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*Meeting Competing Demands: Committee Performance in the Postreform House**

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Theory: A conditional model of committee behavior is proposed to explain variation in committee responsiveness to chamber and party principals.
Hypotheses: Committee member behavior is consistent with the preferences of both the floor and the party caucuses; variation in salience explains differences in committee responsiveness to noncommittee colleagues.
Methods: Committee-specific votes are scaled to produce spatial locations for committee, floor, party caucuses, and party committee delegations; a Monte Carlo simulation is used to assess the statistical significance of voting alignments.
Results: Postreform House committees generally act in a manner acceptable to both the chamber and majority party; the Democratic caucus is frequently represented by extreme committee delegations; members of salient committees are more loyal agents of the chamber and majority party than are members of low salient committees.

Although most legislative scholars concur that the committee system within the House shapes the policies enacted by Congress, no consensus on the nature of committee performance has emerged. Committees are alternately argued to be agents of either the chamber, their party caucuses, or constituencies outside the institution. Moreover, legislative scholars are at odds over the appropriate method for testing divergent portraits of committee performance. In this paper, I present and test a conditional model of committee performance. Specifically, I argue that a committee's responsiveness to its party and chamber principals covaries with changes in the salience of the issues that come before it. Identifying and explaining variation in

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The analysis is based on roll-call data available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR #0004). Each roll-call vote was coded according to the committee of origin. The recodes will be available from the author in August 1996. The roll-call votes were scaled using SPSS's PROXIMITIES, CLUSTER and RELIABILITY procedures (see Appendix). The Monte Carlo simulation was conducted using a program written by the author in PASCAL. The program runs on a Macintosh computer using system 6.07 and is available from the author.

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committee performance, I argue, is central to a full understanding of the role of committees in the postreform House.

During the 1950s, autonomous and powerful committees in Congress shaped policies within their jurisdiction in a way that satisfied the parochial interests of committee members (Shepsle 1989). According to this portrait, the committee system was the locus of institutionalized parochialism and logrolling. In the 1960s, Fenno questioned the dominant portrait in two ways. First, he argued that committees do not have complete autonomy in shaping policy outcomes. In his study of the House Appropriations Committee (1966), he discovered that much of the committee's efforts were spent assembling packages acceptable to the parent chamber. The committee, he recognized, was not completely autonomous, but neither was it a perfect agent of the chamber. Instead, he suggested that the committee had an *independent* impact on the bills that were enacted: the policy preferences of noncommittee members were shaped in part by the Appropriations Committee. Thus, absolute claims that either the chamber controlled the Appropriations Committee or vice versa were inappropriate. Second, Fenno's comparative study of numerous House and Senate committees (1973) led him to conclude that no single model was appropriate for every committee.

In recent years, congressional scholars have articulated two models of the committee system that explicitly contradict the dominant portrait of the 1950s. In Krehbiel's (1991) chamber-dominated model, committees represent the interests of the parent chamber. Krehbiel concludes that committee members use their position not to satisfy parochial interests, but rather to help fulfill the chamber's need for accurate information on policy choices. In contrast, Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) and Cox and McCubbins (1993) (hereinafter KMC) have argued that rather than serving as agents of the chamber, committee members act as agents of their parent party caucuses. This party-dominated model is based on the premises that all members of Congress seek electoral success for their party and that electoral success depends in part upon a party caucus's record. As a result, the caucuses pressure committee members to act as their agents.[1]

The articulation of the newer chamber- and party-dominated portraits

[1]Although the chamber- and party-dominated models were formalized recently, both are consistent with claims made by more traditional students of Congress. For example, the chamber-dominated model is consistent with Maass's (1983) description of the committee system and Cooper's (1970) portrait of the development of the committee system. Although Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) and Cox and McCubbins (1993) make stronger claims about the consistency and nature of party domination, others have argued that some committees operate as tools of the majority party (Hasbrouck 1927) or that at times the majority caucus dominates congressional decision making (Brady 1973; Rohde 1991; Silbey 1967; Sinclair 1989).

has recently led scholars to revisit Fenno's concern about variation among committees. These challenges follow two routes. First, each model has been criticized as unduly narrow. Aldrich (1994a), Hall and Grofman (1990), Maltzman (1993), Maltzman and Smith (1994), Rohde (1994), Shepsle and Weingast (1994) and Sinclair (1993) have argued that each model has some validity, but each provides only a partial picture of the committee system. Instead of representing a single set of interests, committees are said to attempt to balance their parochial interests with the interests of the chamber and their party caucuses. Second, congressional scholars have explored the variation in committee responsiveness to noncommittee colleagues that exists across committees and issue dimensions, between chambers, and over time (Aldrich 1994a; Davidson 1986; Hall and Grofman 1990; Maltzman 1993; Maltzman and Smith 1994; Rohde 1994; Sinclair 1993; Smith and Deering 1990, Chap. 5). Although committee members are responsive to the chamber, their constituencies, and their caucuses, the extent of committee responsiveness is said to vary with changes in political contexts.

In this article, I articulate a conditional model of committee performance that recognizes the compatibility of the chamber- and party-dominated models and the significance of issue salience to the role performed by committees. To test the model, I examine the performance of fourteen House standing committees during the postreform era from 1975 to 1989. I demonstrate that the fit of the chamber- and party-dominated models varies in a predictable fashion. Specifically, I show that committee members are most responsive to their noncommittee colleagues when addressing issues that are most salient to chamber and party memberships; the fit of both the chamber- and party-dominated portraits thus varies by committee and agenda salience. I also demonstrate that most committees act in a manner simultaneously consistent with both the chamber- and party-dominated models. Consequently, I conclude that efforts to test the absolute fit of either model are misplaced, and a synthesis of the two models is warranted.

In the next section, I elaborate a conditional model of committee performance that places agenda salience at the center of differences in committee performance. I then review recent empirical tests of the chamber- and party-dominated models, and explain my approach to testing the conditional model. The data and methods I use are crafted to address the primary objections lodged against recent research on congressional committees. I conclude by presenting and analyzing the empirical support I find for the conditional model.

A Conditional Model of Committee Performance

Congressional scholars have been reluctant to embrace a single portrait of congressional committees derived from either the institutionalized log-

roll, party-dominated model, or chamber-dominated model. Such reluctance stems in part from the absence of robust empirical support for any one model. But it also stems from the recognition that the models are not necessarily incompatible. Although all three models capture important aspects of the relationship among committees, the chamber as a whole, and the party caucuses, the role of committees has always been more complex than is portrayed by any single model. Instead, committee members act within constraints imposed by a variety of individuals and institutions—including their constituents, the interest groups that assist their re-election campaigns, the chamber as a whole, and the parties within Congress. As a result, committees can be considered agents for multiple principals. Thus, we should expect:

> HYPOTHESIS 1: Positions taken by committee medians should be ratified by the chamber; simultaneously, positions taken by a party's committee delegation should be acceptable to the party caucus.

