ethnocentrism and stereotypes of Muslims are coded between 0 and 1. All dependent variables are also coded between 0 and 1, such that 1 represents the “conservative” position: the belief that the Iraq war was not a mistake, opposition to withdrawing troops from Iraq, support for President Bush, a preference for security over civil liberties, support for monitoring phone and email, support for allowing courts to authorize secret searches of homes, a preference for increased spending on the War on Terror and defense, and a preference for decreased spending on foreign aid. All models are estimated with logit or ordered probit, as appropriate. Our models are based on data from the pooled 2006 and 2007 CCES when we have the same dependent variable in both surveys (with a variable representing the year of survey included in the models).

²⁶ The mean of this 0-1 scale, where 1 indicates the highest level of authoritarianism, is 0.44. Its reliability, measured with Cronbach's alpha, is 0.64.

²⁷ The mean of this scale is .39, and its reliability is 0.77

The Consequences of Stereotypes for Attitudes toward the War on Terror

Do stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans matter? Appendix Tables A-1 and A-2 present the coefficients and standard errors from our models. Here, we focus on graphical presentation of the key results: the marginal effect of stereotyping of Muslims and Muslim Americans on the predicted probability of supporting the War on Terror, the Iraq War, and the president; with all other variables are held at their means or modal values. Figure 3 presents the marginal effects of negative warmth and competence stereotypes of Muslims on change in the predicted probability of a given response for each dependent variable; Figure 4 presents the effect of negative warmth and competence stereotypes of Muslim-Americans.²⁸

[insert Figures 3-4 about here]

Our results suggest that stereotypes matter, but that particular stereotypes of a particular group are most important: negative stereotypes of Muslims on the warmth dimension—that is stereotypes of Muslims as violent and untrustworthy. Stereotypes of Muslims’ competence are less important, as are stereotypes of Muslim-Americans generally. Each of these findings corresponds to our expectations. Furthermore, the effects of stereotypes are most evident on attitudes connected to the broader War on Terror, rather than attitudes specific to either the Iraq War or President Bush.

With regard to the War on Terror, stereotypes of Muslims as violent and untrustworthy are associated at a statistically significant level with four different preferences: increased spending for the War on Terror, increased spending on defense, decreased spending on foreign aid, and a willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security. The magnitudes of these effects are also substantively significant. For example, the marginal effect of negative warmth stereotypes of Muslims on the probability of supporting increased spending for the War on Terror is 0.20; by comparison, the marginal effects of party identification and ideology are 0.27 and 0.28, respectively. The marginal effect of these stereotypes on the other three measures is roughly comparable, both in relative and absolute magnitude—e.g., its effect on the probability of

²⁸ The marginal effects were calculated using the “mfx” command in Stata 10. The magnitude of these effects is roughly equal to a shift from one-half standard deviation below the mean to one-half standard deviation above the mean.

supporting increased spending on defense is 0.22 and its effect on the probability of preferring security over civil liberties is 0.23. By contrast, negative warmth stereotypes of Muslims are not significantly associated with support for specific policies designed to fight domestic terrorism—monitoring phone and email and allowing secret searches. Similarly, they are not associated with attitudes toward the Iraq War or President Bush.

Stereotypes of Muslims in terms of competence are rarely associated with attitudes toward the War on Terror, the Iraq War, or President Bush. Only once do competence stereotypes have a statistically significant effect: those who see Muslims as unintelligent and lazy are more likely to support increased spending on defense. Moreover, in these models, the estimated marginal effects of negative competence stereotypes are just as likely to be positive as negative. This conforms to our expectations and also fails to support a credible alternative hypothesis—that “competent” Muslims are considered more threatening.²⁹

Do stereotypes of Muslim-*Americans* have similar effects? There is a statistically significant effect of negative warmth stereotypes of Muslim-Americans in one instance: support for increased spending on defense. These warmth stereotypes are also associated with the willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security and with opposition to withdrawing troops from Iraq, albeit at a lower level of statistical significance ($p < .10$). That attitudes toward Muslim-Americans should implicate spending on national defense, which is historically centered on protecting the United States from foreign enemies, suggests that respondents may believe that “defending” against resident Muslims is just as important as defending ourselves against Muslims generally. However, contrary to our expectations, warmth stereotypes of Muslim-Americans are not associated with policies focused on homeland security, such as eavesdropping and secret searches. The impact of these stereotypes on attitudes toward the Iraq War—the only instance of any relationship between stereotypes and these attitudes—is less explicable.

Finally, competence stereotypes of Muslim-Americans have less notable effects. They are associated with spending on defense, as were competence stereotypes of Muslims. Here again, the direction of this

²⁹ Furthermore, in alternative specifications, we found no evidence of any significant interaction between warmth and competence stereotypes of Muslims—i.e., no evidence the support for the War on Terror is stronger among those with negative stereotypes on both dimensions or, perhaps more plausibly, those who view Muslims as less warm but *more* competent.

association suggests that negative stereotypes of Muslim-Americans (i.e., as unintelligent or lazy) are associated with increased defense spending. Similarly, negative competence stereotypes are associated with greater support for monitoring phone conversations and email ($p < .10$). These effects resemble those of negative competence stereotypes of Muslims, when they are significant: it is beliefs that Muslim-Americans are “incompetent” that are associated with greater support for the War on Terror.

