The United States, the South Caucasus, and Euro-Atlantic Integration

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July 2015

Prepared for publication in
The South Caucasus: Security, Energy, and Europeanisation
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Over the last two decades, the South Caucasus has played an outsized role in U.S. policy toward post-Soviet Eurasia. U.S. development assistance per capita to Georgia and Armenia has dwarfed that of all other post-Soviet states. Georgia is the United States’ closest security partner in the region, with the exception of NATO allies (and EU members) Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The United States was at the forefront of efforts to develop twin oil and gas pipelines through Azerbaijan and Georgia on to Turkey and, until recently, a more ambitious gas line all the way to the heart of Europe. The United States is a co-chairman of the Minsk Group and participant in Geneva Discussions that provide a framework for the management of the Karabakh, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian conflicts.

Despite this impressive level of U.S. engagement, however, the South Caucasus represents less of a coherent field for U.S. policy than it might seem. Particularities of the three states and their bilateral relations with the United States, the cross-regional salience of particular issues, and divides within the region have led to a diverse set of U.S. policies rather than to a coherent regional policy. This is something that stands in contrast to, for example, the ‘New Silk Road’ vision of regional (and cross-regional) integration that the United States has promulgated as a frame for policy in Central Asia.

The diversity of U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus is especially evident with regard to the region’s prospective integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO and the European Union). While the United States, together with NATO and the EU, formally view all three states as equal in regard to their potential for Euro-Atlantic integration, in practice this potential has been activated to varying degrees, with Georgia’s prospects the greatest and those of Armenia and Azerbaijan more distant, if for different reasons.

Concurrent with this diversity, we can still identify three distinct phases in U.S. policy toward the Euro-Atlantic integration of the states of the South Caucasus. In the first decade of independence, U.S. policy conceived of the South Caucasus as part of a bundle of fragile and conflict-ridden states along a ‘Caucasus and Central Asia’ belt far from Euro-Atlantic integration but worthy of assistance and increasing engagement.

From 1999 to 2008, U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus began to take on a more distinct cast even if it continued to lack characteristics of an integrated regional policy. It also began to reflect a more serious but still distant possibility of Euro-Atlantic integration.

The third stage extends from the 2008 Russia-Georgia War to today. In this stage, very little pretence of a coherent policy on regional Euro-Atlantic integration has remained, as U.S. security interests in the region have dipped; energy policy has become more market-driven; and questions of institutional integration and governance have shifted from a Euro-Atlantic domain toward a more specifically European one. In this phase, Georgia remains the South Caucasus state closest to Euro-Atlantic integration, though with ongoing uncertainty about the prospects of this process, while Armenia and Azerbaijan remain distant. The onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2013-2014 did not alter this basic pattern but reinforced it.
The 1990s: Bridge Over Troubled Waters

If the South Caucasus had a regional identity for U.S. policy in the 1990s, it was as the turbulent and chaotic Western edge of the Eurasian region collectively known as the ‘Caucasus and Central Asia’. Riven by multiple ethnic and civil conflicts; interstate war; mass nationalist mobilisation; palace coups; collapse of state functionality; and lurches toward and away from democratisation, the South Caucasus posed a set of challenges different and arguably more complex than those in Central Asia.

Nonetheless, U.S. policy still conceived of the region along roughly the same axis. This policy was embedded in a broad commitment to strengthening the region’s new and fragile states and sustaining their independence. U.S. efforts in the region focused on post-conflict stabilisation, post-crisis economic recovery, prodding toward democratisation and conflict resolution, and, finally, investment in a regional energy pipeline policy.

In this framework, the U.S. vision of Euro-Atlantic integration for the South Caucasus was part and parcel of a broader vision of ‘Greater Europe’ (to borrow Sakwa’s term) that expressly included Russia and other post-Soviet states. In a 1997 speech setting out U.S. policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott spoke of an ‘evolving and expanding’ Euro-Atlantic community that ‘stretches to the west side of the Atlantic and to the east side of the Urals’.¹

It was this ‘Euro-Atlantic community’ that the three South Caucasus states, together with all other post-Soviet states including Russia, approached, first via membership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1992, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, and in 1997 the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a more developed version of the NACC.² The NACC and EAPC provided multilateral fora for NATO members to engage with other European and post-Soviet partners on a wide spectrum of security issues, while the PfP allowed for the development of tailored bilateral relationships with individual partners.