The chamber and party, however, do not care equally about all policy areas. Indeed, both empirical and formal students of Congress have argued that committee responsiveness to chamber and party principals varies across committees and/or policy areas. Hall and Grofman (1990, 1163) have speculated that among other things committee responsiveness to the chamber may depend upon "the identification of specific issues within the panel's jurisdiction that evoke the concerns of a mobilized or otherwise visible constituency." Indeed, proponents of the institutionalized logroll model, as well as those of the party- and chamber-dominated models, recognize that the role a committee performs varies across committees. According to the logroll model, the institutionalized logroll should be most prevalent among committees whose jurisdiction is of low salience to most members (Shepsle and Weingast 1994). Cox and McCubbins (1993) also recognize the importance of committee issues, suggesting that the parties' willingness to permit a party's committee delegation (hereafter referred to as "party-delegation") to be self-selected depends upon the nature of a committee's agenda. If the agenda includes issues that affect many districts, the committee's performance will be central to a party's record. As a result, the parties use their power to appoint party-delegations that represent the parties' positions. Although the informational model implies that committees represent the full chamber, the model predicts the likelihood that a committee will act as an agent of the chamber depends upon the costs of committee specialization and the uncertainty of the policy environment (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Krehbiel 1991).

The responsiveness of committees to the chamber and parent parties, therefore, will vary with differences in the policy environments of each

committee. Indeed, this is consistent with empirical claims by Fenno (1973), Price (1979, 1981), and others. Although Hypothesis 1 suggests that committees attempt to meet the expectations of multiple principals, committees with more salient agendas should face stronger constraints from their chamber and party principals.

Issue salience influences committee responsiveness to the chamber. Agenda salience is important to chamber members because of individual members' concern about their own reelection (Mayhew 1974). Because the public's information about positions taken by their members of Congress is limited to a few highly salient issues (Aldrich 1994b), the presence of highly salient issues inevitably dampens a member's willingness to support a committee out of institutional loyalty. Cognizant of this, committee members actively solicit the opinion of noncommittee members when drafting salient bills. Indeed, both Fenno (1966) and Manley (1970) document this for two committees that clearly have highly salient jurisdictions: Appropriations and Way and Means. The phenomenon that Fenno and Manley identified during the 1960s is likely to have intensified during the postreform period—a time in which candidate-centered and single-issue politics dominate the electoral process. Members ultimately depend on their constituencies for re-election, and they are most likely to feel constrained by them on issues of high salience. Thus,

> HYPOTHESIS 2: If a committee's jurisdiction includes issues of low salience, committee members are more likely to act without regard to the preferences of the chamber. Likewise, committees that address issues of high salience are more likely to act in a manner consistent with the preferences of the chamber.

Salience must also be incorporated into any principal-agent account of committee behavior because of the costs principals incur to supervise and control their agents. These are expensive and will not be pursued unless a principal cares enough about outcomes. For example, although party caucuses have the power to induce individual members to support the caucus, the use of this power is potentially costly. Party caucuses can punish individual members by denying them desirable committee assignments or by stripping them of a committee or subcommittee chairmanship, but individual members can strike back at the caucus by defecting to the other party on future votes (Cox and McCubbins 1994).[2] Indeed, in a few instances

[2]Speaker Foley's (D-WA) active and successful campaign to defeat a Democratic caucus resolution to strip chairmanships from those members who voted against President Clinton's 1993 budget illustrates the reluctance of party leaders to absorb the costs associated with enforcing party discipline. See Burger (1993).

members have struck back at their caucus by changing political parties. As a result, party caucuses are only willing to incur the costs associated with employing coercive tactics to force delegation loyalty on those issues that are most salient. This leads to a third hypothesis:

> HYPOTHESIS 3: If a committee's jurisdiction includes issues of low salience, committee members are more likely to act without regard to the preferences of their caucus. Likewise, members of committees that address issues of high salience are more likely to act in a manner consistent with their caucus's preferences.

A conditional model of committee performance thus has several key features. First, committees can potentially serve as agents of both the chamber and party simultaneously. Second, where we see committee behavior diverge from that of the parent chamber and majority party, the key variable is salience. If a committee's agenda has few followers in the chamber, committee members are less likely to represent chamber and party preferences. We should thus expect to see the greatest differences between committees and the chamber when conventional logroll models *least* expect to find them: on low salient issues with limited audiences inside and outside the chamber (Hall and Grofman 1990, 1154). Prior to turning to a strategy for assessing the robustness of the conditional model, I will briefly review previous efforts to test empirically the party- and chamber-dominated models. A review of studies by Krehbiel, KMC, and others will show the empirical difficulties associated with assessing the roles performed by committees and justify the approach and data I employ.

Previous Tests

The institutionalized logroll, chamber-dominated model and party-dominated model each suggest a different pattern of committee, chamber, and party behavior. Since behavior frequently reflects preferences, efforts to test the relative fit of the chamber- and party-dominated models have usually involved assessments of members' policy preferences. Advocates of the chamber-dominated model try to show that committee and chamber preferences are aligned (Krehbiel 1990, 1991); supporters of the party-dominated model try to demonstrate that the preferences of each party's caucus are aligned with those of each party-delegation (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).

In studying whether committees are representative of the chamber as a whole, Krehbiel (1990, 1991) uses a variety of general and policy-specific interest-group ratings to compare committee and chamber means. Difference of means tests prevented him from rejecting (in all but a few cases) the null hypothesis of no significant difference between chamber and com-

mittee means. Krehbiel argues that "these findings suggest—but cannot establish—that committees are microcosms of the parent chamber" (1993b, 242).[3] Whereas Krehbiel focuses on the difference between committees and the floor, KMC examine both this difference and the difference between party-delegations and the party caucus.[4] Based upon a variety of general ideological scores, Cox and McCubbins (1993) compute the statistical significance of the differences between caucus and party-delegation means and medians for the 87th through 97th Congresses,[5] showing that the relationship between party-delegations and their respective caucuses varies by committee (as well as by party and over time). For example, using Poole and Rosenthal's (1985) NOMINATE ratings to conduct a Wilcoxon difference-of-medians test between the Democratic caucus and its party-delegations, Cox and McCubbins (1993, 208–09) find a significant difference during at least one postreform Congress for 10 of the 19 committees they analyze.

Most of Krehbiel's and KMC's empirical claims have been based upon roll-call analysis.[6] Two basic criticisms of the roll-call measures have been levied.[7] The first charge is that roll-call votes are an inaccurate measure of preferences. The basis of this claim is the impossibility of discerning whether votes are sincere or strategic (Hall and Grofman 1990; Maltzman

[3]Hall and Grofman (1990) question this interpretation of Krehbiel's findings. See also Groseclose (1994) who conducts a statistical test to compare committee and chamber medians. He finds that committee selection cannot be distinguished from random selection.