The precise mechanism behind these effects of competence stereotypes remains elusive. As noted above, it would be more plausible if this relationship were reversed, or if there was a significant interaction between the warmth and competence dimensions. Neither appears to be the case. One explanation derives from the nature of the policy areas in which competence stereotypes appear to matter: spending on defense (where competence stereotypes of both Muslims and Muslim-Americans matter) and eavesdropping (where competence stereotypes of Muslim-Americans matter). Recall that negative warmth stereotypes are predicted to elicit direct action against a group, while negative competence stereotypes are associated with “passive harm” (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2007). Spending on defense—where both stereotype dimensions matter—may connote both active and passive behavior. On the one hand, defense spending provides for the military personnel and hardware necessary for direct action. On the other hand, “defense” also implies a more passive orientation: a reaction to an enemy’s attack, rather than an unprovoked attack on that enemy. Monitoring phone calls and email has a similar passive connotation, as it involves listening for evidence of a threat rather than taking direct action against a tangible threat. This is admittedly a speculative explanation, as there is no established typology of policies along the active-passive continuum central to psychological theory. Nevertheless, the broad pattern of results in these models confirms our primary expectations: that warmth stereotypes, particularly of Muslims, will matter most.

With regard to the other predictors of opinion, our models generally confirm previous research. Partisanship and conservatism have strong and consistent effects across most of the dependent variables we examine. Authoritarian predispositions are important. Those who favor obedience and conformity are more willing to spend money on defense, less willing to send money to foreign countries, more willing to sacrifice civil liberties in the name of security, less likely to see Iraq as a mistake, and more likely to approve of the job

the President is doing. Perceptions of threat also matter: those who believe a new a terrorist attack is likely are more likely to support aggressive action. All of these findings confirm previous research (e.g., Huddy et al. 2005). By contrast, the effects of ethnocentrism in our models contradict previous research (Kam and Kinder 2007). Once we account for Muslim stereotypes, we generally find that ethnocentrism has no effect on attitudes (see Tables A1 and A2).³⁰ The War on Terror clearly has a group-centric basis, but it is attitudes toward the particular group most implicated that matter. We discuss ethnocentrism in more detail below.

Our findings suggest four conclusions regarding the consequences of stereotyping. First, we find that stereotypes of Muslims are an important component of attitudes toward the War on Terror. Groups help structure foreign policy attitudes just as they do domestic policy attitudes. Second, the pattern of findings suggests that attitudes toward Muslims are more important than attitudes toward Muslim-Americans, which confirms our expectation that Muslims would more salient in the public's mind. Third, our results also confirm our expectation that warmth stereotypes, not competence stereotypes, are the more important predictor of attitudes toward the War on Terror. This latter result suggests that the influence of stereotypes may depend on not only the link between the policy and the group, but also the link between the policy and the particular stereotype of that group.

Finally, contrary to our expectations, the effects of attitudes toward Muslims and Muslim-Americans do not extend from the War on Terror to the War in Iraq or President Bush himself. We can think of two reasons for this. First, views on Muslims may matter less because opinions on Iraq and the Bush presidency are strongly bound up with partisanship. As Jacobson (2006) shows, partisans have never been more polarized on a war or a president than they are on Iraq and Bush; we also find that partisanship and ideology strongly affect views on Iraq and approval of the President (see Tables A-1 and A-2). In such a climate, party identification may trump factors such as attitudes toward Muslims. A second reason is that, despite President

³⁰ We find a pattern of *negative*, but non-significant, effects in those models where stereotyping of Muslims is associated with increased support for antiterrorism measures. (The effect is negative and significant in one instance: taking account of the increased support for defense spending on the part of those who negatively stereotype Muslim-Americans, ethnocentrism seems to diminish support for such spending.) In only one model do we find the expected positive effect of ethnocentrism. "Ethnocentrics" are more likely to favor monitoring of phone and emails in the model that includes estimates of the effect of Muslim stereotyping, but not in the model that includes estimates of Muslim-American stereotyping. (See Tables A-1 and A-2.)

Bush's repeated assertion that the war in Iraq is part of the broader War on Terror, the public does not necessarily connect the two. Thus, whereas notions such as "terror" and "defense" and "security" implicate Muslim populations, the war in Iraq does not do so, even though many of the factions in Iraq are themselves Muslims. A corollary idea is that politics within Iraq—which entail tensions among Muslim sects and factions, many of whom the United States even seeks or has sought as allies—may have blurred the boundary between "us" and a Muslim "them," thereby making the war in Iraq something other than a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996) in the minds of Americans.

Replication

To ensure that the apparent influence of Muslim stereotypes is not an artifact of a particular sample, survey instrument, or election campaign, we examined the consequences of attitudes toward Muslims using the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES). Although the 2004 ANES did not include stereotype measures, it did include a feeling thermometer item for Muslims (see Figure 1). We use the difference between a respondent's feeling thermometer rating of Muslims and her rating of her own racial or ethnic group to create a measure of outgroup derogation. While this measure will not allow us to investigate the dimensions of stereotyping, it does provide individuals' assessments of Muslims relative to their own ingroup.