At the time, U.S. policy saw no inherent contradiction between this vision of ‘Greater Europe’ and the post-Soviet (‘Eurasian’) integration of the South Caucasus and other post-Soviet regions with Russia. This was, to a large extent, a concession to reality. All three states were members of the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), even if Azerbaijan and Georgia joined reluctantly only at the end of 1993. The South Caucasus also remained ensconced in the Russian military-strategic orbit. The three states were signatories of the 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty. Both Armenia and Georgia retained Russian military bases and border guards, while Azerbaijan leased a radar station to Russia. Georgia also had agreed to Russian and nominally CIS peacekeepers, respectively, in the conflict-ridden regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

² While a member of the NACC and EACP, Tajikistan did not join the PfP until 2002.
Still, the United States was accepting of regional – CIS – integration only to the extent that it evolved as a partnership of willing participants. In his 1997 speech Talbott argued that the fate of the CIS would ‘depend in large measure on whether it evolves in a way that vindicates its name – that is, whether it develops as a genuine commonwealth of genuinely independent states’. Talbott noted that if Russia ‘trie[d] to make ‘commonwealth’ into a euphemism for domination of its neighbours – then the CIS would deserve to join that other set of initials, U.S.S.R., on the ash heap of history’.  

Still, Talbott underlined the compatibility of regional integration with the broader integration of Russia and its neighbours into Euro-Atlantic (and global) institutions. The U.S. vision for the region was expressly non-‘zero-sum’. ‘What we want to help bring about is just the opposite’, Talbott said. ‘We want to see all responsible players in the Caucasus and Central Asia be winners’.  

While the South Caucasus was just one element of a ‘Greater Europe’ vision, it did constitute the focus of distinctive U.S. attention. Over the eight years from FY1992-1999, sizeable amounts of U.S. foreign assistance were budgeted for Armenia and Georgia: in total, respectively, $1 billion and $733 million (U.S. Department of State 2000). These amounts made the two South Caucasus states not only the highest per capita designees of U.S. foreign assistance in the post-Soviet region but in absolute terms third and fourth, below only Russia and Ukraine, countries with populations 10 to 50 times their size. The U.S. assistance bestowed on these two states can be explained in part by the calamitous declines in GDP that they experienced, the steepest of all post-Soviet states. But it is hard to ignore the role played by, respectively, an active domestic pro-Armenia lobby and the reputation of Georgia’s President Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister identified with the end of the Cold War, whose pleas for assistance in rebuilding his native land the U.S. Congress was well-disposed to accommodate.  

U.S. attention to Azerbaijan during this time was of another sort. When in 1992 Congress passed the Freedom Support Act mandating substantial amounts of foreign assistance to the post-Soviet states, it imposed a unique limitation on aid to Azerbaijan (‘Section 907’) pending the removal of what Congress termed its ‘blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh’, Azerbaijan’s breakaway Armenian-majority region (FREEDOM Support Act 1992). The unusually one-sided and exceptional ban severely limited the amount and kinds of assistance the United States budgeted for Azerbaijan in the 1990s, amounting to a total of $198 million from FY1992-1999, the third lowest after Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (U.S. Department of State 2000).  

This was compensated, however, by another kind of financial linkage – the so-called ‘Contract of the Century’ that Azerbaijan signed in 1994 with the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), a consortium of mainly Western oil majors to develop the country’s Caspian

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3 U.S. Department of State, ‘A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia’
4 Ibid.
5 These rankings largely hold even excluding food assistance, which during these years constituted some 36 and 48 percent of total budgeted aid, respectively, to Armenia and Georgia. Without food assistance, Kazakhstan takes fourth place from Georgia in terms of the budgeted dollar amount (U.S. Department of State 2000).
oilfields. The agreement called for a $7.4 billion investment over 30 years, with some 80 percent of the profits going to Azerbaijan. In the shorter term, Azerbaijan was granted a $300 million ‘signing bonus’ (LeVine 2007: 199).

1999-2008: Knocking on NATO’s Door

For much of the next decade, U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus remained a reflection of broader trends. First, the region was recast as part of a broader ‘arc of instability’ of states susceptible to violence, conflict, extremism, and terrorism that stretched ‘from Sub-Saharan Africa, through North Africa, into the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and South and Central Asia and through parts of Southeast Asia’ (NIC 2008: 61). The aim of U.S. policy toward these states was, as President George W. Bush said in 2006, to ‘slowly but surely [help] transform the…arc of instability to an arc of freedom’. 6

In the case of the South Caucasus, this goal was to be reached no longer by embedding the region within a ‘Greater Europe’ that included Russia as a key partner but by trying to incorporate the region into ‘Wider Europe’ – a domain for the expansion of Western norms and institutions that could in theory include Russia, if it was willing to adopt those norms and institutions. In practice, however, this was unlikely to occur, as Russia itself was becoming more authoritarian and because Western states lacked a vision for integrating Russia if the latter were to come around to Westernisation.