[4]Although it is the alignment between the party-delegations and their caucus that is central to the party-dominated model, Kiewiet and McCubbins explicitly argue that it is in the interest of both parties to have committees that are ideologically representative of the full chamber (1991, 99). For the postreform period, they discover that Armed Services and Education and Labor were the only two committees that were consistently unrepresentative of the chamber as a whole. For the most part, such a finding is consistent with Krehbiel's findings and theory.

[5]Specifically, they use Poole and Rosenthal's (1985) NOMINATE data and the rating system developed by the group Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Unlike ADA rating which are based on a subset of votes, the NOMINATE ratings are based on all roll-call votes.

[6]In light of the absence of cost-effective alternatives to roll-call data for assessing member preferences on specific policy questions, their use of this data is understandable. The only obvious alternative to roll-call data is to assume that a member's preferences reflect those of their constituents. Once again, it is nearly impossible to determine these preferences in a jurisdiction-specific manner. For a discussion of the difficulty of using constituent data as a means for assessing committee behavior, see Krehbiel (1993a).

[7]Questions have also been raised about the appropriateness of using a difference in means test for determining committee responsiveness to the chamber (Bartels and Brady 1993; Groseclose 1994). Because of the decision-making rules employed by the House, the test should be based upon a difference in medians, not means (Black 1958; Kramer 1972; Shepsle 1979). Bartels and Brady (1993) suggest and Groseclose (1994) demonstrates that a Monte Carlo simulation provides an appropriate statistical test for comparing medians.

and Smith 1994; Shepsle and Weingast 1994; Snyder 1992a, 1992c). The second charge is that neither interest-group ratings nor NOMINATE scores are optimal choices for testing the chamber- and party-dominated models. Interest-group ratings are based upon a sample of votes that "are simply not well-tailored to the jurisdiction-specific hypotheses being tested" (Hall and Grofman 1990, 1154).[8] While NOMINATE ratings solve the problem of "artificial extremism" by relying upon every vote, the use of every vote makes these data even more inappropriate for testing jurisdiction-specific hypotheses than are ratings from interest groups with a limited policy focus. Recognizing problems raised by the use of interest-group ratings and NOMINATE scores, Cox and McCubbins (1993, 219–24) supplement their analysis with a contingent bias score, based on votes identified as "committee related" roll-call votes. Using these votes, they calculate the mean absolute difference (MAD) between the percentage of the Democratic caucus and the percentage of each Democratic committee-contingent that voted "yea." For several reasons, however, Cox and McCubbins argue that the bias scores they develop fail to provide a suitable measure of assessing committee-party differences and thus should only be used in concert with NOMINATE and interest group scores.[9] Given the limitations of interest-group scores and NOMINATE ratings, I propose in the next section to use an alternative set of committee-specific data and methods to test the conditional model.

Data and Methods

The behavior of committees is the appropriate focus of theories and tests of committee's roles as agents of their parent chambers and parties.

[8]One problem is that interest groups rarely choose votes that have lopsided outcomes and frequently look for votes that distinguish their friends from their enemies (Fowler 1982, 406). As result, these ratings "exaggerate the degree of extremism in the distribution of legislators' ideal points" (Snyder 1992b, 340). For a response to both Snyder's and Hall and Grofman's concerns regarding the biases that result from the use of interest group ratings, see Krehbiel (1994). Krehbiel demonstrates that under certain conditions interest-group ratings are reasonable measures of legislative preferences.

[9]Cox and McCubbins turn their analytical focus away from MAD for two reasons. First, the use of an absolute mean difference creates an abnormal distribution that is difficulty to judge statistically (1993, 220). Second, they discover that between the 84th and 100th Congresses the correlation between a committee's MAD values in succeeding congresses was a weak .27 (1993, 222). As a result, they question the historical validity of MAD as a measure of committee-contingent unrepresentativeness. Inevitably, the weak correlation they find is attributable to two causes. First, for most committees there are very few committee-specific votes in any given congress prior to the floor's postreform assertiveness (Smith 1989). Second, a mean difference (rather than a median difference) is likely to be highly sensitive to changes in both the nature of the votes that occurred, as well as the relative position of the committee contingent and its caucus.

While roll-call data are an imperfect measure of preferences, such data are a good measure of member behavior. Since behavior is the ultimate indicator of an agent's responsiveness to its principal, roll-call data can be used to assess committee relationships if the behavior of committee members on the floor is a reliable indicator of committee members' behavior in committee.[10] The only comprehensive study of the correlation between floor and committee roll-call votes has demonstrated that floor roll-call votes are a valid indicator of a committee member's behavior in committee (Unekis 1978).

To test the hypotheses comprising the conditional model, I use the floor roll-call record for each House standing committee to construct a jurisdiction-specific data set of committee behavior. First, I identify the committee of jurisdiction for every bill with a mildly contested amendment vote during the 94th (1975–1976), 96th (1979–1980), 98th (1983–1984), and 100th (1987–1988) Congresses.[11] I then tabulate these votes for the House as whole, the committee of jurisdiction, and the majority party caucus.[12] Using

[10]The strength of the bond between a principal and an agent depends upon the behavior not just the preferences of the agent. Although an alignment of preferences would suggest that an agent would act in her principal's interest, a principal can prevent an agent from shirking (regardless of the agent's true preferences) with a carefully designed incentive and monitoring system (Moe 1984). It is this realization that leads Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) to analyze policy outcomes, as well as alignment of preferences between the Appropriations Committee's party delegations and their caucuses.

[11]Jurisdiction is based upon whether a bill was referred to, had a report filed by, was reported by, was or discharged from a particular committee. For the 96th, 98th, and 100th Congresses, this information was obtained from *Legi-Slate*. For the 94th Congress, it was obtained from the index to the *Congressional Record* and the *Final Calendar of the House of Representatives*. I define "mildly contested" as meaning that the vote was recorded and that the majority position consists of 90% or less of all the votes cast in the chamber. I choose this threshold to exclude nearly unanimous votes that are primarily symbolic or procedural in nature. Bills whose jurisdiction consisted of more than two committees are excluded from the analysis. Because such bills are likely to pertain to many of the most salient issues, excluding multiply referred bills inevitably biases my results against finding significant differences across committees.

Committees with fewer than 25 mildly-contested amendment votes in the four Congresses (94th, 96th, 98th, and 100th) are excluded. Since the legislation reported by the Rules Committee is primarily procedural, this committee is excluded as well. The decision to exclude committees with relatively few roll-call votes, to focus on a period when there are a large number of roll-call votes, and to group four congresses together stems from the need to create measures that are a valid indicator of committee performance. These decisions help to avoid some of the problems encountered by Cox and McCubbins (1993) with their MAD score (see footnote 9).