The 2004 ANES also contains a number of questions on policies implicated in the War on Terror: spending on the War on Terror, border security, defense, and foreign aid; whether the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were worth it; whether the war in Iraq has decreased the threat of terrorism; overall approval of President Bush; approval of the president with regard to Iraq, terrorism, and foreign affairs; and vote choice in 2004. Our models include the same independent variables as in the CCES models, with the exception of perceived threat.³¹ Again we code all variables between 0 and 1 except for ethnocentrism and attitudes toward Muslims. For the dependent variables, 1 represents support or a vote for President Bush, support for the war in Iraq and support for stronger efforts to fight terrorism. Table A-3 presents the results, though

³¹ There is no measure assessing the likelihood of future attacks in the 2004 ANES. All other independent variables are measured in the same way except the ethnocentrism variable, which is only based on three trait judgments (hardworking-lazy, trustworthy-untrustworthy, and intelligent-unintelligent).

again we focus on graphs depicting the marginal effects of feelings toward Muslims with all other variables at their means or modes. These are presented in Figure 5.

In these data, we again find that feelings toward Muslims are associated with attitudes toward policies related to the War on Terror. Those who view Muslims less favorably than their own group are more likely to support increased spending on the war on terror, defense, and border security. They are more likely to support decreased spending on foreign aid. They are more likely to approve of how President Bush is handling the War on Terror and to believe the war in Iraq has decreased the threat of terrorism.³² Each of these effects is also substantively significant. For example, the marginal effect of attitudes toward Muslims on the probability of support for anti-terrorism spending is .17, which is roughly comparable to the marginal effects of party identification (.20) and conservatism (.16). The effects of stereotypes are comparably sized in other models—e.g., an effect of .18 in the model of Bush approval with regard to terrorism and an effect of .15 in the model of whether Iraq has reduced the threat of terrorism.

[insert Figure 5 about here]

As in the previous analysis, views of Muslims more strongly affect attitudes toward the War on Terror than attitudes toward the war in Iraq or President Bush. Spending on policy areas like border security and defense, the war in Afghanistan, the relationship of the war in Iraq to the threat of terrorism, and Bush's performance on the issue of terrorism are, in this sense, of a piece. Meanwhile, views on Iraq and approval of George Bush on dimensions other than terrorism are not significantly related to feelings about Muslims. The effects of the other variables are also in line with our previous analysis. Thus, despite the substantial differences in the measures of attitudes toward Muslims, this replication suggest similar findings about when and how attitudes toward Muslims affect attitudes toward the War on Terror.

Discussion

Our primary analysis focuses on public opinion in the fall of 2006 and fall of 2007—more than five years after the September 11 attacks and almost four years into the war in Iraq. Our additional analysis

³² The effect of Muslims on support for the war in Afghanistan is also in the expected direction and is close to statistical significance ($p=.11$).

focuses on opinion in the fall of 2004, when the September 11 “rally effect” was long over and attitudes toward the President and his policies, including the War on Terror, had polarized along partisan lines. A first question is how our findings compare to those of researchers who investigated earlier time periods. Huddy and colleagues (2005) examine support for anti-terrorism policy in the year immediately following the September 11 attacks. Kam and Kinder (2007) examine support for the War on Terror in the fall of 2002, during the lead-up to the Iraq War but after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although our respective analyses concern three very different periods, there are important continuities. At each point in time, partisan and authoritarian predispositions, as well as perceptions of threat, affected support for efforts to combat terrorism.

We also found some differences, particularly with respect to the role of group-centric thinking. Kam and Kinder (2007) demonstrate persuasively that the initiation of the War on Terror activated ethnocentrism, which helped produce support for the War on Terror in the fall of 2002. We find little evidence that ethnocentrism affects attitudes toward the War on Terror.³³ In 2004, 2006, and 2007, such attitudes depended on a different species of group-centrism—one that denigrates a particular “enemy,” Muslims, as opposed to one that denigrates out-groups generally. Kam and Kinder (2007: 336) speculate that views on Muslims would likely be significant predictors of support for the War on Terror but that ethnocentrism would still contribute to opinion as well. Our results suggest that attitudes toward Muslims matter more.

One possible explanation of this difference is that the effects of ethnocentrism mainly derive from the effects of stereotypes of Muslims, which might explain the diminished explanatory power of ethnocentrism. Taking attitudes toward Muslims out of our models, we tend to find consistent, statistically significant positive effects of ethnocentrism.³⁴ Of course we do not know if the inclusion of a measure of

³³ We do find significant positive effects of ethnocentrism on measures of presidential performance in the 2004 NES, but not in the 2006 or 2007 CCES. In 2004, ethnocentrism is a significant predictor of presidential approval generally as well as approving of how Bush is handling Iraq and foreign relations—all questions on which attitudes toward Muslims had no effect.

³⁴ The correlation between ethnocentrism and stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans is approximately 0.69, averaging across the measures of warmth and competence in the CCES. In the ANES, the correlation between ethnocentrism and attitudes toward Muslims is 0.31. In other analysis (not shown), we find that the underpinnings of stereotypes are similar across every target group. All of this suggests that the people who dislike Muslims also tend to dislike other groups, i.e., to be ethnocentric. If we reestimate the

Muslim stereotyping in earlier surveys would also reduce the impact of ethnocentrism. Possibly, just as ethnocentrism is activated under certain conditions, it is also deactivated. It may be that early on—in the face of a new kind of war, with an unclear enemy—Americans were more likely to think about the world in the most general “us versus them” terms. As time went on, the enemy may have come to be more identified by its religious affiliation—whether in news stories, political rhetoric, or elsewhere. Once the abstract enemy became more concrete, citizens may have relied less on a general predisposition toward outgroups and more on assessments of this better-defined enemy.