Finally, there emerged at this time a clearly three-track approach based on differences in the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of and domestic trends in the three states of the South Caucasus, with Georgia emerging as the greatest focus.

The South Caucasus and the ‘Arc of Instability’

The place of the South Caucasus into an ‘arc of instability’ was already identified by U.S. policy in the late 1990s. In 1998, Georgia was identified as a receptive site for beefed-up security assistance focused on addressing transnational crime, including trafficking in drugs and radioactive materials across land and via the Black Sea (Welt 2005a: 507). This assistance received another boost after 11 September, when the United States included Georgia – together with Yemen and the Philippines – in the “second stage” of the war on terror. 7 After over two years denying that Chechen militants had taken refuge in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, Georgian authorities briskly acknowledged their presence and that of foreign jihadists and welcomed U.S. security assistance in their efforts to dislodge them (German 2004, Welt 2005b). The result was a 2-year $64 million train-and-equip program that in 2002 put U.S. military advisors on the ground at a base near Tbilisi that had been vacated by Russia less than a year before. Georgia’s train and equip program was followed by a two-phase Sustainment and Stability Operations Program through 2007 that focused on supporting Georgia’s troop deployment to Iraq (see below).

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Azerbaijan too became a focus, albeit secondary, of U.S. security assistance in the region. After September 11, the longstanding Section 907 was weakened by an annual presidential waiver justified to provide assistance that could bolster Azerbaijani support for the U.S.-led war on terror. In 2003, the United States announced the start of a multiyear ‘Caspian Guard’ program to increase the maritime capacities of Azerbaijan (and Kazakhstan) to combat transnational crime, though the program’s ambition was greater than it eventually delivered (Kucera 2005; Cummins 2006).

The United States also welcomed the efforts of all three South Caucasus states to be not only ‘consumers’ of security in the ‘arc of instability’ but also ‘contributors’. Local contributions to wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq were enmeshed in the broader U.S. policy of cultivating ‘coalitions of the willing’ to assist in these endeavours. All three states served in NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). Georgia contributed over 30 troops from 1999-2003, and another 150 through 2008, while Azerbaijan sent over 30 troops from 1999-2008 (both countries terminated their missions after recognition of Kosovo’s independence, which neither supported). Armenia initiated its troop presence in Kosovo in 2004 which at its height numbered over 80 troops.

During this period, all three states provided overflight rights and offered other logistical support for US and international operations in Afghanistan, although Azerbaijan was the only one at the time to contribute troops (over 20) to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in 2002.

All three states also contributed troops to the coalition forces in Iraq, as well as providing overflight rights and logistical support. Georgia and Azerbaijan deployed in August 2003, while Armenia deployed in January 2005. Georgia’s contribution was outsized at 2,300 troops at peak strength, in addition to some 550 troops that contributed to the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq, making it the seventh largest troop contributor after the United States, the UK, South Korea, Italy, Australia, and Poland and by 2007 its third-largest contingent. Azerbaijan contributed 150 troops, more than some NATO contributors; Armenia, over 40. Georgia withdrew its forces in August 2008, with the start of the war with Russia, and Azerbaijan and Armenia also withdrew by the end of that year.

From ‘Greater Europe’ to ‘Wider Europe’

During this period, U.S. policy also moved toward a vision of ‘Wider Europe’ rather than ‘Greater Europe’ as an instrument of stability and integration for the South Caucasus and other post-Soviet states in Europe. As Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said in a Congressional hearing on the South Caucasus at the end of this period, in June 2008:

> The policy of the United States in this region is unambiguous: we want to help the nations of this region travel along the same path toward freedom, democracy and market-based economies that so many of their neighbours to the West have travelled. We believe that the ultimate place of these nations – which are, after all, a part of Wider Europe – ought to depend on their own choice and their own success. …no outside power should be
able to threaten, pressure, or block the sovereign choice of these nations to join with the institutions of Europe and the transatlantic family if they so choose and we so choose.\(^8\)

This shift in policy had its roots in an apparent geopolitical shift almost a decade before. The year 1999 raised the prospect of a permanent Russian withdrawal from parts of its previous sphere of influence, including the South Caucasus, as NATO began its push eastward. The first wave of post-Cold War NATO enlargement in March 1999 was followed within days by NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo. In April, Georgia and Azerbaijan, together with Uzbekistan, declined to renew their inclusion in the Collective Security Treaty, while Georgia reached agreement on the withdrawal of Russian border guards. That same month saw the construction of the so-called ‘early oil’ pipeline from Baku to Supsa, the first pipeline for Caspian oil to bypass Russia. A few months after Russia launched its second war in Chechnya, it agreed at an OSCE Summit in November to withdraw from two bases in Georgia by July 2001 and to negotiate the ‘duration and modalities of the functioning’ of an additional two bases by the end of 2000 (OSCE 1999).\(^9\) Russia also agreed to withdraw military forces from Moldova’s breakaway Transnistrian region.