[12]I limit my analysis to the majority party to simplify the presentation. This limitation is justified by the fact that the party-dominated model assumes that "the legislative process in general—and the committee system in particular—is stacked in favor of majority party interests" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2).

these data, I develop several measures to tap the behavior of committee members relative to the behavior of the floor and the majority party. The first, a "disagreement score," measures the frequency with which committee members disagree with the full chamber and their party. The second measure is a spatial representation of the distribution of committee members relative to floor and party principals. Such a mapping enables us to see the direction and size any disagreements between principals and agents within the chamber. Both of these measures are explained in detail below.

While roll-call votes will serve as the foundation of my dependent variables, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 anticipate that committee responsiveness to party and chamber principals will vary with issue salience. To measure committee salience, I use the committee-type classifications that Fenno (1973) pioneered and Smith and Deering (1990) refined. This classification provides a measure of the average salience of each committee's jurisdiction.[13] Constituency committees such as Agriculture and Interior address issues that affect narrow constituencies and thus are of low salience. In contrast, policy committees (such as Foreign Affairs) and prestige committees (Appropriations, Budget, and Ways and Means) report policies that have national implications and are highly salient. Shepsle's (1978) finding that the party caucuses are more indifferent about assignments to constituency committees than to policy and prestige committees suggests the appropriateness of this distinction as a measure of issue salience.

Disagreement Scores

The first measure used to test Hypothesis 2 is a median-based committee-chamber disagreement score. This score is the percentage of jurisdiction-specific roll calls on which the committee majority and the chamber majority vote in different directions. A significant disagreement score suggests that the committee is an unfaithful representative of the chamber. By comparing committee disagreement scores, I can determine whether some committees are more representative than others. Hypothesis 2 suggests that salient (policy and prestige) committees should have lower disagreement scores than low-salience (constituency) committees.

Two caveats are in order about the use of disagreement scores. First, disagreement scores cannot be used to make *exclusive* claims about the role performed by committees. If the majority of committee *Xc* votes with the majority of the House more often than the majority of committee *Yc*, one of two explanations seems reasonable. First, committee *Xc* is a better agent of the House than *Yc*. Or second, engaged in a logroll, members of the

[13]In capturing the central tendency of committee salience, the measure inevitably masks significant variation in salience within each committee's jurisdiction.

House are more willing to defer to *Xc* than to *Yc*. As a result, claims that one model of committee roles is valid and the other is not should not be made on the basis of disagreement scores alone. Second, because committees can address issues in a multidimensional space, the disagreement score does not show whether the differences that occur stem from a liberal or conservative bias. Because the responsiveness of an agent depends upon behavior, not preferences, the significance of this is relatively minimal. A committee that acts differently from the chamber because it acts randomly in reporting and supporting bills is as poor an agent (albeit more unpredictable) as a committee that is consistently more conservative than the chamber. Nevertheless, the absence of direction makes it difficult to assess the relationship that exists between a party delegation and its caucus. Thus, I supplement the disagreement score with a second dependent variable that captures the direction of bias. This supplemental measure is discussed below.

To measure the alignment of committees with respect to the majority party caucus, I also calculate majority party delegation-caucus disagreement scores. While the committee-chamber disagreement score helps to determine the fit of Hypothesis 2, the party delegation-caucus disagreement score is trickier to interpret. Even if the disagreement score shows a significant difference between the median of the party-delegation and its caucus, this does not necessarily mean that the party-delegation is a poor agent of the caucus. Indeed, a caucus might find strategic reasons to counterbalance the other party's committee party-delegation by appointing an extreme delegation. While such a delegation might vote differently than its caucus, such a committee is likely to be an effective agent of the caucus. For example, House Democrats in 1977 loaded the Budget Committee with liberals to counter-balance the Republican delegation's conservative bias (Schick 1980). Thus, a measure that captures the *direction* of such differences is also necessary to assess delegation-caucus relations (and Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3).

A Spatial Depiction of Bias

To determine the direction of any delegation-caucus bias, I use a clustering procedure similar to the one used by Clausen (1973), Sinclair (1977), and Brady (1988) to break each committee's set of votes into coherent policy dimensions. As described in the Appendix, I scale each committee's set of mildly contested amendment votes, and then identify policy dimensions within each committee's jurisdiction. I then calculate for each dimension the median scores for the committee, each party-delegation, the chamber as a whole (excluding committee members), and each party caucus (excluding committee members).

To assess the significance of observed differences between committees and floor medians and between party-delegation and caucus medians, I use a nonparametric difference of medians test (Norusis 1990, 230).[14] Although this test suggests whether the observed distribution could have occurred by chance, it does not indicate the relative importance of such differences. The substantive significance of a particular distribution is determined by the distances between medians. To assess these distances, for each dimension I calculate the percentage of members whose scores are situated at the chamber median or between the chamber and committee median. I assume that the more members who fall within this gap, the greater the committee bias. In comparing the party-delegation medians to their respective caucus medians, I calculate the percentage of caucus members situated at the caucus median or between the caucus and party-delegation medians. To summarize the scales, I use a set of labels that characterizes the relationship between the committee and the chamber and between the party-delegations and their respective caucuses.

Committee-Chamber relation. If the committee and chamber have medians that differ significantly from each other, I characterize the committee as an "outlier." If a committee is representative of the chamber, the relation between the committee and chamber is characterized as "aligned."[15] Hypothesis 2 suggests that committees are more likely to be aligned with the chamber when addressing those issues that are universally salient.

I also identify the direction of committee bias on each of the dimensions. I use the subheading "Democratic bias" if the committee median is on the side of the floor position that is closer to the Democratic caucus and if 10% of all members are situated in the gap between the committee and floor medians.[16] Presumably, a Democratic bias suggests that the com-

[14]This is a chi-squared test that indicates whether the distribution of non-committee members (or caucus members) is the same as the committee's distribution (or the party-delegation's) around its median. Since the test requires independent samples, I exclude committee members when computing both the chamber and caucus medians.

[15]To be classified as an outlier, the committee must satisfy two criteria. First, the committee median must significantly differ (at the .05 level) from the floor median. Second, at least 10% of all members must be situated at the floor median or between the floor and committee median.

[16]Since the odds of the chamber and committee medians being perfectly aligned is very small, the ten percent threshold is imposed to exclude purely random and meaningless committee bias. Nevertheless, the 10% threshold is arbitrary. Detailed reports on the percentage of members located between the chamber and committee medians, as well as between each caucus and its committee-contingent medians, are available in Maltzman (1993, 134). Since the criteria used for determining bias are less stringent than those used for determining whether a committee is an outlier, it is possible for an "aligned" committee to be biased.

mittee median is more liberal than the chamber median. If the committee position is on the Republican side of the floor median and if the 10% threshold is satisfied, I use the "Republican bias" subheading.