A second question is whether stereotypes of Muslims, rather than influencing attitudes toward the War on Terror, have been created by it. With single cross-sectional surveys, there is no clear-cut way to sort out the direction of causality, and extant panel data do not offer any measures of attitudes toward Muslims. However, we doubt that stereotypes of Muslims are purely creations or rationalizations of support for policies in the War on Terror. Events and images of violence involving groups of Muslims are nothing new. A list of events that preceded September 11, 2001, and that received substantial coverage in the American media, would include the killing of Israeli athletes and coaches during the 1972 Olympics, the Iran hostage crisis, the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, hijackings of the *Achille Lauro* and various airplanes, the downing of Pan Am flight 103, ongoing conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the attack on the USS *Cole*. In addition, some scholars of media have decried for decades the commonplace portrayal of Muslims as violent villains (Said 1997; Shaheen 1984). Even if attitudes toward Muslims became more negative in the immediate aftermath of September 11, the War on Terror took shape more gradually, over the ensuing months or even years. If so, it is unlikely that people withheld judgments about Muslims until after they had formulated

models in Tables A-1 and A-2 without any measures of Muslim stereotyping, ethnocentrism becomes a significant predictor of increased spending on the War on Terror and defense, decreased spending on foreign aid, and support for security over civil liberties (the latter at $p < .10$). Recall that with Muslim stereotyping in these models the estimates of ethnocentrism were negative and not significant. In models of the 2004 ANES that exclude the measure of attitudes toward Muslims, ethnocentrism does become statistically significant in the model of spending on foreign aid, but not in any other models beyond those in which its effect is already significant in Table A-3. Our estimates of the effect of Muslim stereotyping are less sensitive to the exclusion of ethnocentrism. If this measure is excluded the effects of stereotyping Muslims and Muslim-Americans remain significant in the 2006-2007 CCES models (although in a few cases the effects become marginally significant, at $p < .10$); the effects of attitudes toward Muslims are unchanged in the 2004 ANES models.

attitudes toward the War on Terror and then constructed a portrait of Muslims consonant with those attitudes.

Moreover, there is little evidence that impressions of Muslims or Muslim-Americans became less favorable after September 11. The percentage of Americans with a “favorable” impression of Muslim-Americans was nearly identical before September 11 (55% in a September 2000 Pew survey) and several years thereafter (50% in a July 2005 Pew survey). A similar question about Muslims was asked in a March 1993 Zogby survey, conducted three weeks after the first World Trade Center bombing. In this survey, 23% said their impression was favorable, 36% said it was unfavorable, and 41% provided no opinion. In an August 2007 Pew survey, 43% said their impression of Muslims was favorable, while 35% said their impression was unfavorable and 22% had no opinion. Thus, while more Americans were willing or able to express an opinion about Muslims, if anything the average opinion was more favorable in 2007 than in 1993. These results dispute the notion that the events of September 11 gave rise to a new and more derogatory portrait of Muslims and Muslim-Americans, and that stereotypes of Muslims derive from support for anti-terrorism policies rather than the other way around. Instead, we would argue that the politics surrounding the War on Terror made existing views of Muslims and Muslim-Americans more salient—that is, it activated or “primed” these views, making them a significant factor in attitudes toward this war.³⁵

Conclusion

The attacks of September 11 shifted the priorities of the United States. The resulting War on Terror does not involve any singular “enemy,” but it does entail an interaction, and at times a direct confrontation, with Muslim populations. Yet our knowledge of how Americans view Muslims both at home and abroad, as well as the consequences of these views, is minimal.

A first contribution of this study is to expand this knowledge by delineating the stereotypes that Americans have of both Muslims and Muslim-Americans and comparing these stereotypes to those of other

³⁵ Admittedly, we cannot directly test for a priming effect—i.e., by comparing the effect of stereotypes of Muslims on relevant policy attitudes both before and after September 11. Our claim is simply that our findings are consonant with a priming effect.

ethnic groups. A central finding is far from surprising: Americans tend to see both Muslims and Muslim-Americans as violent and untrustworthy—a finding that dovetails with psychological theories of stereotype content and with depictions of Muslims in the news and entertainment media. A second finding is that Muslims and Muslim-Americans are denigrated more strongly on these dimensions than the other ethnic groups we examined. A third finding is that Americans do not differentiate Muslim-Americans from Muslims generally. On average, Muslim-Americans are considered just as violent and untrustworthy as Muslims. In short, despite rhetorical attempts by political leaders to distinguish Muslims who do commit violent acts from the vast majority of peaceful Muslims, and despite favorable depictions of Muslim-Americans in the wake of September 11, the American public holds a generalized and derogatory view of Muslims as a whole and Muslims in the United States.