During this period, the three South Caucasus states deepened their institutional engagement with NATO. They initially followed a track similar to that of other NATO partners, entering into operational planning and review processes (PARP) in 1997 (Azerbaijan), 1999 (Georgia), and 2002 (Armenia). Subsequently, the three South Caucasus states took the lead in stepping up their partnership with NATO, concluding initial 2-year Individual Partnership Action Plans that broadened and deepened areas of cooperation in 2004 (Georgia) and 2005 (Azerbaijan and Armenia); in the post-Soviet space, only Kazakhstan and Moldova followed suit (in 2006).

Of the three, Georgia was the only one to declare itself an aspirant to NATO, however. Already in 1999, then-President Eduard Shevardnadze announced that Georgia would be ‘knocking on NATO’s door’ by 2005 (Traynor 1999) and, indeed, it requested membership even earlier, in 2002. A January 2008 plebiscite expressed over 75 percent support for NATO membership.

Membership for Georgia was not something that enjoyed broad support within NATO, however, as Alliance members were acutely aware of Russia’s stiff opposition and wary of providing Georgia with collective security guarantees. This was especially the case given the country’s unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that could conceivably flare into open conflict involving Russia on one side and Georgia’s allies on the other. While NATO membership was ultimately a political decision, NATO had issued a ‘study on enlargement’ in 2005 to help shape decisions on accepting new members. While insisting on an absence of ‘fixed’ criteria for membership, the study did note that the resolution of ‘ethnic’ or ‘internal jurisdictional disputes…would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance’ (NATO 1995). NATO members were adamant that no country outside of the Alliance had a ‘veto’ on membership of any state, but inclusion of these criteria did de facto grant such a

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\(^9\) It took over five years for Georgia and Russia to finally reach agreement in 2005 on closure of these last two bases, in Batumi and Akhalkalaki, and another two years for the bases to close, in 2007.
veto to Russia, which evinced little interest in resolving the conflicts at least in part for this reason. Opponents of Georgian membership within NATO could also readily cite the clause as a reason to delay any decision.

Aware of the resistance to its membership, Georgia nonetheless sought to upgrade its ties with NATO via receipt of a Membership Action Plan that would require it to undertake a wide array of reforms designed to prepare the country for membership. While a MAP did not contain an explicit promise of membership, nearly all states that had received MAPs had gone on to become members. NATO avoided making this commitment, however, instead offering Georgia an ‘intensified dialogue’ in 2006 (a similar dialogue was established with Ukraine in 2005). The United States expressed support for granting NATO a MAP in 2008, but could not get the support of all NATO members for such a step. Instead, at the Bucharest Summit, NATO fatefully pledged that Georgia (together with Ukraine) would eventually ‘become members of NATO’ (NATO 2008).

Despite these greater military and institutional associations with NATO members, prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration of the South Caucasus foundered during this period on the question of Western values and governance norms. From 1999 to 2003, all three states fell squarely into a state of semi-authoritarianism at best, marked by limits on political freedoms, fraudulent elections, and high levels of corruption.

Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution had a mixed impact on the South Caucasus’ prospects of Euro-Atlantic integration. On the one hand, it was a shot of optimism for a region that most had written off as incapable of change. The attention of Georgia’s new president, Mikheil Saakashvili, on modernizing state institutions and combatting corruption, coupled with a reinvigorated campaign to move toward the West, raised the possibility of Georgia’s transformation toward Euro-Atlantic norms and even a spillover effect into neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan (Khachatrian and Mir-Ismail 2005; Mitchell 2009).

On the other hand, by 2008, five years of Rose Revolution had left indeterminate results. The new Georgian government’s focus on state- and institution-building had subordinated Western notions of democracy, transparency, and accountability. The government used unexpectedly severe force in suppressing peaceful protesters in fall 2007, leading Saakashvili to call a snap presidential poll. Concerns grew that Saakashvili was developing an authoritarian modernizing state, rather than a democratic one (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008). At the same time, the Georgian government’s more active efforts to resolve its conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia raised the prospect of a shooting war that would bring in Russia and could rope in potential Georgian allies (Welt 2010).

The political changes in Georgia also did not prove capable of traveling across its immediate borders. While opposition movements inspired by events in Georgia (and Ukraine) developed in Azerbaijan and Armenia, they were not strong enough to overcome the determined resistance of authoritarian leaderships.