Delegation-Caucus relation. To summarize the relationship between each party's committee delegations and its caucus, I portray each delegation as either more extreme than, more moderate than, or aligned with its caucus.[17] Hypothesis 3 suggests that a salient committee's majority-party delegation is more likely to be extreme or aligned than a delegation from a committee that addresses issues of low salience. Likewise, we expect more moderate delegations on low salience committees.

Hypothesis 1 suggests that committee members are usually able to act in a manner consistent with the expectations of both their chamber and party principals. Because party caucuses may strategically appoint an extreme party-delegation, testing this hypothesis requires a directional measure of committee behavior. To confirm hypothesis one, two conditions must be simultaneously satisfied. First, on most dimensions, the committee and chamber should be aligned. Second, on these same dimensions, the party-delegations should be either aligned or more extreme than their caucus.

Findings

Disagreement Scores

Table 1 reports the disagreement scores for each committee, broken down by committee type. Committees with high disagreement scores act in a manner that is clearly unacceptable to chamber median. Such a pattern suggests that these committees are poor agents of the chamber. The Armed Services Committee has the largest disagreement score (13%) and is (in comparison to the other committees) the least representative of the chamber. The Armed Services Committee is close to being a statistical outlier. Among all of the committees, Armed Services is the House's worse agent. This finding is consistent with claims made by other scholars about the

[17]For a delegation to be labeled "extreme," three criteria must be satisfied. First, the party delegation must be farther than its caucus from the chamber median. Second, the delegation median must be on the same side of the floor median as the caucus. Third, the difference in caucus-delegation medians either must be statistically significant (at the .05 level) or at least 10% of the caucus members must be either at the caucus median or between the delegation and caucus medians. If there is either statistical significance or the 10% criterion is met, and if the delegation is either closer to the chamber median than its caucus or on the opposite side of the chamber median, I categorize the delegation as "moderate." If a delegation is neither extreme nor moderate, I characterize the relationship as aligned.

Table 1. Disagreement Scores

Committee	Votes	Floor v. Committee Score[1]	Floor v. Committee *p*-value[2]	Majority Committee-Delegation v. Caucus Score	Majority Committee-Delegation v. Caucus *p*-value
Prestige Committees					
Appropriations	346	.0232	.99	.1507	.01
Budget	77	.0260	.99	.1299	.02
Ways and Means	56	.0536	.95	.1429	.01
	478	.0272		.1464	
Policy Committees					
Banking	77	.0519	.88	.1299	.01
Ed. and Labor	74	.0541	.99	.0541	.25
Energy and Commerce	146	.0959	.96	.0890	.25
Foreign Affairs	127	.0630	.99	.1811	.01
Govt. Operations	52	.0769	.89	.1538	.12
Judiciary	76	.0263	.99	.0921	.10
	552	.0652		.1177	
Constituency Committees					
Agriculture	42	.1190	.16	.0952	.15
Armed Services	146	.1301	.15	.3630	.01
Interior	48	.1042	.23	.1042	.33
Public Works	29	.0345	.59	.0690	.57
Science	35	.0571	.85	.0857	.24
	300	.1066		.2233	
Total	1330	.0609		.1519	

[1]The committee-chamber disagreement score is the percentage of the time that the majority of each committee and the majority of the chamber vote differently. The majority delegation-caucus disagreement score is the percentage of the time that each Democratic party-delegation and its caucus vote differently.

[2]The *p*-value is derived from the Monte Carlo simulation described in footnote 19. The score tests whether the disagreement score is significant. If the score is low (i.e., .05 or less), the disagreement score is higher than could have occurred by chance. If the score is high (i.e., above .95), the disagreement score is lower than could have occurred by chance.

representativeness of various committees (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Groseclose 1994; Krehbiel 1990, 1991; Ray 1980; Smith 1989; Weingast and Marshall 1988). After Armed Services, the Agriculture and Interior committees have the next highest disagreement scores, at 11.9% and 10% respectively. This conclusion is consistent with previous portrayals of these two committees.[18]

[18]For example, Fenno (1973) discovered that Interior was more concerned with protecting the interests of land and water users than the House as a whole. Smith and Deering described the House Agriculture Committee as the "classic constituency committee" (1984, 105).

In contrast, Appropriations and Budget appear to be highly representative of the chamber. Appropriations has the lowest disagreement score among the 14 committees, disagreeing with the floor's decision on only 2% of mildly contested amendments. Because Appropriations is the largest committee in the House, its representativeness is not surprising. Indeed, White (1989), Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) and Krehbiel (1991) view the committee as representative of the full chamber. The Budget panel also appears to be representative of the chamber.

If the observed disagreement scores could have occurred had committee members been randomly assigned to committees, it would be unreasonable to portray committees as either outliers from or as representatives of the chamber (Groseclose 1994). Nevertheless, interpreting the significance of levels of disagreement is difficult. Because amendment roll-call votes are not independent of one another, many statistical tests are not applicable. To solve the independence problem, I perform a Monte Carlo simulation to determine the nature of the distribution that would be derived if the committees were composed of legislators selected at random.[19] The simulation generates expected values against which I test the observed values.

[19]By operationalizing the simulation in the following manner, I was able to avoid assuming that each vote was independent. For each committee, 200 random committees were generated. Each of the 200 randomly generated committees was composed of members from the 94th Congress. The random committees were composed of the same number of individuals who served on the "real" committee during the 94th Congress. For each vote attributed to the committee simulated, I calculated whether the majority of the randomly generated committees and the chamber voted in opposite directions. After analyzing all votes in the 94th Congress, I created 200 committees composed of members from the 96th Congress. Each of the 200 simulated committees used during the 96th Congress was an updated version of the committees that were randomly generated to simulate the 94th Congress committees. To update the committees, any member of the 96th Congress who also served in the 94th Congress and who was placed in a particular random committee during the simulation of the 94th Congress (i.e., random committee 1) was placed in the same committee during the 96th Congress. If the newly generated random committees was smaller than the "real" committee during the 96th Congress, vacancies were filled randomly. After updating the committees, I calculated for each vote that occurred during the 96th Congress on a bill that originated in the real committee whether the majority of each randomly generated committee and the chamber voted in opposite directions. This procedure was employed for the 98th and 100th Congresses as well. I then compared the disagreement scores that were generated for each random committee to the scores for each real committee (over the four congresses). With the exception that the randomly generated committees were only composed of Democratic party members (and that the size of the "real" Democratic party delegation was substituted for the size of the "real" committee), the same procedure was employed for determining the significance of the differences between the Democratic committee delegation and the parent caucus.