From a theoretical standpoint, these findings speak to longitudinal trends in levels of prejudice. There is, of course, a vigorous debate over how much prejudice exists and whether its very nature has changed. The debate centers on the nature of prejudice toward African-Americans in particular (see, e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). We suggest that a fuller account of contemporary prejudice should incorporate multiple groups, particularly those who are newly prominent as potential threats. Muslims and Muslim-Americans are two such groups. Moreover, an account of contemporary prejudice must distinguish among different species of prejudice by identifying the particular stereotypes pertaining to social groups. Our findings suggest that stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans center on their intentions and not their capabilities—a distinction that has theoretical grounding in psychology (Fiske et al. 2002) and can be incorporated more fully into other political science research. These particular stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans not only distinguish them from other social groups but also suggest how they will be treated—namely, with direct action rather than passive avoidance.


This implication leads to perhaps our most important finding: stereotypes of Muslims matter. They are associated with support for stronger measures to combat terrorism, although they have little influence on attitudes toward the war in Iraq. The role of Muslim stereotypes arguably reflects an interaction between individual predispositions and political forces—that is, between psychology and politics (see Jackman and

Sniderman 2002). While we do not believe that the aftermath of September 11 created negative stereotypes of Muslims, events such as the September 11 attacks, rhetoric from political leaders, and images in the news and entertainment media, all of which emphasize the threat posed by Muslim terrorists, have likely made attitudes toward Muslims a salient consideration when evaluating certain policies. Thus, our findings dovetail with research that shows how political messages heighten perceived threats and strengthen the connection between attitudes toward groups, such as stereotypes, and support for public policies that affect those groups. Our distinctive contribution is to illustrate how this process operates in the domain of foreign policy. Of course, the War on Terror also encompasses the domestic sphere, but its boundaries are arguably wider. Scholars are just beginning to highlight the relevance of group identities to foreign policy attitudes. Our account suggests that this vein of inquiry will prove even more fruitful.

Finally, it is important to engage the normative implications of our findings, which are not salutary. We have already noted that attitudes toward Muslims are lukewarm as a whole and quite negative on certain dimensions. A second implication concerns the lack of differentiation between Muslims and Muslim-Americans. Survey data shows that Muslim-Americans tend to share traditional American values, endorse assimilation into American culture, and reject Islamic extremism (Pew Center 2007). Nevertheless, negative stereotypes of Muslim-Americans are just as prevalent as those of Muslims. One explanation is that Muslim-Americans are not seen as fully “American”—that is, they are considered to be outside of the mainstream of American society and to share the same traits that are imputed to Muslims elsewhere. The danger, then, is that such sentiments could be mobilized in support of restrictions on the civil liberties of Muslims in the United States. While we did not find that negative stereotypes of Muslims or Muslim-Americans increased support for monitoring the phone calls and email of “ordinary Americans” or to conduct secret searches of “American’s homes,” other data suggests that people may be more willing to curtail the civil liberties of Muslims-Americans in particular. According to a 2003 Cambridge Survey Research Associates poll, about 40 percent of Americans are willing to empower government to monitor “Muslims legally living in the United States” more than other groups (*cf.* Moore 2002).


A question arising from these findings is how stereotypes could be changed, or at least how attitudes toward the War on Terror could be decoupled from stereotypes of Muslims and Muslim-Americans. We see both possibilities as unlikely. For one, the tendency to stereotype originates in relatively stable values, predispositions, and cognitive styles. These factors are unlikely to change dramatically over a person's lifespan. In short, there will always be those who stereotype. Second, current events suggest no end to the elite messages and media coverage that (even inadvertently) frame the War on Terror in ways that enhance the predictive power of negative stereotypes, while at the same time reinforcing the content of these stereotypes. *If* the messages that the public hears are different and *if* there is not another terrorist attack on U.S. soil, then perhaps the content and importance of Muslim stereotypes could be changed, given time. But given the longevity of these stereotypes, as well as the ongoing violence in Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and elsewhere, the prevailing depiction of the Muslim world will likely continue to emphasize violence and the threat that Muslims pose to Americans. Given this perceived threat, it will be difficult for many Americans to think of Muslims as anything but enemies.

Figure 1. Mean Feeling Thermometer Scores of Muslims and Other Groups




Attitudes toward Muslims are much less favorable than attitudes toward nearly every other social group. The data are based on white non-Muslim respondents only. Data points are weighted means, with bars representing 95 percent confidence intervals. The underlying scales run from 0-100, where 100 indicates the most favorable response. The vertical line indicates the midpoint of the scale. Source: 2004 ANES.

Figure 2. Means of Stereotype Items for Muslims and Other Groups




Negative stereotypes of Muslims are prevalent on the “warmth” dimension: the average perception is both “violent” and “untrustworthy.” But negative stereotypes are not prevalent on the “competence” dimension. Stereotypes of Muslims as violent and untrustworthy are more prominent than similar stereotypes of blacks and Hispanics. The data are based on white non-Muslim respondents only. Data points are weighted means, with bars representing 95 percent confidence intervals. The underlying scales run from 1-7, where 7 indicates the most unfavorable response. The vertical lines in these plots indicate the midpoint of the scale. Source: 2006 and 2007 CCES.

Figure 3. Attitudes toward the War on Terror and Stereotypes of Muslims




These graphs depict marginal effects derived from the models in Table A-1, with 95 percent confidence intervals. These effects are calculated with all other variables at their means. Source: 2006 and 2007 CCES.