Throughout this period, Armenia was in a particularly unusual position with regard to its Euro-Atlantic prospects. For all its security cooperation with NATO, Armenia was a formal military
ally of Russia, part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and tied to Russia through a
direct bilateral security agreement that included a Russian military base in Armenia. Still, such
affiliation did not pose an obstacle to cooperation with NATO – CSTO member Kazakhstan also
supported close cooperation with NATO, concluded an IPAP with NATO, and contributed
troops to coalition operations in Iraq. Moreover, the close political ties to Armenia of the United
States and some European states (like France) kept it on the Euro-Atlantic radar. Also, though
Azerbaijan rejected CSTO membership, it too did not actively seek NATO membership, thus
attenuating Armenia’s unique position in the Caucasus.

This period was also marked by a major development in the westward energy integration of the
South Caucasus – or, more precisely, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These two states joined Turkey in
signing an intergovernmental agreement on the construction on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline at the OSCE Summit in 1999. Construction was launched in 2002, and the pipeline
began operating in 2005. While the oil exported via BTC went to global markets, the parallel gas
pipeline that was constructed fed into the Turkish pipeline network and, in 2007 via an
interconnector, began sending gas to Greece. Plans for a more ambitious gas pipeline (Nabucco)
that would pass from Turkey through southeast and central Europe also took shape at this time.

In terms of U.S. foreign assistance, a fundamental shift occurred in this period, consistent with
the rise of Georgia as the leading country of U.S. attention in the South Caucasus. Even
excluding FY2008 supplemental appropriations granted after the Russia-Georgia war, over $1.3
billion was designated in foreign assistance for Georgia from FY2000-2008. Armenia, too,
continued to be an object of considerable foreign assistance, with $860 million budgeted. Finally,
after September 11, Congress introduced an annual waiver of Section 907, leading to the
budgeting of $619 million in foreign assistance for Azerbaijan.10

By mid-2008, U.S. policy had identified the South Caucasus as a core part of the ‘arc of
instability’ that demanded the attention of the Euro-Atlantic community, as well as part of
‘Wider Europe’, connected to the West through security, economic, and political institutions. As
assistant secretary of state Daniel Fried said in Tbilisi in 2007, ‘this is where the link between
freedom and security is being made’.11

This dual identity implied, however, that U.S. policy remained uncertain of the degree to which
the region could truly be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. ‘The issue’, Fried
presciently told the House Foreign Relations Committee in June 2008, ‘of whether the region
between the Black Sea and the Caspian, the south Caucasus, can in fact join Europe and its
institutions is being contested as we speak’.12 Less than two months later, Russia and Georgia
were at war.

**2008-2014: Separate Ways**

10 Authors’ calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State’s annual “U.S. Government
Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia” reports for FY2000-2008, available at:
The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 marked the start of a third phase of U.S. policy toward the Euro-Atlantic integration of the South Caucasus. Regardless of how one apportions blame in the August 2008 war, the choices that the Georgian government made to escalate violence in this crisis made many of its Euro-Atlantic security partners uneasy. While the war increased the latter’s institutional (and, for a time, financial) commitments to Georgia, its overall effect was to reinforce the position of those who favoured a less NATO-oriented approach to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the South Caucasus and, for that matter, the entire region. The next several years – to the present – have seen the Euro-Atlantic community adopt a largely different tack, placing greater emphasis on association with the EU as a driver of integration. This new approach prioritizes governance, trade, and national will over security and energy drivers; the EU’s Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, and visa-free regimes have been designed to attract mainly the states most willing to implement reforms to achieve higher levels of integration – for the present, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.

Security and Energy

Of the three South Caucasus states, Georgia has continued to hew the closest to Euro-Atlantic structures. Just one month after the Russia-Georgia war, NATO offered Georgia a consolation prize to MAP – the establishment of a NATO-Georgia Commission, a bilateral association with NATO that only Ukraine previously enjoyed. This was followed the next year by agreement to upgrade Georgia’s IPAP to an Annual National Program. Such a program was previously reserved only for states with a MAP and involves a broad set of military, governance, and political reforms that Georgia draws up on a yearly basis; a NATO mission then assesses its progress.

Soon after, in January 2009, the United States concluded its own Charter on Strategic Partnership with Georgia (following the signing of a similar one with Ukraine the month before). The charter states that the United States and Georgia share the goal of ‘full integration of Georgia into European and transatlantic political, economic, security, and defence institutions as Georgia meets the necessary standards’ (U.S. Department of State 2009). On the basis of the charter, the two states established a U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission, which meets annually at a plenary level and convenes working groups to address political, economic, security, and people-to-people issues.

At the same time, Georgia established itself from 2009 as a major – and eventually the major – non-NATO contributor to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, with a deployment that reached over 1,500 troops at its height and served with no caveats. A new U.S. military assistance program designed to support the Georgian deployment began at this time.