Congressional roll-call data from ICPSR were used as the basis for analysis. For the 94th Congress, committee size and Democratic committee delegation size was determined from the Congressional Directory. For the 96th, 98th and 100th Congresses, committee and

I use the simulation to test simultaneously for two different scenarios. First, I test whether committees are significantly more representative of the floor than are randomly generated committees. Arguably, committees that faithfully act as the House's agent would have lower disagreement scores than randomly generated committees. In Table 1, a committee that meets this criterion (using the standard .05 significance level) will have a *p*-value greater than .95.[20] Second, I determine whether committees are significantly less representative of the floor than are randomly generated committees. Presumably, committees that ignore consistently the interests of their colleagues outside the committee would have disagreement scores that are significant.[21] In Table 1, a committee that meets this criterion will have a *p*-value less than .05. The bottom left-hand box of Table 2 shows which committees are more representative of the chamber than 95% of randomly generated committees, and the top left box shows which committees are less representative of the chamber than 95% of randomly generated committees. The committees that fall into the middle box are no more or less representative of the chamber than randomly selected committees. The Monte Carlo simulation prevents us from rejecting for every committee the null hypothesis that committees have a higher disagreement score than randomly drawn committees. In other words, each of the 14 committees had a disagreement score lower than 95% of the randomly generated committees, and none of the 14 committees should be labeled a significant outlier. For the most part, such a finding is consistent with Krehbiel's (1990, 1991) findings.

The simulation suggests that many committees are representative of the floor. In fact, the position embraced by a committee majority is usually ratified by the floor. On average, committee majorities lose on only 6% of all mildly contested amendment votes. For Appropriations, Budget, Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Ways and Means, the simulation enables us to accept (at the .05 level) the claim that the committees are more likely to win than randomly drawn committees. Although few (if any) scholars have previously tested the significance level of committee success, the claim that committees are successful has been (and should continue to be) widely accepted (especially for these seven committees). For these committees, more than 95% of the ran-

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delegation size was determined from *Legi-Slate*. While the entire Monte Carlo simulation is based on ICPSR data, the disagreement score was determined from *Legi-Slate* for the 96th, 98th and 100th Congresses and from ICPSR for the 94th Congress.

[20]Using interest group ratings to test for this scenario, Groseclose (1994) finds that none of the House's standing committees are more representative of the chamber than randomly drawn committees.

[21]It is this second scenario that Krehbiel tested for and rejected (Krehbiel 1990, 1991).

Table 2. Summary of Monte Carlo Significance Tests

Disagreement Score	Committee v. Floor	Democratic Committee-Delegation v. Caucus
Significant outlier		°Appropriations °Budget °Ways and Means *Banking *Foreign Affairs ΔArmed Services
Insignificant difference	*Banking *Govt. Operations ΔAgriculture ΔArmed Services ΔInterior ΔPublic Works ΔScience	*Education and Labor *Energy and Commerce *Government Operations *Judiciary ΔAgriculture ΔInterior ΔPublic Works ΔScience
Significant representative	°Appropriations °Budget °Ways and Means *Education and Labor *Energy and Commerce *Foreign Affairs *Judiciary	

Δ = Constituency Committee
° = Prestige Committee
* = Policy Committee

domly drawn committees were less successful than the real committee. Statistically, these committees are, in effect, "inliers." While the seven committees that did not meet this threshold should not be viewed as representative of the chamber, neither are they outliers.

By comparing disagreement scores (and their significance) across committee types, the fit of Hypothesis 2 becomes apparent. In contrast to policy and prestige committees, constituency committees had higher disagreement scores. Whereas the average prestige committee has a disagreement score of 2.7% and the average policy committee has a disagreement score of 6.5%, the average constituency committee has a disagreement score of 10.7%.[22] This pattern clearly suggests that constituency committees—

[22]A test of significance demonstrates that the difference between prestige/policy and constituency as well as between prestige and constituency committees) is significant at the $<.05$ level.

which address lower-salience issues—are not as likely as policy and prestige committees to act in a manner consistent with chamber preferences.

One possibility is that such committee differences result not because of differences in behavior, but because bills from prestige and policy committees are more likely to be considered under restrictive rules (Bach and Smith 1988). Table 2 shows that differences between committee types are not merely a reflection of the type of rule used to consider the legislation. If the differences that existed stemmed from the nature of the rules used, there is no reason to expect prestige and policy committees to be more successful than most randomly generated committees. The reason for this is that the randomly generated committees are tested against the same set of votes as the real committee. Table 2 demonstrates that prestige and policy committees are statistically more representative of the chamber than constituency committees. Whereas 100% of the prestige committees and 66% of the policy committees fell in the bottom box on the left hand side of Table 3, none of the constituency committees fell in this box.

The same measures and statistical tests can be used to compare the votes of the majority party caucus and its committee contingents. The right-hand columns in Table 1 and Table 2 show the level of disagreement between Democratic party-delegations and the Democratic caucus. This comparison, like the committee-chamber comparison, demonstrates that no single pattern emerges across all committees. True, the majority of the Democratic caucus and Democratic committee delegations disagree on average only 15% of the time. While constituency committees (22.3%) have a higher average disagreement score than policy (11.8%) and prestige committees (14.6%), the high constituency disagreement score is disproportionately influenced by Armed Services' high disagreement score and large number of votes. In fact, the delegation-caucus disagreement scores provide little evidence that delegations from highly salient committees are more likely to act as agents of the chamber than those from low-salient committees. Indeed, the Monte Carlo simulation suggests that nearly half of the delegations (six of 14) disagree with their caucus more than 95% of the randomly drawn committees. Thus, they fall in the top right hand box on Table 2. Of these six delegations three are from prestige committees (Appropriations, Budget, and Ways and Means) two are from policy committees (Banking and Foreign Affairs) and only one is from a constituency committee (Armed Services). For these six committees, the evidence is clear: the Democratic caucus and its committee delegations have different policy preferences. Nevertheless, without knowing the direction of party delegation biases, we do not know whether the Democratic party-delegations from these six committees vote differently than their caucus because they are more extreme or moderate than their caucus. For reasons discussed

earlier, even if these delegations are more extreme, they might still be effective agents of their party. Thus, a complete test of hypothesis three requires a spatial depiction of bias.

A Spatial Depiction of Bias

Figure 1 shows the results of the scaling process. In the figure, the floor's position is placed in the middle of the scale and the distance and direction are plotted between the floor (*F*) and the party caucuses (*D* for the Democratic caucus and *R* for the Republican caucus), committee party-delegations (*Dc* or *Rc*), and committee median (*C*). Table 3 summarizes the 22 House dimensions.