Figure 4. Attitudes toward the War on Terror and Stereotypes of Muslim-Americans



These graphs depict marginal effects derived from the models in Table A-1, with 95 percent confidence intervals. These effects are calculated with all other variables at their means. Source: 2006 and 2007 CCES.

Figure 5. Attitudes toward the War on Terror and Feelings toward Muslims (ANES Replication)



These graphs depict marginal effects derived from the models in Table A-3, with 95 percent confidence intervals. These effects are calculated with all other variables at their means. Source: 2004 ANES.

Appendix 1. The Congressional Cooperative Election Survey

The 2006 CCES was a collaborative venture involving 39 universities in the United States, with Stephen Ansolabehere of MIT as the principal investigator. Each university designed a module of questions that was given to 1,000 respondents; in addition, the combined sample of approximately 39,000 respondents was asked a common module of questions. The common content always preceded each university's module. The fieldwork for the survey was carried out by Polimetrix, Inc., of Palo Alto, CA. The survey was fielded in October and November of 2006. The 2007 CCES was structured in much the same way, although with fewer universities participating.

The CCES was administered on-line and, as such, was not administered to a traditional probability sample. Respondents were selected from the Polimetrix PollingPoint Panel—a pool of several hundred thousand individuals who have volunteered or been recruited to participate in occasional on-line polls. Respondents were selected for the CCES using the following sampling procedure. First, a random subsample was drawn from the 2004 American Community Study, which is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and has a sample size of nearly 1.2 million and a response rate of 93 percent. Then, for each person in this subsample, the closest matching respondent was located in the PollingPoint Panel using a function that minimized the “distance” between the ACS and PollingPoint respondents based on several variables, including gender, race, age, marital status, education, party identification, and ideology. (Party identification and ideology were imputed for ACS respondents using demographic variables.) Finally, as is common in many surveys, post-stratification weights were created for the CCES respondents, matching the CCES marginals to the ACS marginals for education, race, gender, and age. For more on sampling matching and weighting, see Rivers (2006).

Two initial investigations of non-probability Internet-based samples (Malhotra and Krosnick 2007; Sanders et al. 2007) find that their results may differ from traditional probability samples in both the mean levels of particular attributes and in the relationship among different attributes (e.g., between political predispositions and vote choice), although the Sanders et al. paper reaches a more sanguine conclusion about the substantive importance of such differences than does Malhotra and Krosnick. Of course, there is no way

to determine, except perhaps when examining the marginals of vote choice or turnout, which kind of poll will produce results closer to the “truth.”

To date, forecasts of election outcomes using Polimetrix data have proven quite accurate (Polimetrix 2005). Moreover, comparisons of the 2006 CCES with other surveys, such as the American National Election Studies and the 2006 exit polls, suggest that the CCES produces similar distributions of opinion with regard to attitudes toward Bush and the Iraq War (Jacobson 2007). We also compared the marginal distributions of the stereotype items for whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians with the comparable items from the 2004 ANES (focusing only on white respondents). Assuming that the distribution of these items is not affected by the different years in which these surveys were administered, this provides a sense of whether the CCES and ANES samples are comparable. Across these 12 items, we found only two instances (ratings of the trustworthiness of Hispanics and intelligence of Asians) in which there were statistically significant differences. (See Table A-4.) This suggests that the mode of the survey does not affect the means level of stereotyping. Moreover, the mode of survey does not appear to reflect our substantive findings about the consequences of attitudes toward Muslims, which are associated with support for the War on Terror in both the ANES and CCES data.

Table A-1. Models of Attitudes toward the War on Terror, Including Stereotypes of Muslims

	Increase spending on War on Terror	Increase spending on defense	Decrease spending on foreign Aid	Support security over civil liberties	Favor monitorin g phone & email	Favor secret searches of homes	Iraq was not a mistake	Oppose troop withdrewa l	Bush job approval 2006	Bush job approval 2007
Warmth of Muslims	0.635* [0.262]	0.571* [0.275]	1.101* [0.508]	1.100* [0.547]	0.003 [0.695]	-0.707 [0.672]	-1.169+ [0.708]	-0.203 [1.069]	0.006 [0.445]	0.32 [0.374]
Competence of Muslims	-0.238 [0.352]	0.781* [0.362]	-0.55 [0.688]	0.548 [0.735]	-0.518 [0.913]	1.036 [0.884]	-0.599 [0.922]	0.339 [1.469]	-0.901 [0.615]	-0.315 [0.491]
Ethnocentrism	-0.369 [0.491]	-0.864+ [0.507]	-0.023 [1.007]	-1.168 [1.076]	2.560* [1.263]	-0.212 [1.178]	0.927 [1.352]	-1.202 [2.035]	0.615 [0.898]	0.529 [0.647]
Party identification	0.873** [0.184]	0.944** [0.186]	1.100** [0.354]	1.555** [0.389]	2.246** [0.521]	1.194* [0.488]	4.249** [0.542]	4.395** [0.830]	2.094** [0.359]	2.352** [0.282]
Conservatism	0.917** [0.191]	0.891** [0.195]	0.238 [0.355]	1.751** [0.408]	0.388 [0.500]	0.56 [0.497]	3.382** [0.526]	4.218** [0.899]	2.100** [0.340]	1.119** [0.283]
Likelihood of attack	0.835** [0.168]	0.538** [0.173]	0.219 [0.319]	1.089** [0.355]	1.673** [0.442]	1.629** [0.426]	1.327** [0.505]	0.855 [0.781]	0.238 [0.311]	0.443+ [0.230]
Authoritarianism	0.386* [0.166]	0.747** [0.167]	0.698* [0.303]	0.817* [0.370]	0.419 [0.434]	0.469 [0.418]	1.713** [0.466]	-0.452 [0.785]	0.730* [0.319]	0.588* [0.233]
Church attendance	0.254* [0.126]	-0.047 [0.128]	-0.252 [0.231]	0.129 [0.267]	0.795* [0.332]	0.830* [0.323]	-0.119 [0.362]	0.11 [0.538]	0.337 [0.221]	0.02 [0.179]
Female	-0.133 [0.101]	0.172+ [0.101]	0.102 [0.179]	0.806** [0.223]	-0.066 [0.277]	-0.236 [0.266]	0.415 [0.289]	-0.598 [0.448]	0.073 [0.178]	0.282+ [0.150]
Nonwhite	-0.028 [0.129]	0.027 [0.124]	-0.352 [0.220]	0.159 [0.286]	0.409 [0.347]	0.034 [0.339]	-0.064 [0.376]	0.117 [0.582]	0.059 [0.230]	0.112 [0.192]
Evaluation of economy									1.657** [0.381]	1.798** [0.317]
Year 2007	-0.104 [0.100]	0.038 [0.101]		0.257 [0.220]			-0.632* [0.292]			
Observations	608	609	242	579	361	356	558	237	243	362