Despite this engagement, the United States remained cautious about assisting Georgia in territorial defence after the August 2008 war. At the start of 2009, U.S. defence officials seemed intent to put into practice U.S. support for Georgia’s ‘legitimate security and defence needs’, something that the Charter on Strategic Partnership underlined. In February 2009, the Commander of US Army Europe, General Carter Ham, observed that Georgian military planning had taken a fundamental shift in direction toward ‘territorial defence’ and European Command
and the Department of Defence were ‘trying to sort out how can we best help them in that regard’. The next month in Tbilisi, vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright went further, noting that military training would be ‘focused on the defence of Georgia, on its self and internal defence’ (Stump 2009).

By the summer, however, the Obama administration had walked back from these early statements. In particular, the administration quietly refrained from approving defensive (anti-tank and anti–aircraft) arms sales to Georgia (Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2009, 6). The chief considerations for this pause were never publicly specified, but they likely included doubts regarding the weaponry’s actual deterrent effect, uncertainty about Tbilisi’s ability to refrain from attempting smaller-scale military offensives if sheltered by powerful defensive weapons systems, and a U.S. desire to avoid needlessly angering Moscow as the administration embarked on its policy of ‘reset’ with Russia. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August, assistant U.S. secretary of defence Alexander Vershbow summed up U.S. military assistance policy to Georgia as ‘a methodical, yet patient, strategic approach…[focused] on building defence institutions, assisting defence sector reform, and building the strategic and educational foundations’ for training and reform. He emphasized that ‘[t]here has been no lethal military assistance to Georgia since the August conflict’ and that the United States was ‘carefully examining each step [of its military assistance program] to ensure it would not be counterproductive to our goals of promoting peace and stability in the region’. While the United States began its new mission to train Georgian forces to serve in Afghanistan, U.S. officials went out of their way to emphasize how little of significance this provided for Georgia’s territorial defence, noting that U.S. training is ‘not about internal defenses’, should not be ‘perceived incorrectly as supplying lethal capabilities’ (Shanker 2009), and, flatly, that ‘no weapons will be provided’.

Two years later, the U.S. government began reconsidering the scope of its defence cooperation with Georgia. At a January 2012 meeting, Presidents Obama and Saakashvili announced the introduction of a substantively new level of cooperation. In a June visit to Georgia, Secretary of State Clinton elaborated that this would cover four areas: defence reform and modernisation, training and equipment for Georgia’s ISAF deployment, NATO interoperability, and – critically – the improvement of Georgia’s self-defence capabilities. The areas specified for training and education included air surveillance/defence, coastal surveillance, defensive combat engineer capabilities, and utility helicopter aviation. In addition, the Department of Defence noted that the

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United States would consider approving the sale of air surveillance radars and coastal surveillance acoustic systems to Georgia (Nichol 2013: 33).

Georgia’s overall security relationship with NATO also deepened over time. As ISAF prepared to transition to a smaller Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan at the start of 2015, Georgia remained a top contributor with 885 troops, second only to the United States. \(^\text{17}\) NATO also accepted Georgia’s offer to join the NATO Response Force, a standing rapid-reaction force, as one of only a few non-member participants (together with Sweden, Finland, and Ukraine). At the September 2014 NATO summit, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, NATO introduced a new Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative and invited Georgia, together with Moldova and Jordan, to join. NATO also singled out Georgia for a ‘substantial package’ to include ‘defence capacity building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and enhanced interoperability opportunities’. Elaborating in December on these elements, including a joint NATO-Georgia training and evaluation centre, NATO special representative James Appathurai noted that ‘you will see a lot more NATO in Georgia, we see a lot more Georgia in NATO every year’ (IPN 2014).

That commitment was kept in 2015. In May, the United States and Georgia held outside Tbilisi their “most robust” joint military exercises ever, with a stated goal of increasing the interoperability of U.S. and Georgian contributors to the NATO Response Force (Civil Georgia 2015). These were followed in July by annual training exercises, which for the first time included other NATO members besides the United States. Finally, in summer 2015, Georgia at last signed two air defense contracts with Western companies, the French-U.S. ThalesRaytheonSystems and Franco-British-Italian MBDA (although details remained undisclosed).

All this has not led to an accelerated timetable for NATO membership, however, although it remains on the table. The four NATO summits since the Russia-Georgia war, in 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2014, have all included strong words of support for Georgia but no MAP or sign of incipient membership. In the Declaration of the 2012 Chicago Summit, Georgia was for the first time mentioned as part of a specific, limited group of ‘partners that aspire to NATO membership’, that additionally includes Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (NATO 2012). At the 2014 summit, NATO observed that since 2008 Georgia had ‘come closer to NATO by implementing ambitious reforms’ and, more artfully, that ‘Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains the tools necessary to continue moving Georgia forward towards eventual membership’ (NATO 2014).