This analysis provides support for all three hypotheses. The dimensional analysis shows that committee are likely to be effective representatives of the chamber and that committee delegations are effective representatives of their caucus. On most dimensions committees simultaneously act in a manner that is consistent with the party- and chamber-dominated models. On 77% of the dimensions, committee medians are aligned with the chamber median and on 86% of the dimensions the majority party delegation is either aligned with or more extreme than its caucus.[23] Such a pattern is clearly consistent with Hypothesis 1.

The disagreement scores confirmed that policy and prestige committees are more likely to act in a manner consistent with the behavior of the chamber majority than are constituency committees. The spatial depiction confirms this finding. Constituency committees are more likely to be outliers than policy or prestige committees. Such a pattern is consistent with Hypothesis 2. A careful look at the dimensions provides further support for hypothesis 2. Both of the prestige committee dimensions that produced outliers fell on the two dimensions dealing primarily with distributive benefits (Appropriations #1 and #4). Education and Labor was the one policy dimension where the committee was an outlier. In this case, the bias results from the Democratic party's practice of stacking its delegation with a set of members more extreme than its caucus. As a result, they pull the committee median away from the floor's median and towards the Democratic caucus median.

The disagreement scores in Table 1 and Table 2 suggested that for several committees, the majority party's committee delegation was not aligned with its caucus. Table 3 demonstrates that this occurs because party committee delegations are frequently more extreme and rarely more moderate than their caucus. Thus, Table 1 and Table 2 should not be interpreted

[23]On 77% of the dimensions the minority party-delegation is either aligned with or more extreme than its caucus.

Figure 1. House Scales

Dimension: Agriculture #1 (Social Welfare—i.e., Food Stamps)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Extreme Majority/Aligned Minority

Dimension: Agriculture #2 (Agribusiness—Commodity Price Targets)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Outlier (Dem. bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Extreme Majority/Moderate Minority



Dimension: Appropriations #1 (Distributive—i.e. Water Projects)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Outlier (Dem. bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Extreme Majority/Moderate Minority)



Dimension: Appropriations #2 (Govt. Management—i.e., Reduce Dept. of Ed $$$)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Moderate Minority

Dimension: Appropriations #3 (Size of Govt.—i.e., Cross Board Cut)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Moderate Minority



Dimension: Appropriations #4 (Defense Policy—i.e., Cut MX Missile)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Outlier (Rep. bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Moderate Majority/Extreme Minority)



Dimension: Appropriations #5 (Social Policy—i.e., Abortion $$$)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Aligned Minority



Figure 1. House Scales *(continued)*

Dimension: Armed Services Committee
Committee-Chamber Relation: Outlier (Rep. bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Moderate Majority/Extreme Minority



Dimension: Banking Committee
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Aligned Minority



Dimension: Budget Committee
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No Bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Aligned Minority



Dimension: Education and Labor Committee
Committee-Chamber Relation: Outlier (Dem. Bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Extreme Majority/Aligned Minority



Dimension: Energy and Commerce Committee
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Extreme Majority/Aligned Minority



Dimension: Foreign Affairs Committee
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (Dem. bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Extreme Majority/Moderate Minority



Dimension: Govt. Operations #1 (Revenue Sharing Program)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Aligned Minority
Direction: Cross-cutting



Figure 1. House Scales *(continued)*

Dimension: Govt. Operations #2 (Govt. Management—Ed. Dept; Sunshine)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Extreme Majority/Extreme Minority

Dimension: Interior #1 (Misc.—Mining; Indian Claims; Park Management)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Extreme Minority



Dimension: Interior #2 (Environment—Protect Glacier Bay; Block Nukes)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Extreme Minority



Dimension: Judiciary
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (Dem. bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Extreme Majority/Extreme Minority



Dimension: Public Works
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Moderate Majority/Aligned Minority



Dimension: Science and Technology
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Aligned Minority



Dimension: Ways & Means #1 (Misc—Energy Conservation; Debt Ceiling)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Extreme Majority/Aligned Minority



Figure 1. House Scales *(continued)*

Dimension: Ways & Means #2 (Misc.—Trade; Social Security; Health Costs)
Committee-Chamber Relation: Aligned (No bias)
Caucus-Contingent Relation: Aligned Majority/Aligned Minority



Key

F = Floor Median
C = Committee Median
D = Democratic Caucus Median
Dc = Democratic Committee Contingent Median
R = Republican Caucus Median
Rc = Republican Committee Contingent Median

to suggest that the Democratic committee delegations are unlikely to represent their caucus faithfully. Instead, extreme delegations are likely used to counter-balance the minority party delegations. As suggested in Hypothesis 3 the party caucuses should be more concerned with enforcing delegation loyalty on those dimensions where the issues are most salient. A comparison of delegation-caucus relations across committee types shows that this is indeed the case. Whereas the majority party delegation was more moderate than its caucus on 29% of the dimensions that fall within a constituency committee's jurisdiction, none of the policy and only one of the eight (13%) prestige dimensions produced a delegation that was more moderate than its caucus.

Although I have no systematic manner of weighing issue salience by dimension, variation in committee performance is likely to occur not only across committees, but potentially within a committee's jurisdiction as well. If a committee addresses an issue that is not universally salient, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the extent of the constraint imposed by chamber and party principals is likely to be minimal. Of the scales in Figure 1, the defense dimension of the Appropriations Committee (Appropriations #4) is the only time that the majority delegation is more moderate than its caucus on a prestige or policy committee dimension. Among the eight prestige dimensions, this is one of the two dimensions that deal with distributive

Table 3. Summary of House Dimensions

Committee Type	Prestige ($N = 8$)	Policy ($N = 7$)	Constituency ($N = 7$)	Total ($N = 22$)
Committee-chamber relationship:				
Outlier	25.0% (2)	14.3 (1)	28.6 (2)	22.7 (5)
Aligned	75.0 (6)	85.7 (6)	71.4 (5)	77.3 (17)
Majority delegation-caucus relationship:				
Moderate	12.5 (1)	00.0 (0)	28.6 (2)	13.6 (3)
Extreme	25.0 (2)	71.4 (5)	42.9 (3)	45.5 (10)
Aligned	87.5 (5)	28.6 (2)	28.6 (2)	40.9 (9)

benefits and thus are unlikely to be uniformly salient. This observation is consistent with White's (1993) analysis of defense politics within the Appropriations Committee.

The committee bias measure thus provides further evidence in support of the conditional model. When a committee exhibits a party bias, it is usually either neutral or in the direction of the majority party. On over 90% of the dimensions, the committee was either aligned with the chamber or biased in the direction of the Democrats. As a result, rules that empower committees rarely appear to harm the interests of the Democratic party in the House. In fact, in many instances such rules are likely to help the majority party, without severely harming the interests of the chamber.