Models were estimated including only non-Muslim white, black, and Hispanic respondents. Cell entries are ordered probit or logit coefficients, with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of cut points are not displayed. Warmth and competence of Muslims coded such that higher numbers represent negative stereotypes. Source: 2006 and 2007 CCES. +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.

Table A-2. Models of Attitudes toward the War on Terror, Including Stereotypes of Muslim-Americans

	Increase spending on War on Terror	Increase spending on defense	Decrease spending on foreign Aid	Support security over civil liberties	Favor monitoring phone & email	Favor secret searches of homes	Iraq was not a mistake	Oppose troop withdrawal	Bush job approval 2006	Bush job approval 2007
Warmth of Muslim-Americans	0.291 [0.269]	0.713** [0.276]	0.054 [0.574]	1.090+ [0.556]	0.073 [0.649]	-0.082 [0.637]	0.535 [0.667]	2.603+ [1.474]	0.467 [0.539]	-0.222 [0.341]
Competence of Muslim-Americans	0.472 [0.323]	1.170** [0.340]	-0.922 [0.715]	0.618 [0.680]	1.575+ [0.823]	0.718 [0.775]	0.976 [0.868]	-1.932 [1.889]	-0.346 [0.647]	0.137 [0.413]
Ethnocentrism	0.109 [0.527]	-1.363* [0.535]	1.485 [1.142]	-0.056 [1.055]	0.256 [1.180]	-0.667 [1.177]	-2.117 [1.298]	0.2 [2.963]	-0.787 [1.151]	0.068 [0.623]
Party identification	0.844** [0.177]	0.884** [0.177]	0.964** [0.308]	1.778** [0.367]	0.993* [0.451]	1.703** [0.471]	2.568** [0.437]	4.610** [1.024]	2.159** [0.378]	0.930** [0.250]
Conservatism	0.898** [0.193]	0.926** [0.197]	1.115** [0.382]	1.460** [0.393]	0.927+ [0.493]	0.397 [0.477]	3.435** [0.500]	3.811** [0.936]	0.818* [0.349]	1.752** [0.274]
Likelihood of attack	1.179** [0.173]	0.742** [0.172]	-0.359 [0.274]	0.867* [0.355]	1.225** [0.458]	0.932* [0.459]	1.389** [0.429]	2.683** [0.869]	1.156** [0.317]	0.475+ [0.247]
Authoritarianism	0.03 [0.172]	0.421* [0.169]	1.336** [0.307]	0.986** [0.359]	1.393** [0.444]	0.153 [0.437]	1.389** [0.462]	-1.144 [0.959]	0.705* [0.321]	0.977** [0.241]
Church attendance	0.104 [0.126]	-0.089 [0.126]	-0.532* [0.230]	0.231 [0.256]	0.362 [0.311]	0.456 [0.310]	-0.049 [0.316]	1.074+ [0.622]	0.36 [0.221]	0.117 [0.165]
Female	-0.067 [0.102]	0.079 [0.101]	-0.173 [0.171]	-0.142 [0.212]	-0.074 [0.266]	-0.770** [0.264]	0.305 [0.263]	-0.868+ [0.501]	0.412* [0.184]	0.114 [0.142]
Nonwhite	-0.007 [0.132]	0.092 [0.131]	-0.551** [0.213]	1.002** [0.283]	0.199 [0.336]	0.488 [0.327]	-1.372** [0.386]	-2.280** [0.864]	-1.426** [0.322]	-0.348+ [0.184]
Evaluation of Economy									2.947** [0.444]	1.072** [0.322]
Year 2007	0.12 [0.101]	0.051 [0.100]		0.162 [0.210]			0.045 [0.257]			
Observations	596	603	265	568	331	337	547	242	267	327

Models were estimated including only non-Muslim white, black, and Hispanic respondents. Cell entries are ordered probit or logit coefficients, with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of cut points are not displayed. Warmth and competence of Muslims coded such that higher numbers represent negative stereotypes. Source: 2006 and 2007 CCES. +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.