Azerbaijan and Armenia also retained security linkages to NATO, if more modest ones. Azerbaijan expanded its ISAF contribution to over 90 troops in 2009-2010, while Armenia contributed troops from 2010, originally 40 but over 120 at their height. Both countries maintained existing troop levels for the Resolute Support mission. Azerbaijan (with Georgia) also formed part of the ‘southern’ route of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) that provided alternative routes to Pakistan for shipping nonlethal supplies to Afghanistan; at the

\(^{17}\) Germany and Romania were third and fourth with 850 and 650 troops, respectively.
height of shipments, this southern route accommodated some 30 percent of NDN cargo.\(^{18}\) However, with the drawdown of forces in 2014 and with most retrograde (outbound) transit designated for Pakistan, the significance of this route declined.

Finally, the westward energy route from Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe has made some (preliminary) gains but on a more moderate scope. Support for the Nabucco pipeline into central Europe floundered on the basis of market concerns, but Azerbaijan offered at the end of 2011 to build its own pipeline across Turkey, which agreed. Two years later, the Shah Deniz consortium of international energy companies developing Azerbaijan’s Caspian gasfields made their final investment decision, giving the go-ahead to utilize this Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and a southerly Trans-Adriatic Pipeline across Greece, Albania, and Italy, with a connection to Bulgaria. This project, which began construction in 2015, is more modest than Nabucco but in line with anticipated supply and demand and still carries the possibility of expansion. In June 2014, then-European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso noted that Azerbaijan was ‘a very close partner’ for the EU, having ‘already achieved a strategic partnership in the energy field’\(^{19}\).

**Governance**

Until the fall of 2012, opponents of Georgia’s NATO membership could invoke not only Georgia’s unresolved internal conflicts (and the Russian military occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) but also what appeared to be a retreat from democracy, largely understood to be a precondition for NATO membership. Georgia’s October 2012 parliamentary elections were repeatedly referenced by NATO and other officials as a ‘test’ for Georgia.\(^{20}\)

Once it passed that test by holding democratic elections that led to an institutionalized transfer of power, Georgia still was not rewarded by any clear promise of membership. Perceptions that the new government was pursuing politically-motivated court cases against members of the previous government – including the 2014 indictment of former President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was living overseas –made it easier for the Alliance to skirt the question of why Georgia still could not become a member of NATO. In December 2013, then NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen underlined the importance of ‘cooperation between government and opposition’ and of ‘clearly and actively uphold[ing] the rule of law for all citizens’.\(^{21}\) The following December the issue remained live: NATO special representative James Appathurai expressed concern in Tbilisi ‘about a perception of politically motivated prosecutions’ that ‘can become an obstacle on Georgia’s path towards NATO membership’ (Civil Georgia 2014).

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Another foreign policy development, however, made it easier over time to decouple questions of Georgia’s governance from its relationship to NATO. In 2009, the EU launched its fateful Eastern Partnership program for the three countries of the South Caucasus, together with Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. At first, the Eastern Partnership did not appear a promising vehicle for promoting the integration of these six states into the Euro-Atlantic community. But over time the multi-year negotiation and development of substantive ‘Association Agreements’ that encouraged the fulfilment of much of the *acquis communitaire* in exchange for the establishment of ‘deep and comprehensive’ free trade areas, the promise of visa-free travel, and sustained institutional partnerships across an array of issue-specific areas began to seem a potentially powerful tool for change – at least for those states willing to make reforms.

Initially, the Association Agreement process attracted two states in the South Caucasus – Georgia and Armenia. For Georgia, there was never any question of its commitment to the process in principle, although the Georgian government under Saakashvili may not have been in a rush to reach the end, thanks to some of the challenging reforms that were required (Khuntsaria 2012, 8-9). In November 2013, the next government initialled an agreement with the EU and prepared to embark on a process of signing, ratification, and implementation. While Georgia hoped to sign the agreement in another year, President Georgi Margvelashvili acknowledged that Georgia had a ‘long and meticulous’ road ahead (RFE/RL 2013). The Ukraine crisis, however, accelerated the process, and the EU and Georgia signed the agreement in June. Within a year, Georgia, the European Parliament, and most EU members had ratified it.