Conclusion

This analysis provides empirical support for the conditional model of committee performance. First, the majority of committees votes in a manner acceptable to the chamber majority. Second, the alignment between committee party-delegations and their caucus suggests that many delegations have preferences that differ from a majority of their caucus. However, the differences that do occur between the Democratic delegations and their caucus usually stem from the liberal bias of the party-delegation. As a result, these delegations are likely to be effective, albeit overly zealous, agents of their caucus. Since every committee has representatives of both parties, it is frequently in the interest of the median member of the Democratic party to be represented by an extreme party-delegation. Third, given these findings, it appears that for most committees the Democratic party-delegation is able to act in a manner acceptable to its caucus while the committee median simultaneously acts in a manner acceptable to the chamber. This suggests in turn that exclusive claims that committee members

are the agents of either the chamber or their party are incomplete. Both the party- and chamber-dominated models capture only partially the complexity of committee performance. Fourth, the responsiveness of a committee to the chamber, or a delegation, to its caucus increases when the issues the committee addresses are uniformly and highly salient to the chamber's members. Thus, responsiveness of committees and committee delegations to their chamber and parent parties clearly hinges on the issues before the committees. Where the chamber or party shares high interest in a committee's work, the panel is most likely to be a faithful agent of those principals.

Although both the institutionalized logroll model and the conditional model suggest variation in committee-chamber behavior alignments, the expected differences are not the same. If committee success reflects nothing more than a logroll among members, we should expect the exchange to be easiest to arrange on those dimensions where preferences are heterogeneous. As a result, non-committee members would be most likely to defer to committee recommendations on those issues that are not universally salient. Indeed, the conditional model suggests that because they know the chamber is *not* willing to defer to them, salient committees are more likely to act in a manner consistent the chamber and its expectations. The evidence presented here clearly supports the conditional model. Still, although it is clear that members of salient committees are more likely to act in a manner acceptable to noncommittee members, we still do not know precisely why this is so. Salient committee members may act in accordance with the preferences of noncommittee members because they have similar policy preferences, or they may respond to noncommittee member preferences because they recognize that committee power depends on the support of noncommittee colleagues. Future studies need to determine which scenario best explains committee behavior.

The conditional model suggests that salience accounts for the differences that exist across committees. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that salience varies by both issue and committee (Maltzman and Smith 1994; Rohde 1994). Even a committee that on average has a jurisdiction which is highly salient (such as Ways and Means) frequently addresses issues that are of relatively low salience. While I have tested the conditional model using the average salience of each committee, future research needs to assess whether intracommittee variation in salience has a measurable effect on a committee's behavior. In addition to exploring intracommittee variation, future research should also look at temporal variation as well. While I have not presented longitudinal data, it seems reasonable to speculate that the pattern of the postreform period did not prevail during the 1940s and 1950s, the heyday of the institutionalized logroll model. It is

conceivable that the importance of issue salience in shaping relations among members results from the type of political campaign and media exposure dominant in the postreform period.

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APPENDIX

To identify the issue dimensions, I analyzed all mildly contested votes falling within a particular committee's jurisdiction during the 94th, 96th, 98th or 100th Congresses. A Yule's Q intercorrelation matrix was calculated for these votes. The score was based upon the voting pattern of the 130 members who served in every Congress within the period analyzed. I then employed a hierarchical scaling technique to identify those clusters with an average Yule's Q intercorrelation of .7. When Clausen (1973), Sinclair (1977), and Brady (1988) cluster analyzed a Yule's Q correlation matrix they relied on a *minimum* Yule's Q intercorrelation of either .5 or .6. I used a .7 *average* intercorrelation to resolve a problem endemic to hierarchical clustering algorithms. Although computational costs necessitated the use of a hierarchical clustering technique, any clustering algorithm that proceeds in a hierarchical manner will break a set of votes into more clusters than is necessarily warranted. This problem is exacerbated when a stringent *minimum* intercorrelation, such as .6, is used. Although the use of a *minimum* intercorrelation may ensure the integrity of the clusters identified, the results are difficult to interpret. Scholars using this approach have tended to select the one or two clusters that they believe best characterizes a particular issue dimension. Such a process raises questions about the objectivity of the results. By using an *average* intercorrelation (with a relatively high average), the result is fewer and larger clusters. Although this approach produces few enough dimensions that I can report on every cluster meeting a certain minimum size criteria, it slightly diminishes the integrity of any particular cluster. In large clusters, it is possible that some votes have so little weight that they fail to meaningfully alter the mean and thus are included in a cluster where they have only a weak correlation.

Having created a single dimension, I then randomly chose one vote in each cluster and identified the direction (positive or negative) of every other vote in the cluster relative to the chosen vote. Then, I constructed a scale and then determined the correlation between each vote and the overall scale (without the vote in question). Any vote with a correlation of below .30 with the overall scale was eliminated. The purpose of this second test was to confirm the reliability of each vote. In addition to confirming each vote's reliability, the test provided an indication of the appropriateness of the vote that I randomly selected to calibrate the other votes. In the few instances where my initial reliability check

showed several votes with strong negative correlations with the overall scale, I selected another direction determining roll-call. The result of these procedures is a series of clusters that are relatively large and that have integrity. To confirm each scale's overall reliability, I calculated Cronbach's α. With a couple of exceptions, I report any cluster that is made up of more than five votes. The few exceptions occurred if the scale was both relatively small (fewer than seven votes) and it either had a reliability score (Cronbach's α) below .70 or it was based almost exclusively on votes from a single bill within a single Congress. I consider these scales weak characterizations of a committee's relationships.

After isolating specific clusters, I scored every member who voted on either one-third or five (whichever was less) of the votes included in a portion of the congresses that make up each set of clusters. To prevent any particular vote from having too much influence, no member casting fewer than three votes on an issue dimension received a score. This was done to prevent any particular vote from having too much influence on any single cluster. Based on individual scores, I then identified committee, committee party delegation, chamber, and caucus medians for each dimension.

I aggregated across congresses to ensure that there were enough votes to form meaningful clusters and to diminish the impact of any particular bill on my overall portrayal of a committee and its relationships. By aggregating across congresses, I treated all members who served on the committee during any of the four congresses as a committee member. A repercussion of this decision is to suppress the likelihood of differences between committee and noncommittee members. This suppression is likely to be greatest for those committees that have higher turnover rates. Since committees of low salience have a higher turnover rate (Munger 1988), this phenomenon makes it more difficult to demonstrate Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. However, this phenomenon does slightly stack the deck in favor of Hypothesis 1. Fortunately, the findings derived from the dimension analysis are confirmed with the disagreement score. Likewise, I gave any member who satisfied my minimum vote criteria a dimension score even though he or she might not have served in every Congress.

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