Table A-3. Models of Attitudes toward the War on Terror (Replication with NES Data)

	Increase spending on War on Terror	Increase spending on border security	Increase spending on defense	Decrease spending on foreign aid	War in Afghan- istan worth it	War in Iraq worth it	War in Iraq decreased threat of terrorism	Approve of Bush	Approve of Bush (Iraq)	Approve of Bush (War on Terror)	Approve of Bush (foreign relations)	Voted for Bush
Muslim FT difference	0.424*	0.543**	0.603**	0.472**	0.628	0.083	0.499**	0.16	0.106	0.470*	-0.048	0.197
	[0.170]	[0.194]	[0.164]	[0.172]	[0.388]	[0.387]	[0.172]	[0.191]	[0.194]	[0.191]	[0.194]	[0.614]
Ethnocentrism	0.264	0.737*	-0.371	0.416	0.099	-0.008	0.051	1.230**	0.732*	0.305	1.125**	1.381
	[0.298]	[0.363]	[0.295]	[0.304]	[0.679]	[0.681]	[0.308]	[0.350]	[0.353]	[0.345]	[0.356]	[1.039]
Party identification	0.522**	0.005	0.828**	-0.241+	2.581**	4.059**	1.216**	2.297**	2.051**	1.755**	1.934**	5.455**
	[0.142]	[0.161]	[0.137]	[0.143]	[0.329]	[0.347]	[0.144]	[0.175]	[0.173]	[0.168]	[0.172]	[0.546]
Conservatism	0.396+	1.020**	0.871**	0.823**	-0.591	1.120*	0.605**	0.668**	0.535*	0.717**	0.962**	2.479**
	[0.207]	[0.232]	[0.199]	[0.210]	[0.458]	[0.464]	[0.209]	[0.232]	[0.238]	[0.228]	[0.237]	[0.754]
Authoritarianism	0.113	0.424**	0.196	0.055	-0.267	0.361	0.370**	0.424**	0.391**	0.159	0.218	0.384
	[0.134]	[0.149]	[0.126]	[0.134]	[0.306]	[0.296]	[0.135]	[0.149]	[0.151]	[0.150]	[0.155]	[0.484]
Church attendance	-0.063	-0.161	-0.137	-0.152	0.456+	0.199	0.103	-0.077	-0.037	0.019	0.165	0.532
	[0.119]	[0.135]	[0.113]	[0.120]	[0.274]	[0.268]	[0.121]	[0.135]	[0.134]	[0.134]	[0.135]	[0.424]
Female	-0.247**	0.032	-0.153*	-0.09	-1.126**	-0.12	-0.023	0.096	-0.042	-0.293**	-0.131	0.129
	[0.081]	[0.090]	[0.077]	[0.081]	[0.188]	[0.182]	[0.082]	[0.090]	[0.091]	[0.090]	[0.092]	[0.289]
Nonwhite	-0.106	-0.439**	0.067	-0.376**	-0.963**	0.108	-0.02	0.041	-0.196	-0.004	-0.11	-0.642+
	[0.104]	[0.113]	[0.101]	[0.105]	[0.212]	[0.243]	[0.107]	[0.117]	[0.126]	[0.118]	[0.122]	[0.368]
Economic evaluations								2.022**	1.689**	1.508**	1.691**	3.129**
								[0.189]	[0.189]	[0.182]	[0.189]	[0.583]
Observations	854	854	777	852	851	845	855	841	844	838	830	666

Data are based on non-Muslim white, black, and Hispanic respondents. Cell entries are ordered probit or logit coefficients, with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of cutpoints are not displayed. Source: 2004 NES.

+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$ or better.

Table A-4. Mean Trait Ratings of Racial Groups among Whites, 2004 ANES and 2006-2007 CCES

	2004 ANES				2006-2007 CCES			
	mean	s.e.	lower bound d of c.i.	upper bound d of c.i.	Mean	s.e.	lower bound d of c.i.	upper bound d of c.i.
Hardworking vs. Lazy								
Whites	3.18	0.04	3.11	3.26	3.21	0.03	3.15	3.28
Blacks	4.06	0.04	3.98	4.14	4.21	0.04	4.13	4.28
Hispanics	3.46	0.04	3.38	3.55	3.40	0.04	3.33	3.48
Asians	2.86	0.04	2.78	2.95	2.73	0.04	2.66	2.80
Intelligent vs. Unintelligent								
Whites	3.05	0.04	2.97	3.13	3.00	0.03	2.94	3.07
Blacks	3.77	0.04	3.69	3.84	3.87	0.04	3.80	3.94
Hispanics	3.77	0.04	3.70	3.84	3.91	0.04	3.84	3.97
Asians	3.02	0.04	2.93	3.10	2.72	0.03	2.66	2.79
Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy								
Whites	3.28	0.04	3.20	3.36	3.24	0.03	3.18	3.30
Blacks	3.93	0.04	3.85	4.01	4.04	0.04	3.96	4.11
Hispanics	3.83	0.04	3.75	3.91	4.01	0.04	3.94	4.09
Asians	3.52	0.04	3.45	3.60	3.45	0.03	3.38	3.52

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