For Armenia, the Association Agreement appeared to lead the way to an improved equilibrium in its international relations. Armenia had always declared a policy of ‘complementarity’ in its relations between Russia and the West (Minasyan 2012). The Association Agreement promised to tilt Armenia’s orientation further toward the West. Armenia would be able to retain its primary security ties with Russia, and secondary ties with NATO, while further orienting its economy and – if it made good on its commitments – governance structures toward primarily Europe. Unfortunately for Armenia, however, Russia came to define the Association Agreements as contrary to its interests. In September 2013, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan was summoned to Moscow, where he made the unexpected announcement that Armenia would join the Customs Union and forgo plans to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. The next year, Armenia agreed to join the new Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia upon its founding in 2015 (Giragosian 2014).

Even so, Armenia did not give up on its policy of complementarity. Soon after announcing its change of course, Armenian officials proposed signing the Association Agreement without a free trade agreement. While the EU rejected this approach, it did not reject alternative ways forward toward deepening its relations with Armenia. After months of deliberation on the possibilities, in May 2015 the EU signalled its readiness to launch negotiations on a new agreement between the EU and Armenia that would be compatible with Armenia’s membership in the EEU.22 If a new

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22 Delegation of the European Union to Armenia, ‘Proposal for a framework agreement between the EU and Armenia’, 21 May 2015, available at:
agreement were to emerge, and met with Russia’s approval, it could help maintain Armenia’s bidirectional foreign policy. However, the practicality and longer-term benefits of such an arrangement remain unclear.

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, gradually cast aside any pretence of desiring to adopt Euro-Atlantic norms of governance. Over this period, the government hardened its authoritarian style of rule to the point of seeking to entirely eliminate any form of civil society activism and media freedom. By the end of 2014, nearly all governance-oriented NGOs and independent or foreign-financed media had been shuttered, and scores of activists, NGO workers, and journalists were imprisoned. Defending the government’s new zero-tolerance policy, longtime head of the presidential administration Ramiz Mehdiyev issued a 50-page manifesto lambasting the new ‘fifth column’ working for foreign powers to spread ‘politically oriented ideas disguised under the so-called democracy’ (Azadliq Radiosu 2014).

In this context, the EU’s efforts to encourage greater integration with Azerbaijan have appeared quixotic. In November 2013, deputy head of the presidential administration Novruz Mammadov indicated that Baku had already told the EU a year earlier that it did not wish to pursue an Association Agreement. Instead, Azerbaijan sought to conclude an agreement on a ‘strategic modernisation partnership’ that would ‘more adequately meet the level of our relations with the European Union’ (Contact.az 2013; ABC.az 2013). As late as June 2014, EC President Barroso noted that the EU was ‘ready to sign’ an agreement for such a partnership.23 However, in October, the European Parliament made clear that ‘ongoing negotiations…must be conditional on and include clauses relating to the protection and promotion of human rights’ and that its consent to such an agreement would also be conditional on the wholesale ‘cessation of repression and intimidation’ of civil society and the media (European Parliament 2014).

Can There Be a Euro-Atlantic Policy for the South Caucasus?

In U.S. policy, the South Caucasus has gone from being the remote and unknown edge of exotic Eurasia to a region embedded in a number of U.S. security and economic interests and enjoying greater U.S. attention than its size and power would predict. However, these U.S. interests are of cross-regional salience, and Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan pursue different policy agendas while the latter two remain divided in bitter conflict. As a result, the United States lacks a coherent regional policy for the South Caucasus.

This lack of a regional policy is clearest with regard to the South Caucasus’ prospective integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Excluding the Baltic states, Georgia is the closest security partner of the United States and NATO in the post-Soviet region and a “frontrunner,” together with Moldova, in European integration. Armenia and Azerbaijan are also security partners of the West, but their Euro-Atlantic integration has limitations that stem from different sources. Armenia is hamstrung by its reliance on Russia to protect its security interests, which

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has had the additional impact of slowing down its association with the EU. Azerbaijan seeks to maintain its own “independent” course, tacking toward the West (and to Russia) as needed in pursuit of its interests. For the United States, Georgia remains a part of “Wider Europe,” Azerbaijan remains closer to Central Asia, and Armenia remains stuck in-between.

This is not necessarily the end of the story. Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic prospects remain uncertain. There has been no end to NATO’s finessing of its promise of membership, the likelihood and impact of implementing the association agreement remain unseen, and Russia’s relative disinterest in Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration is surely only tactical. The question for Georgia could end up being whether it is possible to become a member of the Euro-Atlantic community in kind but not in form, in the absence of institutional memberships. While the prospects for greater Armenian and Azerbaijani integration with the Euro-Atlantic community are less likely, shifts in their orientation are also conceivable, given domestic changes and a resolution to their simmering conflict. If these states sought to move closer to the West, the United States would likely again support their inclusion in a “Wider Europe” framework. In sum, when it comes to the Euro-Atlantic integration, the “end of history” has not yet arrived in the South Caucasus.
Bibliography


